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THE FIRST PART

OF THE

HISTORY

OF THE

WORLD:

ENTREATING OF

THE TIMES FROM THE SETTLED RULE OF ALEXANDER'S SUCCESSORS IN THE EAST, UNTIL THE ROMANS, PREVAILING OVER ALL, MADE CONQUEST OF ASIA AND MACEDON.

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

Of the first Punic war.

SECT. I.

A discussion of that problem of Livy, Whether the Romans could have resisted the great Alexander. That neither the Macedonian nor the Roman soldier was of equal valour to the English.

THAT question handled by Livy, Whether the great Alexander could have prevailed against the Romans, if after his eastern conquest he had bent all his forces against them? hath been, and is, the subject of much dispute; which, as it seems to me, the arguments on both sides do not so well explain, as doth the experience that Pyrrhus hath given of the Roman power in his days. For if he, a commander (in Hannibal's judgment) inferior to Alex-

ander, though to none else, could with small strength of men, and little store of money, or of other needful helps in war, vanquish them in two battles, and endanger their estate, when it was well settled, and held the best part of Italy under a confirmed obedience; what would Alexander have done, that was abundantly provided of all which is needful to a conqueror, wanting only matter of employment, coming upon them before their dominion was half so well settled. It is easy to say that Alexander had no more than thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse, (as indeed at his first passage into Asia he carried over not many more,) and that the rest of his followers were no better than base effeminate Asiatics. But he that considers the armies of Perdiccas, Antipater, Craterus, Eumenes, Ptolomy, Antigonus, and Lysimachus, with the actions by them performed, every one of which (to omit others) commanded only some fragment of this dead emperor's power, shall easily find, that such a reckoning is far short of the truth.

It were needless to speak of treasure, horses, elephants, engines of battery, and the like; of all which the Macedonian had abundance; the Roman having nought, save men and arms. As for sea-forces, he that shall consider after what sort the Romans in their first Punic war were trained in the rudiments of navigation; sitting upon the shore, and beating the sand with poles, to practise the stroke of the oar, as not daring to launch their ill-built vessels into the sea; will easily conceive how far too weak they would have proved in such services.

Now for helpers in war; I do not see why all Greece and Macedon, being absolutely commanded by Alexander, might not well deserve to be laid in balance against those parts of Italy which the Romans held in ill-assured subjection. To omit therefore all benefit that the eastern world, more wealthy indeed than valiant, could have afforded unto the Macedonian; let us only conjecture how the states of Sicily and Carthage, nearest neighbours to such a quarrel, (had it happened,) would have stood affected. The Sicilians were, for the most part, Grecians; neither is it to be

doubted, that they would readily have submitted themselves unto him that ruled all Greece besides them. In what terms they commonly stood, and how ill they were able to defend themselves, it shall appear anon. Sure it is, that Alexander's coming into those parts would have brought excessive joy to them that were fain to get the help of Pyrrhus, by offering to become his subjects. As for the Carthaginians; if Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse, hated of his people, and ill able to defend his own besieged city, could, by adventuring to sail into Afric, put their dominion, yea, and Carthage itself, in extreme hazard; shall we think that they would have been able to withstand Alexander? But why do I question their ability, seeing that they sent ambassadors, with their submission, as far as Babylon, ere the war drew near them? Wherefore it is manifest that the Romans must without other succour than perhaps of some few Italian friends (of which yet there were none that forsook them not at some time, both before and after this) have opposed their valour, and good military discipline, against the power of all countries to them known, if they would have made resistance. How they could have sped well in undertaking such a match, it is uneasy to find in discourse of human reason. It is true, that virtue and fortune work wonders; but it is against cowardly fools, and the unfortunate: for whosoever contends with one too mighty for him, either must excel in these, as much as his enemy goes beyond him in power; or else must look both to be overcome, and to be cast down so much the lower, by how much the opinion of his fortune and virtue renders him suspected, as likely to make head another time against the vanquisher. Whether the Roman or the Macedonian were in those days the better soldier, I will not take upon me to determine; though I might, without partiality, deliver mine own opinion, and prefer that army, which followed not only Philip and Alexander, but also Alexander's princes after him, in the greatest dangers of all sorts of war, before any that Rome either had, or in long time after did send forth. Con-

cerning fortune, who can give a rule that shall aways hold? Alexander was victorious in every battle that he fought, and the Romans in the issue of every war. But forasmuch as Livy hath judged this a matter worthy of consideration, I think it a great part of Rome's good fortune that Alexander came not into Italy; where, in three years after his death, the two Roman consuls, together with all the power of that state, were surprised by the Samnites, and enforced to yield up their arms. We may therefore permit Livy to admire his own Romans, and to compare with Alexander those captains of theirs, which were honoured sufficiently in being thought equal to his followers: that the same conceit should blind our judgment, we cannot permit without much vanity.

Now in deciding such a controversy, methinks it were not amiss for an Englishman to give such a sentence between the Macedonians and Romans, as the Romans once did (being chosen arbitrators) between the [a] Ardeates and Aricini, that strove about a piece of land; saying, that it belonged unto neither of them, but unto the Romans themselves.

If therefore it be demanded, whether the Macedonian or the Roman were the best warrior; I will answer, the Englishman. For it will soon appear, to any that shall examine the noble acts of our nation in war, that they were performed by no advantage of weapon; against no savage or unmanly people; the enemy being far superior unto us in numbers and all needful provisions, yea, as well trained as we, or commonly better, in the exercise of war.

In what sort Philip won his dominion in Greece; what manner of men the Persians and Indians were, whom Alexander vanquished; as likewise of what force the Macedonian phalanx was, and how well appointed, against such arms as it commonly encountered; any man, that hath taken pains to read the foregoing story of them, doth sufficiently understand. Yet was this phalanx never, or very seldom, able

[a] Livy, Dec. 1. l. 3.

to stand against the Roman armies; which were embattled in so excellent a form, as I know not whether any nation besides them have used, either before or since. The Roman weapons likewise, both offensive and defensive, were of greater use than those with which any other nation hath served, before the fiery instruments of gunpowder were known. As for the enemies with which Rome had to do, we find that they which did overmatch her in numbers were as far overmatched by her in weapons; and that they of whom she had little advantage in arms, had as little advantage of her in multitude. This also (as Plutarch well observeth) was a part of her happiness, that she was never overlaid with two great wars at once.

Hereby it came to pass, that having at first increased her strength by accession of the Sabines; having won the state of Alba, against which she adventured her own self, as it were in wager, upon the heads of three champions, and having thereby made herself princess of Latium; she did afterwards, by long war in many ages, extend her dominion over all Italy. The Carthaginians had well near oppressed her, but her soldiers were mercenary; so that for want of proper strength, they were easily beaten at their own doors. The Ætolians, and with them all or the most of Greece, assisted her against Philip the Macedonian: he, being beaten, did lend her his help to beat the same Ætolians. The wars against Antiochus, and other Asiatics, were such as gave to Rome small cause of boast, though much of joy; for those opposites were as base of courage, as the lands which they held were abundant of riches. Sicily, Spain, and all Greece fell into her hands, by using her aid to protect them against the Carthaginians and Macedonians.

I shall not need to speak of her other conquests; it was easy to get more when she had gotten all this. It is not my purpose to disgrace the Roman valour, (which was very noble,) or to blemish the reputation of so many famous victories; I am not so idle. This I say, that among all their wars I find not any wherein their valour hath appeared

comparable to the English. If my judgment seem over partial, our wars in France may help to make it good.

First therefore it is well known, that Rome (or perhaps all the world besides) had never any so brave a commander in war as Julius Cæsar; and that no Roman army was comparable unto that which served under the same Cæsar. Likewise it is apparent that this gallant army, which had given fair proof of the Roman courage, in good performance of the Helvetian war, when it first entered into Gaul, was nevertheless utterly disheartened when Cæsar led it against the Germans. So that we may justly impute all that was extraordinary in the valour of Cæsar's men, to their long exercise, under so good a leader, in so great a war. Now let us in general compare with the deeds done by these best of Roman soldiers, in their principal service, the things performed in the same country by our common English soldier, levied in haste from following the cart, or sitting on the shop-stall; so shall we see the difference. Herein will we deal fairly, and believe Cæsar in relating the acts of the Romans; but will call the French historians to witness what actions were performed by the English. In Cæsar's time France was inhabited by the Gauls, a stout people, but inferior to the French, by whom they were subdued, even when the Romans gave them assistance. The country of Gaul was rent in sunder (as Cæsar witnesseth) into many lordships; some of which were governed by petty kings, others by the multitude, none ordered in such sort as might make it appliable to the nearest neighbour. The factions were many and violent; not only in general through the whole country, but between the petty states, yea in every city, and almost in every house. What greater advantage could a conqueror desire? yet there was a greater; Ariovistus, with his Germans, had overrun the country, and held much part of it in a subjection little different from mere slavery: yea, so often had the Germans prevailed in war upon the Gauls, that the Gauls (who had sometimes been the better soldiers) did hold themselves no way equal to

those daily invaders. Had France been so prepared unto our English kings, Rome itself by this time, and long ere this time, would have been ours. But when king Edward the Third began his war upon France, he found the whole country settled in obedience to one mighty king; a king whose reputation abroad was no less than his puissance at home; under whose ensign the king of Bohemia did serve in person; at whose call the Genoese, and other neighbour states, were ready to take arms; finally, a king unto whom one [b] prince gave away his dominion for love, [c] another sold away a goodly city and territory for money. The country lying so open to the Roman, and being so well fenced against the English, it is note-worthy, not who prevailed most therein, (for it were mere vanity to match the English purchases with the Roman conquest,) but whether of the two gave the greater proof of military virtue. Cæsar himself doth witness, that the Gauls complained of their own ignorance in the art of war, and that their own hardiness was overmastered by the skill of their enemies. Poor men, they admired the Roman towers and engines of battery, raised and planted against their walls, as more than human works. What greater wonder is it that such a people was beaten by the Romans, than that the Caribees, a naked people, but valiant as any under the sky, are commonly put to the worse by small numbers of Spaniards? Besides all this, we are to have regard of the great difficulty that was found in drawing all the Gauls, or any great part of them, to one head, that with joint forces they might oppose their assailants; as also the much more difficulty of holding them long together. For hereby it came to pass, that they were never able to make use of opportunity, but sometimes compelled to stay for their fellows; and sometimes driven to give or take battle upon extreme disadvantages, for fear lest their companies should fall asunder: as indeed upon any little disaster they were ready to break, and return every one to the defence of his own. All this, and (which was little less than all this) great odds in wea-

[b] The dolphin of Viennois. [c] The king of Majorca.

pon, gave to the Romans the honour of many gallant victories. What such help, or what other worldly help than the golden mettle of their soldiers, had our English kings against the French? Were not the French as well experienced in feats of war? yea, did they not think themselves therein our superiors? Were they not in arms, in horse, and in all provision exceedingly beyond us? Let us hear what a French [d] writer saith of the inequality that was between the French and English, when their king John was ready to give the onset upon the Black Prince at the battle of Poictiers: "[e] John had all advantages over Edward, both of "number, force, show, country, and conceit, (the which is "commonly a consideration of no small importance in worldly "affairs,) and withal the choice of all his horsemen, (esteem-"ed then the best in Europe,) with the greatest and wisest "captains of his whole realm." And what could he wish more?

I think it would trouble a Roman antiquary to find the like example in their histories; the example, I say, of a king brought prisoner to Rome by an army of eight thousand, which he had surrounded with forty thousand, better appointed, and no less expert warriors. This I am sure of, that neither Syphax the Numidian, followed by a rabble of half scullions, as Livy rightly terms them, nor those cowardly kings Perseus and Gentius, are worthy patterns. All that have read of Cressy and Agincourt will bear me witness, that I do not allege the battle of Poictiers for lack of other as good examples of the English virtue; the proof whereof hath left many a hundred better marks in all quarters of France, than ever did the valour of the Romans. If any man impute these victories of ours to the long-bow, as carrying further, piercing more strongly, and quicker of discharge than the French cross-bow, my answer is ready; that in all these respects, it is also (being drawn with a

[d] John de Serres.

[e] Jean avoit tout l'avantage par dessus Edouard, le nombre, la force, le lustre, le pays, le préjugé (qui n'est pas communement une considération de peu d'importance aux affaires du monde) et avec soi l'élite de sa cavallerie, lors estimée la meilleure de tout son royaume.

strong arm) superior to the musket; yet is the musket a weapon of more use. The gun and the cross-bow are of like force when discharged by a boy or woman, as when by a strong man; weakness, or sickness, or a sore finger, makes the long-bow unserviceable. More particularly, I say, that it was the custom of our ancestors to shoot for the most part pointblank, and so shall he perceive that will note the circumstances of almost any one battle. This takes away all objection; for when two armies are within the distance of a butt's length, one flight of arrows, or two at the most, can be delivered before they close. Neither is it in general true, that the long-bow reacheth further, or that it pierceth more strongly than the cross-bow; but this is the rare effect of an extraordinary arm, whereupon can be grounded no common rule. If any man shall ask, how then came it to pass that the English won so many great battles, having no advantage to help him? I may, with best commendation of modesty, refer him to the French historian; who, relating the victory of our men at Crevant, where they passed a bridge in face of the enemy, useth these words; "[f] The "English comes with a conquering bravery, as he that was "accustomed to gain every where, without any stay; he "forceth our guard placed upon the bridge to keep the "passage." Or I may cite another place of the same author, where he tells how the Britons, being invaded by Charles the Eighth, king of France, thought it good policy to apparel a thousand and two hundred of their own men in English cassocks, hoping that the very sight of the English red cross would be enough to terrify the French. But I will not stand to borrow of the French historians (all which, excepting De Serres and Paulus Æmilius, report wonders of our nation) the proposition which first I undertook to maintain, That the military virtue of the English, prevailing against all manner of difficulties, ought to be preferred before that of the Romans, which was assisted with all advantages that could be desired. If it be demanded, Why then did not our kings finish the conquest, as Cæsar

[f] John de Serres.

had done? my answer may be, (I hope without offence,) that our kings were like to the race of the Æacidæ, of whom the old poet Ennius gave this note: *Belli potentes sunt magis quam sapienti potentes;* "They were more warlike than "politic." Who so notes their proceedings, may find that none of them went to work like a conqueror, save only king Henry the Fifth, the course of whose victories it pleased God to interrupt by his death. But this question is the more easily answered, if another be first made; Why did not the Romans attempt the conquest of Gaul before the time of Cæsar? why not after the Macedonian war? why not after the third Punic, or after the Numantian? At all these times they had good leisure; and then especially had they both leisure and fit opportunity, when under the conduct of Marius they had newly vanquished the Cimbri and Teutones, by whom the country of Gaul had been piteously wasted. Surely the words of Tully were true, that with other nations the Romans fought for dominion, with the Gauls for preservation of their own safety.

Therefore they attempted not the conquest of Gaul, until they were lords of all other countries to them known. We on the other side held only the one half of our own island, the other half being inhabited by a nation (unless perhaps in wealth and numbers of men somewhat inferior) every way equal to ourselves; a nation, anciently and strongly allied to our enemies the French, and in that regard enemy to us. So that our danger lay both before and behind us; and the greater danger at our backs, where commonly we felt, always we feared, a stronger invasion by land, than we could make upon France, transporting our forces over sea.

It is usual with men that have pleased themselves, in admiring the matters which they find in ancient histories, to hold it a great injury done to their judgment, if any take upon him, by way of comparison, to extol the things of later ages. But I am well persuaded, that as the divided virtue of this our island hath given more noble proof of itself, than under so worthy a leader that Roman army could do, which afterwards could win Rome and all her empire, making

Cæsar a monarch; so hereafter, by God's blessing, who hath converted our greatest hinderance into our greatest help, the enemy that shall dare to try our forces will find cause to wish, that, avoiding us, he had rather encountered as great a puissance as was that of the Roman empire. But it is now high time that, laying aside comparisons, we return to the rehearsal of deeds done; wherein we shall find how Rome began, after Pyrrhus had left Italy, to strive with Carthage for dominion in the first Punic war.

SECT. II.

The estate of Carthage before it entered into war with Rome.

THE city of Carthage had stood above six hundred years, when first it began to contend with Rome for the mastery of Sicily. It forewent Rome one hundred and fifty years in antiquity of foundation; but in the honour of great achievements it excelled far beyond this advantage of time. For Carthage had extended her dominion in Africa itself, from the west part of Cyrene to the straits of Hercules, about one thousand and five hundred miles in length, wherein stood three hundred cities. It had subjected all Spain, even to the Pyrenean mountains, together with all the islands in the Mediterranean sea to the west of Sicily, and of Sicily the better part. It flourished about seven hundred and thirty years before the destruction thereof by Scipio, who, besides other spoils, and all that the soldiers reserved, carried thence four hundred and seventy thousand weight of silver, which make of our money (if our pounds differ not) fourteen hundred and ten thousand pound sterling. So as this glorious city ran the same fortune which many other great ones have done, both before and since; the ruin of the goodliest pieces of the world foreshews the dissolution of the whole.

About one hundred years after such time as it was cast down, the senate of Rome caused it to be rebuilt, and by Gracchus it was called Junonia: it was again and again abandoned and repeopled, taken and retaken; by Genseric the Vandal, by Belisarius under Justinian, by the

Persians, by the Egyptians, and by the Mahometans: it is now nothing. The seat thereof was exceeding strong, and, while the Carthaginians commanded the sea, invincible. For the sea compassed it about, saving that it was tied to the main by a neck of land; which passage had two miles and more of breadth, (Appian saith three miles and one furlong;) by which we may be induced to believe the common report, that the city itself was above twenty miles in compass; if not, that of Strabo, affirming the circuit to have been twice as great.

It had three walls without the wall of the city; and between each of those, three or four streets, with vaults under ground of thirty foot deep, in which they had place for three hundred elephants, and all their food. Over these they had stables for four thousand horse, and granaries for all their provender. They had also lodging in these streets between these outwalls for four thousand horsemen and twenty thousand footmen, which (according to the discipline used now by those of China) never pestered the city. It had towards the south part the castle of Byrsa, to which Servius gives two and twenty furlongs in compass, that make two miles and a half. This was the same piece of ground which Dido obtained of the Libyans, when she got leave to buy only so much land of them as she could compass with an ox hide. On the west side it had also the salt sea, but in the nature of a standing pool; for a certain arm of land, fastened to the ground on which the city stood, stretched itself towards the west continent, and left but seventy foot open for the sea to enter. Over this standing sea was built a most sumptuous arsenal, having their ships and galleys riding under it.

The form of their commonweal resembled that of Sparta, for they had titulary kings, and the aristocratical power of senators. But (as Regius well observeth) the people in later times usurped too great authority in their councils. This confusion in government, together with the trust that they reposed in hired soldiers, were helping causes of their destruction in the end. Two other more forcible causes of

their ruin were their avarice and their cruelty. [g] Their avarice was shewed both in exacting from their vassals (besides ordinary tributes) the one [h] half of the fruits of the earth, and in conferring of great offices, not upon gentle and merciful persons, but upon those who could best tyrannize over the people, to augment their treasures. Their cruelty appeared in putting them to death without mercy that had offended through ignorance; the one of these rendered them odious to their vassals, whom it made ready upon all occasions to revolt from them: the other did break the spirits of their generals, by presenting, in the heat of their actions abroad, the fear of a cruel death at home. Hereby it came to pass, that many good commanders of the Carthaginian forces, after some great loss received, have desperately cast themselves, with all that remained under their charge, into the throat of destruction, holding it necessary either to repair their losses quickly, or to ruin all together; and few of them have dared to manage their own best projects after that good form wherein they first conceived them, for fear lest the manner of their proceeding should be misinterpreted, it being the Carthaginian rule to crucify, not only the unhappy captain, but even him whose bad counsel had prosperous event. The faults, wherewith in general they of Carthage are taxed by Roman historians, I find to be these; lust, cruelty, avarice, craft, unfaithfulness, and perjury.

[g] In Pol. Arist. l. 2. c. 9.

[h] The Turks at this day do also take the one half of the poor man's corn, that labours the earth; yea, they take tribute both of the bodies and of the souls of the Christians their vassals, by bereaving them of their ablest children, and bringing them up in the Mahometan religion. The Irish take the fourth sheaf, and were wont to eat up with their horsemen, footmen, and dogs, what they pleased of the other three parts remaining. The husbandman and the yeoman of England are the freest of all the world; and reason good; for of them have the bodies of our victorious armies been compounded. And it is the freeman, and not the slave, that hath courage, and the sense of shame deserved by cowardice. How free the English yeomen have been in times not long since past, Fortescue hath shewed in his praise of our country's laws. But I may say, that they are more free now than ever, and our nobility and gentry more servile. For since the excessive bravery and vain expense of our grandees hath taught them to raise their rents, since by enclosures and dismembering of manors, the court baron, and the court leet, the principalities of the gentry of England have been dissolved, the tenants, having paid unto their lords their rack-rent, owe them now no service at all, and (perchance) as little love.

Whether the Romans themselves were free from the same crimes, let the trial be referred unto their actions. The first league between Carthage and Rome was very ancient, having been made the year following the expulsion of Tarquin. In that league the Carthaginians had the superiority, as imposing upon the Romans the more strict conditions. For it was agreed that the Romans should not so much as have trade in some part of Afric, nor suffer any ship of theirs to pass beyond the headland, or cape, then called the Fair Promontory, unless it were by force of tempest: whereas on the other side no haven in Italy was forbidden to the Carthaginians. A second league was made long after, which (howsoever it hath pleased [i] Livy to say that the Romans granted it at the Carthaginians entreaty) was more strict than the former, prohibiting the Romans to have trade in any part of Africa or in the island of Sardinia.

By these two treaties it may appear that the Carthaginians had an intent, not only to keep the Romans (as perhaps they did other people) from getting any knowledge of the state of Afric, but to countenance and uphold them in their troubling all Italy, whereby they themselves might have the better means to occupy all Sicily, whilst that island should be destitute of Italian succours. Hereupon we find good cause of the joy that was in Carthage, and of the crown of gold weighing twenty and five pound, sent from thence to Rome, when the Samnites were overthrown. But the little state of Rome prevailed faster in Italy, than the great power of Carthage did in Sicily [k]. For that mighty army of three hundred thousand men, which Hannibal conducted out of Afric into Sicily, won only two cities therein; many great fleets were devoured by tempests; and howsoever the Carthaginians prevailed at one time, the Sicilians, either by their own valour, or by assistance of their good friends out of Greece, did at some other time repair their own losses, and take revenge upon these invaders. But never were the people of Carthage in better hope of getting all Sicily, than when the death of Agathocles the tyrant had left the

[i] Livy, Dec. 1. l. 7. [k] Xenoph. Græc. Hist. l. 2.

whole island in combustion; the estate of Greece being such, at the same time, that it seemed impossible for any succour to be sent from thence. But whilst the Carthaginians were busy in making their advantage of this good opportunity, Pyrrhus, invited by the Tarentines and their fellows, came into Italy, where he made sharp war upon the Romans. These news were unpleasing to the Carthaginians, who, being a subtle nation, easily foresaw that the same busy disposition, which had brought this prince out of Greece into Italy, would as easily transport him over into Sicily, as soon as he could finish his Roman war. To prevent this danger they sent Mago ambassador to Rome, who declared in their name, that they were sorry to hear what misadventure had befallen the Romans, their good friends, in this war with Pyrrhus; and that the people of Carthage were very willing to assist the state of Rome, by sending an army into Italy, if their help were thought needful against the Epirots.

It was indeed the main desire of the Carthaginians to hold Pyrrhus so hardly to his work in Italy, that they might at good leisure pursue their business in Sicily, which caused them to make such a goodly offer. But the Romans were too high minded, and refused to accept any such aid of their friends, lest it should blemish their reputation, and make them seem unable to stand by their own strength. Yet the message was taken lovingly, as it ought, and the former league between Rome and Carthage renewed, with covenants added concerning the present business, that if either of the two cities made peace with Pyrrhus, it should be with reservation of liberty to assist the other, in case that Pyrrhus should invade either of their dominions. All this notwithstanding, and notwithstanding that the same Mago went and treated with Pyrrhus, using all means to sound his intentions, (a matter very difficult, where one upon every new occasion changeth his own purposes,) yet Pyrrhus found leisure to make a step into Sicily; where, though in fine he was neither getter nor saver, yet he clean defeated the purposes of Carthage, leaving them at his

departure thence as far from any end as when they first began.

So many disasters, in an enterprise that from the first undertaking had been so strongly pursued, through the length of many generations, might well have induced the Carthaginians to believe that an higher providence resisted their intendment. But their desire of winning that fruitful island was so inveterate, that with unwearied patience they still continued in hope of so much the greater an harvest, by how much their cost and pains, therein buried, had been the more. Wherefore they recontinued their former courses, and by force or practice recovered in few years all their old possessions, making peace with Syracuse, the chief city of the island, that so they might the better enable themselves to deal with the rest.

Somewhat before this time a troop of Campanian soldiers, that had served under Agathocles, being entertained within Messana as friends, and finding themselves too strong for the citizens, took advantage of the power that they had to do wrong, and with perfidious cruelty slew those that had trusted them; which done, they occupied the city, lands, goods, and wives of those whom they had murdered. These mercenaries called themselves Mamertines: good soldiers they were; and like enough it is, that mere desperation of finding any that would approve their barbarous treachery added rage unto their stoutness. Having therefore none other colour of their proceedings than *the law of the stronger*, they overran the country round about them.

In this course, at first, they sped so well, that they did not only defend Messana against the cities of Sicily confederate, to wit, against the Syracusians and others, but they rather won upon them, yea, and upon the Carthaginians, exacting tribute from many neighbour places. But it was not long ere, fortune turning her back to these Mamertines, the Syracusians won fast upon them, and finally confining them within the walls of Messana, they also with a powerful army besieged the city. It happened ill, that about the same time a contention began between the Syracusian sol-

diers, then lying at Megara, and the citizens of Syracuse and governors of the commonwealth; which proceeded so far, that the army elected two governors among themselves, to wit, Artemidorus, and Hiero, that was afterward king. Hiero, being for his years excellently adorned with many virtues, although it was contrary to the policy of that state to approve any election made by the soldiers, yet, for the great clemency he used at his first entrance, was by general consent established, and made governor. This office he rather used as a scale, thereby to climb to some higher degree, than rested content with his present preferment.

In brief, there was somewhat wanting, whereby to strengthen himself within the city; and somewhat without it, that gave impediment to his obtaining and safe keeping of the place he sought; to wit, a powerful party within the town, and certain mutinous troops of soldiers without, often and easily moved to sedition and tumult. For the first, whereby to strengthen himself, he took to wife the daughter of Leptines, a man of the greatest estimation and authority among the Syracusians. For the second, leading out the army to besiege Messana, he quartered all those companies which he held suspected on the one side of the city; and leading the rest of his horse and foot unto the other side, as if he would have assaulted it in two several parts, he marched away under the covert of the town walls, and left the mutineers to be cut in pieces by the assieged: so returning home, and levying an army of his own citizens, well trained and obedient, he hasted again towards Messana, and was by the Mamertines (grown proud by their former victory over the mutineers) encountered in the plains of Mylæum, where he obtained a most signal victory, and leading with him their commander captive into Syracuse, himself by common consent was elected and saluted king. Hereupon the Mamertines, finding themselves utterly enfeebled, some of them resolved to give themselves to the Carthaginians, others to crave assistance of the Romans: to each of whom the several factions despatched ambassadors for the same purpose.

The Carthaginians were soon ready to lay hold upon the good offer; so that a captain of theirs got into the castle of Messana, whereof they that had sent for him gave him possession. But within a little while, they that were more inclinable to the Romans had brought their companions to so good agreement, that this captain, either by force or by cunning, was turned out of doors, and the town reserved for other masters.

These news did much offend the people of Carthage; who crucified their captain, as both a traitor and coward; and sent a fleet and army to besiege Messana, as a town that rebelled, having once been theirs. Hiero, the new made king of Syracuse, (to gratify his people, incensed with the smart of injuries lately received,) added his forces to the Carthaginians, with whom he entered into a league, for exterminating the Mamertines out of Sicily. So the Mamertines on all sides were closed up within Messana; the Carthaginians lying with a navy at sea, and with an army on the one side of the town, whilst Hiero, with his Syracusians, lay before it on the other side.

In this their great danger came Appius Claudius, the Roman consul, with an army, to the straits of Sicily; which passing by night with notable audacity, he put himself into the town, and sending messengers to the Carthaginians and to Hiero, required them to depart; signifying unto them, that the Mamertines were now become confederate with the people of Rome, and that therefore he was come to give them protection, even by force of war, if reason would not prevail.

This message was utterly neglected; and so began the war between Rome and Carthage; wherein, it will then be time to shew on which part was the justice of the quarrel, when some actions of the Romans, lately foregoing this, have been first considered.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the first Punic war. That it was unjustly undertaken by the Romans.

WHEN Pyrrhus began his wars in Italy, the city of Rhegium, being well affected to Rome, and not only fearing to be taken by the Epirot, but much more distrusting the Carthaginians, as likely to seize upon it in that busy time, sought aid from the Romans, and obtained from them a legion, consisting of four thousand soldiers, under the conduct of Decius Campanus, a Roman prefect; by whom they were defended and assured for the present. But after a while, this Roman garrison, considering at good leisure the fact of the Mamertines committed in Messana, (a city in Sicily, situate almost opposite to Rhegium, and no otherwise divided than by a narrow sea, which severeth it from Italy,) and rather weighing the greatness of the booty, than the odiousness of the villainy by which it was gotten, resolved finally to make the like purchase, by taking the like wicked course. Confederating therefore themselves with the Mamertines, they entertained their hosts of Rhegium after the same manner, dividing the spoil, and all which that state had, among themselves.

When complaint was made to the senate and people of Rome of this outrage, they, finding their honour thereby greatly stained, (for no nation in the world made a more severe profession of justice than they did, during all the time of their growing greatness,) resolved, after a while, to take revenge upon the offenders. And this they performed shortly after, when they had quenched the fires kindled in Italy by Pyrrhus. For notwithstanding that those Romans in Rhegium (as men, for the foulness of their fact, hopeless of pardon) defended themselves with an obstinate resolution, yet in the end the assailants forced them; and those which escaped the present fury were brought bound to Rome, where, after the usual torments by whipping inflicted, according to the custom of the country, they had their heads stricken from their shoulders; and the people of

Rhegium were again restored to their former liberties and estates.

This execution of justice being newly performed, and the fame thereof sounding honourably through all quarters of Italy, messengers came to Rome from Messana, desiring help against the Carthaginians and Syracusians, that were in a readiness to inflict the like punishment upon the Mamertines for the like offence. An impudent request it was which they made; who, having both given example of that villainy to the Roman soldiers, and holpen them with joint forces to make it good, entreat the judges to give them that assistance which they were wont to receive from their fellow thieves.

The Romans could not suddenly resolve, whether the way of honesty or of profit were to be followed; they evermore pretended the one, but they many times walked in the other. They considered how contrary the course of succouring the Mamertines was to their former counsels and actions; seeing for the same offences they had lately put to torment and to the sword their own soldiers, and restored the oppressed to their liberty. Yet when they beheld the description of the Carthaginian dominion, and that they were already lords of the best parts of Africa, of the Mediterranean islands, of a great part of Spain, and some part of Sicily itself; whilst also they feared that Syracuse, therein seated, (a city in beauty and riches little, at that time, inferior to Carthage, and far superior to Rome itself,) might become theirs; the safety of their own estate spake for these Mamertines; who, if they (driven to despair by the Romans) should deliver up Messana, with those other holds that they had, into the hands of the Carthaginians, then would nothing stand between Carthage and the lordship of all Sicily: for Syracuse itself could not, for want of succour, any long time subsist, if once the Carthaginians, that were masters of the sea, did fasten upon that passage from the main land. It was further considered, that the opportunity of Messana was such, as would not only debar all succours

out of the continent from arriving in Sicily, but would serve as a bridge, whereby the Carthaginians might have entrance into Italy at their own pleasure.

These considerations of profit at hand, and of preventing dangers that threatened from afar, did so prevail, above all regard of honesty, that the Mamertines were admitted into confederacy with the Romans, and Ap. Claudius, the consul, presently despatched away for Messana; into which he entered, and undertook the protection of it, as is shewed before. The besiegers were little troubled with his arrival, and less moved with his requiring them to desist from their attempt. For they did far exceed him in number of men; the whole island was ready to relieve them in their wants; and they were strong enough at sea to hinder any supply from getting into the town. All this, Appius himself well understood; and against all this he thought the stiff mettle of his Roman soldier a sufficient remedy. Therefore he resolved to issue out into the field, and to let the enemies know, that his coming was to send them away from the town, not to be besieged by them within it.

In executing this determination, it was very beneficial to him that the enemy lay encamped in such sort, as one quarter was not well able to relieve another in distress. Hiero was now exposed to the same danger whereinto he had wilfully cast his own mutinous followers not long before; only he was strong enough (or thought so) to make good his own quarter, without help of others. Against him Ap. Claudius issued forth, and (not attempting by unexpected sally to surprise his trenches) arranged his men in order of battle, wherewith he presented him. The Syracusian wanted not courage to fight; but surely he wanted good advice, else would he not have hazarded all his power against an enemy of whom he had made no trial, when it had been easy, and as much as was requisite, to defend his own camp. It may, be, that he thought to get honour, wherewith to adorn the beginning of his reign. But he was well beaten, and driven to save himself within his trenches: by which loss he learned a point of wisdom, that stood him

and his kingdom in good stead all the days of his life. It was a foolish desire of revenge that had made the Syracusians so busy in helping those of Carthage against the Mamertines.

Had Messana been taken by the Carthaginians, Syracuse itself must have sought help from Rome, against those friends which it now so diligently assisted. Hiero had (in respect of those two mighty cities) but a small stock, which it behoved him to govern well; such another loss would have made him almost bankrupt. Therefore he quietly brake up his camp, and retired home; intending to let them stand to their adventures that had hope to be gainers by the bargain. The next day Claudius perceiving the Sicilian army gone, did, with great courage and with much alacrity of his soldiers, give charge upon the Carthaginians; wherein he sped so well, that the enemy forsook both field and camp, leaving all the country open to the Romans; who having spoiled all round without resistance, intended to lay siege unto the great city of Syracuse.

These prosperous beginnings, howsoever they animated the Romans, and filled them with hopes of attaining to greater matters than at first they had expected; yet did they not imprint any form of terror in the city of Carthage, that had well enough repaired greater losses than this; in which no more was lost than what had been prepared against the Mamertines alone, without any suspicion of war from Rome.

Now in this place I hold it seasonable to consider of those grounds whereupon the Romans entered into this war; not how profitable they were, nor how agreeable to rules of honesty, (for questionless the enterprise was much to their benefit, though as much to their shame,) but how allowable in strict terms of lawfulness, whereupon they built all their allegations in maintenance thereof. That the Mamertines did yield themselves, and all that they had, into the Romans' hands, (as the Campanes, distressed by the Samnites, had done,) I cannot find; neither can I find how the messengers of those folk, whereof one part had already admitted

the Carthaginians, could be enabled to make any such surrendry, in the public name of all their company.

If therefore the Mamertines, by no lawful surrendry of themselves and their possessions, were become subject unto Rome, by what better title could the Romans assist the Mamertines against their most ancient friends the Carthaginians, than they might have aided the Campanes against the Samnites, without the same condition? which was (as they themselves confessed) by none at all. But let it be supposed that some point, serving to clear this doubt, is lost in all histories. Doubtless it is, that no company of pirates, thieves, outlaws, murderers, or such other malefactors, can by any good success of their villainy obtain the privilege of civil societies to make league or truce, yea, or to require fair war; but are by all means, as most pernicious vermin, to be rooted out of the world. I will not take upon me to maintain that opinion of some civilians, that a prince is not bound to hold his faith with one of these; it were a position of ill consequence: this I hold, that no one prince or state can give protection to such as these, as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance against them, without becoming accessary to their crimes. Wherefore we may esteem this action of the Romans so far from being justifiable, by any pretence of confederacy made with them, as that, contrariwise, by admitting this nest of murderers and thieves into their protection, they justly deserved to be warred upon themselves by the people of Sicily, yea, although Messana had been taken, and the Mamertines all slain, ere any news of this confederacy had been brought unto the besiegers. The great Alexander was so far persuaded herein, that he did put to sword all the Branchiadæ, (a people in Sogdiana,) and rased their city, notwithstanding that they joyfully entertained him as their lord and king; because they were descended from a company of Milesians, who, to gratify king Xerxes, had robbed a temple, and were by him rewarded with the town and country, which these of their posterity enjoyed. Nevertheless, in course of human justice, long and peaceable posses-

sion gives *jus acquisitum*, a kind of right by prescription, unto that which was at first obtained by wicked means; and doth free the descendants from the crime of their ancestors, whose villainies they do not exercise. But that the same generation of thieves, which by a detestable fact hath purchased a rich town, should be acknowledged a lawful company of citizens, there is no show of right. For even the conqueror, that by open war obtaineth a kingdom, doth not confirm his title by those victories which gave him first possession; but length of time is requisite to establish him, unless by some alliance with the ancient inheritors he can better the violence of his claim, as did our king Henry the First by his marriage with Maud, that was daughter of Malcolm king of the Scots, by Margaret, the niece of Edmund Ironside. Wherefore I conclude, that the Romans had no better ground (if they had so good) of justice in this quarrel, than had the Goths, Huns, Vandals, and other nations, of the wars that they made upon the Roman empire, wherein Rome herself, in the time of her visitation, was burnt to the ground.

SECT. IV.

Of the island of Sicily.

§. 1.

The quality of the island, and the first inhabitants thereof.

THE defence of the Mamertines, or the possession of Messana, being now no longer, since the first victories of Appius Claudius, the objects of the Roman hopes; but the dominion of all Sicily being the prize for which Rome and Carthage are about to contend, it will be agreeable unto the order, which in the like cases we have observed, to make a brief collection of things concerning that noble island, which hath been the stage of many great acts, performed as well before and after, as in this present war.

That Sicily was sometimes a peninsula, or demi-isle, adjoined to Italy, as a part of Brutium in Calabria, near unto Rhegium, and afterward by violence of tempest severed from the same, it is a general opinion of all antiquity. But at what certain time this division happened, there is no me-

morial remaining in any ancient writer. [l] Strabo, Pliny, and Dionysius affirm, that it was caused by an earthquake; [m] Silius and Cassiodorus do think it to have been done by the rage and violence of the tide, and surges of the sea. Either of these opinions may be true; for so was Eubœa severed from Bœotia, Atalante and Macris from Eubœa, Scilly here in England from the cape of Cornwall, and Britain itself (as may seem by Verstegan's arguments) from the opposite continent of Gaul. But for Sicily, they which lend their ears to fables, do attribute the cause of it to Neptune, (as Eustathius witnesseth,) who with his three-forked mace, in favour of Jocastus, the son of Æolus, divided it from the main land, and so made it an island, which before was but a demi-isle; that by that means he might the more safely inhabit and possess the same. [n] Diodorus Siculus, moved by the authority of Hesiodus, ascribeth the labour of sundering it from Italy to Orion; who, that he might be compared to Hercules, (cutting through the rocks and mountains,) first opened the Sicilian straits, as Hercules did those of Gibraltar.

They which value the islands of the midland sea, according to their quantity and content, do make this the greatest, as Eustathius and Strabo, who affirm this not only to excel the rest for bigness, but also for goodness of soil. As concerning the form of this island, Pomponius Mela saith it is like that capital letter of the Greeks which they call Delta; namely, that it hath the figure of a triangle; which is generally known to be true. That the whole island was consecrated to Ceres and Proserpina, all old writers with one consent affirm. To Ceres it was dedicated, because it first taught the rules of setting and sowing of corn; to Proserpina, not so much, for that she was from hence violently taken by Pluto, as because (which Plutarch and Diodorus do report for truth) that Pluto, as soon as she, uncovering herself, first shewed herself to be seen of him, gave her the dominion thereof.

[l] Plin. l. 2. cap. 91. [m] Sil. l. 5. [n] Orion. l. 4. c. 14. Diod. l. 6. Ovid. de Fast. 4.

Of the fertility and riches of this country, there is a famous testimony written by Cicero, in his second oration against Verres, where he saith that Marcus Cato did call it the "granary and storehouse of the commonwealth, and "the nurse of the vulgar sort." The same Cicero doth add in that place, that it was not only the storehouse of the people of Rome, but also that it was accounted for a well-furnished treasury: for without any cost or charge of ours, saith he, it hath usually clothed, maintained, and furnished our greatest armies with leather, apparel, and corn. [9] Strabo reporteth almost the same thing of it. Whatsoever Sicily doth yield, (saith Solinus,) whether by the sun and temperature of the air, or by the industry and labour of man, it is accounted next unto those things that are of best estimation; were it not that such things as the earth first putteth forth are extremely overgrown with saffron. Diodorus Siculus saith, that in the fields near unto Leontium, and in divers other places of this island, wheat doth grow of itself, without any labour or looking to of the husbandman. Martianus sheweth, that there were in it six colonies and sixty cities: there are that reckon more, whereof the names are found scatteringly in many good authors.

Now besides many famous acts done by the people of this island, as well in peace as war, there be many other things which have made it very renowned, as the birth of Ceres, the ravishing of Proserpina, the giant Enceladus, the mount Ætna, Scylla and Charybdis, with other antiquities and rarities; besides those learned men, the noble mathematician Archimedes, the famous geometrician Euclides, the painful historian Diodorus, and Empedocles the deep philosopher.

That Sicily was at first possessed and inhabited by giants, Læstrygones, and Cyclops, barbarous people and uncivil, all histories and fables do jointly with one consent aver. Yet Thucydides saith, that these savage people dwelt only in one part of the island. Afterward the Sicani, a people of Spain, possessed it: that these Sicani were not bred in the

[9] Strabo, l. 6.

isle, (although some do so think,) Thucydides and Diodorus do constantly avouch.

Of these it was named Sicania. The Sicani were invaded by the Siculi, who, inhabiting that part of Latium whereon Rome was afterward built, were driven by the Pelasgi from their own seats, and finding no place upon the continent, which they were able to master and inhabit, passed over into this island three hundred years before the Greeks sent any colonies thither; and (saith Philistus) eighty years before the fall of Troy. These Siculi gave the name of Sicilia to the island; and, making war upon the Sicani, drave them from the east and northern part thereof into the west and south. At their landing, they first built the city Zancle, afterward called Messana; and after that Catana, Leontium, and Syracuse itself, beating from thence the Ætolians, who long before had set up a town in that place. As for the name of Syracuse, it was not known till such time as Archias of Corinth (long after) won that part of the island from the Siculi; neither did the Siculi at their first arrival dispossess the Ætolians thereof, but some hundred years after their descent, and after such time as they had founded the cities before named, with Neæ, Hybla, Trinacia, and divers others.

After these Siculi came another nation out of Italy, called Morgetes, who were thence driven by the Œnotrians. These sat down in that part of Sicily where they afterward raised the cities of Morgentum and Leontium: for at this time the Siculi were divided, and by a civil war greatly enfeebled. Among these ancient stories, we find the last voyage and the death of Minos, king of Crete. Thucydides, an historian of unquestionable sincerity, reports of Minos, that he made conquest of many islands; and some such business, perhaps, drew him into Sicily. But the common report is, that he came thither in pursuit of Dædalus. The tale goes thus: Dædalus fleeing the revenge of Minos, came into Sicily to Cocalus, king of the Sicani, and, during his abode there, he built a place of great strength near unto Megara, for Cocalus to lay up his treasure in, together

with many notable works, for which he was greatly admired and honoured.

Among the rest, he cast a ram in gold, that was set up in the temple of Venus Erycina; which he did with so great art, as those that beheld it thought it rather to be living than counterfeit.

Now Minos, hearing that Cocalus had entertained Dædalus, prepares to invade the territory of Cocalus; but when he was arrived, Cocalus, doubting his own strength, promiseth to deliver Dædalus. This he performs not, but in the mean while kills Minos by treason, and persuades the Cretans, Minos's followers, to inhabit a part of Sicily; the better (as it seems) to strengthen himself against the Siculi. Hereunto the Cretans (their king being dead) gave their consent, and builded for themselves the city of Minoa, after the name of their king Minos. After, they likewise built the town of Engyum, now called Gangi; and these were the first cities built by the Greeks in Sicily, about two ages before the war of Troy; for the grandchildren of Minos served with the Greeks at the siege thereof.

But after such time as the Cretans understood that their king had by treason been made away, they gathered together a great army to invade Cocalus; and landing near unto Camicus, they besieged the same five years, but in vain. In the end (being forced to return without any revenge taken) they were wrecked on the coast of Italy; and having no means to repair their ships, nor the honour they had lost, they made good the place whereon they fell, and built Hyria, or Hyrium, between the two famous ports of Brundusium and Tarentum. Of these Cretans came those nations afterward called Iapyges and Messapii.

After the taking of Troy, Ægestus and Elymus brought with them certain troops into Sicily, and seated themselves among the Sicani, where they built the cities of Ægesta and Elyma.

It is said that Æneas visited these places in his passage into Italy; and that some of the Trojans, his followers, were left behind him in these towns of Sicily; whereof

there want not good authors that make Æneas himself the founder.

About the same time the Phœnicians seized upon the promontories of Pachinus and Lilybæum, and upon certain small isles adjoining to the main island; which they fortified, to secure the trades that they had with the Sicilians; like as the Portugals have done in the East India, at Goa, Ormus, Mosambique, and other places. But the Phœnicians stayed not there; for after they had once assured their descents, they built the goodly city of Panormus, now called Palermo.

These we find were the nations that inhabited the isle of Sicily before the war of Troy, and ere the Greeks in any numbers began to straggle in those parts.

It may perchance seem strange to the reader, that in all ancient story, he finds one and the same beginning of nations, after the flood; and that the first planters of all parts of the world were said to be mighty and giantlike men; and that, as Phœnicia, Egypt, Libya, and Greece, had Hercules, Orestes, Antæus, Typhon, and the like; as Denmark had Starchaterus, remembered by [p] Saxo Grammaticus; as Scythia, Britany, and other regions had giants for their first inhabitants; so this isle of Sicily had her Læstrygones and Cyclops. This discourse I could also reject for feigned and fabulous, did not Moses make us know, that the Zamzummims, Emims, Anakims, and Og of Basan, with others, which sometime inhabited the mountains and deserts of Moab, Ammon, and mount Seir, were men of exceeding strength and stature, and of the races of giants; and were it not that [q] Tertullian, St. Augustine, Nicephorus, Procopius, Isidore, Pliny, Diodore, Herodotus, Solinus, Plutarch, and many other authors, have confirmed the opinion. Yea, Vesputius, in his second navigation into America, hath reported, that himself hath seen the like men in those parts. Again, whereas the selfsame is

[p] Saxo G. in præfat. hist.
[q] Tertul. de Resurr. Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 15. c. 9. Et quæst. in Gen. Niceph. l. 2. c. 37. Procop. l. 2. de Bello Goth. Plin. l. 7. c. 2.

written of all nations that is written of any one; as, touching their simplicity of life, their mean fare, their feeding on acorns and roots, their poor cottages, the covering of their bodies with the skins of beasts, their hunting, their arms and weapons, and their warfare; their first passages over great rivers and arms of the sea upon rafts of trees tied together; and afterward, their making boats, first of twigs and leather, then of wood; first, with oars, and then with sail; that they esteemed as gods the first finders out of arts; as of husbandry, of laws, and of policy; it is a matter that makes me neither to wonder at nor to doubt of it: for they all lived in the same newness of time, which we call *old time*, and had all the same want of his instruction, which (after the Creator of all things) hath by degrees taught all mankind: for other teaching had they none that were removed far off from the Hebrews, who inherited the knowledge of the first patriarchs, than that from variable effects they began, by time and degrees, to find out the causes; from whence came philosophy natural, as the moral did from disorder and confusion, and the law from cruelty and oppression.

But it is certain that the age of time hath brought forth stranger and more incredible things than the infancy: for we have now greater giants for vice and injustice, than the world had in those days for bodily strength; for cottages, and houses of clay and timber, we have raised palaces of stone; we carve them, we paint them, and adorn them with gold; insomuch as men are rather known by their houses than their houses by them; we are fallen from two dishes to two hundred; from water to wine and drunkenness; from the covering of our bodies with the skins of beasts, not only to silk and gold, but to the very skins of men. But to conclude this digression, time will also take revenge of the excess which it hath brought forth: *Quam longa dies peperit, longiorque auxit, longissima subruit;* "Long "time brought forth, longer time increased it, and a time "longer than the rest shall overthrow it."

§. 2.

The plantation of the Greeks in Sicily.

WHEN the first inhabitants had contended long enough about the dominion of all Sicily, it happened that one Theocles, a Greek, being driven upon that coast by an easterly wind, and finding true the commendations thereof, which had been thought fabulous, being delivered only by poets, gave information to the Athenians of this his discovery, and proposed unto them the benefit of this easy conquest, offering to become their guide. But Theocles was as little regarded by the Athenians, as Columbus, in our grandfathers' times, was by the English. Wherefore he took the same course that Columbus afterwards did. He overlaboured not himself in persuading the noble Athenians (who thought themselves to be well enough already) to their own profit; but went to the Chalcidians, that were needy and industrious, by whom his project was gladly entertained. By these was built the city of Naxus, and a colony planted of Eubœans.

But the rest of the Greeks were wiser than our western princes of Europe; for they had no pope that should forbid them to occupy the void places of the world. Archias of Corinth followed the Eubœans, and landed in Sicily, near unto that city called afterward [r] Syracuse; of which,

[r] Syracuse, as Cicero relates, was the greatest and most goodly city of all that the Greeks possessed: for the situation is both strong and of an excellent prospect, from every entrance by land or sea. The port was (for the most part) environed with beautiful buildings; and that part which was without the city, was on both sides banked up, and sustained with beautiful walls of marble. The city itself was one of the greatest in the world: for it had in compass, (as Strabo reporteth,) without the treble wall thereof, one hundred and eighty furlongs, which made of our miles about eighteen. It was compounded of four cities, (Strabo saith of five,) to wit, Insula, Acradina, Tycha, and Neapolis; of which greatness the ruins and foundations of the walls do yet witness. After such time as the Dores of Peloponnesus had driven out the Sicilians, this goodly city for a long time became the seat of tyrants. The first whereof was Gelo; the second, Hiero the elder; the third, Thrasybulus; the fourth and fifth, Dionysius the elder and younger; the sixth, Dion; the seventh, Agathocles; the eighth, Pyrrhus; the ninth, Hiero the younger; the tenth and last, Hieronymus; who being slain at Leontium, at length the Romans conquered it under the conduct of Marcellus.

that part only was then compassed with a wall which the Ætolians called Homothermon, the Greeks Nasos, the Latins Insula. He with his Corinthians having overcome the Siculi, drove them up into the country; and after a few years, their multitudes increasing, they added unto the city of the island that of Acradina, Tycha, and Neapolis. So as well by the commodity of the double port, capable of as many ships as any haven of that part of Europe, as by the fertility of the soil, Syracuse grew up in great haste to be one of the goodliest towns of the world. In short time the Greeks did possess the better part of all the sea-coast; forcing the Sicilians to withdraw themselves into the fast and mountainous parts of the island, making their royal residence in Trinacia.

Some seven years after the arrival of Archias, the Chalcidians, encouraged by the success of the Corinthians, did assail and obtain the city of Leontium, built and possessed by the Siculi. In brief, the Greeks win from the Siculi and their associates the cities of Catana and Hybla, which, in honour of the Megarians that forced it, they called Megara.

About five and forty years after Archias had taken Syracuse, Antiphemus and Entimus, the one from Rhodes, the other from Crete, brought an army into Sicily, and built Gela; whose citizens, one hundred and eight years after, did erect that magnificent and renowned city of Agrigentum, governed according to the laws of the Dorians.

The Syracusians also, in the seventieth year after their plantation, did set up the city of Acra, in the mountains; and in the ninetieth year Casmena, in the plains adjoining; and again, in the hundred and thirtieth year of their dwelling in Syracuse, they built Camerina; and soon after that, Enna, in the very centre of the island. So did the Cumani, about the same time, recover from the Siculi the city of Zancle, which they had founded in the strait between Sicily and Italy. They of Zancle had been founders of Himera.

Not long after this, Dorieus the Lacedæmonian built Heraclea; which the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, fearing the neighbourhood of the Spartans, soon after invaded and ruined, though the same were again ere long reedified.

Selinus also was built by a colony of Megara, and Zancle was taken by the Messenians; who, having lost their own country, gave the name thereof unto this their new purchase. Such were the beginnings of the greatest cities in this island.

§. 3.

Of the government and affairs of Sicily before Dionysius's tyranny.

THE most part of the cities in Sicily were governed by the rule of the people, till such time as Phalaris began to usurp the state of Agrigentum, and to exercise all manner of tyranny therein.

This was that Phalaris to whom Perillus, the cunning artificer of a detestable engine, gave an hollow bull of brass, wherein to enclose men, and scorch them to death; praising the device with this commendation, that the noise of one tormented therein should be like unto the bellowing of a bull. The tyrant gave a due reward to the inventor, by causing the first trial to be made upon himself. He reigned one and thirty years, saith Eusebius; others give him but sixteen: howsoever it were, one Telemachus, in the end, fell upon him with the whole multitude of Agrigentum, and stoned him to death; being thereto animated by Zeno, even whilst the tyrant was tormenting the same Zeno, to make him confess some matter of conspiracy.

After the death of Phalaris, the citizens recovered their liberty, and enjoyed it long, till Thero usurped the government of the commonweal: at which time also Panætius made himself lord of Leontium, and Cleander of Gela: but Cleander, having ruled seven years, was slain by one of the citizens. Cleander being dead, his brother Hippocrates succeeded in his room, and greatly afflicted the people of Naxos, of Zancle or Messana, and of Leontium; whom, with divers other of the ancient inhabitants, he forced to acknowledge him their lord. He also made war with the

Syracusians, and in the end got from them, by composition, the city of Camerina. But when he had reigned seven years, he was slain in a battle against the Siculi, before Hybla.

At this time did the Syracusians change their form of government from popular to aristocratical; a preparation towards a principality, whereinto it was soon after changed. After the death of Hippocrates, Gelon, (descended from the Rhodians, which together with the Cretans had long before, among other of the Greeks, seated themselves in Sicily,) that had commanded the forces of Hippocrates in the former war with notable success, became lord of Gela. He, after his master's death, breaking the trust committed unto him by Hippocrates over his children, and being in possession of Gela, took the occasion and advantage of a contention in Syracuse between the magistrates and the people. For coming with a strong army to the succour of the governors driven out by the multitude, they elected him their prince, being the first, and indeed the most famous, that ever governed the Syracusians. [z] This change happened in the second year of the threescore and twelfth Olympiad; wherein the better to establish himself, he took to wife the daughter of Thero, who had also usurped the state of Agrigentum.

Now this Gelon, the son of Dinomenes, had three brethren, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus; to the first of which he gave up the city of Gela, when he had obtained the principality of Syracuse: for after that time, all his thoughts travailed in the strengthening, beautifying, and amplifying of Syracuse. He defaced Camerina, that a little before was fallen from the obedience of the Syracusians who built it, and brought the citizens to Syracuse. The Megarians, that had moved a war against him, he overcame; the richer sort he brought to Syracuse, and the people he sold for slaves. In like manner dealt he with other places upon like occasion. Not long after this, Thero, a prince of the Agrigentines, having dispossessed Terillus of his city Hi-

[z] Pausan. l. 6.

mera, the Carthaginians were drawn into the quarrel by Anaxilus, lord of Messana, father-in-law to Terillus; and Gelon also was solicited by his father-in-law, Thero. Gelon was content, and in fine, after divers conflicts, the Carthaginians and other Africans, led by Amilcar, were overthrown by [a] Gelon; and an hundred and fifty thousand of them left their bodies in Sicily.

This Gelon it was to whom the Athenians and Lacedæmonians sent for succour, when Xerxes with his huge army passed the Hellespont. He for their relief having armed thirty thousand soldiers and two hundred ships, refused nevertheless to send them into Greece, because they refused him the commandment of one of their armies, either by sea or by land. So he used to their ambassadors only this saying, That their spring was withered; accounting the army by him prepared, to be the flower of the Greek nations.

The Carthaginians, after this great loss received, fearing the invasion of their own country, sent to Gelon by their ambassadors to desire peace, who grants it them on these conditions: that from thenceforth they should not sacrifice their children to Saturn; that they should pay him two thousand talents of silver, and present him with two armed ships, in sign of amity. These conditions the Carthaginians not only willingly accepted, but with the two thousand talents and the ships for war, they sent unto Demarata, Gelon's wife, a crown, valued at an hundred talents of gold, with other presents. Whereby we see that some nations and some natures are much the better for being well beaten: The wars ended, and Sicily in peace, Gelon beautified the temples of the gods, and erected others in honour of them: So being exceedingly beloved and honoured of his subjects, he left the world, and left for his successor his brother Hiero. Philistus and Pliny report, that when his body was burnt, according to the custom of that age, a dog of his, which always waited on him, ran into the fire, and suffered himself to be burnt with him.

To Gelon, Hiero his brother succeeded; a man rude;

[a] Herod. et Diod.

cruel, covetous, and so suspicious of his brethren Polyzelus and Thrasybulus, as he sought by all means to destroy them. Notwithstanding all this, by the conversation which he had with Simonides, he became of better condition, and greatly delighted with the study of good arts. Divers quarrels he had, as well with Theron of Agrigentum, as with other cities; all which he shortly after compounded, and gave a notable overthrow to the Carthaginians, whom Xerxes had incited to invade Sicily, fearing the succours which Gelon had prepared to aid the Grecians against him. He also overthrew in battle Thrasydæus, the son of Theron, and thereby restored the Agrigentines to their former liberty. But in the end he lost the love of the Syracusians; and after he had reigned eleven years, he left the kingdom to his brother Thrasybulus, who became a most unjust and bloody tyrant. Thrasybulus enjoyed his principality no longer than ten months: for notwithstanding the force of mercenary soldiers which he entertained for his guards, he was beaten out of Syracuse by the citizens; to whom, being besieged in Acradina, he restored the government, and was banished the island. From whence he sailed into Greece, where he died a private man among the Locrians.

And now had the Syracusians recovered again their former liberty, as all the rest of the cities did, after which they had never sought, had the successors of Gelon inherited his virtue, as they did the principality of Syracuse. For in all changes of estates, the preservation ought to answer the acquisition. Where a liberal, valiant, and advised prince hath obtained any new seigniory, and added it to that of his own, or exalted himself from being a private man to the dignity of a prince, it behoveth the successor to maintain it by the same way and art by which it was gotten.

To conclude, Syracuse (though not without blows, ere she could cleanse herself of the creatures and lovers of Gelon) was now again become mistress of herself, and held herself free well near threescore years, to the time of Dionysius; though she were in the mean while greatly endangered by a citizen of her own, called Tyndario.

Now to prevent the greatness of any one among them for the future, they devised a kind of banishment of such among them as were suspected, taking pattern from the Athenian ostracism. They called this their new devised judgment of exile *petalismus*, wherein every one wrote upon an olive-leaf (as at Athens they wrote upon shells) the name of him whom he would have expelled the city. He that had most suffrages against him was banished for five years. Hereby, in a short time, it came to pass, that those of judgment, and best able to govern the commonweal, were by the worst able either suppressed or thrust out of the city. Yea such as feared this law, though they had not yet felt it, withdrew themselves as secretly as they could, seeking some place of more security wherein to maintain themselves. And good reason they had so to do; seeing there is nothing so terrible in any state, as a powerful and authorized ignorance. But this law lasted not long: for their necessity taught them to abolish it, and restore again the wiser sort to the government; from which, the nobility having practised to banish one another, the state became altogether popular. But after a while, being invaded by Ducetius king of the Sicilians, that inhabited the inner part of the island, (who had already taken Enna, and some other of the Grecian cities, and overthrown the army of the Agrigentines,) the Syracusians sent forces against him, commanded by an unworthy citizen of theirs, called Bolcon. This their captain made nothing so much haste to find Ducetius, against whom he was employed, as he did to flee from the army he led, as soon as Ducetius presented him battle. So for want of conduct the greatest number of the Syracusians perished.

But making better choice among those whom they had banished, they levy other troops; by whom, in conclusion, Ducetius being beaten submitteth himself, and is constrained to leave the island for a time. Yet it was not long ere he returned again, and built the city Collatina on the sea-side.

Ducetius being dead, all the Greek cities did in a sort ac-

knowledge Syracuse, Trinacia excepted; which also by force of arms, in the fourscore and fifth Olympiad, they brought to reason.

But they do not long enjoy this their superintendency: for the citizens of Leontium, being oppressed by them, seek aid from the Athenians, about the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. In this suit they prevailed by the eloquence of Gorgias their orator; and got an hundred Athenian galleys to succour them, under the leading of Laches and Charœades. To this fleet, the Leontines and their partners added one hundred more; with which forces, and with some supplies brought by Sophocles, Pythodorus, Eurymedon, and other Athenian captains, they invaded the territories of the Syracusians, and their partisans; won and lost divers places, took Messana, and, in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war, lost it again. They also at the same time attempted Himera, but in vain. The fire of this quarrel took hold upon many cities, which invaded each other's territory with great violence. But when they had wearied themselves on all hands, and yet could see none issue of the war; the Leontines, without the advice of the Athenians, came to an accord with the Syracusians, and were admitted into their society with equal freedom. So the Athenians, who hoped to have greatened themselves in Sicily by the division and civil war, were disappointed of their expectation by the good agreement of the Sicilians, and fain to be gone with the broken remainder of their fleet. This they knew not how to amend, but (according to the custom of popular estates) by taking revenge upon their own commanders. So they banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and laid an heavy fine upon Eurymedon. Shortly after this, followed the most memorable war that ever was made by the Greeks in Sicily, which was that of the Athenians against the Selinuntines and Syracusians, in favour of the cities of Ægesta, Leontium, and Catana. They of Selinus had oppressed the Ægestans, and they of Syracuse the Leontines and the Catanians, which was the ground of the war. For the Athe-

nians undertook the protection of their old friends, and, in hatred of the Athenians, aid from Lacedæmon was sent to the Syracusians. The Lacedæmonians dealt plainly, having none other end than that which they pretended, namely, to help a people of their own tribe that craved their succour, being in distress. The Athenians scarce knew what to pretend; for their preparations were so great, as discovered their intent to be none other than the conquest of the whole island. Yet they which had called them in were so blinded with their own passions, that they would not believe their own eyes; which presented unto them a fleet and army, far greater than the terrible report of fame had made it.

In this expedition the city of Athens had engaged all her power; as regarding not only the greatness of the enterprise, but the necessity of finishing it in a short space of time. For the Lacedæmonians (as hath already been shewed in due place) stood at that time in such broken terms of peace with Athens, as differed not much from open war. Wherefore it was thought necessary, either to spare no cost in this great expedition, or altogether to forbear it; which was likely to be hindered by wars at home, if their proceedings were slack abroad. And surely, had not the desire of the Athenians been over-passionate, the arguments of Nicias had caused them to abstain from so chargeable a business, and to reserve their forces for a more needful use. But young counsels prevailed against the authority of ancient men, that were more regardful of safety than of honour.

Of this business mention hath been already made in that which we have written of the Peloponnesian war. But what was there delivered in general terms, as not concerning the affairs of Greece, otherwise than by consequence, doth in this place require a more perfect relation, as a matter wherein the whole state of Sicily was like to have felt a great conversion.

Though Alcibiades had prevailed against Nicias, in exhorting the people to this great voyage; yet Nicias, toge-

ther with Alcibiades and Lamachus, was appointed to be one of the chief commanders therein.

These had commission and direction, as well to succour the Segestans, and to reestablish the Leontines, cast out of their places by the Syracusians, as also, by force of arms, to subject the Syracusians, and all their adherents, in Sicily, and compel them by tribute to acknowledge the Athenians for their supreme lords. To effect which, the forenamed captains were sent off with an hundred and thirty galleys, and five thousand one hundred soldiers, besides the thirty ships of burden, which transported their victuals, engines, and other munitions for the war: and these were Athenians, Mantinæans, Rhodians, and Candians: [b] there were, besides these, six thousand Megarians light armed, with thirty horsemen.

With these troops and fleets they arrive at Rhegium, where the Rhegians refuse to give them entry, but sell them victuals for their money. From thence they sent to the Ægestans, to know what treasure they would contribute towards the war, seeing, for their sakes, they had entered thereinto. But they found, by their answers, that these Ægestans were poor, and that they had abused the Athenian ambassadors with false shows of gold, having in all but thirty talents. The Athenians further were discouraged, when they found that the Rhegians, their ancient friends, and allied unto the Leontines, refused to trust them within their walls. Hereupon Nicias adviseth to depart towards the Selinuntines, and to force them, or persuade them, to an agreement with the Ægestans; as likewise to see what disbursements the Ægestans could make, and so to return again into Greece, and not to waste Athens in a needless war. Alcibiades, on the other side, would solicit the cities of Sicily to confederacy against the Syracusians and Selinuntines, whereby to force them unto restitution of all that they had taken from the Leontines. Lamachus, he persuades them to assail Syracuse itself, before it were prepared

[b] Thucyd. l. 6. c. 9.

against them. But in the end (being excluded out of divers cities) they surprise Catana, and there they take new counsel how to proceed. Thence they employed Nicias to those of Ægesta, who received from them thirty talents towards his charges, and one hundred and twenty talents more there were of the spoils they had gotten in the island. Thus, the summer being spent in idle consultations and vain attempts, the Athenians prepare to assail Syracuse: but Alcibiades, having been accused at home in his absence, was sent for back by the Athenians to make his answer, and the army was left to the conduct of Nicias and Lamachus. These commanders obtain a landing-place very near unto Syracuse by this device.

They employ to Syracuse an inhabitant of Catana, whom they trust; and instruct him to promise unto the Syracusians, that he would deliver into their hands all the Athenians within Catana. Hereupon the Syracusians draw thitherward with their best forces. But in the mean while the Athenians, setting sail from Catana, arrive at Syracuse, where they land at fair ease, and fortify themselves against the town. Shortly after this, they fight, and the Syracusians had the loss; but the Athenians, wanting horse, could not pursue their victory to any great effect. They then retire themselves, with a resolution to refresh their army at Catana for the winter season. From thence they made an attempt upon Messana, hoping to have taken it by an intelligence, but in vain. For Alcibiades had discovered such as were traitors within the city to the Messenians. This he now did, in despite of his own citizens the Athenians, because they had recalled him from his command, with a purpose either to have put him to death, or to have banished him; whereof being assured by his friends, he took his way towards the Lacedæmonians, and to them he gave mischievous counsel against his country. While this winter yet lasted, the Syracusians send ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Corinth for aid; as likewise the Athenian captains in Sicily send to Athens for supplies: which both the one and the other obtained.

In the spring following (which was the beginning of the eighteenth year of the Peloponnesian war) the Athenians in Sicily sail from the port of Catana to Megara, forsaken of the inhabitants; from whence, foraging the country, they obtain some small victories over the straggling Syracusians; and at their return to Catana they receive a supply of two hundred men at arms, but without horse, which they hoped to furnish in the island, from the Segestans and other their adherents: they were also strengthened with a company of archers, and with three hundred talents in money.

Hereupon they take courage, and encamp near Syracuse, upon the banks of the great port, repelling the Syracusians that sallied to impeach their intrenchments. They also received from their confederates four hundred horsemen, with two hundred other horse, to mount their men at arms. Syracuse was now in effect blocked up, so as hardly any succours could enter, but such as were able to force their passage; yet the Athenians receive divers losses, among which it was not the least that Lamachus, one of their best commanders, was slain.

In the mean while Gylippus and Python, with the Lacedæmonian and Corinthian forces, arrive, and take land at Himera. The citizens of Himera and of Gela, together with the Selinuntines, join with them; so that with these and his own troops, Gylippus adventured to march over land towards Syracuse. The Syracusians send a part of their forces to meet him, and conduct him. The Athenians prepare to encounter them, expecting his arrival near unto the city, upon a place of advantage. At the first encounter they had the better of their enemies, by reason that the Syracusian horsemen could not come to fight in those straits; but soon after, Gylippus, charging them again, brake them, and constrained Nicias to fortify himself within his camp. Whereupon Nicias made the state of his affairs known by his letters to the Athenians, shewing, that, without great supplies by sea and land, the enterprise would be lost, together with the small army remaining. These letters received, the Athenians appoint two other generals,

Eurymedon and Demosthenes, to join with Nicias; the one they despatch presently with some supply, the other they send after him in the spring following.

In the mean while Gylippus at Syracuse fights with the Athenians both by sea and land, sometimes with ill, and at other times with good success: but in conclusion, he took from them their fort near unto Syracuse, at the promontory called Plymmyrium, wherein the Athenians lost their treasure, and a great part of all their provisions. Notwithstanding which loss, and that the Athenians themselves, in Greece, were (in effect) besieged within Athens by the Lacedæmonians; yet were they most obstinate in prosecuting the war in Sicily, and despatched away Demosthenes with new succours. Demosthenes, in his way towards Sicily, encountered with Polyanthes the Corinthian with his fleet; both the captains being bound for Sicily, the one to succour Nicias, the other Gylippus. The loss between them was in effect equal, and neither so broken but that each of them prosecuted the enterprise they had in hand. But before the succours arrived to either, Gylippus and Ariston had assailed the Athenians in the great port of Syracuse, and in a sea-fight put them to the worst, to the great discouragement of the Athenians. On the neck of this, Demosthenes arrived with threescore and thirteen galleys, charged with footmen; and (blaming the sloth of Nicias) he invaded the Syracusians the same day that he arrived. But he made more haste than he had good speed, being shamefully beaten, and repulsed with great loss. Hereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon determine to rise up from before Syracuse, and return to the succour of Athens; but Nicias disputed to the contrary, pretending that he had good intelligence within Syracuse, whereby he learned that the town could not long hold out.

Whatsoever Nicias's intelligence was, upon the arrival of a new supply into the town, the Athenians had all consented to depart, and to lodge at Catana, had not an eclipse of the moon, boding (as was thought) ill success, caused them to defer their departure. But this superstition cost

them dear. For the Syracusians, Lacedæmonians, and Corinthians, with threescore and seventeen sail of galleys, entered the great port of Syracuse, wherein the Athenians kept their fleet, and whereon they had fortified themselves. The Athenians, in the same port, encountered them with fourscore and six galleys, commanded by Eurymedon, in which the Athenian fleet was beaten by the lesser number, and Eurymedon slain. Now, though it were so that the Syracusians received the more loss by land (for the fight was general) yet when the Athenians were beaten by sea, in which kind they thought themselves invincible, they were wonderfully cast down. For it was well said of Gylippus to the Syracusians, "When any people do find themselves "vanquished in that manner of fight, and with those wea- "pons, in which they persuade themselves that they exceed "all others, they not only lose their reputation, but their "courage." The Athenians, besides the galleys sunk and wrecked, had seventeen taken and possessed by the enemy; and with great labour and loss they defended the rest from being fired, having drawn them within a palisado, in one corner of the port, unadvisedly; for it is as contrary to a sea war to thrust ships into a strait room and corner, as it is to scatter foot in a plain field against horse; the one subsisting by being at large, the other by close embattling.

The Syracusians, having now weakened the Athenian fleet, resolve to imprison them within the port. And to that purpose they range all their galleys in the mouth of the haven, being about a mile over, and there they came to anchor, filling the outlet with all manner of vessels, which they man most strongly, because the Athenians, being now made desperate, should not with double ranks of galleys break through the Syracusian fleet, which lay but single, because they were forced to range themselves over all the outlet of the port. They therefore not only moored themselves strongly by their anchors, but chained the sides of their galleys together, and laid behind them again certain ships, which served in the former war for victuallers; to the end, that if any of their galleys were sunk, or the chain

which joined them to their fellows broken, the Athenians might yet find themselves a second time entangled and arrested. To disorder also those Athenian galleys, which came on in form of a wedge, to break through and force a passage, the Syracusians had left within these galleys and ships, enchained together, a certain number of loose ones, to stop their course and fury. For where the way of any vessel using oar or sails is broken, and their speed foreslowed, they cannot force with any weight and violence the resistance opposing.

On the other side, the Athenians knew that they were utterly lost, except with an invincible resolution they could make their way, and break down this great bridge of boats, or at least force a passage through them in some part or other; which they resolve to hazard, with all their shipping, (to the number of one hundred and ten, of all sorts,) and with all the strength of their land-army in them embarked. But the galleys, which were within the bridge of boats, did so disorder the Athenian fleet, ere they came to force the bridge, as, albeit some few of them had broken through the chains, yet being stopped by the ships without, and assailed by other loose galleys of the Syracusians, which were purposely left at large in the sea, they were either taken or sunk. Three great disadvantages the Athenians had; the first, that fighting within a haven, and, as it were, in a strait, they had no room to turn themselves, nor to free themselves one from another, being entangled; the second, that having over-pestered their galleys with soldiers, who used offensive arms of darts and slings, they had not place upon the decks to stretch their arms; the third was, the discomfortable end for which they fought, namely, to force a passage, by which they might save themselves by running away. To be short, the fight was no less terrible than the confusion; the slaughter great on all sides; and the noise and the cries so loud and lamentable, as that no direction could be heard. But in the end, the Athenians, as many as survived, were beaten back to the land, with loss of threescore of their galleys broken, sunk, or abandoned. The

Syracusians did also lose twenty of theirs, with Python, commander of the Corinthians. The rest of the Athenian galleys, running themselves into the bottom of the port, saved themselves by the help and countenance of the land-army there fortified. In this desperate estate the Athenian commanders go to counsel. Demosthenes persuades them to furnish with fresh soldiers those few galleys which remained, and, while the Syracusians were triumphing and made secure by their present victory, to set upon them, and forcing their way out of the port, to return to Athens. This was no ill counsel: for, as we have heard of many great captains (yea the greatest number of all that have been victorious) that have neglected the speedy prosecution of a beaten enemy, so might we produce many examples of those, who, having slept securely in the bosom of good success, have been suddenly awaked by the re-allied companies of a broken army, and have thereby lost again all the honour and advantage formerly gotten. But Nicias opposeth the advice of Demosthenes; others say, that the seamen were against it. Whereupon, abandoning their galleys, they all resolve to march over land to the cities of their confederates, till some more favourable fortune should call them thence. On the other side, Gylippus, and other the Lacedæmonian and Corinthian captains, with Hermocrates, exhort the Syracusians to put themselves presently into the field, and to stop all the passages leading to those cities of their enemies, to which the Athenians might make retreat. But many were weary, and many were wounded, and many of them thought that they had done enough for the present. Which humour in some of our commanders at Cadiz lost us both the Indian fleet and the spoils of many other neighbour places. Hermocrates the Syracusian, finding it a lost labour to persuade his countrymen to any hasty prosecution, devised this good stratagem thereby to gain time, not doubting but that after a day or two he should draw them willingly out. He sent two or three horsemen out of Syracuse by night, willing them to find Nicias, and (after they had assured him that they were of the Athenians fac-

tion) to give him advice not to march away over hastily from the place wherein he was fortified, alleging that the Syracusians had lodged their army, which could not long stay there, upon the passages and places of advantage leading towards the cities of their allies. These tidings Nicias easily believed, and put off his journey to the third day. For men newly beaten are (for the most part) more fearful than wise; and to them every thistle in the field appears by night a man at arms.

The third day (leaving all their galleys and all their baggage) they remove, being pierced and pursued with the lamentable outcries of those that were sick and hurt, whom they abandon to the cure of their enemy's swords. The rest march away, to the number of forty thousand, and make their first passage by force over the river of Anapus, notwithstanding the opposition of their enemies. But being every day charged in their marches, and by the Syracusian horsemen beaten in from foraging and provision of food, they grow weak and heartless. The Syracusians also possess the mountain Lepas, by which they were to pass towards Camerina, and thereby force them to fall back again towards the sea-coast, and to take what way they could, being unable to proceed in their journey intended. Many hard shifts they made, in difficult passages and blind marches by night, which they were fain to endure, as having none other means to escape from the enemy that pursued them, and held them waking with continual skirmishing. To keep all in order, Nicias undertook the leading of the vanguard, and Demosthenes conducted the rear. At the river Erineus, Nicias takes the start of a whole night's march, leaving Demosthenes to make the retreat, who being encompassed and overpressed with numbers, in the end renders himself. The conditions he obtained were far better than he could have hoped for, and the faith of his enemies far worse than he suspected. For he was afterward, with Nicias, murdered in prison. The army of Demosthenes being dissolved, they pursue Nicias with the greater courage, who being utterly broken upon the passage of the

river Assinarus, rendered himself to Gylippus upon honest conditions. Gylippus sought to preserve him, and to have had the honour to have brought these two to Sparta; Nicias, as a noble enemy to the Lacedæmonians, and who, at the overthrow which they received at Pylus by the Athenians, had saved the lives of the vanquished; Demosthenes, as one that had done to Lacedæmon the greatest hurt. Hermocrates also, the commander of the Syracusian army, dissuaded the rest, by all the art he had, from using any barbarous violence after so noble a victory. But the cruel and the cowardly sort (cowardice and cruelty being inseparable passions) prevailed, and caused these brave captains to be miserably murdered; one part of their soldiers to be starved in loathsome prisons, and the rest sold for slaves. This was the success of the Sicilian war, which took end at the river Assinarus, the four and twentieth day of May, in the fourscore and eleventh Olympiad.

The Athenians being beaten out of Sicily, the Ægestans, (for whose defence, against the Selinuntines, this late war had been taken in hand,) fearing the victorious Syracusians, sought help from the Carthaginians; to whom they offered themselves and their city as their vassals. The Carthaginians, though ambitious enough of enlarging their dominion in Sicily, yet considering the prosperity of the Syracusians, and their late victories over the Athenians, they stayed a while to dispute of the matter, whether they should refuse or accept the offer made unto them; for the Selinuntines were straitly allied to the Syracusians, as may appear by what is past. In the end, the senators of Carthage resolve upon the enterprise; and (by a trick of their Punic wit) to separate the Syracusians from the Selinuntines, they send ambassadors to Syracuse; praying that city, as in the behalf of the Ægestans, to compel the Selinuntines to take reason, and to rest content with so much of the lands in question, as they of Syracuse should think meet to allow them. The Syracusians approved the motion, for it tended to their own honour. But the Selinuntines would make no such appointment; rather they took it ill, that the

Syracusians, with whom they had run one course of fortune in the Athenian war, should offer to trouble them, by interposing as arbitrators in a business that themselves could end by force. This was right as the Carthaginians would have it: for now could they of Selinus with an ill grace crave aid of Syracuse; and the Syracusians as ill grant it unto those that had refused to stand to the arbitrament, which the Carthaginians would have put into their hands. Hereupon an army of three hundred thousand men is set out from Carthage, under the conduct of Hannibal, nephew to that Amilcar, who (as you have heard before) was overthrown with the great Carthaginian army at Himera by Gelon. Hannibal was exceeding greedy of this employment, that he might take revenge, as well of his uncle's as of his father's death; the one of them having been slain by the Himerans, the other by those of Selinus. Both these cities Hannibal in this war won by force of arms, sacked them, and burnt them; and having taken three thousand of the Himerans prisoners, he caused them to be led unto the place where Amilcar was slain, and buried them there.

After this followed some trouble at Syracuse, occasioned by the banishment of Hermocrates, who had lately been general of the Syracusian forces against the Athenians. The malice of his enemies had so far prevailed with the ingrateful multitude, that he was condemned to exile for his mere virtue, at such time as he was aiding the Lacedæmonians in their war against Athens, wherein he did great service. All the honester sort within Syracuse were sorry for the injury done unto him, and sought to have him repealed. Hermocrates himself, returning into Sicily, gathered an army of six thousand, with which he began to repair Selinus; and by many noble actions laboured to win the love of his citizens. But the faction that opposed him was the stronger. Wherefore he was advised to seize upon a gate of Syracuse, with some strength of men, whereby his ffiends within the town might have the better means to rise against the adverse party. This he did; but presently the multitude fell to arms, and set upon him; in which conflict

he was slain. But his son-in-law, Dionysius, shall make them wish Hermocrates alive again.

§. 4.

Of Dionysius the tyrant; and others following him in Syracuse.

THE Syracusians had enjoyed their liberty about threescore years, from the death of Thrasybulus to the death of Hermocrates; at which time Dionysius was raised up by God, to take revenge, as well of their cruelty towards strangers, as of their ingratitude towards their own best citizens: for before the time of Dionysius, they had made it their pastime to reward the virtue of their worthiest commanders with death or disgrace; which custom they must now be taught to amend.

Dionysius obtained the principality of Syracuse by the same degrees that many others before him had made themselves masters of other cities, and of Syracuse itself: for, being made prætor, and commanding their armies against the Carthaginians, and other their enemies, he behaved himself so well, that he got a general love among the people and men of war. Then began he to follow the example of Pisistratus, that made himself lord of Athens; obtaining a band of six hundred men to defend his person; under pretence that his private enemies, being traitorously affected to the state of Syracuse, had laid plots how to murder him, because of his good services. He doubled the pay of the soldiers, alleging, that it would encourage them to fight manfully; but intending thereby to assure them to himself. He persuaded the citizens to call home, out of exile, those that had been banished, which were the best men of Syracuse; and these were afterwards at his devotion, as obliged unto him by so great a benefit. His first favour, among the Syracusians, grew from his accusation of the principal men. It is the delight of base people to reign over their betters; wherefore gladly did he help them to break down, as fetters imprisoning their liberty, the bars that held it under safe custody. Long it was not, ere the chief citizens had found whereat he aimed. But what they saw, the people would not see; and some that were needy, and

knew not how to get offices without his help, were willing to help him, though they knew his purposes to be such as would make all the city to smart. He began early to hunt after the tyranny, being but five and twenty years of age when he obtained it; belike it was his desire to reign long. His first work, of making himself absolute lord in Syracuse, was the possession of the citadel, wherein was much good provision, and under it the galleys were moored. This he obtained by allowance of the people; and having obtained this, he cared for no more, but declared himself without all shame or fear: the army; the chief citizens, restored by him from banishment; all the needy sort within Syracuse, that could not thrive by honest courses; and some neighbour-towns, bound unto him either for his help in war, or for his establishing the faction reigning at that present, were wholly affected to his assistance. Having therefore gotten the citadel into his hands, he needed no more, save to assure what he had already. He strengthened himself by divers marriages, taking first to wife the daughter of Hermocrates; and after her, two at once; the one a Locrian, Doris, by whom he had Dionysius, his successor; the other Aristomache, the daughter of Hipparinus, and sister to Dion, honourable men in Syracuse, which bare unto him many children, that served to fortify him with new alliances.

Yet it was not long ere some of the Syracusians (envying his prosperity) incited the multitude, and took arms against him, even in the novelty of his rule. But their enterprise was more passionately than wisely governed. He had shamefully been beaten by the Carthaginians at Gela; which, as it vexed the Sicilian men at arms, making them suspect that it was his purpose to let the Carthaginians waste all, that he might afterwards take possession of the desolate places; so it inflamed them with a desire to free themselves from his tyranny. They departed therefore from him, and marched hastily to Syracuse, where they found friends to help them: there they forced his palace, ransacked his treasures, and so shamefully abused his wife, that for the grief thereof she

poisoned herself. But he followed their heels apace; and, firing a gate of the city by night, entered soon enough to take revenge, by making a speedy riddance of them: for he spared none of his known, no not of his suspected enemies. After that, he grew so doubtful of his life, as he never durst trust barber to trim him, nor any person, no not so much as his brother, to enter into his chamber unstript and searched. He was the greatest robber of the people that ever reigned in any state, and withal the most unrespectively cruel.

After this, he separated with fortification that part of the city called the Island from the rest, like as the Spaniard did the citadel of Antwerp; therein he lodged his treasures and his guards.

He then began to make war upon the free cities of Sicily; but while he lay before Herbesse, an inland town, the Syracusians rebelled against him, so as with great difficulty he recovered his citadel; from whence, having allured the old soldiers of the Campanians, who forced their passage through the city with one thousand and two hundred horse, he again recovered the mastery over the Syracusians. And when a multitude of them were busied in gathering in their harvest, he disarmed all the townsmen remaining, and new strengthened the fort of the island with a double wall. He enclosed that part also called Epipoles, which, with threescore thousand labourers, he finished in three weeks, being two leagues in compass. He then built two hundred new galleys, and repaired one hundred and ten of the old; forged one hundred and forty thousand targets, with as many swords and headpieces, with fourteen thousand corslets, and all other suitable arms. Which done, he sent word to the Carthaginians, (greatly enfeebled by the plague,) that except they would abandon the Greek towns, which they held in Sicily, he would make war upon them; and, not staying for answer, he took the spoil of all the Phœnician ships and merchandise within his ports, as king Philip the Second did of our English before the war in our late queen's time. He then goes to the field with fourscore thousand

foot, and three thousand horse, and sends his brother Leptines to sea with two hundred galleys and five hundred ships of burden. Most of the towns which held for Carthage yielded unto him, saving Panormus, Segesta or Ægesta, Ancyræ, Motya, and Entella. Of these, he first won Motya by assault, and put all therein to the sword; but before Ægesta he lost a great part of his army by a sally of the citizens. In the mean while Himilco arrives; but, ere he took land, he lost in a fight at sea with Leptines fifty ships of war, and five thousand soldiers, besides many ships of burden. This notwithstanding, he recovered again Motya upon his first descent. From thence marching towards Messana, he took Lypara, and, soon after, Messana, and razed it to the ground. Now began Dionysius greatly to doubt his estate. He therefore fortified all the places he could in the territory of the Leontines, by which he supposed that Himilco would pass toward Syracuse, and he himself took the field again with four and thirty thousand foot and one thousand horse. Now, hearing that Himilco had divided his army into two parts, marching with the one half over land, and sending Mago with the other by sea, he sent Leptines his brother to encounter Mago. But Leptines was utterly beaten by the Carthaginian; twenty thousand of his men were slain, and an hundred of his galleys lost. It is very strange, and hardly credible, which yet good authors tell us, that one city should be able to furnish five hundred sail of ships, and two hundred galleys; (for so many did Syracuse arm in this war;) and more strange it is, that in a battle at sea, without any great artillery or musket-shot, twenty thousand should be slain in one fight. In all our fights against the Turks, of which that at Lepanto was the most notable, we hear of no such number lost; nor in any other fight by sea, that ever happened in our age, nor before us. When Charles the Fifth went to besiege Algier, he had in all his fleet, transporters and others, but two hundred and fifty sail of ships, and threescore and five galleys; for the furnishing of which fleet he sought help from all the cities and ports

of Spain, Naples, and the rest of Italy. But in old times it was the manner to carry into the field, upon extremity, as many as were needful, of all that could bear arms, giving them little wages, or other allowance; in our days it is not so; neither indeed is it often requisite. Upon this overthrow Dionysius posts away to Syracuse to strengthen it: Himilco follows him, and besiegeth the town by land and sea. But the tyrant, having received aid from the Lacedæmonians, under the conduct of Pharacidas, puts himself to sea, to make provision for his citizens; who, in his absence, take twenty of the Carthaginian galleys, and sink four. Hereupon finding their own success prosperous, and that of the tyrant exceeding ill, having also at the present weapons in their hands, they consult how to recover their liberty. And this they had done, had not Pharacidas the Lacedæmonian resisted them. It also fell out, to his exceeding advantage, that the plague was so increased, and so violent among the Carthaginians, as it is said that above an hundred thousand of them died thereof. He therefore, with the power that he could gather together, sets upon them both by sea and land; and having slain great numbers of them, forceth Himilco to desire peace. This peace Dionysius sold him for a great sum of money, on condition that he should steal away with his Carthaginians only; which he basely accepted, betraying the rest of the Africans and Spaniards. Yet no faith was kept with him; for he was pursued, and left many of his Carthaginians behind him. The rest of the Africans fell under the swords of their enemies; only the Spaniards, after they had a while bravely defended themselves, were (after their submission) entertained, and served the conqueror.

Many such examples of perfidious dealing have I noted in other places, and can hardly forbear to deliver unto memory the like practices when they meet with their matches: that which happened unto Monsieur de Piles was very suitable to this treachery wherewith Dionysius pursued Himilco. I was present when De Piles related the injury done unto him. He had rendered St. John d'Angelie to the

French king, Charles the Ninth, who besieged him therein. He rendered it upon promise, made by the faith of a king, that he should be suffered to depart in safety, with all his followers. Yet in presence of the king himself, of the duke of Anjou his brother, general of his army, of the queen-mother, and of divers dukes and marshals of France, he was set upon and broken in his march, spoiled of all that he had, and forced to save his life by flight, leaving the most of his soldiers dead upon the place; the king's hand and faith, warranting him to march away with ensigns displayed, and with all his goods and provisions, no whit availing him. It needs not therefore seem strange that an heathen tyrant should thus break his faith, since kings professing Christianity are bold to do the like, or command their captains to do it for them.

Dionysius, after this great victory, took care to reedify Messana. Mago, who stayed in Sicily to hold up the Carthaginians therein, is again beaten by Dionysius, who is also beaten by the Tauromenians. A new supply of fourscore thousand soldiers is sent from Carthage to Mago; but they take eggs for their money, and make peace with Dionysius, leaving the Sicilians in Tauromenium to shift for themselves; whom Dionysius, after a long siege, overcame, and gave their city to his mercenary soldiers.

He then passed into Italy, obtained divers victories there, brought the Rhegians on their knees, forced them to pay him one hundred and fourscore thousand crowns, to furnish him with threescore galleys, and to put in an hundred pledges for assurance of their future observance of covenants. This he did, not with any purpose to perform unto them the peace that they had so dearly bought; but that, having taken from them their galleys, he might besiege them, and ruin them utterly, with the more ease. Now to the end he might not without some colour falsify the faith that he had given to them, he pretended to want victuals for his army, at such time as he seemed ready to depart out of Italy, and sent to them to furnish him there-

with; promising to return them the like quantity at his coming home to Syracuse.

His resolution was, that if they refused to furnish him, he would then make their refusal the cause of his quarrel; if they yielded to aid him with the proportion which he desired, that then they should not be able, for want of food, to endure a siege any long time against him. For to ruin them he had fully determined, at what price soever. And great reason he had to take revenge of them, if he had done it fairly, and without breach of faith. For when in the beginning of his reign he desired them to bestow a daughter of some of their nobility upon him for a wife, they answered, that they had not any one fit for him, save the hangman's daughter. Princes do rather pardon ill deeds than villainous words. Alexander the Great forgave many sharp swords, but never any sharp tongues; no, though they told him but truly of his errors. And certainly it belongs to those that have warrant from God, to reprehend princes, and to none else, especially in public.

It is said, that Henry the Fourth of France had his heart more inflamed against the duke of Biron for his overbold and biting taunts, that he used against him before Amiens, than for his conspiracy with the Spaniard, or Savoyan: for he had pardoned ten thousand of such as had gone further, and drawn their swords against him. The contemptuous words that sir John Parret used of our late queen Elizabeth were his ruin; and not the counterfeit letter of the Romish priest produced against him. So fared it with some other, greater than he, that thereby ran the same and a worse fortune soon after.

To be short, he made them know new bread from old. He assaulted their town on all sides, which he continued to do eleven months, till he won it by force. He used his victory without mercy, specially against Phyton, who had commanded within it.

Some other wars he made with the Carthaginians, after the taking and razing of this city, and those with variable

success. For as in one encounter he slew Mago, with ten thousand Africans; so the son of Mago beat him, and slew his brother Leptines, with fourteen thousand of his soldiers. After which he bought his peace of the Carthaginians, as they had formerly done of him; following therein the advice of prosperity and adversity, as all kings and states do.

When he had reigned eight and thirty years, he died; some say in his bed, peaceably, which is the most likely, though others report it otherwise. A cruel man he was, and a faithless; a great poet, but a foolish one. He entertained Plato a while, but afterward, for speaking against his tyranny, he gave order to have him slain, or sold for a slave; for he could endure no man that flattered him not beyond measure. His parasites therefore styled his cruelty, "the hate of evil men;" and his lawless slaughters, "the "ornaments and effects of his justice." True it is, that flatterers are a kind of vermin, which poison all the princes of the world; and yet they prosper better than the worthiest and valiantest men do; and I wonder not at it, for it is a world; and, as our Saviour Christ hath told us, *the world will love her own.*

To this Dionysius, his son of the same name succeeded, and inherited both his kingdom and his vices. To win the love of the people, he pardoned and released out of prison a great number of persons by his father locked up and condemned. Withal, he remitted unto his citizens divers payments by his father imposed upon them. Which done, and thereby hoping that he had fastened unto himself the people's affections, he cast off the sheep's skin, and put on that of the wolf; for being jealous of his own brethren, as men of more virtue than himself, he caused them all to be slain; and all the kindred that they had by their mother's side: for Dionysius his father (as hath been said) had two wives, Doris of Locris, and Aristomache a Syracusian, the sister of Dion, which brother-in-law of his he greatly enriched.

By Doris he had this Dionysius, who succeeded unto him; and by Aristomache he had two sons and two daugh-

ters; of which, the elder, called Sophrosyne, he gave in marriage to his eldest son, and her half-brother, Dionysius; the younger, called Areta, he bestowed on his brother Theorides, after whose death Dion took her to wife, being his niece.

This Dion, a just and valiant man, finding that Dionysius had abandoned all exercise of virtue, and that he was wholly given over to sensuality, prevailed so much with Plato, whose disciple he had been, as he drew him into Sicily to instruct the young king. And having persuaded the king to entertain him, he wrought so well with him as Dionysius began to change condition; to change tyranny into monarchy, and to hold the principality that he had, rather by the love of his people and his national laws, than by the violence of his guards and garrisons. But this goodness of his lasted not long; for Philistus the historian, and other his parasites that hated Dion's severity, wrought him out of the tyrant's favour, and caused him soon after to be banished out of Sicily, to the great grief of the whole nation. For whereas Dion had made offer to the king, either to compound the quarrels between him and the Carthaginians, of whom Dionysius stood in great fear, or (at least) if they refused it, to furnish him with fifty galleys at his own charge during the war against them; his enemies found means, by sinister interpretation, to convert his good-will into matter of treason. They told Dionysius, that all the great commendations given of Plato had tended to none other end than to soften his mind, and to make him neglect his own affairs by the study of philosophy; whilst Dion, in the mean time, having furnished fifty galleys under colour of the king's service, had it in his own power either to deliver to the Syracusians their former liberty, or to make himself lord and sovereign of their state.

It is likely that the honest and liberal offer which he made to serve the king with so great a preparation, at his own charge, begot him many enemies. For they that had served the king for none other end than to raise and enrich themselves, and had already been raised and enriched,

thought themselves bound to make the same offer that Dion had made, if the king had had the grace to conceive it aright. But these covetous and ignorant cowards, that had neither the knowledge nor the daring that Dion had, were bold to style his love and liberality, pride and presumption; and heartened the young king in his oppressing and eating up his own people, of whose spoils they themselves shared no small portion. I have heard it, that when Charles the Fifth had the repulse at Algier in Africa, Ferdinando Cortes, one of the bravest men that ever Spain brought forth, offered unto the emperor to continue the siege at his own charge. But he had never good day after it: for they that envied his victories, and his conquest of Mexico in the West Indies, persuaded the emperor that Cortes sought to value himself above him, and to have it said, that what the emperor could not, Cortes had effected, and was therefore more worthy of the empire than he that had it.

When Dion was newly banished, the tyrant was contented at first to send him the revenues of his lands, and permit him to dispose of his moveables at his own pleasure; not without giving hope to recall him in short time. Had he continued in this good mood, like enough it is that Dion would have been well pleased to live well, as he did, at Athens. But after some time Dionysius made port-sale of this nobleman's goods, and thereby urged him to take another course, even to seek the restitution of his country to liberty. The virtues of Dion, especially his great liberality, had purchased much love in Greece. This love made him suspected and hated of the tyrant; but it stood him in good stead when he sought to raise men, with whose help he might return into Sicily. Yet he got not above eight hundred (for he carried the matter closely) to follow him in this adventure; but many of them were men of quality, and fit to be leaders. Neither did he doubt of finding in Syracuse as many as should be needful, that would readily assist him. Therefore he landed boldly in Sicily, marched to Syracuse, entered the city without resistance, armed the multitude, and won all, save the citadel.

Dionysius was then absent in Italy; but he quickly had advertisement of this dangerous accident. Wherefore he returned hastily to Syracuse: whence, after many vain treaties of peace, and some forcible attempts to recover the town, he was fain to depart; leaving yet the castle to the custody of Apollocrates, his eldest son. Yet ere he went, his minion Philistus, coming with a strength of men to assist him, was beaten, taken, and put to death by torment. But Dion, for the recovery of his country's liberty, had the same reward that all worthy men have had from popular estates: he was disgraced, assaulted, and forced to abandon the city. He retireth himself to the Leontines, who receive him with great joy. Soon after his departure from Syracuse, new troops enter the castle; they sally out, assail, spoil, and burn a great part of the city. Dion is sent for with humble request; yet ere he could arrive, Dionysius's soldiers were retired; and the townsmen, thinking themselves secure, shut the gates against Dion. But the next night they of the castle sally again, with greater fury than ever; they kill man, woman, and child, and set fire in all parts of the town. In this their extremity Dion comes the second time to their succour; the love of his country surmounting all the injuries that he had received. He sets upon the garrison of the castle with the one part of his army, and quencheth the fire, every where kindled, with the other part. In conclusion, after he had conquered both the fire and the sword, that had well near burnt to ashes and depopulated Syracuse, he recovered the castle, with the munition and furniture thereof, and sent Apollocrates, after Dionysius his father, into Italy. But their malice, of whom he had best deserved, and whom he had loved most, gave an untimely end to his days. For he was, soon after this his victory, murdered by Calippus; who, after he had with ill success a while governed Syracuse, was slain with the same dagger with which he had murdered Dion.

Ten years after the death of Dion, Dionysius, with the assistance of his friends in Italy, recovers his estate, and returns to Syracuse, driving Nysæus thence, whom he found

governor therein. The better sort of the citizens, fearing more than ever his cruelty, flee to Icetes, a Syracusian born, and then ruling the Leontines. Icetes enters into confederacy with the Carthaginians, hoping by their assistance not only to prevail against Dionysius, but by the hatred of the Syracusians toward Dionysius, to make him also lord of their city. The Syracusians, being deservingly afflicted on all sides, send to the Corinthians for succour. Icetes also sends thither, and dissuades the Corinthians, as well as he can, from intermeddling in the business. He tells them, by his messengers, that he had entered into league with the Carthaginians, who were so strong by sea, that it was not in the power of Corinth to land any army in Sicily. But the Corinthians, being by this treason of Icetes more enraged than dissuaded, sent Timoleon with nineteen galleys to deliver Syracuse from tyranny. In the mean while Icetes had entered Syracuse, and, with the help of the Carthaginians, driven Dionysius into the castle, wherein he besieged him.

Icetes, being himself a tyrant in Leontium, rather sought how to enlarge his power, than how to deliver his country. Therefore, hearing that Timoleon was arrived at Rhegium, he sent to persuade him to return his fleet; for that all things were (in effect) established in Sicily. The Carthaginian galleys were also in the same port of Rhegium, whose captains advised Timoleon to get him gone in peace. They had far more galleys there than he had, and were like to compel him, if he would not be persuaded. Timoleon, finding himself overmastered, makes request to the Carthaginian captains that they would be pleased to enter into Rhegium, and there, in an open assembly of the people, to deliver unto him those arguments for his return, which they had used to him in private; that he might, by public testimony, discharge himself to the senate of Corinth.

The Carthaginians, persuading themselves that a victory obtained by a few fair words was without loss, and far more easy than that of many blows and wounds, yielded to Timoleon's desire. But while the orations were delivering, Timoleon, favoured by the Rhegians, stole out of the press; and

having set sail before the gates were opened to the Carthaginians, he recovered the port of Tauromenium, where he was joyfully received by Andromachus the governor. From thence he marched towards Adranum, where surprising Icetes's army, he slew a part thereof, and put the rest to run. It is the nature of victory to beget friends. The Adranitans joined with him; and so did Mamercus, the tyrant of Catana. Dionysius also sent to Timoleon, offering to surrender the castle of Syracuse into his hands; as thinking it better to yield up himself, and the places which he could not defend, unto the Corinthians, than either to Icetes whom he disdained, or to the Carthaginians whom he hated. Now Timoleon, who within fifty days after his arrival had recovered the castle of Syracuse, and sent Dionysius to Corinth, to live there a private man, was still invaded by the armies and molested by the practices of Icetes. For he besieged the Corinthians within the castle of Syracuse, and attempted (but in vain) the murder of Timoleon.

The Corinthians send unto Timoleon a supply of two thousand foot and two hundred horse, which are stayed in Italy by foul weather. Icetes is strengthened with threescore thousand Africans, brought unto him by Mago, (all which he lodgeth within Syracuse,) and with an hundred and fifty galleys, to keep the port. This was the first time that ever the Carthaginians had dominion within the walls of that city. With this great army Icetes assaulteth the castle: Timoleon sends them victuals and succour, in small boats by night, from Catana. Mago and Icetes do therefore resolve to besiege Catana; but they were no sooner on their way towards it with part of their forces, than Leon, captain of the Corinthians, sallied out of the castle, and took that part of Syracuse called Acradina, which he fortified.

In the mean while the two thousand Corinthians arrive; with whom, and two thousand other soldiers, Timoleon marcheth towards Syracuse. Mago abandoneth Icetes, being frighted out of Sicily (which he might easily have conquered) with an idle rumour of treason. This made him return to Carthage, where the general exclamation

against his cowardice did so much affright him, that for fear of further punishment he hanged himself. Timoleon enters the city, and beats down the castle (which he called the nest of tyrants) to the ground. But he found the city, when the strangers were fled, in effect desolate, so as their horses did feed on the grass growing in the market-place. Therefore he writes to Corinth for people to reinhabit it. Ten thousand are sent out of Greece, many come from Italy, others from other parts of the island.

But a new storm ariseth. Asdrubal and Amilcar, Carthaginians, arrive about Lilybæum with threescore and ten thousand soldiers, transported (with all their provisions) in a thousand ships of burden and two hundred galleys. Timoleon marcheth thither, and chargeth this great army upon the passage of a river.

A tempest of rain, hail, and lightning, with boisterous winds, beating upon the faces of the Carthaginians, they are utterly broken; ten thousand slain, five thousand taken, with all their carriages and provisions; among which there were found a thousand corslets, gilt and graven. After this, [b] Timoleon gave an overthrow to Icetes, and following his victory took him, with his son Eupolemus and the general of his horse, prisoners, whom he caused all to be slain; and afterwards (which was imputed to him for great cruelty) he suffered Icetes's wives and daughters to be put to death. But this was the revenge of God upon Icetes, who (after the murder of Dion) had caused Arete, Dion's wife, and a young child of his, with Aristomache his sister, to be cast into the sea.

He again prevailed against Mamercus, tyrant of Catana, and won Catana itself. Mamercus fled to Hippon, tyrant of Messana; but Timoleon pursuing him, won the town, delivering Hippon to his citizens, who tormented him to death. The same end had Mamercus, and all other the tyrants in Sicily.

Finally, he made peace with the Carthaginians, on condition that they should not pass the river of Lycus. After

[b] Plut. in vit. Tim.

this, he lived in great honour among the Syracusians till his death, and was solemnly buried by them in the market-place of their city; the day of his funerals being for ever ordained to be kept holy among them.

After such time as Timoleon had delivered Syracuse from the tyranny of Dionysius, and brought peace to the whole island, the inhabitants enjoyed their liberty in peace about twenty years. The cities and temples were repaired, the trade renewed, the merchant sailed in safety, and the labouring man enjoyed the fruits of the earth in quiet. But it was impossible that a nation, which neither knew how to govern, nor how to obey; which could neither endure kings, nor men worthy to be kings, to govern them, should any long time subsist.

Twenty years after the death of Timoleon, there started up an Agathocles among them, a man of base birth, and of baser condition, who from a beggar to a common soldier; from a soldier to a captain, and so from degree to degree; rising to be a prætor, finally became lord and sovereign of the Syracusians. Many fortunes he ran, and underwent as many dangers, ere he obtained the principality. For he had more than once attempted it, and was therein both beaten and banished. A passing valiant man he was, and did notable service, as well for those by whom he was employed, as also for the Syracusians, and against them. For in their wars against those of Enna and the Campanes, he did them memorable service; and on the contrary, as memorable service for the Murgantines against the Syracusians. For being entertained by the people of Murgantia, and made general of their forces, he sacked Leontium, and besieged Syracuse so straitly, that the citizens were driven to crave aid, even from their ancient and natural enemies the Carthaginians. Amilcar was sent by the Carthaginians to relieve Syracuse. With him Agathocles wrought so well, that he got him to make peace between himself and the Syracusians; binding himself by promise and oath to remain a friend and servant to the state of Carthage for ever after. Amilcar entertained the business, and compounded

the quarrels between Agathocles and the Syracusians. Agathocles is chosen pretor; he entertains five thousand Africans, and divers old soldiers of the Murgantines, under colour of a purpose to besiege Herbita. With these, and with the assistance of the poor and discontented Syracusians, (the city being also divided into many factions,) he assails the senators, kills all his enemies and opposites, divides the spoil of the rich among the poor, and gives liberty to his soldiers to rob, to ravish, and to murder, for two whole days and nights, without controlment: the third day, when they had blunted their barbarous appetites, and strewed the streets with ten thousand dead carcasses, besides those that had broken their necks over the walls, their fury had no further subject to work on.

Agathocles, in an assembly of the people, (being an eloquent knave,) persuaded them, that, for the violent sickness by which the commonwealth was utterly consumed, he found no better than the violent remedies which he had administered; and that he affected no other thing, than the reducing of the state from an oligarchy, or the rule of a few tyrannous magistrates, to the ancient and indifferent democraty, by which it had been governed from the first institution with so great glory and prosperity. This he did, to have the crown clapped on his head (as it were) perforce. For as he knew that he had left none living within the city fit nor able to exercise the office of a magistrate, so knew he right well, that all they which had assisted in the murder and spoil of their fellow-citizens had no other hope of defence, than the support of a lawless lord, who had been partaker with them in their villainies and cruelties committed. So as this rabble, his oration ended, proclaimed him king; again and again saluting and adoring him by that name, as if it had been given to him by some lawful election. Hence had our king Richard the Third a piece of his pattern; but the one was of base, the other of kingly parents; the one took liberty from a commonweal, the other sought only to succeed in a monarchy; the one continued his cruelty to the end, the other, after he had obtained the crown,

sought, by making of good laws, to recover the love of his people.

The life of this tyrant is briefly written by Justin; more largely and particularly by Diodorus Siculus; the sum whereof is this. The same Amilcar that had brought him into Syracuse, and that had lent him five thousand men to help in the massacre of the citizens, was also content to wink at many wrongs that he did unto the confederates of the Carthaginians. It was the purpose of Amilcar to settle Agathocles in his tyranny, and to let him vex and waste the whole island, because it was thereby like to come to pass, that he should reduce all Sicily into such terms as would make it become an easy prey to Carthage. But, when the cities confederate with the Carthaginians sent their ambassadors with complaint of this ill dealing to Carthage, the Punic faith (so much taunted by the Romans, as no better than mere falsehood) shewed itself very honourable in taking order for the redress. Ambassadors were sent to comfort the Sicilians, and to put Agathocles in mind of his covenants; Amilcar was recalled home into Afric, and a new captain appointed to succeed in his charge, with such forces as might compel Agathocles to reason, if otherwise he would not hearken to it. All this tended to save their confederates from suffering such injuries in the future. For that which was past, (since it could not be recalled,) they took order to have it severely punished. Amilcar was accused secretly, and by way of scrutiny; the suffrages being given, but not calculated, and so reserved until he should return. This was not so closely handled, but that Amilcar had some notice of it. In managing his business with Agathocles, it is likely that he had an eye to his own profit, as well as to the public benefit of his country. For he had made such a composition with the Syracusian, as gave him not only means to weaken others, but to strengthen himself, both in power and authority, even against the Carthaginians. Such is commonly the custom of those that hope to work their own ends by cunning practices; thinking to deal subtilely and finely, they spin their threads so small, that they are broken

with the very wind. Amilcar saw that his Carthaginians had a purpose to deal substantially, and that therefore it would be hard for him to make them follow his crooked devices; which if he could not do, it was to be expected that their anger would break out into so much the greater extremity, by how much the more they had concealed it. Therefore he followed the example which some of his foregoers had taught him, and, for fear of such a death as the judges might award him, he ended his own life in what sort he thought best. This desperation of Amilcar served to inform Agathocles of the Carthaginians' intent. He saw they would not be deluded with words, and therefore resolved to get the start of them in action. He dissembled no longer, but, instead of spoil and robbery, made open war upon all their adherents. He had made the better part of Sicily his own, ere the Carthaginian forces arrived; which, thinking to have encountered an ill-established tyrant, found him ready, as a king, to defend his own, and give them sharp entertainment. They were beaten by him, and their navy was so tempest-beaten, that they could neither do good by land nor sea, but were glad to leave their business undone, and return to Afric.

The Carthaginians prepare a new fleet; which being very gallantly manned and furnished, was broken by foul weather, and the best part of it cast away, even whilst it was yet within kenning of their city. But Amilcar the son of Gisco, gathering together the remainders of this shipwreck, was bold to pass over into Sicily, and landed not far from Gela, where Agathocles was soon ready to examine the cause of their coming. Many skirmishes passed between them, in which (commonly) the Syracusian had the better. But his good success begat presumption, whereby he lost a battle more important than all the other fights. One adverse chance is enough to overthrow the state of a tyrant, if it be not upheld by great circumspection. The war was soon transferred to the walls of Syracuse, within which Agathocles was closed up, and driven to make his last defence by their help, who may be judged to have loved him

not very greatly. But the inhabitants of Syracuse, after that great massacre of the principal men made in the beginning of this new tyranny, were (for the most part) such as had been either mercenary soldiers, enfranchised slaves, or base and needy people; helpers in establishing the present government, and executioners of the murders and spoil committed in that change. If there were any other, (as some there were,) they were so well observed, and (withal) so fearful, that they durst not stir. But it was not enough that they all agreed in the common defence of themselves and their city, famine was likely to grow upon them, and enforce them to change their resolution. In this necessity Agathocles adventured upon a strange course, which the event commended as wise. He embarked as many as he thought meet in those vessels that rode in the haven, and committing the government of the city to his brother Antander, willed the people to be of good courage, for that (as he told them) he had bethought himself of a mean both to raise the siege and to repair all other losses. A Carthaginian fleet lay in the mouth of the haven, both to hinder the entrance of victuallers, and to keep the besieged from issuing forth.

Now at such time as Agathocles was ready to depart, advertisement came that many ships of burden, laden with corn and other provisions, were drawing near unto Syracuse. To intercept these, the Carthaginians hoist sail, and launch forth into the deep. They were not far gone, when they might behold Agathocles issuing forth of the port, with purpose (as they thought) to give convoy unto his victuallers. Hereupon they wheel about, and make amain towards him, as thinking him the better booty. He neither abode their coming, nor fled back into the city, but made all speed towards Afric, and was pursued by the Carthaginians as long as day would give them light. In the mean season the victuallers were gotten into Syracuse, which was the more plentifully relieved by their coming, for that Agathocles had unburdened the place of no small number. When the Carthaginian admiral perceived, first, that by pursuing

two fleets at once he had missed of them both; and secondly, that Agathocles returned not again, but was gone to seek his fortune elsewhere; he thought it good to pursue those that were fled, and to attend so well upon them, that they should not have leisure to do mischief in some other part.

The Carthaginian navy followed Agathocles (whether by chance or by relation of such as had met with him at sea) directly towards Afric, and overtook him after six days. He had (at the first) a great start of them, so that (belike) they rowed hard, and wearied themselves in seeking their own misfortune. For he fought with them, and beat them; and, having sunk or taken many, drove the rest to fly which way they could, laden with strange tidings of his voyage.

When Agathocles had landed his men in Afric, then did he discover unto them his project, letting them understand, that there was no better way to divert the Carthaginians, not only from Syracuse, but from all the isle of Sicily, than by bringing the war to their own doors. For here, said he, they have many that hate them, and that will readily take arms against them, as soon as they perceive that there is an army on foot which dares to look upon their walls. Their towns are ill fortified, their people untrained and unexperienced in dangers; the mercenary forces that they levy in these parts will rather follow us than them, if we offer greater wages than they can give; which we may better promise and make good, by letting them have some share with us in all the wealth of the Carthaginians, than our enemies can do, by making some addition to their stipends. Thus he talked, as one already master of all the riches in Afric, and with many brave words encouraged his men so well, that they were contented to set fire on all their ships, (reserving one or two to use as messengers,) to the end that no hope should remain, save only in victory. In this heat of resolution they win by force two cities, which, after they had throughly sacked, they burnt to the ground, as a mark of terror to all that should make resistance. The Car-

thaginians hearing this are amazed, thinking that Amilcar is broken, and his whole army destroyed in Sicily. This impression so dismays them, that when they know the truth of all, by such as had escaped in the late sea-fight, yet still they fear, and know not what. They suspect Amilcar's faith, who had suffered Agathocles to land in Afric; they suspect their principal citizens at home of a meaning to betray Carthage unto the enemy; they raise a great army, and know not unto whose charge they may safely commit it.

There were at that time two famous captains in the city, Hanno and Bomilcar, great enemies, and therefore the more unlikely to conspire against the commonwealth. These are made generals of the army levied, which far exceeded the forces of Agathocles. But it seldom happens that dissension between commanders produceth any fortunate event. Necessity drave Agathocles to fight, and the courage of his men, resolved to deal with the whole multitude of the Carthaginians, made easy the victory against the one half of them. For Bomilcar would not stir, but suffered Hanno to be cut in pieces.

The reputation of this victory brought over a king of the Africans from the Carthaginian society to take part with Agathocles, who, pursuing his victory, wins many towns, and sends word to Syracuse of his good success. The Carthaginians also send into Sicily, willing Amilcar their general to succour the state of Afric, which was in danger to be lost, whilst he was travelling in the conquest of Sicily. Amilcar sends them five thousand men; all his forces he thought it not needful to transport, as hoping rather to draw Agathocles back into Sicily, than to be drawn home by one that could scarce retain his own kingdom. But these good hopes had a bad issue. He spent some time in winning a few towns that adhered unto the Syracusians, and having brought his matters to some good order, he conceived a sudden hope of taking Syracuse by surprise. It was a pretty (though tragical) accident, if it were true, as Tully relates it. Amilcar had a dream, which told him that he should sup the next day within Syracuse. His fancy

begot this dream, and he believed it. He made more haste than good speed towards the city; and coming upon it on the sudden, had good hope to carry it. But his enemies were prepared for him, and had laid an ambush to entrap him, whereunto he fell. So he was carried prisoner into the city, in which it was likely that he had no great cheer to his supper; for they struck off his head, and sent it into Afric, (a welcome present,) to Agathocles.

This good success of things at home did put such courage into the Sicilian army, that Agathocles was bold to wear a crown, and style himself king of Afric. He had allured Ophellas, king of the Cyrenians, to take his part, by promises to deliver the country into his hands; for that, as he said, it was sufficient unto himself to have diverted the Carthaginians from Sicily, wherein (after this war ended) he might reign quietly. Ophellas came with a great army, and was friendly entertained: but the traitorous Sicilian taking an advantage, did murder this his assistant; and afterwards, by good words and great promises, drew all the Cyrenian army to follow him in his wars. Thus his villainy found good success; and he so prevailed in Afric, that he got leisure to make a step into Sicily. Many towns in Sicily had embraced a desire of recovering their liberty; thinking it high time to fight at length for their own freedom, after that they had so long been exposed, (as a reward of victory,) either unto aliens, or to tyrants of their own country. These had prevailed far, and gotten many to take their parts, as in a common cause; when the coming of Agathocles abated their high spirits, and his good success in many fights compelled them to obedience. Out of Sicily he returned into Afric, where his affairs stood in very bad terms. Archagathus, his son, had lost a battle, and (which was worse) had ill means to help himself, his army being in mutiny for lack of pay. But Agathocles pacified the tumult, by the accustomed promises of great booty and spoil. It had now been time for him to offer peace to the Carthaginians; which to obtain, they would (questionless) have given to him both money enough to pay his army, and all that they

then held in Sicily. For their city had been distressed, not only by this his war, but by the treason of Bomilcar, who failed not much of making himself tyrant over them. But ambition is blind. Agathocles had all his thoughts fixed upon the conquest of Carthage itself; out of which dream he was awaked by the loss of a battle, not so memorable in regard of any accident therein, as of the strange events following it. The Carthaginians, after their great misfortunes in this war, had renewed their old sacrifices of children to Saturn; from whence they had abstained, ever since they made peace with Gelon. And now they made choice of some, the goodliest of their prisoners taken in the battle, to offer unto the said idol, in way of thankfulness for their victory. The fire, with which these unhappy men were consumed, caught hold upon the lodgings nearest unto the altar; and spreading itself further through the camp, with the destruction of many men, caused such a tumult, as is usual in the like cases. At the same time, the like accident of fire burnt up the pavilion of Agathocles. Hereupon both the armies fled away; each of them believing, that the noise in the adverse camp was the sign of the enemy's coming to invade it. But the Carthaginians had a safe retreat; Agathocles, by a second error, fell into a new calamity. In the beginning of this his flight in the dark, he met with his own African soldiers; and thinking them to be enemies, (as indeed the one half of them had revolted from him to the Carthaginians in the last battle,) he began to assail them, and was so stoutly resisted, that he lost in this blind fight above four thousand of his men. This did so discourage his proud heart, that, being fallen from the near hope of taking the city of Carthage unto some distrust of his own safety, he knew no more how to moderate his present weak fears, than lately he had known how to govern his ambition. Therefore he took the way that came next into his head; which was, to steal closely aboard his ships with his younger son, (the elder he suspected of incest and of ambition,) and so to fly into Sicily; thinking it the best course to shift for himself, as wanting vessels

wherein to transport his army. His elder son Archagathus perceived his drift, arrested him, and put him under custody; but by means of a sudden tumult he was let loose, escaped, and fled alone, leaving both his sons behind him. His flight being noised through the army, all was in uproar; and extremity of rage caused not only the common soldier, but even such as had been friends to the tyrant, to lay hold upon his two sons and kill them. That this flight of Agathocles was extremely base, I need not use words to prove: that his fear was truly, as all fear is said to be, a passion, depriving him of the succours which reason offered, the sequel doth manifest. His forsaken soldiers, being now a headless company, and no longer an army to be feared, obtained nevertheless a reasonable composition from the Carthaginians; to whom they sold those places, whereof they had possession, for nineteen talents. Likewise Agathocles himself, having lost his army, did nevertheless, by the reputation of this late war, make peace with Carthage upon equal terms.

After this, the tyrant, being delivered from foreign enemies, discovered his bloody nature in most abominable cruelties among the Sicilians. His wants and his fears urged him so violently, that he was not satisfied with the spoils of the rich, or the death of those whom he held suspected, but in a beastly rage depopulated whole cities. He devised new engines of torment; wherein, striving to exceed the bull of Phalaris, he made a frame of brass that should serve to scorch men's bodies, and withal give him leave to behold them in their misery. So devilish is the nature of man, when reason, that should be his guide, is become a slave to his brutish affections. In these mischiefs he was so outrageous, that he neither spared sex nor age; especially when he was informed of the slaughter of his children in Afric. But this was not the way to preserve his estate; it threw him into new dangers. They whom he had chased out of their country took arms against him, and drove him into such fear, that he was fain to seek the love at Carthage, which, by ruling well, he might have had in Sicily. He

freely delivered into the Carthaginians' hands all those towns of the Phœnicians in Sicily belonging unto them, which were in his possession. They requited him honourably with great store of corn, and with four hundred talents of gold and silver. So (though not without much trouble and hazard) he prevailed against the rebels, and settled his estate. Having no further business left in Sicily, he made a voyage into Italy: there he subdued the Brutians, rather by terror of his name than by any force, for they yielded at his first coming. This done, he went to the isle of Lipara, and made the inhabitants buy peace with one hundred talents of gold. But when he had gotten this great sum, he would needs exact a greater; and finding plainly that they had no more left, he was bold to spoil the temples of their gods. Herein, methinks, he did well enough. For how could he believe those to be gods, that had continually given deaf ears to his horrible perjuries? Then he returned richly home, with eleven ships laden with gold; all which, and all the rest of his fleet, were cast away by foul weather at sea; one galley excepted, in which he himself escaped, to suffer a more miserable end. A grievous sickness fell upon him, that rotted his whole body, spreading itself through all his veins and sinews. Whilst he lay in this case, all desiring his end, save only Theogenia (a wife that he had taken out of Egypt) and her small children; his nephew, the son of Archagathus, before mentioned, and a younger son of his own, began to contend about the kingdom. Neither did they seek to end the controversy by the old tyrant's decision; they regarded him not so much. But each of them laid wait for the other's life: wherein the nephew sped so well, that he slew his uncle, and got his grandfather's kingdom without asking any leave. These tidings wounded the heart of Agathocles with fear and sorrow. He saw himself without help, like to become a prey to his ungracious nephew, from whom he knew that no favour was to be expected, either by himself, or by those whom only he now held dear, which were Theogenia and her children. Therefore he advised her and them to fly before they were surprised; for

that otherwise they could by no means avoid either death, or somewhat that would be worse. He gave them all his treasures and goods, wherewith he even compelled them (weeping to leave him desolate in so wretched a case) to embark themselves hastily, and make speed into Egypt. After their departure, whether he threw himself into the fire, or whether his disease consumed him, there was none left that cared to attend him; but he ended his life as basely as obscurely, and in as much want as he first began it.

After the death of Agathocles it was, that the Mamertines, his soldiers, traitorously occupied Messana, and infested a great part of the island. Then also did the Carthaginians begin to renew their attempts of conquering all Sicily. What the nephew of Agathocles did, I cannot find: likely it is that he quickly perished; for the Sicilians were driven to send for Pyrrhus to help them, who had married with a daughter of Agathocles. But Pyrrhus was soon weary of the country, (as hath been shewed before,) and therefore left it; prophesying that it would become a goodly champaign field, wherein Rome and Carthage should fight for superiority. In which business how these two great cities did speed, the order of our story will declare.

SECT. V.

A recontinuation of the Roman war in Sicily. How Hiero, king of Syracuse, forsook the Carthaginians, and made his peace with Rome.

WHEN Appius Claudius, following the advantage of his victory gotten at Messana, brought the war unto the gates of Syracuse, and besieged that great city, Hiero found it high time for him to seek peace; knowing that the Carthaginians had neither any reason to be offended with him for helping himself by what means he could, when they were not in case to give him assistance; and foreseeing withal, that when once he had purchased his quiet from the Romans, it would be free for him to sit still without fear of molestation, whilst Rome and Carthage were fighting for the mastery. In this good mood the new Roman consuls,

M. Valerius and C. Octacilius found him, and readily embraced the offer of his friendship. Yet they made use of their present advantage, and sold him peace for an hundred (some say two hundred) talents.

These consuls had brought a great army into Sicily; yet did they nothing else in effect than to bring over Hiero to their side. If the Syracusian held them busied (which I find not, otherwise than by circumstances, as by the sum of money imposed upon him, and by their performing none other piece of service) all the whole time of their abode in the island; then was his departure from the friendship of Carthage no less to his honour than it was to his commodity. For by no reason could they require, that he should suffer his own kingdom to run into manifest peril of subversion for their sakes, that should have received all the profit of the victory; seeing they did expose him to the whole danger, without straining themselves to give him relief. But the Carthaginians had lately made good proof of the strength of Syracuse, in the days of Agathocles; and therefore knew that it was able to bear out a very strong siege. And hereupon it is like that they were the more slack in sending help, if perhaps it were not some part of their desire that both Rome and Syracuse should weaken one the other, whereby their own work might be the easier against them both. Yet indeed the case of the besieged city was not the same when the Romans lay before it, as it had been when the Carthaginians attempted it. For there was great reason to try the uttermost hazard of war against the Carthaginians, who sought no other thing than to bring it into slavery; not so against the Romans, who thought it sufficient, if they could withdraw it from the party of their enemies. Besides, it was not all one to be governed by Agathocles or by Hiero. The former of these cared not what the citizens endured, so long as he might preserve his own tyranny; the latter, as a just and good prince, had no greater desire than to win the love of his people by seeking their commodity; but, including his own felicity within the public, laboured to uphold both by honest and faithful dealing. Hereby it came

to pass, that he enjoyed a long and happy reign; living dear to his own subjects, beloved of the Romans, and not greatly molested by the Carthaginians; whom either the consideration that they had left him to himself, ere he left their society, made unwilling to seek his ruin; or their more earnest business with the Romans made unable to compass it.

SECT. VI.

How the Romans besiege and win Agrigentum. Their beginning to maintain a fleet. Their first loss and first victory by sea. Of sea-fight in general.

HIERO having sided himself with the Romans, aided them with victuals and other necessaries; so that they, presuming upon his assistance, recall some part of their forces. The Carthaginians find it high time to bestir them: they send to the Ligurians, and to the troops they had in Spain, to come to their aid; who being arrived, they made the city of Agrigentum the seat of the war against the Romans, filling it with all manner of munition.

The Roman consuls, having made peace with Hiero, return into Italy; and in their places Lucius Posthumius and Quintus Mamilius arrive. They go on towards [c] Agri-

[c] Agrigentum was a goodly city built by the Geloi, under conduct of Ariston and Pystilus. The compass was ten miles about the walls, and it had sometimes in it eight hundred thousand inhabitants. This city, by reason of the fertility of the soil, and the neighbourhood of Carthage, grew in a short space from small beginnings to great glory and riches. The plenty and luxury thereof was so great, as it caused Empedocles to say, that the Agrigentines built palaces of such sumptuosity, as if they meant to live for ever; and made such feasts, as if they meant to die the next day. But their greatest pomp and magnificence was in their goodly temples and theatres, water-conduits, and fish-ponds; the ruins whereof at this day are sufficient argument that Rome itself could never boast of the like. In the porch of the temple of Jupiter Olympius, (by which we may judge of the temple itself,) there was set out on one side the full proportion of the giants fighting with the gods, all cut out in polished marble of divers colours, a work the most magnificent and rare that ever hath been seen: on the other side, the war of Troy, and the encounters which happened at that siege, with the personages of the heroes that were doers in that war; all of the like beautiful stone, and of equal stature to the bodies of men in those ancient times: in comparison of which, the latter works of that kind are but petty things and mere trifles. It would require a volume to express the magnificence of the temples of Hercules, Æsculapius, Concord, Juno, Lacinia, Chastity, Proserpina, Castor and Pollux; wherein the masterpieces of those exquisite painters and

gentum, and, finding no enemy in the field, they besiege it, though it were stuffed with fifty thousand soldiers. After a while, the time of harvest being come, a part of the Roman army range the country to gather corn, and those at the siege grow negligent; the Carthaginians sally furiously, and endanger the Roman army, but are in the end repelled into the town with great loss; but by the smart felt on both sides, the assailants redoubled their guards, and the besieged kept within their covert. Yet the Romans, the better to assure themselves, cut a deep trench between the walls of the city and their camp, and another on the outside thereof; that neither the Carthaginians might force any quarter suddenly by a sally, nor those of the country without break upon them unawares; which double defence kept the besieged also from the receiving any relief of victuals and munitions, whilst the Syracusian supplies the assailants with what they want. The besieged send for succour to Carthage, after they had been in this sort pent up five months. The Carthaginians embark an army, with certain elephants, under the command of Hanno, who arrives with it at Heraclea, to the west of Agrigentum. Hanno puts himself into the field, and surpriseth Erbessus, a city wherein the Romans had bestowed all their provision. By means hereof the famine without grew to be as great as it was within Agrigentum, and the Roman camp no less straitly assieged by Hanno, than the city was by the Romans; insomuch, as if Hiero had not supplied them, they had been forced to abandon the siege. But seeing that this distress was not enough to make them rise, Hanno determined to give them battle. To which end departing from Heraclea, he makes approach unto the Roman camp. The Romans resolve to sustain him, and put themselves in order. Hanno directs the Numidian horsemen to charge their vanguard, to the end to draw them further on; which done, he commands

carvers, Phidias, Zeuxis, Myron, and Polycletus, were to be seen. But in process of time it ran the same fortune that all other great cities have done, and was ruined by divers calamities of war; whereof this war present brought unto it not the least.

them to return, as broken, till they came to the body of the army that lay shadowed behind some rising ground. The Numidians perform it accordingly; and while the Romans pursued the Numidians, Hanno gives upon them, and having slaughtered many, beats the rest into their trenches.

After this encounter, the Carthaginians made no other attempt for two months, but lay strongly encamped, waiting until some opportunity should invite them. But Hannibal, that was besieged in Agrigentum, as well by signs as messengers, made Hanno know how ill the extremity which he endured was able to brook such dilatory courses. Hanno thereupon a second time provoked the consuls to fight. But his elephants being disordered by his own vanguard, which was broken by the Romans, he lost the day, and with such as escaped he recovered Heraclea. Hannibal perceiving this, and remaining hopeless of succour, resolved to make his own way. Finding therefore that the Romans, after this day's victory, wearied with labour, and secured by their good fortune, kept negligent watch in the night, he rushed out of the town with all the remainder of his army, and passed by the Roman camp without resistance. The consuls pursue him in the morning, but in vain; sure they were that he could not carry the city with him, which with little ado the Romans entered, and pitifully spoiled. The Romans, proud of this victory, purpose henceforth rather to follow the direction of their present good fortunes, than their first determinations. They had resolved in the beginning of this war only to succour the Mamertines, and to keep the Carthaginians from their own coasts; but now they determine to make themselves lords of all Sicily, and from thence, being favoured with the wind of good success, to sail over into Afric. It is the disease of kings, of states, and of private men, to covet the greatest things, but not to enjoy the least; the desire of that which we neither have nor need, taking from us the true use and fruition of what we have already. This curse upon mortal men was never taken from them since the beginning of the world to this day.

To prosecute this war, Lucius Valerius and Titus Octa-

cilius, two new consuls, are sent into Sicily. Whereupon, the Romans being masters of the field, many inland towns gave themselves unto them. On the contrary, the Carthaginians keeping still the lordship of the sea, many maritimate places became theirs. The Romans therefore, as well to secure their own coasts, often invaded by the African fleets, as also to equal themselves in every kind of warfare with their enemies, determine to make a fleet. And herein fortune favoured them with this accident, that being altogether ignorant in shipwrights' craft, a storm of wind thrust one of the Carthaginian galleys, of five banks, to the shore.

Now had the Romans a pattern, and by it they began to set up an hundred *quinqueremes*, which were galleys rowed by five on every bank, and twenty of three on a bank; and while these were in preparing, they exercised their men in the feat of rowing. This they did after a strange fashion: they placed upon the sea-sands many seats, in order of the banks in galleys, whereon they placed their watermen, and taught them to beat the sand with long poles, orderly, and as they were directed by the master, that so they might learn the stroke of the galley, and how to mount and draw their oars.

When their fleet was finished, some rigging and other implements excepted, C. Cornelius, one of the new consuls, (for they changed every year,) was made admiral, who being more in love with this new kind of warfare than well advised, passed over to Messana with seventeen galleys, leaving the rest to follow him. There he stayed not, but would needs row along the coast to Lipara, hoping to do some piece of service. Hannibal, a Carthaginian, was at the same time governor in Panormus, who, being advertised of this new seaman's arrival, sent forth one Boodes, a senator of Carthage, with twenty galleys to entertain him. Boodes, falling upon the consul unawares, took both him and the fleet he commanded. When Hannibal received this good news, together with the Roman galleys and their consul, he grew no less foolish hardy than Cornelius had been. For he, fancying to himself to surprise the rest of the Roman

fleet on their own coast, ere they were yet in all points provided, sought them out with a fleet of fifty sail; wherewith falling among them, he was well beaten, and, leaving the greater number of his own behind him, made an hard escape with the rest; for of one hundred and twenty galleys, the Romans under Cornelius had lost but seventeen, so as one hundred and three remained, which were not easily beaten by fifty.

The Romans, being advertised of Cornelius's overthrow, make haste to redeem him, but give the charge of their fleet to his colleague Duilius. Duilius, considering that the Roman vessels were heavy and slow, the African galleys having the speed of them, devised a certain engine in the prow of his galleys, whereby they might fasten or grapple themselves with their enemy's, when they were (as we call it) board and board, that is, when they brought the galleys' sides together. This done, the weightier ships had gotten the advantage, and the Africans lost it. For neither did their swiftness serve them, nor their mariners' craft, the vessels wherein both nations fought being open; so that all was to be carried by the advantage of weapon, and valour of the men. Besides this, as the heavier galleys were likely to crush and crack the sides of the lighter and weaker, so were they, by reason of their breadth, more steady; and those that best kept their feet could also best use their hands. The example may be given between one of the long boats of his majesty's great ships and a London barge.

Certainly, he that will happily perform a fight at sea, must be skilful in making choice of vessels to fight in; he must believe, that there is more belonging to a good man of war upon the waters, than great during; and must know, that there is a great deal of difference between fighting loose, or at large, and grappling. The guns of a slow ship pierce as well, and make as great holes, as those in a swift. To clap ships together without consideration, belongs rather to a madman than to a man of war; for by such an ignorant bravery was Peter Strossie lost at the Azores, when he fought against the marquis of Santa Cruz. In like sort

had the lord Charles Howard, admiral of England, been lost in the year 1588, if he had not been better advised, than a great many malignant fools were that found fault with his demeanour. The Spaniards had an army aboard them, and he had none; they had more ships than he had, and of higher building and charging; so that, had he entangled himself with those great and powerful vessels, he had greatly endangered this kingdom of England. For twenty men upon the defences are equal to an hundred that board and enter; whereas then, contrariwise, the Spaniards had an hundred for twenty of ours, to defend themselves withal. But our admiral knew his advantage, and held it; which had he not done, he had not been worthy to have held his head. Here to speak in general of sea-fight, (for particulars are fitter for private hands than for the press,) I say, that a fleet of twenty ships, all good sailers and good ships, have the advantage, on the open sea, of an hundred as good ships and of slower sailing. For if the fleet of an hundred sail keep themselves near together, in a gross squadron, the twenty ships, charging them upon any angle, shall force them to give ground, and to fall back upon their next fellows, of which so many as entangle are made unserviceable, or lost. Force them they may easily, because the twenty ships, which give themselves scope, after they have given one broadside of artillery, by clapping into the wind, and staying, they may give them the other, and so the twenty ships batter them in pieces with a perpetual volley; whereas those that fight in a troop have no room to turn, and can always use but one and the same beaten side. If the fleet of an hundred sail give themselves any distance, then shall the lesser fleet prevail, either against those that are a-rear and hindmost, or against those that by advantage of over-sailing their fellows keep the wind; and if upon a lee-shore the ships next the wind be constrained to fall back into their own squadron, then it is all to nothing that the whole fleet must suffer shipwreck, or render itself. That such advantage may be taken upon a fleet of unequal speed, it hath been well enough conceived in old time, as by that

oration of [d] Hermocrates, in Thucydides, which he made to the Syracusians when the Athenians invaded them, it may easily be observed.

Of the art of war by sea, I had written a treatise for the lord Henry, prince of Wales; a subject to my knowledge never handled by any man, ancient or modern; but God hath spared me the labour of finishing it by his loss; by the loss of that brave prince, of which, like an eclipse of the sun, we shall find the effects hereafter. Impossible it is to equal words and sorrows, I will therefore leave him in the hands of God that hath him: *Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent.*

But it is now time to return to the beaten Carthaginians, who, by losing their advantage of swift boats, and boarding the Romans, have lost fifty sail of their galleys; as on the other side, their enemies, by commanding the seas, have gotten liberty to sail about the west part of Sicily, where they raised the siege laid unto Segesta by the Carthaginians, and won the town of Macella, with some other places.

SECT. VII.

Divers enterfeats of war between the Romans and Carthaginians, with variable success. The Romans prepare to invade Afric, and obtain a great victory at sea.

THE victory of Duilius, as it was honoured at Rome with the first naval triumph that was ever seen in that city, so gave it unto the Romans a great encouragement to proceed in their wars by sea; whereby they hoped, not only to get Sicily, but all the other isles between Italy and Afric, beginning with Sardinia, whither soon after they sent a fleet for that purpose. On the contrary side, Amilcar the Carthaginian, lying in Panormus, carefully waited for all occasions that might help to recompense the late misfortune; and being advertised that some quarrel was grown between the Roman soldiers and their auxiliaries, being such as caused them to encamp apart, he sent forth Hanno to set upon them, who, taking them unawares, buried four thou-

[d] Thucyd. l. 6.

sand of them in the place. Now, during the continuance of the land-war in Sicily, Hannibal, who had lately been beaten by sea, but escaped unto Carthage, meaning to make amends for his former error, obtained the trust of a new fleet, wherewith he arrived at Sardinia; the conquest of which island the Romans had entertained for their next enterprise. Now it so fell out that the Romans, crossing the seas from Sicily, arrived in the port where Hannibal with his new fleet anchored. They set upon him unawares, and took the better part of the fleet which he conducted, himself hardly escaping their danger. But it little availed him to have escaped from the Romans: his good friends the Carthaginians were so ill pleased with this his second unfortunate voyage, that they hanged him up for his diligence; for, as it hath been said of old, *Non est bis in bello peccare;* "In war it is too "much to offend twice."

After this, it was long ere any thing of importance was done by the consuls, till [c] Panormus was besieged; where,

[c] If we may give credit to antiquities, which Fazellus, a diligent writer, hath left us in his history of Sicily; Panormus, now called Palermo, is one of the first cities that hath been built in all Europe. For whereas Thucydides seems to make it a colony of the Phœnicians, Ranzanus, *in libello de Panormo*, lib. 6. affirms, that it was first, and long before the time which Thucydides sets down, founded by the Chaldæans and Damascenes. To prove which, he tells us of two inscriptions upon marble, in the Hebrew character, found at Panormus in the time of William the Second, king of Sicily, that were then beheld of all the citizens and other strangers, which being translated into Latin, say as followeth: *Vivente Isaac filio Abrahæ, et regnante in Idumæa, atque in valle Damascena, Esau filio Isaac; ingens Hebræorum manus, quibus adjuncti sunt multi Damasceni, atque Phœnices, profecti in hanc triangularem insulam, sedes perpetuas locaverunt in hoc amœnissimo loco, quem Panormum nominaverunt.* In the other marble table are found these words: *Non est alius Deus præter unum Deum; non est alius potens, præter eundem Deum, &c. Hujus turris præfectus est Saphu, filius Eliphar filii Esau, fratris Jacob, filii Isaac, filii Abrahami: et turri quidem ipsi nomen est Baych; sed turri huic proximæ nomen est Pharuh.* And this inscription, saith Fazellus, was found entire in the castle Baych, in the year 1534. Now whether these inscriptions were truly as ancient as these men believe they were, I leave every man to his own faith. But that the city was of aged times, it appears by Thucydides, who affirmeth, when the Greeks passed first into Sicily, that then the Phœnicians inhabited Panormus; which certain it is that they did in the first Punic war, to wit, the Carthaginians, who were Phœnicians, from whom the Romans (A. Aquilius and C. Cornelius commanding this army) took it. And when Marcellus besieged Syracuse, it sent him in aid three thousand soldiers. But it was rather confederate than subject to the Romans. For Cicero against Verres, names it among the free cities of Sicily. After Syra-

when the Romans had sought in vain to draw the Carthaginians into the field, being unable to force that great city, because of the strong garrison therein bestowed, they departed thence, and took certain inland towns, as Mytistratum, Enna, Camerina, Hippana, and others, between Panormus and Messana. The year following, C. Atilius the consul, who commanded the Roman fleet, discovered a company of the Carthaginian galleys ranging the coast, and, not staying for his whole number, pursued them with ten of his. But he was well beaten for the haste he made, and lost all, save the galley which transported him, wherein himself escaped with great labour. But ere all was done, the rest of Atilius's fleet was gotten up; who, renewing the fight, recovered from the Carthaginians a double number of theirs, by which the victory remaining doubtful, both challenge it. Now, to try at once which of these two nations should command the seas, they both prepare all they can. The Romans make a fleet of three hundred and thirty galleys, the Carthaginians of three hundred and fifty, [f] *triremes*, *quadriremes*, and *quinqueremes*.

The Romans resolve to transport the war into Afric; the Carthaginians to arrest them on the coast of Sicily. The numbers, with which each of them filled their fleet, was perhaps the greatest that ever fought on the waters. By Polybius's estimation, there were in the Roman galleys an hundred and forty thousand men, and in those of Carthage an hundred and fifty thousand; reckoning one hundred and twenty soldiers, and three hundred rowers to every galley, one with the other. The Roman fleet was divided into four parts, of which the three first made the form of a wedge or

cuse destroyed, it became the first city and regal seat, as well of the Goths and Saracens in that island, as of the emperors of Constantinople; of the Normans, French, and Arragonians; which honour it holds to this day, and is much frequented for the excellent wine which grows about it.

[f] The *quinqueremes* are galleys wherein every oar hath five men to draw it; the *quadriremes* had four to an oar, and the *triremes* three. Some have thought that the *quinqueremes* had five ranks of oars, one over another; and the other galleys (ratably) fewer. But had this been so, they must then have had five decks each over other, which hath seldom been seen in ships of a thousand tons; neither could the third, fourth, and fifth ranks have reached unto the water with their oars.

triangle; the two first squadrons making the flanks, and the third squadron the base; the point thereof (wherein were the two consuls as admirals) looking toward the enemy, and the middle space lying empty. Their vessels of carriage were towed by the third squadron. After all, came up the fourth, in form of a crescent, very well manned, but exceeding thin; so that the horns of it enclosed all the third squadron, together with the corners of the first and second. The order of the Carthaginian fleet I cannot conceive by the relation; but, by the manner of the fight afterwards, I conjecture that the front of their fleet was thin, and stretched in a great length, much like to that which the French call *combat en haii;* a long front of horse, and thin; which form, since the pistol prevailed over the lance, they have changed. Behind this first outstretched front, their battalions were more solid. For Amilcar, admiral of the Carthaginians, had thus ordered them of purpose, (his galleys having the speed of the Romans,) that, when the first fleet of the Romans hasted to break through the first galleys, they should all turn tail, and the Romans pursuing them (as after a victory) disorder themselves, and for eagerness of taking the runaways, leave their other three squadrons far behind them. For so must it needs fall out, seeing that the third squadron towed their horse-boats and victuallers, and the fourth had the rearward of all. According to Amilcar's direction, it succeeded: for when the Romans had charged and broken the thin front of the Carthaginian first fleet, which ran away, they forthwith gave after them with all speed possible, not so much as looking behind them for the second squadron. Hereby the Romans were drawn near unto the body of the Carthaginian fleet led by Amilcar, and by him (at the first) received great loss, till their second squadron came up, which forced Amilcar to betake him to his oars. Hanno also, who commanded the right wing of the Carthaginian fleet, invaded the Roman rearward, and prevailed against them. But Amilcar being beaten off, Marcus Atilius fell back to their succour, and put the Carthaginians to their heels, as not able to sustain both squad-

rous. The rear being relieved, the consuls came to the aid of their third battalion, which towed their victuallers, which was also in great danger of being beaten by the Africans; but the consuls, joining their squadrons to it, put the Carthaginians on that part also to running. This victory fell to the Romans, partly by the hardiness of their soldiers, but principally, for that Amilcar, being first beaten, could never after join himself to any of his other squadrons, that remained as yet in fair likelihood of prevailing, so long as they fought upon even terms, and but squadron to squadron. But Amilcar forsaking the fight, thereby left a full fourth part of the Roman fleet unengaged, and ready to give succour to any of the other parts that were oppressed. So as in conclusion the Romans got the honour of the day; for they lost but four and twenty of theirs, whereas the Africans lost thirty that were sunk, and threescore and three that were taken.

Now if Amilcar, who had more galleys than the Romans, had also divided his fleet into four squadrons, (besides those that he ranged in the front, to draw on the enemy's and to engage them,) and that, while he himself fought with one squadron that charged him, all the rest of the enemy's fleet had been at the same time entertained, he had prevailed; but the second squadron, being free, came to the rescue of the first, by which Amilcar was oppressed; and Amilcar being oppressed and scattered, the consuls had good leisure to relieve both their third and fourth squadron, and got the victory.

Charles the Fifth, among other his precepts to Philip the Second, his son, where he adviseth him concerning war against the Turks, tells him, that in all battles between them and the Christians, he should never fail to charge the janizaries in the beginning of the fight, and to engage them at once with the rest. For, saith he, the janizaries, who are always reserved entire in the rear of the battle, and in whom the Turk reposeth his greatest confidence, come up in a gross body when all the troops on both sides are disbanded and in confusion; whereby they carry the victory before

them without resistance. By the same order of fight and reservation did the Romans also prevail against other nations; for they kept their *triarii* in store (who were the choice of their army) for the upshot and last blow. A great and a victorious advantage it hath ever been found, to keep some one or two good troops to look on, when all else are disbanded and engaged.

SECT. VIII.

The Romans prevail in Afric. Atilius the consul propoundeth intolerable conditions of peace to the Carthaginians. He is utterly beaten, and made prisoner.

NOW the Romans, according to their former resolution, after they had repaired and revictualled their fleet, set sail for Africa, and arrived at the promontory of Hercules, a great headland, somewhat to the east of the port of Carthage, and some forty leagues from Heraclea in Sicily, where Amilcar himself as yet stayed. From this headland (leaving the entrance into Carthage) they coasted the east side of the promontory, till they came to Clypea, a town about fifty English miles from it. There they disembarked, and prepared to besiege Clypea; which, to ease them of labour, was yielded unto them. Now had they a port of their own on Africa side; without which all invasions are foolish. By this time were the Africans also arrived at their own Carthage, fearing that the Roman fleet and army had directed themselves thither; but being advertised that they had taken Clypea, they made provisions of all sorts, both by sea and land, for their defence. The Romans send to Rome for directions, and in the mean while waste all round about them. The order given from the senate was, that one of the consuls should remain with the army, and that the other should return with the fleet into Italy. According to this direction, Manlius the consul is sent home to Rome, whither he carried with him twenty thousand African captives, with all the Roman fleet and army; except forty ships, fifteen thousand foot, and five hundred horse, that were left with Atilius.

With these forces Regulus easily won some towns and places that were unwalled, and laid siege to others: but he performed no great matter before he came unto Adis. Yet I hold it worthy of relation, that near unto the river of Bagrada he encountered with a serpent of one hundred and twenty foot long, which he slew, not without loss of many soldiers, being driven to use against it such engines of war as served properly for the assaulting of towns. At Adis he met with the Carthaginian army, whereof the captains were Hanno and Bostar, together with Amilcar, who had brought over out of Sicily five thousand foot and five hundred horse to succour his country. These, belike, had an intent rather to weary him out of Africa by wary protraction of time, than to undergo the hazard of a main fight. They were careful to hold themselves free from necessity of coming to blows; yet had they a great desire to save the town of Adis out of his hands. Intending therefore to follow their general purpose, and yet to disturb him in the siege of Adis, they encamp near unto him, and strongly, (as they think,) on the top of an hill; but thereby they lose the services both of their elephants and of their horsemen. This disadvantage of theirs Regulus discovers, and makes use of it. He assails them in their strength, which they defend a while; but in fine the Romans prevail, and force them from the place, taking the spoil of their camp. Following this their good fortune at the heels, they proceed to [s] Tunis, a city within sixteen miles of Carthage, which they assault and take.

By the loss of this battle at Adis, and more especially by the loss of Tunis, the Carthaginians were greatly dismayed. The Numidians, their next neighbours towards the west, insult upon their misfortunes, invade and spoil their terri-

[s] This city was taken from the Turks by Charles the Fifth, in the year 1536, and was one of the three keys which he gave in charge to Philip the Second, his son, to keep safe; to wit, this Tunis, the key of Africa; Flushing, the key of the Netherlands; and Cadix, the key of Spain. But two of these Philip so lost, that he never found them again; the third our English were bold, in the time of the renowned queen Elizabeth, to wring out of his hands; where we stayed not to pick any lock, but brake open the doors, and having rifled all, threw it into the fire.

tory, and force those that inhabit abroad to forsake their villages and fields, and to hide themselves within the walls of Carthage. By reason hereof a great famine at hand threatens the citizens. Atilius finds his own advantage, and assures himself that the city could not long hold out; yet he feared lest it might defend itself until his time of office, that was near expired, should be quite run out, whereby the new consuls were like to reap the honour of obtaining it. Ambition, therefore, that hath no respect but to itself, persuades him to treat of peace with the Carthaginians. But he propounded unto them so unworthy and base conditions, as thereby their hearts, formerly possessed with fear, became now so courageous and disdainful, that they resolved either to defend their liberty, or to die to the last man. To strengthen this their resolution, there arrived at the same time a great troop of Greeks, whom they had formerly sent to entertain. Among these was a very expert soldier named Xantippus, a Spartan; who being informed of what had passed, and of the overthrow which the Carthaginians received near unto Adis, gave it out publicly that the same was occasioned by default of the commanders, and not of the nation. This bruit ran, till it came to the senate; Xantippus is sent for, gives the reason of his opinion, and in conclusion, being made general of the African forces, he puts himself into the field. The army which he led, consisted of no more than twelve thousand foot and four thousand horse, with an hundred elephants. No greater were the forces wherewith the Carthaginians fought for all that they had, liberty, lives, goods, wives, and children; which might well make it suspected that the armies by sea, before spoken of, were misnumbered; the one consisting of an hundred and forty thousand, and the other of an hundred and fifty thousand; were it not commonly found, that they which use the service of mercenary soldiers are stronger abroad than at their own doors.

Xantippus, taking the field with this army, marched directly towards the Romans; and ranging his troops upon fair and level ground, fittest both for his elephants and

horse, presented them battle. The Romans wondered whence this new courage of their enemies might grow; but confident they were that it should be soon abated. Their chief care was how to resist the violence of the elephants. Against them they placed the Velites, or light-armed soldiers, as a forlorn hope; that these might, either with darts and other casting weapons, drive back the beasts upon the enemies, or at least break their violence, and hinder them from rushing freely upon the legions. To the same end they made their battles deeper in file than they had been accustomed to do. By which means, as they were the less subject unto the impression of the elephants, so were they the more exposed unto the violence of horse, wherein the enemy did far exceed them. The elephants were placed by Xantippus, all in one rank, before his army, which followed them at a reasonable distance; his horsemen, and some light-armed foot of the Carthaginian auxiliaries, were in the wings. The first onset was given by the elephants, against which the Velites were so unable to make resistance, that they brake into the battalions following, and put them into some disorder. In this case the depth of the Roman battle was helpful: for when the beasts had spent their force in piercing through a few of the first ranks, the squadrons nevertheless persisted in their order without opening. But the Carthaginian horse, having at the first encounter, by reason of their advantage in number, driven those of Atilius out of the field, began to charge the Roman battalions in flank, and put them in great distress; who being forced to turn face every way, could neither pass forward nor yet retire, but had much ado to make good the ground whereon they stood. In the mean while, such of the Romans as had escaped the fury of the elephants, and left them at their backs, fell upon the Carthaginian army, that met them in very good array. It was no even match. The one were a disordered company, wearied with labour, and hurt; the other fresh, and well prepared to have dealt with the enemy upon equal terms. Here was therefore a great slaughter with little fight; the Romans hastily recoiling to the body of their

army, which being surrounded with the enemy, and spent with travail, fell all to rout upon the defeat of these troops, that open the way to a general overthrow. So the Carthaginians obtained a full victory; destroying the whole Roman army, save two thousand, and taking five hundred prisoners, together with Atilius the consul. Of their own they lost no more than eight hundred mercenaries, which were slain when the fight began by two thousand of the Romans, that wheeling about to avoid the elephants, bare down all before them, and made way even to the Carthaginian trenches. These were the two thousand that escaped, when the whole army behind them was routed. All the rest were either taken or slain. Hereby fortune made the Romans know, that they were no less her vassals than were the Carthaginians, how insolent soever they had been in their proposition of peace, as if they had purchased from her the inheritance of their prosperity, which she never gave nor sold to any mortal man. With what joy these news were welcomed, when they came to Carthage, we may easily conjecture; and what great things the virtue of one man hath often brought to pass in the world there are many examples to prove, no less than this of Xantippus; all of them confirming that sentence of Euripides: *Mens una sapiens plurium vincit manus;* "Many men's hands equal not one "wise mind."

After this great service done to the Carthaginians, Xantippus returned into Greece; whether for that he was more envied than honoured, or for what other cause, it is unknown.

The death of Atilius Regulus the consul was very memorable. He was sent from Carthage to Rome, about the exchange and ransom of prisoners on both sides; giving his faith to return, if the business were not effected. When he came to Rome, and plainly saw that his country should lose by the bargain; so far was he from urging the senate unto compassion of his own misery, that he earnestly persuaded to have the prisoners in Afric left to their ill destinies. This done, he returned to Carthage; where for his

pains taken, he was rewarded with an horrible death. For this his constancy and faith all writers highly extol him. But the Carthaginians seem to have judged him an obstinate and malicious enemy, that neither in his prosperity would hearken to reason, nor yet in his calamity would have the natural care to preserve himself and others, by yielding to such an office of humanity as is common in all wars, (not grounded upon deadly hatred,) only in regard of some small advantage. Whatsoever the Carthaginians thought of him, sure it is that his faithful observance of his word given cannot be too much commended. But that grave speech, which he made in the senate against the exchange of prisoners, appears, in all reason, to have proceeded from a vainglorious frowardness, rather than from any necessity of state. For the exchange was made soon after his death; wherein the Romans had the worse bargain, by so much as Regulus himself was worth. As for the authority of all historians that magnify him in this point, we are to consider that they lived under the Roman empire; Philinus, the Carthaginian, perhaps did censure it otherwise. Yet the death which he suffered with extreme torments, could not be more grievous to him than it was dishonourable to Carthage. Neither do I think that the Carthaginians could excuse themselves herein otherwise than by recrimination; saying, that the Romans deserved to be no better entreated, forasmuch as it was their ordinary practice to use others in the like sort. Cruelty doth not become more warrantable, but rather more odious, by being customary. It was the Roman fashion to whip almost to death, and then to behead, the captains of their enemies whom they took; yea, although they were such as had always made fair wars with them. Wherefore it seem not meet, in reason, that they should cry out against the like tyrannical insolence in others, as if it were lawful only in themselves.

The consideration both of this misfortune, that rewarded the pride of Atilius's intolerable demands, and of the sudden valour whereinto the Carthaginians' fear was changed by mere desperation, calls to remembrance the like insolency

of others in prosperity, that hath bred the like resolution in those to whom all reasonable grace hath been denied. In such cases, I never hold it impertinent to add unto one, more testimonies, approving the true rules from which our passions carry us away.

In the year 1378, the Genoese won so fast upon the Venetians, as they not only drove their galleys out of the sea, but they brought their own fleet within two miles of Venice itself. This bred such an amazement in the citizens of Venice, that they offered unto the Genoese (their state reserved) whatsoever they would demand. But Peter Doria, blown up with many former victories, would hearken to no composition, save the yielding of their city and state to his discretion. Hereupon the Venetians, being filled with disdain, thrust out to sea with all their remaining power, and assail Doria with such desperate fury, that they break his fleet, kill Doria himself, take nineteen of his galleys, fourscore boats of Padoa, and four thousand prisoners; recover Chiozza, and all the places taken from them; and following their victory, enter the port of Genoa, enforcing the Genoese basely to beg peace, to their extreme dishonour and disadvantage, being beaten; which, being victorious, they might have commanded to their greatest honour and advantage. The like happened to the earl of Flanders in the year 1380, when having taken a notable, and withal an over-cruel revenge upon the Gantois, he refused mercy to the rest; who in all humility, submitting themselves to his obedience, offered their city, goods, and estates, to be disposed at his pleasure. This when he had unadvisedly refused, and was resolved to extinguish them utterly, they issue out of their city with five thousand chosen men, and armed with a desperate resolution, they charge the earl, break his army, enter Bruges (pellmell) with his vanquished followers, and enforce him to hide himself under an heap of straw in a poor cottage; out of which with great difficulty he escaped and saved himself. Such are the fruits of insolency.

SECT. IX.

How the affairs of Carthage prospered after the victory against Atilius; how the Romans, having lost their fleet by tempest, resolve to forsake the seas; the great advantages of a good fleet in war between nations divided by the sea.

BY the reputation of this late victory, all places that had been lost in Afric return to the obedience of Carthage. Only Clypea stands out; before which the Carthaginians sit down, and assail it, but in vain; for the Romans, hearing of the loss of Atilius with their forces in Afric, and withal that Clypea was besieged, make ready a gross army, and transport it in a fleet of three hundred and fifty galleys, commanded by M. Æmilius and Ser. Fulvius, their consuls. At the promontory of Mercury, two hundred Carthaginian galleys, set out of purpose upon the bruit of their coming, encounter them, but greatly to their cost; for the Romans took by force an hundred and fourteen of their fleet, and drew them after them to Clypea, where they stayed no longer than to take in their own men that had been besieged; and this done, they made amain toward Sicily, in hope to recover all that the Carthaginians held therein. In this hasty voyage they despise the advice of the pilots, who pray them to find harbour in time, for that the season threatened some violent storms, which ever happened between the rising of Orion and of the [h] Dog-star. Now although the pilots of the Roman fleet had thus forewarned them of the weather at hand, and certified them withal, that the south coast of Sicily had no good ports wherein to save themselves upon such an accident; yet this victorious na-

[h] There is no part of the world which hath not some certain times of outrageous weather, besides their accidental storms. We have upon our coast a Michaelmas flaw, that seldom or never fails. In the West Indies, in the months of August and September, those most forcible winds which the Spaniards call the *nortes*, or northwinds, are very fearful; and therefore they that navigate in those parts take harbour till those months take end. Charles the Fifth being as ill advised, in passing the seas towards Algier, in the winter quarter, contrary to the counsel of A. Dosia, as he was in like unseasonable times to continue his siege before Metz in Lorrain, lost an hundred and forty ships by tempest, and fifteen galleys, with all in effect in them of men, victuals, horses, and munition; a loss no less great, than his retreat, both from before the one and the other, was extreme dishonourable.

tion was persuaded, that the wind and seas feared them no less than did the Africans, and that they were able to conquer the elements themselves. So refusing to stay within some port, as they were advised, they would needs put out to sea; thinking it a matter much helping their reputation, after this victory against the Carthaginian fleet, to take a few worthless towns upon the coast. The merciless winds in the mean while overtake them, and near unto Camerina overturn, and thrust headlong on the rocks, all but fourscore of three hundred and forty ships; so as their former great victory was devoured by the seas, before the fame thereof recovered Rome.

The Carthaginians, hearing what had happened, repair all their warlike vessels, hoping once again to command the seas: they are also as confident of their land-forces, since the overthrow of Atilius. They send Asdrubal into Sicily with all their old soldiers, and an hundred and forty elephants, embarked in two hundred galleys. With this army and fleet he arrives at Lilybæum, where he begins to vex the partisans of Rome. But adversity doth not discourage the Romans; they build in three months (a matter of great note) one hundred and twenty ships; with which, and the remainder of their late shipwreck, they row to Panormus, or Palermo, the chief city of the Africans in Sicily, and surround it by land and water; after a while they take it, and leaving a garrison therein, return to Rome.

Very desirous the Romans were to be doing in Afric; to which purpose they employed C. Servilius and C. Sempronius, their consuls: but these wrought no wonders. Some spoil they made upon the coasts of Africa; but fortune robbed them of all their gettings; for in their return, they were first set upon the sands, and like to have perished, near unto the lesser Syrtes, where they were fain to heave all overboard, that so they might get off; then, having with much ado doubled the cape of Lilybæum, in their passage from Panormus toward Italy they lost an hundred and fifty of their ships by foul weather. A greater discouragement never nation had; the god of the wars favoured them

no more than the god of the waters afflicted them. Of all that Mars enriched them with upon the land, Neptune robbed them upon the seas: for they had now lost, besides what they lost in fight, four hundred and six ships and galleys, with all the munition and soldiers transported in them.

The exceeding damage hereby received, persuaded them to give over their navigation, and their fight by sea, and to send only a land army into Sicily, under L. Cæcilius and C. Furius, their consuls. These they transported in some threescore ordinary passage-boats by the straits of Messana, that are not above a mile and an half broad from land to land. In like sort, the overthrow which Attilius received in Africa, occasioned chiefly by the elephants, made them less choleric against the Carthaginians than before; so that for two years after, they kept the high and woody grounds, not daring to fight in the fair and champaign countries. But this late resolution of forsaking the seas lasted not long: for it was impossible for them to succour those places which they held in Sicily without a navy, much less to maintain the war in Africa: for whereas the Romans were to send forces from Messana to Ægesta, to Lilybæum, and to other places in the extreme west parts of Sicily, making sometimes a march of above an hundred and forty English miles by land, which could not be performed with an army, and the provisions that follow it, in less than fourteen days; the Carthaginians would pass it with their galleys in eight and forty hours.

An old example we have, of that great advantage of transporting armies by water, between Canutus and Edmund Ironside: for Canutus, when he had entered the Thames with his navy and army, and could not prevail against London, suddenly embarked; and sailing to the west, landed in Dorsetshire, so drawing Edmund and his army thither. There finding ill entertainment, he again shipped his men, and entered the Severn, making Edmund to march after him, to the succour of Worcestershire, by him greatly spoiled. But when he had Edmund there, he

sailed back again to London; by means whereof he both wearied the king, and spoiled where he pleased, ere succour could arrive. And this was not the least help which the Netherlands have had against the Spaniards, in the defence of their liberty, that being masters of the sea, they could pass their army from place to place, unwearied and entire, with all the munition and artillery belonging unto it, in the tenth part of the time wherein their enemies have been able to do it. Of this an instance or two. The count Maurice of Nassau, now living, one of the greatest captains and of the worthiest princes that either the present or preceding ages have brought forth, in the year 1590 carried his army by sea, with forty cannons, to Breda; making countenance either to besiege Boisleduc or Gertreuiden-Berg; which the enemy (in prevention) filled with soldiers and victuals. But, as soon as the wind served, he suddenly set sail, and arriving in the mouth of the Meuse, turned up the Rhine, and thence to Yssel, and sat down before Zutphen. So before the Spaniards could march over-land round about Holland, about fourscore miles, and over many great rivers, with their cannon and carriage, Zutphen was taken. Again, when the Spanish army had overcome this wearisome march, and were now far from home, the prince Maurice, making countenance to sail up the Rhine, changed his course in the night; and sailing down the stream, he was set down before Hulst in Brabant, ere the Spaniards had knowledge what was become of him. So this town he also took before the Spanish army could return. Lastly, the Spanish army was no sooner arrived in Brabant, than the prince Maurice, well attended by his good fleet, having fortified Hulst, set sail again, and presented himself before Nimeguen in Guelders, a city of notable importance, and mastered it.

And to say the truth, it is impossible for any maritime country, not having the coasts admirably fortified, to defend itself against a powerful enemy that is master of the sea. Hereof I had rather that Spain than England should be an example. Let it therefore be supposed, that king Philip the Second had fully resolved to hinder sir John

Norris in the year 1589 from presenting Don Antonio, king of Portugal, before the gates of Lisbon; and that he would have kept off the English by power of his land-forces, as being too weak at sea, through the great overthrow of his mighty armada, by the fleet of queen Elizabeth, in the year foregoing. Surely it had not been hard for him to prepare an army that should be able to resist our eleven thousand. But where should this his army have been bestowed? if about Lisbon, then would it have been easy unto the English to take, ransack, and burn the town of Groin, and to waste the country round about it: for the great and threatening preparations of the earl of Altemira, the marquis of Seralba, and others, did not hinder them from performing all this. Neither did the hasty levy of eight thousand, under the earl of Andrada, serve to more effect than the increase of honour to sir John Norris and his associates; considering, that the English charged these at Puente de Burgos, and passing the great bridge, behind which they lay, that was flanked with shot, and barricadoed at the further end, routed them, took their camp, took their general's standard with the king's arms, and pursued them over all the country, which they fired. If a royal army, and not (as this was) a company of private adventurers, had thus begun the war in Galicia, I think it would have made the Spaniards to quit the guard of Portugal, and make haste to the defence of their St. Jago, whose temple was not far from the danger. But, had they held their first resolution, as knowing that sir John Norris's main intent was to bring Don Antonio, with an army, into his kingdom, whither coming strong, he expected to be readily and joyfully welcomed; could they have hindered his landing in Portugal? Did not he land at Penicha, and march over the country to Lisbon, six days' journey? Did not he (when all Don Antonio's promises failed) pass along by the river of Lisbon to Cascaliz, and there, having won the fort, quietly embark his men, and depart? But these, though no more than an handful, yet were they Englishmen. Let us consider of the matter itself; what another nation

might do, even against England, in landing an army, by advantage of a fleet, if we had none. This question, Whether an invading army may be resisted at their landing upon the coast of England, were there no fleet of ours at the sea to impeach it? is already handled by a learned gentleman of our nation, in his observations upon Cæsar's Commentaries, that maintains the affirmative. This he holds only upon supposition, *in absence of our shipping*; and comparatively; as, that it is a more safe and easy course to defend all the coast of England, than to suffer an enemy to land, and afterwards to fight with him. Surely I hold with him, that it is the best way to keep our enemy from treading upon our ground; wherein, if we fail, then must we seek to make him wish that he had stayed at his own home. In such a case, if it should happen, our judgments are to weigh many particular circumstances that belong not unto this discourse. But making the question general and positive, Whether England, without help of her fleet, be able to debar an enemy from landing; I hold that it is unable so to do; and therefore I think it most dangerous to make the adventure: for the encouragement of a first victory to an enemy, and the discouragement of being beaten to the invaded, may draw after it a most perilous consequence.

It is true, that the marshal Monluc, in his Commentaries, doth greatly complain, that by his wanting forces, wherewith to have kept the frontier of Guienne, they of the protestant religion, after the battle of Moncounter, entered that country, and gathered great strength and relief thence; for if the king, saith he, would have given me but reasonable means, *J'eusse bien gardé à monsieur l'admiral de faire boire ses chevaux en la Garonne*; "I would have kept "the admiral from watering his horses in the river of Ga- "ronne." Monsieur de Langey, on the contrary side, prefers the not fighting upon a frontier with an invading enemy, and commends the delay; which course the constable of France held against the emperor Charles when he invaded Provence. Great difference I know there is, and a

diverse consideration to be had between such a country as France is, strengthened with many fortified places; and this of ours, where our ramparts are but of the bodies of men. And it was of invasions upon firm land that these great captains spake; whose entrances cannot be uncertain. But our question is, of an army to be transported over sea, and to be landed again in an enemy's country, and the place left to the choice of the invader. Hereunto I say, that such an army cannot be resisted on the coast of England without a fleet to impeach it; no, nor on the coast of France, or any other country, except every creek, port, or sandy bay, had a powerful army in each of them to make opposition: for let his whole supposition be granted; that Kent is able to furnish twelve thousand foot; and that those twelve thousand be laid in the three best landing places within that county, to wit, three thousand at Margate, three thousand at the Ness, and six thousand at Folkstone, that is somewhat equally distant from them both; as also, that two of these troops (unless some other order be thought more fit) be directed to strengthen the third, when they shall see the enemy's fleet to bend towards it; I say, that notwithstanding this provision, if the enemy, setting sail from the Isle of Wight, in the first watch of the night, and towing their long boats at their sterns, shall arrive by dawn of day at the Ness, and thrust their army on shore there; it will be hard for those three thousand that are at Margate (twenty and four long miles from thence) to come time enough to reinforce their fellows at the Ness. Nay, how shall they at Folkstone be able to do it, who are nearer by more than half the way? seeing that the enemy, at his first arrival, will either make his entrance by force, with three or four hundred shot of great artillery, and quickly put the first three thousand, that were entrenched at the Ness, to run; or else give them so much to do, that they shall be glad to send for help to Folkstone, and perhaps to Margate, whereby those places will be left bare. Now let us suppose that all the twelve thousand Kentish soldiers arrive at the Ness ere the enemy can be ready to disembark his army, so that

he shall find it unsafe to land in the face of so many prepared to withstand him; yet must we believe that he will play the best of his own game; and (having liberty to go which way he list) under covert of the night, set sail towards the east, where what shall hinder him to take ground, either at Margate, the Downs, or elsewhere, before they at the Ness can be well aware of his departure? certainly there is nothing more easy than to do it. Yea the like may be said of Weymouth, Purbeck, Pool, and of all landing places on the south coast: for there is no man ignorant that ships, without putting themselves out of breath, will easily outrun the soldiers that coast them; *Les armées ne volent poynt en poste;* "Armies neither fly, nor run post," saith a marshal of France. And I know it to be true, that a fleet of ships may be seen at sunset, and after it, at the Lizard; yet by the next morning they may recover Portland; whereas an army of foot shall not be able to march it in six days. Again, when those troops, lodged on the sea-shores, shall be forced to run from place to place in vain, after a fleet of ships, they will at length sit down in the midway, and leave all at adventure. But say it were otherwise; that the invading enemy will offer to land in some such place where there shall be an army of ours ready to receive him; yet it cannot be doubted, but that when the choice of all our trained bands, and the choice of our commanders and captains, shall be drawn together, (as they were at Tilbury in the year 1588,) to attend the person of the prince, and for the defence of the city of London; they that remain to guard the coast can be of no such force as to encounter an army like unto that wherewith it was intended that the prince of Parma should have landed in England.

The isle of Tercera hath taught us by experience what to think in such a case. There are not many islands in the world better fenced by nature and strengthened by art; it being every where hard of access, having no good harbour wherein to shelter a navy of friends; and upon every cove or watering-place a fort erected, to forbid the approach of an enemy's boat. Yet when Emanuel de Sylva and mon-

sieur de Chattes, that held it to the use of Don Antonio, with five or six thousand men, thought to have kept the marquis of Santa Cruz from setting foot on ground therein, the marquis having shewed himself in the road of Angra, did set sail ere any was aware of it, and arrived at the Port des Moles, far distant from thence, where he won a fort, and landed, ere monsieur de Chattes, running thither in vain, could come to hinder him. The example of Philip Strossie, slain the year before, without all regard of his worth, and of three hundred French prisoners murdered in cold blood, had instructed de Chattes and his followers what they might expect at that marquis's hands: therefore it is not like that they were slow in carrying relief to Port des Moles. Whether our English would be persuaded to make such diligent haste from Margate to the Ness, and back again, it may be doubted; sure I am, that it were a greater march than all the length of Tercera; whereof the Frenchmen had not measured the one half, when they found themselves prevented by the more nimble ships of Spain.

This may suffice to prove, that a strong army, in a good fleet, which neither foot nor horse is able to follow, cannot be denied to land where it list in England, France, or elsewhere, unless it be hindered, encountered, and shuffled together by a fleet of equal or answerable strength.

The difficult landing of our English at Fayal, in the year 1597, is alleged against this; which example moves me no way to think that a large coast may be defended against a strong fleet. I landed those English in Fayal myself, and therefore ought to take notice of this instance. For whereas I find an action of mine cited with omission of my name, I may by a civil interpretation think that there was no purpose to defraud me of any honour, but rather an opinion that the enterprise was such, or so ill managed, as that no honour could be due unto it. There were indeed some which were in that voyage who advised me not to undertake it; and I hearkened unto them somewhat longer than was requisite, especially whilst they desired me to reserve the title of such an exploit (though it were

not great) for a greater person. But when they began to tell me of difficulty, I gave them to understand, the same which I now maintain, that it was more difficult to defend a coast than to invade it. The truth is, that I could have landed my men with more ease than I did, yea, without finding any resistance, if I would have rowed to another place; yea even there where I landed, if I would have taken more company to help me. But, without fearing any imputation of rashness, I may say, that I had more regard of reputation in that business than of safety. For I thought it to belong unto the honour of our prince and nation, that a few islanders should not think any advantage great enough against a fleet set forth by queen Elizabeth: and further, I was unwilling that some Low Country captains, and others not of mine own squadron, whose assistance I had refused, should please themselves with a sweet conceit (though it would have been short, when I had landed in some other place) *that for want of their help I was driven to turn tail.* Therefore I took with me none but men assured, commanders of mine own squadron, with some of their followers, and a few other gentlemen, voluntaries, whom I could not refuse; as sir William Brooke, sir William Harvey, sir Arthur Gorges, sir John Skot, sir Thomas Ridgeway, sir Henry Thinne, sir Charles Morgan, sir Walter Chute, Marcellus Throckmorton, captain Laurence Kemis, captain William Morgan, and others, such as well understood themselves and the enemy; by whose help, with God's favour, I made good the enterprise I undertook. As for the working of the sea, the steepness of the cliffs, and other troubles, that were not new to us, we overcame them well enough. And these (notwithstanding) made five or six companies of the enemy's, that sought to impeach our landing, abandon the wall whereon the musketeers lay on the rest for us, and won the place of them without any great loss. This I could have done with less danger, so that it should not have served for example of a rule that failed even in this example; but the reasons before alleged (together with other reasons well known to some of the gentlemen above

named, though more private than to be here laid down) made me rather follow the way of bravery, and take the shorter course, having it still in mine own power to fall off when I should think it meet. It is easily said, that *the enemy was more than a coward;* (which yet was more than we knew;) neither will I magnify such a small piece of service, by seeking to prove him better, whom, had I thought equal to mine own followers, I would otherwise have dealt with. But for so much as concerns the proposition in hand, he that beheld this may well remember, that the same enemy troubled us more in our march towards Fayal than in our taking the shore; that he sought how to stop us in place of his advantage; that many of our men were slain or hurt by him, among whom sir Arthur Gorges was shot in that march; and that such as, thinking all danger to be past when we had won good footing, would needs follow us to the town, were driven by him to forsake the pace of a man of war, and betake themselves to an hasty trot.

For end of this digression, I hope that this question shall never come to trial; his majesty's many moveable forts will forbid the experience. And although the English will no less disdain, than any nation under heaven can do, to be beaten upon their own ground, or elsewhere, by a foreign enemy; yet to entertain those that shall assail us, with their own beef in their bellies, and before they eat of our Kentish capons, I take to be the wisest way. To do which, his majesty, after God, will employ his good ships on the sea, and not trust to any entrenchment upon the shore.

SECT. X.

How the Romans attempt again to get the mastery of the seas. The victory of Cæcilius the Roman consul at Panormus. The siege of Lilybæum. How a Rhodian galley entered Lilybæum at pleasure in despite of the Roman fleet. That it is a matter of great difficulty to stop the passage of good ships. The Romans, by reason of grievous losses received under Claudius and Junius, their consuls, abandon the seas again.

WHEN, without a strong navy, the Romans found it al-

together impossible, either to keep what they had already gotten in Sicily, or to enlarge their dominions in Africa, or elsewhere; they resolved once again, notwithstanding their late misadventures, to strengthen their fleet and ships of war. So causing fifty new galleys to be built, and the old to be repaired, they gave them in charge (together with certain legions of soldiers) to the new consuls, C. Attilius and L. Manlius. On the other side, Asdrubal perceiving that the Romans, partly by reason of the shipwreck which they had lately suffered, partly by reason of the overthrow which they received by Xantippus in Africa, were less daring than they had been in the beginning of the war; and withal, that one of the consuls was returned into Italy with the one half of the army, and that Cæcilius with only the other half remained at Panormus, he removed with the Carthaginian forces from Lilybæum towards it, hoping to provoke Cæcilius to fight. But the consul was better advised: for when Asdrubal had made his approaches somewhat near the town, Cæcilius caused a deep trench to be cut, a good distance without the ditch of the city; between which and his trench he left ground sufficient to embattle a legion of his soldiers. To these he gave order that they should advance themselves, and pass over the new trench, till such time as the African elephants were thrust upon them. From those beasts he commanded them to retire, by slow degrees, till they had drawn on the elephants to the brink of the new trench, which they could by no means pass. This they performed accordingly. For when the elephants were at a stand, they were so galled and beaten, both by those soldiers that were on the inside of the trench, and by those that lay in the trench itself, that being enraged by their many wounds, they brake back furiously upon their own footmen, and utterly disordered them. Cæcilius, espying this advantage, sallied with all the force he had, and charging the other troops that stood embattled, he utterly brake them, and put them to their heels, making a great slaughter of them, and taking all their elephants.

The report of this victory being brought to Rome, the

whole state, filled with courage, prepared a new fleet of two hundred sail, which they sent into Sicily, to give end to that war that had now lasted fourteen years. With this fleet and army the Romans resolve to attempt Lilybæum, the only place of importance which the Carthaginians held in Sicily; and all indeed, save Drepanum, that was near adjoining. They sit down before it, and possess themselves of all the places of advantage near unto it, especially of such as command the haven, which had a very difficult entrance. They also beat to the ground six towers of defence, and by forcible engines weaken so many other parts of the city, as the defendants begin to despair. Yet Himilco, commander of the place, faileth not in all that belongs to a man of war: all that is broken he repaireth with admirable diligence; he maketh many furious sallies, and giveth to the Romans all the affronts that possibly could be made. He hath in garrison (besides the citizens) ten thousand soldiers, among which there are certain lieutenants, and other petty officers, that conspire to render and betray the town. But the matter is revealed by an Achæan, called Alexon, who had formerly, in danger of the like treason, saved Agrigentum. Himilco useth the help of Alexon to assure the hired soldiers, and employeth Hannibal to appease the troops of the Gauls, which did waver, and had sent their agents to the enemy. All promise constancy and truth; so that the traitors, being unable to perform what they had undertaken, are fain to live in the Roman camp as fugitives, that had wrought no good whereby to deserve their bread. In the mean while a supply of ten thousand soldiers is sent from Carthage to their relief, having Hannibal the son of Amilcar for their conductor; who in despite of all resistance entered the port and city, to the incredible joy of the besieged. The old soldiers, together with the new companies, (thereto persuaded by Himilco with hope of great reward,) resolve to set upon the Romans in their trenches, and either force them to abandon the siege, or at least to take from them, or set on fire, their engines of battery. The attempt is presently made, and pursued to the uttermost with great

slaughter on both sides. But the Romans being more in number, and having the advantage of the ground, hold still their places, and with extreme difficulty defend their engines.

They of Carthage desire greatly to understand the state of things at Lilybæum, but know not how to send into the town. A certain Rhodian undertakes the service, and, having received his despatch, sails with one galley to Ægusa, a little island near Lilybæum. Thence, taking his time, he steered directly with the port; and having a passing swift galley, he passed through the best of the channel, and recovered the water-gate, ere any of those which the Romans had to guard the port could thrust from the shores on either side.

The next day, neither attending the covert of the dark night, nor dreading to be boarded by the Roman galleys, who waited his return, he set sail, and shipping his oars, (his galley being exceeding quick of steerage, and himself expert in all parts of the channel,) recovered the haven's mouth and the sea, in despite of all the pursuit made after him. Then, finding himself out of danger of being encompassed by many, he turned again towards the mouth of the haven, challenging any one, if any one durst come forth, to undertake him. This enterprise, and the well performing of it, was very remarkable, and much wondered at in those days; and yet, where there was no great artillery, nor any other weapons of fire to kill afar off, the adventure which this Rhodian made was not greatly hazardous. For in this age a valiant and judicious man of war will not fear to pass by the best appointed fort of Europe, with the help of a good tide and a leading gale of wind; no, though forty pieces of great artillery open their mouths against him, and threaten to tear him in pieces.

In the beginning of our late queen's time, when Denmark and Sweden were at war, our East-land fleet, bound for Liefland, was forbidden by the king of Denmark to trade with the subjects of his enemies, and he threatened to sink their ships, if they came through the straits of Elsineur. Notwithstanding this, our merchants (having a ship of her ma-

jesty's, called the Minion, to defend them) made the adventure, and, sustaining some vollies of shot, kept on their course. The king made all the provision he could to stop them, or sink them at their return. But the Minion, commanded (as I take it) by William Burrough, leading the way, did not only pass out with little loss, but did beat down with artillery a great part of the fort of Elsineur, which at that time was not so well rampired as now perhaps it is; and the fleet of merchants that followed him went through without any wound received. Neither was it long since that the duke of Parma, besieging Antwerp, and finding no possibility to master it, otherwise than by famine, laid his cannon on the bank of the river so well to purpose, and so even with the face of the water, that he thought it impossible for the least boat to pass by. Yet the Hollanders and Zealanders, not blown up by any wind of glory, but coming to find a good market for their butter and cheese, even the poor men, attending their profit when all things were extreme dear in Antwerp, passed in boats of ten or twelve ton, by the mouth of the duke's cannon, in despite of it, when a strong westerly wind, and a tide of flood favoured them; as also with a contrary wind, and an ebbing water, they turned back again; so as he was forced in the end to build his stockado overthwart the river, to his marvellous trouble and charge.

The fort St. Philip terrified not us in the year 1596, when we entered the port of Cadiz; neither did the fort at Puntal, when we were entered, beat us from our anchoring by it, though it played upon us with four demi-cannons, within pointblank, from six in the morning till twelve at noon. The siege of Ostend, and of many other places, may be given for proof how hard a matter it is to stop the passage of a good ship, without another as good to encounter it. Yet this is true, that where a fort is so set, as that of Angra in Tercera, that there is no passage along beside it, or that the ships are driven to turn upon a bow-line towards it, wanting all help of wind and tide, there, and in such places, is it of great use, and fearful; otherwise not.

But to return to our adventurous Rhodian; he arrives in safety at Carthage, and makes them know the estate of Lilybæum. Others also, after this, take upon them to do the like, and perform it with the same success. The Romans therefore labour to choke the channel; and for that purpose fill many merchants ships with great stones, and sink them therein. The force of the tides clears it again in part; but they grounded so many of those great-bellied boats in the best of the entrance, as at last it made a manifest rising and heap, like a ragged island, in the passage. Hereby it came to pass that a Carthaginian galley, taking her course by night, and not suspecting any such impediment, ran herself aground thereon, and was taken. Now comes the brave Rhodian, thinking to enter as he had done before; but this Carthaginian galley, a little before taken, gave him chace, and gathered upon him: he finds what she is, both by her form and by her swiftness, and being not able to run from her, resolved to fight with her: but she is too well manned for him, so that he is beaten and taken.

Lilybæum after this is greatly distressed; the soldiers being worn with labour and watching. But in this despair there rose so violent a tempest, as some of the Romans' wooden towers, by which they overtopped the walls of Lilybæum, were overturned. A Greek soldier undertakes to fire those that were fallen, and performs it: for the fire was no sooner kindled, but being blown unto by the bellows of a tempest, it increased so fast, as it became resistless, and in the end burned all to ashes, and melted the brasen heads of the battering rams. Hereupon despair and weariness hinder the Romans from repairing their engines; so that they resolve, by a long siege, to starve the defendants.

Upon relation of what had passed, a supply of ten thousand soldiers is sent from Rome, under M. Claudius the consul. He arrives at Messana, and marcheth over land to Lilybæum; where having reinforced the army, and supplied the galleys with new rowers, he propounds the surprise of Drepanum, a city on the other side of the bay of Lilybæum. This service the captains and soldiers willingly

embrace: so the consul embarks his troops, and arrives on the sudden in the mouth of the port. Adherbal is governor of the town, a valiant and prudent man of war, who being ignorant of the new supply arrived at Lilybæum, was at first amazed at their sudden approach; but having recovered his spirits, he persuades the soldiers rather to fight abroad than to be enclosed. Herewithal he promiseth great rewards to such as by their valour shall deserve them; offering to lead them himself, and to fight in the head of his fleet. Having sufficiently encouraged his men, he thrusts into the sea towards the Romans. The consul, deceived of his expectation, calls back the foremost galleys, that he might now marshal them for defence. Hereupon some row backward, some forward, in great confusion. Adherbal finds and follows his advantage, and forceth the consul into a bay at hand, wherein he rangeth himself, having the land on his back; hoping thereby to keep himself from being encompassed. But he was thereby, and for want of sea-room, so straitened, as he could not turn himself any way from his enemies, nor range himself in any order: therefore when he found no hope of resistance, keeping the shore on his left hand, he thrust out of the bay with thirty galleys, besides his own, and so fled away; all the rest of his fleet, to the number of ninety and four ships, were taken or sunk by the Carthaginians. Adherbal for this service is greatly honoured at Carthage; and Claudius, for his indiscretion and flight, as much disgraced at Rome.

The Romans, notwithstanding this great loss, arm threescore galleys, with which they send away L. Junius, their consul, to take charge of their business in Sicily. Junius arrives at Messana, where he meets with the whole remainder of the Roman fleet, those excepted which rode in the port of Lilybæum. One hundred and twenty galleys he had; and besides these, he had gotten together almost eight hundred ships of burden, which were laden with all necessary provisions for the army. With this great fleet he arrives at Syracuse, where he stays a while; partly to take in corn, partly to wait for some that were too slow of sail to

never find that any nation hath endured so many misadventures and miseries as the Spaniards have done, in their Indian discoveries; yet persisting in their enterprises with an invincible constancy, they have annexed to their kingdom so many goodly provinces, as bury the remembrance of all dangers past. Tempests and shipwrecks, famine, overthrows, mutinies, heat and cold, pestilence, and all manner of diseases, both old and new, together with extreme poverty, and want of all things needful, have been the enemies wherewith every one of their most noble discoverers, at one time or other, hath encountered. Many years have passed over some of their heads, in the search of not so many leagues; yea, more than one or two have spent their labour, their wealth, and their lives, in search of a golden kingdom, without getting further notice of it, than what they had at their first setting forth. All which notwithstanding, the third, fourth, and fifth undertakers have not been disheartened. Surely they are worthily rewarded with those treasuries and paradises which they enjoy; and well they deserve to hold them quietly, if they hinder not the like virtue in others, which perhaps will not be found.

SECT. XI.

The city of Eryx is surprised by the Romans, and recovered by Amilcar; who stoutly holds war with them five years. The Romans, having emptied their common treasury, build a new fleet a the charges of private men. The great victory at sea of Luctatius the consul, whereby the Carthaginians are forced to crave peace. The conditions of the peace between Rome and Carthage.

THE Romans were careful to supply with all industry by land the want of strength at sea. Therefore they continue the siege of Lilybæum, and seek to make sure to themselves all places whither the enemy's ships could not bring relief. The consul Junius, to cure the wound of dishonour which he had received, bethought him what enterprise to undertake. In the end, he resolved to attempt the mountain and city of Eryx, with the temple of Venus Erycina,

which was the fairest and richest of all the island; and of these, by cunning or treason, he got possession. Eryx was commodiously seated between Drepanum and Panormus; so that it seemed a fit place for a garrison, that should restrain the Carthaginians from making roads into the country. Wherefore Junius fortified both the top of the mountain, and the first entrance of the passage from the bottom, (both which places were very defensible,) with a good strength of men. But shortly after, in the eighteenth year of this war, the Carthaginians sent forth Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, father of the great Hannibal, with a fleet and army, who, sailing to the coasts of Italy, did throughly repay the spoils which the Romans made in Africa. For he first of all wasted and destroyed the territories of the Locrines, and of the Brutians, that were dependants of Rome; then entered he into Sicily, and finding there no walled city in the Carthaginians power, that served fitly to infest the Romans, he occupied a piece of ground of great advantage, and lodged his army thereon; to confront as well the Romans that were in Panormus, as those that kept about Eryx, putting himself between both armies with admirable resolution.

The place that Amilcar had seized upon was not only very strong by situation, but had the command of a port; whereby it gave him opportunity to scour all the coast of Italy with his fleet, wasting all along as far as to Cuma. In the isle of Sicily he held the Romans to hard work; lying near unto Panormus, where in three years' abode he did many notable acts, though not of much consequence, for that the enemy could never be drawn to hazard the main chance. Having wearied himself and the Romans long enough about Panormus, he undertook a strange piece of work at Eryx. The Roman garrisons, placed there by Junius on the top and at the bottom of the mountain, were very strongly lodged. Nevertheless Amilcar found a way, lying towards the sea-side, by which he conveyed his men into the city of Eryx, that was about the midst of the ascent, ere the enemy knew of it. By this it came to pass

that the Romans, which kept the top of the mountain, were straitly held (as it were) besieged. And no less was Amilcar himself restrained by both of these garrisons, and such as came to relieve them. There he found them pastime about two years more; hoping still to weary out those that lay over his head, as they on the contrary did their best to thrust him out of those quarters.

At this time, all the care, both of the Romans and of the Carthaginians, was bent unto the prosecuting of this business at Eryx. Wherein it seems true, (as Hannibal in Livy[h] spake unto Scipio,) that the affairs of Carthage never stood in better terms, since the beginning of the war, than now they did. For whereas the Romans had utterly forsaken the seas, partly by reason of their great losses, partly upon confidence of their land-forces, which they held resistless; Amilcar, with a small army, had so well acquitted himself, to the honour of his country, that by the trial of five years' war the Carthaginian soldier was judged equal, if not superior, to the Roman. Finally, when all that might be, had been devised and done for the dislodging of this obstinate warrior, no way seemed better to the senate of Rome, than once again to build a fleet; whereby, if the mastery of the sea could once be gotten, it was likely that Amilcar, for lack of supply, should not long be able to hold out. But in performing this, extreme difficulty was found: the common treasure was exhausted; and the cost was not little that was requisite unto such an enterprise. Wherefore there was none other way left, than to lay the burden upon private purses. Divers of the principal citizens undertook to build (each at his own charges) one *quinquereme*; which example wrought so well, that they whose ability would not serve to do the like, joined with some others, and laying their money together, concurred two or three of them in building of another; with condition to be repaid when the war was finished. By this voluntary contribution they made and furnished two hundred new *quinqueremes*; taking

[h] Liv. Dec. 3. l. 10.

for their pattern that excellent swift rowing galley which they had gotten from the Rhodian, in the port of Lilybæum, as was shewed before. The charge of this fleet was committed to C. Luctatius Catulus, who passed with the same into Sicily the spring following, and entered the port of Drepanum, endeavouring by all means to have forced the city. But being advertised that the Carthaginian fleet was at hand, and being mindful of the late losses which his predecessors had received, he was careful to put himself in order against their arrival.

Hanno was admiral of the Carthaginian fleet, a man (as his actions declare him) wise in picture, exceedingly formal, and skilful in the art of seeming reverend. How his reputation was first bred, I do not find; but it was upheld by a factious contradiction of things undertaken by men more worthy than himself. This quality procured unto him (as it hath done to many others) both good liking among the ancient sort, whose cold temper is averse from new enterprises, and therewithal an opinion of great foresight, confirmed by every loss received. More particularly, he was gracious among the people, for that he was one of the most grievous oppressors of their subject provinces, whereby he procured unto the Carthaginians much wealth, but therewithal such hatred as turned it all to their great loss. He had ere this been employed against the Numidians and wild Africans, that were more like to rovers than to soldiers in making war. Of those fugitive nations, he learned to neglect more manly enemies, to his own great dishonour, and to the great hurt of Carthage; which lost not more by his bad conduct, than by his malicious counsel, when, having shewed himself an unworthy captain, he betook himself to the long robe. Yet is he much commended in Roman histories as a temperate man, and one that studied how to preserve the league between Carthage and Rome. In which regard, how well he deserved of his own country it will appear hereafter; how beneficial he was to the Romans, it will appear both hereafter and in his present voyage, wherein he reduced the Carthaginians to a miserable ne-

cessity of accepting, upon hard conditions, that peace which he thenceforth commended.

Hanno had very well furnished his navy with all needful provisions for the soldiers in Eryx, (for dexterity in making preparation was the best of his qualities,) but he had neither been careful in training his mariners to the practice of sea-fight, nor in manning his galleys with stout fellows. He thought that the fame of a Carthaginian fleet was enough to make the unexpert Romans give way; forgetting, that rather the resistless force of tempests than any other strength of opposition, had made them to forsake the seas. Yet in one thing he had either conceived aright, or else was sent forth well-instructed. It was his purpose first of all to sail to Eryx, and there to discharge his ships of their lading; and having thus lightened himself, he meant to take aboard some part of the land-army, together with Amilcar himself, by whose help he doubted not but that he should be able to make the enemy repent of his new adventure to sea. This was a good course, if it could have been performed. But Catulus used all possible diligence to prevent the execution of this design, not because he was informed of the enemy's purpose, but for that he knew it to be the best for them, and for that he feared no danger so greatly as to encounter with Amilcar. Wherefore, although the weather was very rough, and the seas went high, when the Carthaginian fleet was descried, yet he rather chose to fight with the enemy that had the wind of him, than to suffer this convoy to pass along to Eryx, upon unlikely hope of better opportunity in the future. All that Hanno should have done, Catulus had performed. He had carefully exercised his men in rowing, he had lightened his galleys of all unnecessary burden, and he had taken aboard the choice men of the Roman land-soldiers. The Carthaginians therefore, at the first encounter, were utterly broken and defeated, having fifty of their galleys stemmed and sunk, and seventy taken, wherein were few less than ten thousand men, that were all made prisoners; the rest, by a sudden change of wind, escaping to the isle of Hieronesus.

The state of Carthage, utterly discouraged by this change of fortune, knew not whereon to resolve. Means to repair their fleet in any time, there were none left, their best men of war by sea were consumed, and Amilcar, upon whose valour and judgment the honour and safety of the commonweal rested, was now surrounded by his enemies in Sicily, where he could not be relieved. In this extremity they make a despatch unto Amilcar himself, and authorize him to take what course should seem best unto his excellent wisdom, leaving all conclusions to his election and sole counsel.

Amilcar, whom no adversity, accompanied with the least hope or possibility of recovery, had ever vanquished, looking over every promise, true or false, that the present time could make him, (for to attend any thing from the future he was not able,) resolved to make trial, whether his necessity might be compounded upon any reasonable terms. He therefore sent to Luctatius the consul an overture of peace, who considering it well, gathered so many arguments from the present poverty of the Roman state, wasted beyond expectation in the former war, that he willingly hearkened unto it. So in conclusion an accord was made, but with provision, that it should hold none otherwise, than if the senate and people of Rome would ratify it with their allowance.

The conditions were, first, that the Carthaginians should clearly abandon the isle of Sicily; secondly, that they should never undertake upon Hiero king of Syracuse, nor invade any part of his territories, nor the territories of any of his friends and allies; thirdly, that they should set at liberty, and send back into Italy, all the Romans whom they held prisoners without ransom; lastly, that they should pay unto the Romans two thousand and two hundred talents, which make, after six hundred French crowns to the talent, thirteen hundred and twenty thousand crowns; the same to be delivered within twenty years next following.

These articles were sent to Rome, where they were not throughly approved: but ten commissioners were sent into Sicily to make perfect the agreement. These commissioners added a thousand talents to the former sum, and required

a shorter time of payment. Further also, they took order that the Carthaginians should not only depart out of Sicily itself, but should also withdraw their companies out of all the other islands between it and Italy, renouncing their whole interest therein.

Such was the end of the first Punic war, that had lasted about twenty-four years without intermission; in which time the Romans had lost, by flight or shipwreck, about seven hundred *quinqueremes*, and the Carthaginians about five hundred; the greatness of which losses doth serve to prove the greatness both of these two cities, and of the war itself; wherein I hold good the judgment of Polybius, that the Romans in general did shew themselves the braver nation, and Amilcar the most worthy captain.

CHAP. II.

Of divers actions passing between the first and second Punic wars.

SECT. I.

Of the cruel war begun between the Carthaginians and their own mercenaries.

THE Romans having, partly by force and partly by composition, thrust the Carthaginians out of Sicily, and all the little islands thereunto adjacent, gave them rather means and leisure to help themselves in a following war, than cause to hold themselves contented with the present peace. It is a true rule, [a] *Quod leges a victoribus dicuntur, accipiuntur a victis;* "That laws are given by the conquerors, "and received of the conquered." But the Romans had either forgotten the answer that was made unto them by one of the Privernates, or else had forgotten to follow it, in this weighty business. For when one of Privernum, after a rebellion, defending in the senate the cause of his city, was demanded by a senator, "What peace the Romans might

[a] Q. Curt. l. 4.

" hopé for, or assure themselves of, if they quitted their " present advantage over them;" he answered in these words, *Si bonam dederitis, et fidam et perpetuam; si malam, haud diuturnam;* " If the peace be good and faithful " that you give us, it will be perpetual; if it be ill, then of " little continuance." To this answer the senate at that time gave such approbation, that it was said, *Viri et liberi vocem auditam; an credi posse, ullum populum, aut hominem denique in ea conditione, cujus eum pœniteat, diutius quam necesse sit mansurum?* " That it was the speech of a " manly and a free man; for who could believe that any peo- " ple, or indeed any one man, would continue longer in an " overburdened estate than mere necessity did enforce?" Now if the Romans themselves could make this judgment of those nations who had little else beside their manly resolution to defend their liberty, surely they grossly flattered themselves in presuming that the Carthaginians, who neither in power nor in pride were any way inferior unto themselves, would sit down any longer by the loss and dishonour received, than until they could recover their legs, and the strength which had a while failed them, to take revenge. But occasion, by whom (while well entertained) not only private men, but kings and public states have more prevailed, than by any proper prowess or virtue, withheld the tempest from the Romans for a time, and turned it most fearfully upon Africa, and the Carthaginians themselves.

For after that the first Punic war was ended, Amilcar, leaving Eryx, went to Lilybæum, from whence most conveniently the army might be transported into Afric; the care of which business he committed unto Gesco, to whom, as to a man of approved sufficiency, he delivered over his charge. Gesco had an especial consideration of the great sums wherein Carthage was indebted unto these mercenaries, and withal of the great disability to make payment. Therefore he thought it the wisest way to send them over (as it were) by handfuls, a few at a time; that so the first might have their despatch, and be gone, ere the second or third companies arrived. Herein he dealt providently: for

it had not been hard to persuade any small number, lodged within so great a city as Carthage, unto some such reasonable composition, as the present emptiness of the common treasury did require; so that the first might have been friendly discharged, and a good precedent left unto the second and third, whilst their disjunction had made them unable to recover their whole due by force. But the Carthaginians were of a contrary opinion. They thought to find in the whole army some that would be contented to gratify the public state, by remitting a great part of their own due; and hoped by such an example to draw all the multitude to the like agreement and capitulation. So they detained the first and second comers, telling them, that they would make an even reckoning with all together. Thus every day the number increased, and many disorders (a thing incident among soldiers) were committed, which much disquieted the city, not accustomed unto the like. In this regard, it was thought fit to remove them all to some other place, where they might be less troublesome. This must be done by some colourable words of persuasion; for their number was already so great, that it was not safe to offend them too far. Wherefore it is devised, that they should all attend the coming of their fellows at Sicca, receiving every one a piece of gold to bear his charges in the mean while. This motion is accepted, and the soldiers begin to dislodge, leaving behind them their wives, their children, and all their baggage, as meaning shortly to fetch away all, when they came back for their pay. But the Carthaginians have no fancy to their returning into the town, and therefore compel them to truss up their fardels, that they might have none occasion left to make any errands thither. So to Sicca they removed with all their goods, and there lay waiting for news of their fellows' arrival, and their own pay. Business they had none to do, and therefore might easily be drawn to mutiny; the whole argument of their discourse inclining them to nothing else. Their daily talk was, how rich they should be when all their money came in, how much would fall to every single share, and for how long time the city

was behindhand with them in reckoning. They were all grown arithmeticians, and he was thought a man of worth that could find most reason to increase their demands to the very highest, even beyond their due. No part of their long service was forgotten; but the comfortable words and promises of their captains, leading them forth to any dangerous fight, were called to mind as so many obligations not to be cancelled, without satisfying their expectation by some unordinary largess.

Thus the time passeth away, until the whole army being arrived and lodged in Sicca, Hanno comes thither to clear the account. Now is the day come, wherein they shall all be made rich, especially if they can hold together in maintaining stoutly the common cause. So think they all, and assemble themselves to hear what good news this messenger had brought, with a full resolution to help his memory, in case he should happen to forget any part of the many promises made unto them; all which were to be considered in their donative. Hanno begins a very formal oration, wherein he bewails the poverty of Carthage, tells them how great a sum of money is to be paid unto the Romans, reckons up the excessive charges whereat the commonwealth had been in the late war; and finally desires them to hold themselves contented with part of their pay, and out of the love which they bare unto the city, to remit the rest. Few of them understood his discourse; for the Carthaginian army was composed of sundry nations, as Greeks, Africans, Gauls, Ligurians, Spaniards, and others, all of different languages. Yet they stared upon him, and were (as I think) little pleased with his very gesture. But when such as conceived the whole tenour of his speech, had informed the rest what cold comfort he brought, they were all enraged, and fared like madmen, so that nothing would serve to appease them. Hanno would fain have assuaged their fury, but he knew not how; for he less understood their dissonant loud noises, than they did his oration. An army collected out of many countries, that have no one language common to all, or to the greater part of them, is neither easily stirred up to mu-

tiny, nor easily pacified when once it is broken into outrage. The best that Hanno can do, is to use the help of interpreters and messengers. But these interpreters mistake his meaning; some for want of skill, others of set purpose; and such as deliver his errands in the worst sense are best believed. Finally, they think themselves much abused by the Carthaginians, and resolve to demand their own, in peremptory terms, at a nearer distance. In this mood they leave Sicca, and march as far as Tunis, that is, within a little of Carthage, and there they encamp.

Now begin the Carthaginians to find their own error: it is a good rule,

Curandum inprimis, ne magna injuria fiat
Fortibus et miseris:
Have special care, that valiant poverty
Be not oppress'd with too great injury.

But this proud city, having neglected the rule, hath also been careless in providing to secure herself against the inconvenience that might follow. She had suffered the whole multitude, whereunto she was like to give cause of discontent, to join itself into one body, when the several troops might easily have been dispersed: she hath turned out of her gates the wives, children, and goods of these poor men, which had she retained in show of kindness, she might have used them as hostages for her own safety; and by employing a miserable penny-father in her negotiation with men of war, she hath weakened the reputation of her bravest captains, that might best have served to free her from the threatening danger. Yet likely enough it is, that Amilcar had no desire to be used as an instrument in defrauding his own soldiers of their wages; especially considering, that as he best could bear witness of their merits, so was he not ignorant that means to content them were not wanting, if the citizens had been willing thereunto. Hereunto may be added a probable conjecture, that Hanno with his complices, who at this very time was a bitter enemy to Amilcar, had the boldness to impose the blame of his own wretched counsel upon the liberal promises made by the captains.

Amilcar therefore did wisely, in suffering those that maligned him to have the managing of their own plot, and to deal the cards which themselves had shuffled. This they continue to do as foolishly as they had at first begun. They furnish a market at Tunis for the soldiers, whom they suffer to buy what they list, and at what price they list. They send ever and anon some of their senators into the camp, who promise to satisfy all demands, as far forth as it should be possible. And thus, by shifting from one extreme to another, they make the soldiers understand into what fear the city was driven; which cannot but add much insolence to the passions already stirred up.

This sudden change of weather, and the true cause of it, is quickly found by the army, which thereupon grows wise, and finding the season fit, labours to make a great harvest. Money must be had, and without any abatement. This is granted. Many have lost their horses in public service of the state: the state shall pay for them. They had lived some years by making hard shift, without receiving their allowance of victuals from Carthage. If they had lived, they wanted not meat; therefore what was this to the Carthaginians? Was it not all one, whether the ships did bring in provision, or their captain direct them where to fetch it? But this would not serve. They said that they had been sometimes driven to buy; and that (since they could not remember how much, or at what rate they bought) they would be paid for their provision during the whole time, and according to the dearest price that wheat had borne whilst the war lasted. Such are now the demands of these mutineers, who might easily have been satisfied with far less charges, and far more honour, by receiving their due at the first. But now they make none end of craving: for whilst the Carthaginians are perplexed about this corn-money, the soldiers have devised many more tricks, whereby to extort a greater sum of money, without all regard of shame. Since therefore no good end could be found of these controversies, which daily did multiply, it was thought convenient that one of the Carthaginians which had commanded in

Sicily should be chosen by the soldiers to reconcile all differences. Hereunto the army condescended, and made choice of Gesco; partly out of good liking to him, who had shewed himself at all times a friendly man to them, and careful of their good, especially when they were to be transported into Afric; partly out of a dislike which they had conceived of Amilcar, for that he had not visited them in all this busy time. So Gesco comes among them; and, to please them the better, comes not without money; which might give better countenance to his proceedings, than barren eloquence had done to the negotiation of Hanno. He calls unto him first of all the captains, and then the several nations apart; rebuking them gently for that which had passed, advising them temperately concerning the present; and exhorting them to continue their love unto the state, which had long entertained them, and would always be mindful of their good services. After this, he began to put hand to his purse; offering to give them their whole pay in hand, and then after to consider of other reckonings at a more convenient time. This had been well accepted, and might have served to bring all to a quiet pass, if two seditious ringleaders of the multitude had not stood against it.

There was in the camp one Spendius, a sturdy fellow, and audacious, but a slave, that in the late war had fled from a Roman whom he served, and therefore stood in fear lest he should be delivered back to his master; at whose hands he could expect no less than to be whipped and crucified. This wretch could find no better way to prolong his own life, than by raising such troubles as might serve to withdraw men from care of private matters, and make his own restitution impossible, were his master never so importunate. With Spendius there associated himself one Matho, an hotheaded man, that had been so forward in stirring up the tumult, as he could not choose but fear lest his own death should be made an example to deter others from the like seditious behaviour. This Matho deals with his countrymen, the Africans, telling them that they were in far worse condition than either the Gauls, the Greeks, the

Spaniards, or any foreign mercenaries. For, saith he, "these our companions have no more to do than to receive "their wages, and so get them gone; but we, that are to "stay behind in Africa, shall be called to another manner "of account when we are left alone; so that we shall have "cause to wish that we had returned home beggars, rather "than loaden with the money, which (little though it be) "shall break our backs. Ye are not ignorant how tyran- "nically these our haughty masters of Carthage do reign "over us. They think it reasonable that our lives and "goods should be at their disposition, which they have at "other times been accustomed to take away from us, even "without apparent cause, as it were, to declare their sove- "reignty: what will they now do, seeing that we have de- "meaned ourselves as free men, and been bold to set a "good face on the matter, demanding our own as others "have done? Ye all do know that it were a very shame "for us, if having been as forward in every danger of war "as any other men, we should now stand quaking like "slaves, and not dare to open our mouths, when others take "liberty to require their due. This notwithstanding ye "may assure yourselves, that we are like to be taught better "manners, as soon as our fellows are gone; in regard of "whom they are contented to shadow their indignation "with a good, but a forced countenance. Let us therefore "be wise, and consider that they hate and fear us. Their "hatred will shew itself, when their fear is once passed; "unless we now take our time, and, whilst we are the "stronger, enfeeble them so greatly, that their hatred shall "not be able to do us wrong. All their strength consisteth "in money, wherewithal they have hired others against us, "and us against others. At the present they have neither "money nor friends. The best army that ever served "them, whereof we are no small part, lies at their gates, "ready to help us, if we be men. A better opportunity "cannot be expected; for were our swords once drawn, all "Afric would rise on our side. As for the Carthaginians, "whither can they send for help? the case itself is plain;

" but we must quickly resolve. Either we must prevent " the diligence of Gesco, by incensing these Gauls and " Spaniards, and procuring them to draw blood; or else it " behoveth us to please our good masters, by joining with " them against our fellows, yea, by offering to forgive unto " them all our wages, if so (peradventure) they may be won " to forgive us, or not over-cruelly to punish our faults " already committed. He is worthily a wretched slave, " that neither hath care to win his master's love, nor cou- " rage to attempt his own liberty."

By such persuasions Matho wins the African soldiers to his own purpose. They are not now so greedy of money as of quarrel; which he that seeks will not miss to find. When Gesco therefore offered to pay them their whole stipend presently, but referred their other demands, for horses and victuals, to some other more convenient time; they break into great outrage, and say that they will have all, even all at once, and that out of hand. In this tumult the whole army flock together about Matho and Spendius, whose diligence is not wanting to add more fuel to the fire already blazing. Matho and Spendius are the only men to whom the soldiers will hearken; if any other stand up to make a speech, a shower of stones flying about his ears puts him to silence, that he shall never afterwards speak word more. Neither stay they to consider what it is that any man would say; enough hath been said already by these good spokesmen; so that no other word (though perhaps to the same purpose) can be heard, save only, *Throw, throw.*

Now the rebellion begins to take form. Matho and Spendius are chosen captains; who, followed by a desperate crew of ruffians, will suffer no man to make his own peace, but pursue their own ends, under fair pretence of the common cause. All which notwithstanding, Gesco is not wanting to the good of his country, but adventures himself upon their fury. One while he deals with the captains, and other principal men, taking them by the hand, and giving gentle words; another while he works with the several nations, putting them all in hope of their own hearts

desire, if any reason would content them. None of them are so sullen as the Africans; indeed none of them had so good cause. They require him peremptorily to give them their own, and not to feed them with words. The truth is, that they are not so covetous as they seem; but will be more glad of an ill answer than of a good payment. This is more than Gesco knows: he sees not that Matho hath any more than bare words to bestow upon them. Wherefore, as rebuking their inconsiderate heat, he tells them that they may do well, if they stand in want of money, to seek it of their captain Matho. This is enough: shall he both defraud them and deride them? They stay no longer, but lay violent hands upon the treasure that he had brought, yea upon him also, and all that are with him; as intending to take this in part of payment, and for the rest to take another course. Matho and Spendius are glad of this. It had little pleased them to see their fellows begin to grow calm by his fair language; wherefore they cast into bonds both him and all the Carthaginians that they can find; that so the army may be freed from danger of good admonition, which they call treason. After this follows open war: Matho solicits all Afric, and his ambassadors are every where well entertained. Neither is it needful to use persuasion: the very fame of this rebellion sufficeth to draw the whole country into it. Now must the Carthaginians be plagued for those oppressions with which they have plagued others. It is true that adversity hath never been untold of her errors; and as she is ever assured to hear her own, so commonly with her own she undergoes those of other men. The Africans, finding the Carthaginians hang under the wheel, tell them boldly that their impositions were merciless; that they took from them the one half of their corn, that they doubled their tributes in all things else, and that they inflicted upon their vassals the greatest punishments for the least offences. These cruelties the Carthaginians themselves have forgotten; but the people, that have suffered so much, retain all in perfect memory. Wherefore not only such as can bear arms are ready to do service in this great commo-

tion; but the very women bring forth their jewels, and other ornaments, offering all to sale for maintenance of so just a quarrel. By this great forwardness and liberal contribution, Matho and Spendius are supplied with a strong aid of threescore and ten thousand Africans; and are moreover furnished with money, not only to satisfy the present appetite of their men, but sufficient to continue the war begun, though it should be of long endurance.

SECT. II.

Divers observations upon this war with the mercenaries.

§. 1.

Of tyranny, and how tyrants are driven to use help of mercenaries.

HERE let us rest a while, as in a convenient breathing-place; whence we may take prospect of the subject over which we travel. Behold a tyrannical city, persecuted by her own mercenaries with a deadly war. It is a common thing, as being almost necessary, that a tyranny should be upheld by mercenary forces; it is common that mercenaries should be false; and it is common that all war made against tyrants should be exceeding full of hate and cruelty. Yet we seldom hear that the ruin of a tyranny is procured or sought by those that were hired to maintain the power of it; and seldom or never do we read of any war that hath been prosecuted with such inexpiable hatred as this that is now in hand.

That which we properly call tyranny is a violent form of government, not respecting the good of the subject, but only the pleasure of the commander. I purposely forbear to say, that it is the unjust rule of one over many; for very truly doth Cleon in [a] Thucydides tell the Athenians, that their dominion over their subjects was none other than a mere tyranny; though it were so, that they themselves were a great city, and a popular estate. Neither is it peradventure greatly needful, that I should call this form of commanding *violent;* since it may well and easily be conceived, that no man willingly performs obedience to one regardless

[a] Thucyd. l. 6.

of his life and welfare, unless himself be either a madman, or (which is little better) wholly possessed with some extreme passion of love. The practice of tyranny is not always of a like extremity; for some lords are more gentle than others to their very slaves; and he that is most cruel to some is mild enough towards others, though it be but for his own advantage. Nevertheless, in large dominions, wherein the ruler's discretion cannot extend itself unto notice of the difference which might be found between the worth of several men; it is commonly seen that the taste of sweetness, drawn out of oppression, hath so good a relish, as continually inflames the tyrant's appetite, and will not suffer it to be restrained with any limits of respect. Why should he seek out bounds to prescribe unto his desires, who cannot endure the face of one so honest, as may put him in remembrance of any moderation? It is much that he hath gotten by extorting from some few; by sparing none, he should have riches in goodly abundance: he hath taken a great deal from every one; but every one could have spared more: he hath wrung all their purses, and now he hath enough; but (as covetousness is never satisfied) he thinks that all this is too little for a stock, though it were indeed a good yearly income. Therefore he deviseth new tricks of robbery, and is not better pleased with the gains than with the art of getting. He is hated for this, and he knows it well; but he thinks by cruelty to change hatred into fear. So he makes it his exercise, to torment and murder all whom he suspecteth: in which course, if he suspect none unjustly, he may be said to deal craftily; but if innocency be not safe, how can all this make any conspirator to stand in fear, since the traitor is no worse rewarded than the quiet man? Wherefore he can think upon none other security than to disarm all his subjects, to fortify himself within some strong place, and, for defence of his person and state, to hire as many lusty soldiers as shall be thought sufficient. These must not be of his own country; for if not every one, yet some one or other might chance to have a feeling of the public misery. This considered, he allures unto him a desperate

ners; his humour may be found and soothed; age, or good advice, yea or some unexpected accident, may reform him; all which failing, yet is there hope that his successor may prove better. Many tyrants have been changed into worthy kings; and many have ill-used their ill-gotten dominion, which, becoming hereditary to their posterity, hath grown into the most excellent form of government, even a lawful monarchy. But they that live under a tyrannical city have no such hope; their mistress is immortal, and will not slacken the reins until they be pulled out of her hands, and her own mouth receive the bridle of a more mighty charioteer. This is woful; yet their present sufferings make them less mindful of the future. New flies, and hungry ones, fall upon the same sore, out of which others had already sucked their fill. A new governor comes yearly among them, attended by all his poor kindred and friends, who mean not to return home empty to their hives, without a good lading of wax and honey. These fly into all quarters, and are quickly acquainted with every man's wealth, or whatsoever else in all the province is worthy to be desired. They know all a man's enemies and all his fears; becoming themselves, within a little space, the enemies that he feareth most. To grow into acquaintance with these masterful guests, in hope to win their friendship, were an endless labour, (yet it must be undergone,) and such as every one hath not means to go about; but, were this effected, what availeth it? The love of one governor is purchased with gifts; the successor of this man, he is more loving than could be wished, in respect of a fair wife or daughter; then comes the third, perhaps of the contrary faction at home, a bitter enemy to both his foregoers, who seeks the ruin of all that have been inward with them. So the miseries of this tyranny are not simple, but interlaced (as it were) with the calamities of civil war. The Romans had a law *de repetundis*, or of recovery, against extorting magistrates; yet we find, that it served not wholly to restrain their provincial governors, who, presuming on the favour of their own citizens, and of their kindred and friends at home,

were bold in their provinces to work all these enormities rehearsed, though somewhat the more sparingly, for fear of judgment. If the subjects of Rome groaned under such oppressions, what must we think of those that were vassals unto Carthage? The Romans imposed no burdensome tribute; they loved not to hear that their empire was grievous; they condemned many noble citizens for having been ill governors. At Carthage all went quite contrary; the rapines newly devised by one magistrate served as precedents to instruct another; every man resolved to do the like when it should fall to his turn; and he was held a notable statesman whose robberies had been such as might afford a good share to the common treasure. Particular examples of this Carthaginian practice are not extant: the government of Verres the Roman, in Sicily, that is livelily set out by Tully, may serve to inform us what was the demeanour of these Punic rulers, who stood in fear of no such condemnation as Verres underwent. By prosecuting this discourse, I might infer a more general proposition, that a city cannot govern her subject provinces so mildly as a king; but it is enough to have shewed, that the tyranny of a city is far more intolerable than that of any one most wicked man.

Suitable to the cruelty of such lords is the hatred of their subjects; and again, suitable to the hatred of the subjects is the jealousy of their lords. Hence it followed, that in wars abroad, the Carthaginians durst use the service of African soldiers; in Afric itself, they had rather be beholding to others that were further fetched. For the same purpose did Hannibal, in the second Punic war, shift his mercenaries out of their own countries: [k] *Ut Afri in Hispania, Hispani in Africa, melior procul ab domo futurus uterque miles, velut mutuis pignoribus obligati stipendia facerent;* "That the Africans might serve in Spain, the Spaniards in "Afric, being each of them like to prove the better soldiers "the further they were from home, as if they were obliged "by mutual pledges." It is disputable, I confess, whether

[k] Livy, Dec. 3. l. 1.

these African and Spanish hirelings could properly be termed mercenaries; for they were subject unto Carthage, and carried into the field, not only by reward, but by duty. Yet seeing their duty was no better than enforced, and that it was not any love to the state, but mere desire of gain that made them fight; I will not nicely stand upon propriety of a word, but hold them, as Polybius also doth, no better than mercenaries.

§. 3.

The dangers growing from the use of mercenary soldiers and foreign auxiliaries.

THE extreme danger growing from the employment of such soldiers is well observed by Machiavel; who sheweth, that they are more terrible to those whom they serve, than to those against whom they serve. They are seditious, unfaithful, disobedient, devourers, and destroyers of all places and countries whereinto they are drawn; as being held by no other bond than their own commodity. Yea, that which is most fearful among such hirelings is, that they have often, and in time of greatest extremity, not only refused to fight in their defence who have entertained them, but revolted unto the contrary part, to the utter ruin of those princes and states that have trusted them. These mercenaries, (saith Machiavel,) which filled all Italy when Charles the Eighth of France did pass the Alps, were the cause that the said French king won the realm of Naples with his buckler without a sword. Notable was the example of Sforza, the father of Francis Sforza, duke of Milan, who being entertained by queen Joan of Naples, abandoned her service on the sudden, and forced her to put herself into the hands of the king of Arragon. Like unto his father was Francis Sforza, the first of that race duke of Milan; who, being entertained by the Milanese, forced them to become his slaves, even with the same army which themselves had levied for their own defence. But Lodovick Sforza, the son of this Francis, by the just judgment of God, was made a memorable example unto posterity in losing his whole estate by the treachery of such faithless mercenaries

as his own father had been. For, having waged an army of Switzers, and committed his duchy, together with his person, into their hands, he was by them delivered up unto his enemy the French king, by whom he was enclosed in the castle of Loches to his dying day.

The like inconvenience is found in using the help of foreign auxiliaries. We see, that when the emperor of Constantinople had hired ten thousand Turks against his neighbour princes, he could never, either by persuasion or force, set them again over sea upon Asia side; which gave beginning to the Christian servitude that soon after followed. Alexander, the son of Cassander, sought aid of the great Demetrius; but Demetrius being entered into his kingdom, slew the same Alexander who had invited him, and made himself king of Macedon. Syracon the Turk was called into Egypt by Sanar the soldan against his opposite; but this Turk did settle himself so surely in Egypt, that Saladine his successor became lord thereof, and of all the Holy Land soon after. What need we look about for examples of this kind? every kingdom in effect can furnish us. The Britons drew the Saxons into this our country, and Mac Murrough drew the English into Ireland; but the one and the other soon became lords of those two kingdoms.

Against all this may be alleged the good success of the united provinces of the Netherlands, using none other than such kind of soldiers in their late war. Indeed these Low Countries have many goodly and strong cities, filled with inhabitants that are wealthy, industrious, and valiant in their kind. They are stout seamen, and therein is their excellency; neither are they bad at the defence of a place well fortified; but in open field they have seldom been able to stand against the Spaniard. Necessity therefore compelled them to seek help abroad; and the like necessity made them forbear to arm any great numbers of their own: for, with money raised by their trade, they maintained the war; and therefore could ill spare, unto the pike and musket, those hands that were of more use in helping to fill the

common purse. Yet what of this? they sped well: surely they sped as ill as might be, whilst they had none other than mercenary soldiers. Many fruitless attempts made by the prince of Orange can witness it; and that brave commander, count Lodowick of Nassau, felt it to his grief in his retreat from Groningen, when, in the very instant that required their service in fight, his mercenaries cried out aloud for money, and so ran away. This was not the only time when the hired soldiers of the States have either sought to hide their cowardice under a show of greediness, or, at least, by mere covetousness, have ruined in one hour the labour of many months. I will not stand to prove this by many examples; for they themselves will not deny it: neither would I touch the honour of monsieur the duke of Anjou, brother to the French king, save that it is folly to conceal what all the world knows. He that would lay open the danger of foreign auxiliaries needeth no better pattern. It is commonly found, that such aiders make themselves lords over those to whom they lend their succour; but where shall we meet with such another as this monsieur, who, for his protection promised, being rewarded with the lordship of the country, made it his first work to thrust by violence a galling yoke upon the people's neck? Well, he lived to repent it, with grief enough. Even whilst he was counterfeiting unto those about him, that were ignorant of his plot, an imaginary sorrow for the poor burghers of Antwerp, as verily believing the town to be surprised and won; the death of the count St. Aignan, who fell over the wall, and the cannon of the city discharged against his own troops, informed him better what had happened, shewing that they were his own French who stood in need of pity. Then was his feigned passion changed into a very bitter anguish of mind, wherein, smiting his breast and wringing his hands, he exclaimed, *Helas, mon Dieu, que veux tu faire de moi*; "Alas, my God, what "wilt thou do with me?" So the affairs of the Netherlands will not serve to prove that there is little danger in using mercenary soldiers, or the help of foreign auxiliaries. This

notwithstanding, they were obedient unto necessity, and sought help of the English, Scots, and French; wherein they did wisely, and prospered. For when there was in France a king, partaker with them in the same danger; when the queen of England refused to accept the sovereignty of their country, which they offered, yet being provoked by the Spaniard their enemy, pursued him with continual war; when the heir of England reigned in Scotland, a king too just and wise (though not engaged in any quarrel) either to make profit of his neighbour's miseries, or to help those that had attempted the conquest of his own inheritance; then might the Netherlanders very safely repose confidence in the forces of these their neighbour-countries. The soldiers that came unto them from hence, were (to omit many other commendations) not only regardful of the pay that they should receive, but well affected unto the cause that they took in hand; or, if any were cold in his devotion to the side whereon he fought, yet was he kept in order by remembrance of his own home, where the English would have rewarded him with death, if his faith had been corrupted by the Spaniard. They were therefore trusted with the custody of cities; they were held as friends and patrons; the necessity of the poorer sort was relieved, before the payday came, with lendings and other helps, as well as the ability of the States could permit. When three such princes, reigning at one time, shall agree so well to maintain against the power of a fourth, injurious (or at least so seeming) to them all, a neighbour country of the same religion, and to which they all are lovingly affected; then may such a country be secure of her auxiliaries, and quietly intend her trade, or other business, in hope of like success. But these circumstances meet so seldom, as it may well hold true in general, That mercenary and foreign auxiliary forces are no less dangerous than the enemy against whom they are entertained.

§. 4.

That the moderate government of the Romans gave them assurance to use the service of their own subjects in their wars. That in man's nature there is an affection breeding tyranny, which hindereth the use and benefit of the like moderation.

HERE may it be demanded, whether also the Romans were not compelled to use service of other soldiers in their many great wars, but performed all by their own citizens? for if it were their manner to arm their own subjects, how happened it that they feared no rebellion? if strangers, how then could they avoid the inconveniences above rehearsed? The answer is, that their armies were compounded usually of their own citizens, and of the Latins, in equal number; to which they added, as occasion required, some companies of the Campanes, Hetrurians, Samnites, or other of their subjects, as were either interested in the quarrel, or might best be trusted. They had, about these times, (though seldom they did employ so many,) ten Roman legions; a good strength, if all other help had been wanting; which served to keep in good order their subjects, that were always fewer in the army than themselves. As for the Latins, if consanguinity were not a sufficient obligation, yet many privileges and immunities, which they enjoyed, made them assured unto the state of Rome; under which they lived almost at liberty, as being bound to little else than to serve it in war. It is true, that a yoke, how easy soever, seems troublesome to the neck that hath been accustomed to freedom. Therefore many people of Italy have taken occasion of several advantages, to deliver themselves from the Roman subjection. But still they have been reclaimed by war, the authors of rebellion have been sharply punished, and the people by degrees have obtained such liberty, as made them esteem none otherwise of Rome than as the common city of all Italy. Yea, in process of time it was granted unto many cities, and those far off removed, even to Tarsus in Cilicia, where St. Paul was born, that all the burgesses should be free of Rome itself. This favour was conferred absolutely upon some; upon some, with restraint of giving voice in

election of magistrates, or with other such limitation as was thought fit. Hereunto may be added, that it was their manner, after a great conquest, to release unto their new subjects half of their tribute which they had been wont to pay unto their former lords, which was a ready way to bring the multitude into good liking of their present condition; when the review of harder times past should rather teach them to fear a relapse, than to hope for better in the future, by seeking innovation. Neither would it be forgotten, as a special note of the Romans' good government[l], that when some, for their well-deserving, have had the offer to be made citizens of Rome, they have refused it, and held themselves better contented with their own present estate. Wherefore it is no marvel that Petellia, a city of the Brutians in Italy, chose rather to endure all extremity of war [m], than, upon any condition, to forsake the Romans; even when the Romans themselves had confessed that they were unable to help these their subjects, and therefore willed them to look to their own good, as having been faithful to the utmost. Such love purchased these mild governors, without impairing their majesty thereby. The sum of all is, they had of their own a strong army, they doubled it by adjoining thereunto the Latins, and they further increased it, as need required, with other help of their own subjects; all, or the most of their followers, accounting the prosperity of Rome to be the common good.

The moderate use of sovereign power being so effectual, in assuring the people unto their lords, and consequently in the establishment or enlargement of dominion; it may seem strange that the practice of tyranny, whose effects are contrary, hath been so common in all ages. The like, I know, may be said of all vice and irregularity whatsoever: for it is less difficult, (whosoever think otherwise) and more safe, to keep the way of justice and honesty, than to turn aside from it; yet commonly our passions lead us into bypaths. But where lust, anger, fear, or any the like affection seduceth our reason, the same unruly appetite either bringeth

[l] Liv. Dec. 3. l. 3. [m] Liv. ibid.

with it an excuse, or at leastwise taketh away all cause of wonder. In tyranny it is not so; forasmuch as we can hardly descry the passion that is of force to insinuate itself into the whole tenour of a government. It must be confessed that lawless desires have bred many tyrants; yet so, that these desires have seldom been hereditary or long-lasting, but have ended commonly with the tyrant's life, sometimes before his death, by which means the government hath been reduced to a better form. In such cases the saying of Aristotle holds[n], that tyrannies are of short continuance. But this doth not satisfy the question in hand: Why did the Carthaginians exercise tyranny? why did the Athenians? why have many other cities done the like? If in respect of their general good, how could they be ignorant that this was an ill course for the safety of the weal public? if they were led hereunto by any affection, what was that affection wherein so many thousand citizens, divided and subdivided within themselves by factions, did all concur, notwithstanding the much diversity of temper, and the vehemency of private hatred among them? Doubtless we must be fain to say, that tyranny is by itself a vice distinct from others. A man we know is *animal politicum*, apt, even by nature, to command or to obey; every one in his proper degree. Other desires of mankind are common likewise unto brute beasts, and some of them to bodies wanting sense; but the desire of rule belongeth unto the nobler part of reason, whereunto is also answerable an aptness to yield obedience. Now as hunger and thirst are given by nature, not only to man and beast, but unto all sorts of vegetables, for the sustentation of their life; as fear, anger, lust, and other affections are likewise natural, in convenient measure, both unto mankind and to all creatures that have sense, for the shunning or repelling of harm, and seeking after that which is requisite; even so is this desire of ruling or obeying engrafted by nature in the race of man, and in man only as a reasonable creature, for the ordering of his life in a civil form of justice. All these inbred qualities are good

[n] Arist. Pol. lib. 5. c. 12.

and useful: nevertheless, hunger and thirst are the parents of gluttony and drunkenness, which, in reproach, are called beastly, by an unproper term; since they grow from appetites found in less worthy creatures than beasts, and are yet not so common in beasts as in men. The effects of anger, and of such other passions as descend no lower than unto brute beasts, are held less vile, and perhaps not without good reason; yet are they more horrible, and punished more grievously by sharper laws, as being in general more pernicious. But as no corruption is worse than of that which is best, there is not any passion that nourisheth a vice more hurtful unto mankind, than that which issueth from the most noble root, even the depraved affection of ruling. Hence arise those two great mischiefs, of which hath been an old question in dispute, whether be the worse, that all things, or that nothing, should be lawful. Of these a dull spirit, and overladen by fortune with power whereof it is not capable, occasioneth the one; the other proceedeth from a contrary distemper, whose vehemency the bounds of reason cannot limit. Under the extremity of either, no country is able to subsist; yet the defective dulness, that permitteth any thing, will also permit the execution of law, to which mere necessity doth enforce the ordinary magistrate; whereas tyranny is more active, and pleaseth itself in the excess, with a false colour of justice. Examples of stupidity and unaptness to rule are not very frequent, though such natures are every where found; for this quality troubles not itself in seeking empire; or if, by some error of fortune, it encounter therewithal, (as when Claudius, hiding himself in a corner, found the empire of Rome,) some friend, or else a wife, is not wanting to supply the defect, which also cruelty doth help to shadow. Therefore this vice, as a thing unknown, is without a name. Tyranny is more bold, and feareth not to be known, but would be reputed honourable; for it is *prosperum et fœlix scelus*, "a fortunate mis-"chief," as long as it can subsist. "There is no reward or "honour," saith Peter Charron, "assigned to those that "know how to increase, or to preserve human nature;

" all honours, greatness, riches, dignities, empires, triumphs, " trophies, are appointed for those that know how to afflict, " trouble, or destroy it." Cæsar and Alexander have unmade and slain, each of them, more than a million of men; but they made none, nor left none behind them. Such is the error of man's judgment, in valuing things according to common opinion. But the true name of tyranny, when it grows to ripeness, is none other than *ferity*; the same that Aristotle saith to be worse than any vice. It exceedeth indeed all other vices, issuing from the passions incident both to man and beast, no less than perjury, murder, treason, and the like horrible crimes, exceed in villainy the faults of gluttony and drunkenness, that grow from more ignoble appetites. Hereof Sciron, Procrustes, and Pityocamptes, that used their bodily force to the destruction of mankind, are not better examples than Phalaris, Dionysius, and Agathocles, whose mischievous heads were assisted by the hands of detestable ruffians. The same barbarous desire of lordship transported those old examples of ferity and these latter tyrants beyond the bounds of reason; neither of them knew the use of rule, nor the difference between freemen and slaves.

The rule of the husband over the wife, and of parents over their children, is natural, and appointed by God himself; so that it is always, and simply, allowable and good. The former of these is as the dominion of reason over appetite; the latter is the whole authority, which one free man can have over another. The rule of a king is no more, nor none other, than of a common father over his whole country; which he that knows what the power of a father is, or ought to be, knows to be enough. But there is a greater and more masterly rule, which God gave unto Adam, when he said, [o] *Have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth:* which also he confirmed unto Noah and his children, saying, [p] *The fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every*

[o] Gen. i. 28. [p] Gen. ix. 2.

fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands are they delivered. He who gave this dominion to man, gave also an aptitude to use it. The execution of this power hath since extended itself over a great part of mankind. There are indeed no small numbers of men, whose disability to govern themselves proves them, according unto Aristotle's doctrine, to be naturally slaves.

Yet find I not in scripture any warrant to oppress men with bondage; [q] unless the lawfulness thereof be sufficiently intimated, where it is said, that a man shall not be punished for the death of a servant, whom he hath slain by correction, if the servant live a day or two, because [r] *he is his money;* or else by the captivity of the [s] Midianitish girls, which were made bondslaves, and the sanctuary had a part of them for *the Lord's tribute.* Doubtless the custom hath been very ancient; [t] for Noah laid this curse upon Canaan, that he should be *a servant of servants;* and Abraham had of Pharaoh, among other gifts, [u] *menservants and maidservants,* which were none other than slaves. Christian religion is said to have abrogated this old kind of servility; but surely they are deceived that think so. [x] St. Paul desired the liberty of Onesimus, whom he had won unto Christ; yet wrote he for this unto Philemon by way of request, craving it as a benefit, not urging it as a duty. Agreeable hereto is the direction which the same St. Paul giveth unto servants; [y] *Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called. Art thou called being a servant? care not for it: but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather.* It is true, that Christian religion hath procured liberty unto many; not only in regard of piety, but for that the Christian masters stood in fear of being discovered by their slaves unto the persecutors of religion. Mahomet likewise, by giving liberty to his followers, drew many unto his impiety; but whether he forbade it, as unlawful, unto his

[q] Arist. Pol. l. 1. c. 3.
[r] Exod. xxi. 21.
[s] Num. xxxi. 9.
[t] Gen. ix. 25.
[u] Gen. xii. 16.
[x] Epist. to Philem. ver. 14.
[y] 1 Cor. vii. 20, 21.

sectators to hold one another of them in bondage, I cannot tell, save that by the practice of the Turks and Moors it seems he did not. In England we had many bondservants, until the times of our last civil wars; and I think that the laws concerning villanage are still in force, of which the latest are the sharpest. And now, since slaves were made free, which were of great use and service, there are grown up a rabble of rogues, cutpurses, and other the like trades; slaves in nature, though not in law.

But whether this kind of dominion be lawful or not, Aristotle hath well proved that it is natural. And certainly we find not such a latitude of difference in any creature, as in the nature of man; wherein (to omit the infinite distance in estate of the elect and reprobate) the wisest excel the most foolish, by far greater degree than the most foolish of men doth surpass the wisest of beasts. Therefore when commiseration hath given way to reason, we shall find that nature is the ground even of masterly power and of servile obedience, which is thereto correspondent. But it may be truly said, that some countries have subsisted long without the use of any servility; as also it is true, that some countries have not the use of any tame cattle. Indeed the affections which uphold civil rule are (though more noble) not so simply needful, unto the sustentation either of our kind, as are lust and the like; or of every one, as are hunger and thirst; which notwithstanding are the lowest in degree. But where most vile and servile dispositions have liberty to shew themselves begging in the streets, there may we more justly wonder, how the dangerous toil of seafaring men can find enough to undertake them, than how the swarm of idle vagabonds should increase, by access of those that are weary of their own more painful condition. This may suffice to prove, that in mankind there is found, ingrafted even by nature, a desire of absolute dominion, whereunto the general custom of nations doth subscribe; together with the pleasure which most men take in flatterers, that are the basest of slaves.

This being so, we find no cause to marvel how tyranny

hath been so rife in all ages, and practised, not only in the single rule of some vicious prince, but ever by consent of whole cities and estates; since other vices have likewise gotten head, and borne a general sway, notwithstanding that the way of virtue be more honourable and commodious. Few there are that have used well the inferior passions; how then can we expect that the most noble affections should not be disordered? In the government of wife and children, some are utterly careless, and corrupt all by their dull connivancy; others, by masterly rigour, hold their own blood under condition of slavery. To be a good governor is a rare commendation; and to prefer the weal public above all respects whatsoever, is the virtue justly termed heroical. Of this virtue many ages afford not many examples. Hector is named by Aristotle as one of them, and deservedly, if this praise be due to extraordinary height of fortitude, used in defence of a man's own country. But if we consider, that a love of the general good cannot be perfect without reference unto *the fountain of all goodness*, we shall find that no moral virtue, how great soever, can by itself deserve the commendation of *more than virtue*, as the heroical doth. Wherefore we must search the scriptures for patterns hereof, such as David, Josaphat, and Josias were. Of Christian kings if there were many such, the world would soon be happy. It is not my purpose to wrong the worth of any, by denying the praise where it is due, or by preferring a less excellent. But he that can find a king religious and zealous in God's cause, without enforcement either of adversity or of some regard of state; a procurer of the general peace and quiet; who not only useth his authority, but adds the travail of his eloquence in admonishing his judges to do justice; by the vigorous influence of whose government civility is infused, even into those places that have been the dens of savage robbers and cutthroats; one that hath quite abolished a slavish Brehon law, by which an whole nation of his subjects were held in bondage; and one whose higher virtue and wisdom doth make the praise, not only of nobility and other ornaments, but of abstinence

from the blood, the wives, and the goods of those that are under his power, together with a world of chief commendations, belonging unto some good princes, to appear less regardable; he, I say, that can find such a king, findeth an example worthy to add unto virtue an honourable title, if it were formerly wanting. Under such a king it is likely, by God's blessing, that a land shall flourish, with increase of trade, in countries before unknown; that civility and religion shall be propagated into barbarous and heathen countries; and that the happiness of his subjects shall cause the nations far off removed, to wish him their sovereign. I need not add hereunto, that all the actions of such a king, even his bodily exercises, do partake of virtue; since all things tending to the preservation of his life and health, or to the mollifying of his cares, (who, fixing his contemplation upon God, seeketh how to imitate the unspeakable goodness, rather than the inaccessible majesty, with both of which himself is endued, as far as human nature is capable,) do also belong to the furtherance of that common good which he procureth. Lest any man should think me transported with admiration, or other affection, beyond the bounds of reason, I add hereunto, that such a king is nevertheless a man, must die, and may err; yet wisdom and fame shall set him free from *error* and from *death*, both with and without the help of *time*. One thing I may not omit, as a singular benefit (though there be many other besides) redounding unto this king, as the fruit of his goodness. The people that live under a pleasant yoke are not only loving to their sovereign lord, but free of courage, and no greater in muster of men than of stout fighters, if need require; whereas on the contrary, he that ruleth as over slaves, shall be attended, in time of necessity, by slavish minds, neither loving his person, nor regarding his or their own honour. Cowards may be furious, and slaves outrageous for a time; but among spirits that have once yielded unto slavery universally, it is found true that [z] Homer saith,

[z] Hom. Odyss. l. 17.

" God bereaveth a man of half his virtue that day, when he " casteth him into bondage."

Of these things I might perhaps more seasonably have spoken in the general discourse of government; but where so lively an example of the calamity following a tyrannical rule, and the use of mercenaries thereupon depending, did offer itself, as is this present business of the Carthaginians, I thought that the note would be more effectual, than being barely delivered as out of a common place.

SECT. III.

How the war against the mercenaries was diversely managed by Hanno and Amilcar with variable success. The bloody counsels of the mercenaries, and their final destruction.

BEING now to return unto those mercenaries, from whom I have thus far digressed, I cannot readily find by what name henceforth I should call them. They are no longer in pay with the Carthaginians, neither care they to pretend that they seek their wages already due, so that they are neither mercenaries nor mutineers. Had they all been subjects unto Carthage, then might they justly have been termed rebels: but Spendius and others, that were the principal part of them, ought none allegiance to that state, which they endeavoured to subvert. Wherefore I will borrow the name of their late occupation, and still call them mercenaries, as Polybius also doth.

These using the advantage of their present strength, besieged [a] Utica and Hippagreta, cities of great importance, as being seated upon the western haven of Carthage, where it is divided by a neck of land; Hippagreta standing inwards upon the great lake, Utica further out upon the sea.

[a] Utica is seated in the great bay that enters towards Carthage, not far within the promontory of Apollo. At this time it is called Porto Farina, or Biserta; and by the Africans themselves Garel Melba. Niger saith, that the town itself is ruined, and the place whereon it stood now called Mazachares. It was very ancient, and built before Carthage, saith Silius. As it flourished before Carthage was set up, so did it after Carthage was thrown down by the Romans in the third Punic war. Famous it was by the death of Cato the younger, who held it against Cæsar. Victor, that worthy divine, was bishop thereof in the time of Genseric the Arrian, who lived all the time of that tyrant, and hath written the story of his cruelties.

Neither was the camp at Tunis abandoned, which lay fitly to hinder the Carthaginians from passing up into the country; for Matho and Spendius wanted not men to follow the war in all parts at once.

How the Carthaginians were amazed with this unexpected peril, any man may conceive. But the business itself awakes them hastily. They are hardly pressed on all sides, and therefore travailed their brains to the uttermost how to shake off these furious dogs from their shoulders, who sometimes by night, sometimes by day, came unto the very walls of their city. In this exigent Hanno was made their general; who failed not in his accustomed diligence of making all good preparation, but had gotten together whatsoever was needful, as well to relieve a town besieged, as to batter and assail any place defended against him. With these provisions, and with an hundred elephants, he came to Utica so suddenly, that the enemies, as men surprised, forsook their trenches, and retired themselves unto a rising piece of woody ground, where they might be safe against the violence of his beasts. Hanno, thinking that he had to do with Numidians, whose custom was, after any loss, to fly two or three whole days' journey off, presently entered the town to shew himself after this his victory. But these good fellows, against whom he was to war, had learned of Amilcar to retire and to fight again many times in one day, as need required. Therefore as soon as they perceived that he knew not how to use a victory, they assailed their own camp, and with great slaughter drave the Carthaginians out of it, forcing them to hide themselves within Utica, and got possession of all the store that Hanno had brought for the relief of the town. This bad beginning Hanno followed with suitable indiscretion, losing the benefit of many fair opportunities, and suffering the enemies to take possession of all the entrance from Carthage to the firm land.

The Carthaginians, perceiving this, were exceedingly troubled, and did therefore let fall their sheet-anchor, sending to the field their great captain Amilcar, whom they furnished with ten thousand foot of supply, and seventy ele-

plants. Amilcar had work enough to do, before he should be able to meet with the enemy upon equal ground. For, besides other places of advantage that the mercenaries had occupied, Hanno had suffered them to win the only bridge by which the river Macra, or Bagradas, was passable unto these that were to travel into the continent. This river had not many fords, nor those easy for a single man to get over; but upon them all was kept such guard, as gave to Amilcar little hope of prevailing in seeking way by force. As for the bridge itself, Matho and his followers were there lodged, and had there built a town wherein to lie commodiously, intentive only to the custody thereof. But Amilcar had observed, that the very mouth of Bagradas used to be sometimes cloyed with sand and gravel, that was driven in by certain customary winds, and could not be driven out again by force of that slow river, till the wind, falling or changing, suffered the weight of the waters to disburden their channel. Hereof he made use, and taking his opportunity, passed the river, contrary to all expectation either of the enemy or of his own citizens.

There was no need to bid Spendius look about him, when once it was heard that Amilcar was come over Bagradas; all the mercenaries were troubled with the news, knowing that they were no longer to deal with the improvident gravity of Hanno, but with an able spirit, even with their own master in the art of war, whom they admired, though they hated him. But this fear was soon changed into presumption, when more than fifteen thousand of their own society were come from Utica, and other ten thousand from the guard of the bridge. Their army was far greater than that of Amilcar, and they were in their own judgment the better men; upon which confidence they resolved to charge him on all sides, and beat him down in despite of his worth and reputation. With this resolution they attended upon him, watching for some advantage, and still exhorting one and other to play the men, and give the onset. Especially they that followed him in the rear had a great mind to begin the fight, whereunto their promptness was such as took from

them their former circumspection. Amilcar held his way towards the bridge, keeping himself on plain grounds, that were fittest for the service of his elephants, which he placed in front of his army. Neither made he show of any desire to fight, but suffered the rashness of his enemies to increase, till it should break into some disorder. At length perceiving that with more boldness than good heed they followed him so near, as would be little for their good if he should turn upon them, he hastened his march, even to such a pace as made a show little differing from plain flight. The mercenaries presently fell upon his skirts, believing, that for fear of them he was ready to run away. But whilst they confusedly, as in sudden opinion of victory, were driving at the heels of those that had the rear, Amilcar wheeled about and met them in the face, charging them hotly, but in very good order, so that, amazed with the apprehension of unexpected danger, they fled without making any resistance. In this overthrow there were six thousand of the mercenaries slain, and about two thousand taken; the rest fled, some to the camp at Utica, others to the town at the bridge, whither Amilcar followed them so fast that he won the place easily; the enemies being thence also fled unto Tunis, as not having recollected their spirits to make it good.

The fame of this victory, together with the diligence of Amilcar in pursuing it, caused many towns revolted, partly by fear, partly by force, to return to their former obedience. Yet was not Matho wanting to himself in this dangerous time. He sent about Numidia and Afric for new supplies, admonishing the people now or never to do their best for the recovery of their freedom; he persuaded Spendius, and Autarius, that was captain of the Gauls, to wait upon Amilcar, and always to keep the higher grounds, or at least the foot of some hill, where they might be safe from the elephants; and he himself continued to press the town of Hippagreta with an hard siege. It was necessary for Amilcar, in passing from place to place, as his business required, to take such ways as there were, for all the country lay not level. Therefore Spendius, who still coasted him,

had once gotten a notable advantage of ground, the Carthaginians lying in a plain, surrounded with hills that were occupied by the mercenaries, with their Numidian and African succours. In this difficulty, the fame of Amilcar's personal worth did greatly benefit his country. For Naravasus, a young gentleman commanding over the Numidians, was glad of this occasion, serving to get the acquaintance and love of so brave a man, which he much desired; and therefore came unto Amilcar, signifying his good affection to him, with offer to do him all service. Amilcar joyfully entertained this friend, promised unto him his own daughter in marriage, and so won from the enemies two thousand horse, that following Naravasus, turned unto the Carthaginian's side. With this help he gave battle unto Spendius, wherein the Numidian laboured to approve his own valour to his new friend. So the victory was great; for there were slain ten thousand of Spendius's fellows, and four thousand taken prisoners; but Spendius himself, with Autarius the Gaul, escaped to do more mischief. Amilcar dealt very gently with his prisoners, pardoning all offences past, and dismissing as many as were unwilling to become his followers, yet with condition, that they should never more bear arms against the Carthaginians; threatening to take sharp revenge upon all that should break this covenant.

This humanity was vehemently suspected by Matho, Spendius, and Autarius, as tending to win from them the hearts of their soldiers. Wherefore they resolved to take such order, that not a man among them should dare to trust in the good nature of Amilcar, nor to hope for any safety whilst Carthage was able to do him hurt. They counterfeited letters of advertisement, wherein was contained, that some of their company, respective only of their private benefit, and careless of the general good, had a purpose to betray them all unto the Carthaginians, with whom they held intelligence; and that it was needful to look well unto Gesco and his companions, whom these traitors had a purpose to enlarge. Upon this theme Spendius makes an oration to the soldiers, exhorting them to fidelity, and shewing

with many words, that the seeming humanity of Amilcar toward some, was none other then a bait wherewith to entrap them all at once together; as also telling them, what a dangerous enemy Gesco would prove, if he might escape their hands. While he is yet in the midst of his tale, were letters come to the same purpose. Then steps forth Autarius, and speaks his mind plainly; saying, that it were the best, yea the only way, for the common safety, to cut off all hope of reconciliation with Carthage; that if some were devising to make their own peace, it would go hard with those that had a care of the war; that it were better to make an end of Gesco's life, than to trouble themselves with looking to his custody; that by such a course every one should be engaged in the present action, as having none other hope left than in victory alone; finally, that such as would speak here-against were worthy to be reputed traitors. This Autarius was in great credit with the soldiers, and could speak sundry languages in such sort that he was understood by all. According to his motion therefore it was agreed, that Gesco, and all the other prisoners, should forthwith be put to horrible death by torments. Nevertheless there were some, that for love of Gesco, sought to alter this intended cruelty; but they were forthwith stoned to death as a document unto others; and so the decree was put in execution. Neither were they herewithal contented, but further ordained, that all Carthaginian prisoners, which they took, should be served in like sort; and that the subjects or friends of Carthage should lose their hands, and so be sent home; which rule they observed ever afterwards.

Of this cruelty I need say no more, than that it was most execrable ferity. As for the counsel of using it, it was like unto the counsel of Ahithophel; *All Israel shall hear that thou art abhorred of thy father: then shall the hands of all that are with thee be strong.* Such are the fruits of desperation. He that is past all hope of pardon is afraid of his own fellows, if they be more innocent; and to avoid the punishment of less offences committeth greater. The cowardice of offenders, and the revengeful spirits of those that

have been wronged, are breeders of this desperation; to which may be added, some deficiency of laws in distinguishing the punishments of malefactors according to the degree of their several crimes. A coward thinks all provision too little for his own security: "If Phocas be a coward," said the emperor Mauritius, "then is he murderous." To be steadfast and sure in taking revenge, is thought a point of honour and a defensative against new injuries. But wrongfully; for it is opposite to the rule of Christianity; and such a quality discovered makes them deadly enemies, who otherwise would have repented and sought to make amends for the wrong done in passion. This was it which wrought so much woe to the Carthaginians, teaching Matho and his Africans to suspect even their gentleness as the introduction to extreme rigour. Like unto the errors of princes and governors are the errors of laws: where one and the same punishment is awarded unto the less offence and unto the greater, he that hath adventured to rob a man is easily tempted to kill him for his own security.

Against these inconveniences, mercy and severity, used with due respect, are the best remedies. In neither of which Amilcar failed: for as long as these his own soldiers were any way likely to be reclaimed by gentle courses, his humanity was ready to invite them. But when they were transported with beastly outrage, beyond all regard of honesty and shame, he rewarded their villainy with answerable vengeance, casting them unto wild beasts to be devoured.

Until this time Hanno, with the army under his command, had kept himself apart from Amilcar, and done little, as may seem, for that nothing is remembered of him since his late losses. Neither was Amilcar sorry to want his help, as being able to do better without him. But when the war grew to such extremity, as threatened utter ruin to the one or the other side; then was Hanno sent for, and came to Amilcar, with whom he joined his forces. By this access of strength Amilcar was not enabled to do more than in former times; rather he could now perform nothing, such

was the hatred between him and his unworthy colleague. The towns of Utica and Hippagreta, that had stood always firm on the Carthaginian party, did now revolt unto the enemy, murdering all the soldiers that they had in garrison, and casting their bodies forth, without suffering them to be buried. The provisions brought by sea, for maintenance of the army, were lost in foul weather; and Carthage itself stood in danger of being besieged, about which Matho and Spendius consulted, whilst one of the Carthaginian generals did (as it were) bind the other's hands.

It hath in all ages been used, as the safest course, to send forth in great expeditions two generals of one army. This was the common practice of those two mighty cities, Athens and Rome; which other states and princes have often imitated, persuading themselves, that great armies are not so well conducted by one as by two; who, out of emulation to excel each other, will use the greater diligence. They have also joined two chief commanders in equal commission, upon this further consideration, the better to restrain the ambition of any one that should be trusted with so great a strength: for hereof all commonweals have been jealous, having been taught by their examples that have made themselves tyrants over those cities and states that have employed them. In this point, the Venetians have been so circumspect, as they have, for the most part, trusted strangers, and not their own, in all the wars which they have made. It is true, that the equal authority of two commanding in chief, serveth well to bridle the ambition of one or both from turning upon the prince or state that hath given them trust; but in managing the war itself, it is commonly the cause of ill success. In wars made near unto Rome itself, when two good friends were consuls, or such two at least as concurred in one desire of triumph; which honour (the greatest of any that Rome could give) was to be obtained by that one year's service, it is no marvel, though each of the consuls did his best, and referred all his thoughts unto none other end than victory. Yet in all dangerous cases, when the consuls proceeded otherwise than

was desired, one dictator was appointed, whose power was neither hindered by any partner, nor by any great limitation. Neither was it indeed the manner to send forth both the consuls to one war; but each went, whither his lot called him, to his own province, unless one business seemed to require them both, and they also seemed fit to be joined in the administration. Now although it was so, that the Romans did many times prevail with their joint generals; yet was this never or seldom without as much concord as any other virtue of the commanders: for their modesty hath often been such, that the less able captain, though of equal authority, hath willingly submitted himself to the other, and obeyed his directions. This notwithstanding, they have many times, by ordaining two commanders of one army, received great and most dangerous overthrows; whereof in the second Punic war we shall find examples. On the contrary side, in their wars most remote, that were always managed by one, they seldom failed to win exceeding honour, as hereafter shall appear. Now of those ten generals, which served the Athenians at the battle of Marathon, it may truly be said, that had not their temper been better than the judgment of the people that sent them forth, and had not they submitted themselves to the conduction of Miltiades, their affairs had found the same success which they found at other times, when they coupled Nicias and Alcibiades together in Sicily; the one being so overwary, and the other so hasty, as all came to nought that they undertook; whereas Cimon alone, as also Aristides and others, having sole charge of all, did their country and commonweal most remarkable service: for it is hard to find two great captains of equal discretion and valour; but that the one hath more of fury than of judgment, and so the contrary; by which the best occasions are as often overslipt, as at other times many actions are unseasonably undertaken. I remember it well, that when the prince of Condé was slain after the battle of Jarnac, (which prince, together with the admiral Chastillon, had the conduct of the protestant army,) the protestants did greatly bewail the loss of

the said prince, in respect of his religion, person, and birth; yet, comforting themselves, they thought it rather an advancement than an hinderance to their affairs; for so much did the valour of the one outreach the advisedness of the other, as whatsoever the admiral intended to win by attending the advantage, the prince adventured to lose by being overconfident in his own courage.

But we need no better example than of the Carthaginians in this present business; who, though they were still sick of their ill-grounded love to Hanno, and were unwilling to disgrace him; yet, seeing that all ran towards ruin through the discord of the generals, committed the decision of their controversies unto the army that served under them. The judgment of the army was, that Hanno should depart the camp, which he did; and Hannibal was sent in his stead, one that would be directed by Amilcar; and that was enough.

After this, the affairs of Carthage began to prosper somewhat better. Matho and Spendius had brought their army near unto the city, and lay before it as in a siege. They might well be bold to hope and adventure much, having in their camp above fifty thousand, besides those that lay abroad in garrisons. Nevertheless, the city was too strong for them to win by assault; and the entrance of victuals they could not hinder, if any should be sent in by friends from abroad.

Hiero king of Syracuse, though during the wars in Sicily he assisted the Romans, and still continued in their alliance, yet now sent succours to the Carthaginians; fearing their fall, and consequently his own; because, if no other state gave the Romans somewhat to trouble their digestion, the principality of Syracuse would soon be devoured by them. The Romans also gave them some slender assistance, and for the present refused good offers made unto them by the mercenaries. This they did to shew a kind of noble disposition, which was indeed but counterfeit, as the sequel manifestly proved.

Whilst Matho and his followers were busily pressing the

city, Amilcar was as diligent in waiting at their backs and cutting off all that came to their supply; so that finding themselves more straitly besieged by him than Carthage was by them, they purposed to desist from their vain attempt, and try some other course. Hereupon they issue into the field; where Spendius, and one Zarcas, an African captain assisting the rebellion, take upon them to find Amilcar work; leaving Matho in Tunis to negotiate with their friends, and take a general care of the business. The elephants of Carthage, and horse of Naravasus, made Spendius fearful to descend into the plains. Wherefore he betook himself to his former method of war, keeping the mountains and rough grounds, or occupying the straitest passages wherein the desperate courage of his men might shew itself with little disadvantage. But Amilcar had more skill in this art than could be matched by the labour of Spendius. He drew the enemy to many skirmishes; in all which the success was such, as added courage to his own men, and abated the strength and spirit of the rebels. Thus he continued, provoking them night and day; still entrapping some of them, and sometimes giving them the overthrow in plain battle; until at length he got them into a strait, whence ere they should get out, he meant to take of them a good account. Their judgment was enough to perceive their own disadvantage; and therefore they had the less stomach to fight, but awaited for help from Tunis. Amilcar prudently foreseeing that necessity might teach them to dare impossibilities, used the benefit of their present fear, and shut them close up with trench and rampart. There they waited miserably for succour that came not; and having spent all their victuals, were so pinched with hunger, that they fed upon the bodies of their prisoners. This they suffered patiently, as knowing that they had not deserved any favour from Carthage; and hoping that their friends at Tunis would not be unmindful of them. But when they were driven to such extremity, that they were fain to devour their own companions, and yet saw none appearance or likelihood of relief, their obstinacy was broken, and they

threatened their captains with what they had deserved, unless they would go forth to Amilcar, and seek such peace as might be gotten. So Spendius, Zarcas, and Autarius fell to consultation, wherein it was resolved to obey the multitude, and yield themselves, if it were so required, unto the death, rather than to perish by the hands of their own companions. Hereupon they send to crave parley, which is granted; and these three come forth to talk with Amilcar in person. What they could say unto him, it is hard to conjecture; yet by the conditions which Amilcar granted, it seems that they took the blame upon themselves, and craved pardon for the multitude. The conditions were, that the Carthaginians should choose, out of the whole number of these enemies, any ten whom they pleased, to remain at their discretion; and that the rest should all be dismissed, each in his shirt, or in one single coat. When the peace was thus concluded, Amilcar told these ringleaders, that he chose them presently as part of the ten, and so commanded to lay hands on them; the rest he forthwith went to fetch, with his whole army in order. The rebels, who knew not that peace was concluded upon so gentle articles, thought themselves betrayed, and therefore amazedly ran to arms. But they wanted captains to order them; and the same astonishment, that made them break the covenants of peace, whereof they were ignorant, gave unto Amilcar both colour of justice, in accomplishing revenge, and ease in doing the execution. They were all slain, being forty thousand or more in number.

This was a famous exploit; and the news thereof exceeding welcome to Carthage, and terrible to the revolted cities of Afric. Henceforward Amilcar, with his Naravasus and Hannibal, carried the war from town to town, and found all places ready to yield; Utica and Hippagreta only standing out, upon fear of deserved vengeance; and Tunis, being held by Matho, with the remainder of his army. It was thought fit to begin with Tunis, wherein lay the chief strength of the enemy. Coming before this town, they brought forth Spendius, with his fellows, in view of the de-

fendants, and crucified them under the walls, to terrify those of his old companions that were still in arms. With this rigour the siege began, as if speedy victory had been assured. Hannibal quartered on that part of Tunis which lay towards Carthage; Amilcar on the opposite side, too far asunder to help one another in sudden accidents; and therefore it behoved each to be the more circumspect.

Matho from the walls beheld his own destiny in the misery of his companion, and knew not how to avoid it otherwise, than by a cast at dice with fortune. So he broke out upon that part of the Carthaginian army that lay secure, as if all danger were past, under the command of Hannibal; and with so great and unexpected fury he sallied, that after an exceeding slaughter he took Hannibal prisoner; on whom, and thirty the most noble of the Carthaginian prisoners, he presently revenged the death of Spendius by the same torture. Of this, Amilcar knew nothing, till it was too late; neither had he strength enough remaining, after this great loss, to continue the siege; but was fain to break it up, and remove unto the mouth of the river Bagradas, where he encamped.

The terror was no less within Carthage upon the fame of this loss, than had been the joy of the late great victory. All that could bear arms were sent into the field, under Hanno; whom, it seems, they thought the most able of their captains surviving the late accidents of war. If there were any law among them forbidding the employment of one sole general near unto their city, (for they are known to have trusted one man abroad,) the time did not permit, in this hasty exigent, to devise about repealing it. But thirty principal men are chosen by the senate to bring Hanno to Amilcar's camp, and by all good persuasions to reconcile them. This could not be effected in one day. It nearly touched Amilcar in his honour, that the carelessness of Hannibal seemed to be imputed unto him, by sending his enemy to moderate his proceedings. Nevertheless, after many conferences, the authority of the senators prevailed; Amilcar and Hanno were made friends, and thenceforth, whilst this

war lasted, Hanno took warning by Hannibal's calamities to follow good directions, though afterwards he returned to his old and deadly hatred [a].

In the mean season Matho was come abroad, as meaning to use the reputation of his late success, whilst it gave some life unto his business. He had reason to do as he did, but he wanted skill to deal with Amilcar. The skirmishes and light exercises of war, wherein Amilcar trained his Carthaginians, did so far abate the strength, and withal diminish the credit of Matho, that he resolved to try the fortune of one battle; wherein either his desires should be accomplished, or his cares ended. To this conclusion the Carthaginians were no less prone than Matho; as being weary of these long troubles and insupportable expenses; confident in the valour of their own men, which had approved itself in many trials, and well assured of Amilcar's great worth, whereunto the enemy had not what to oppose. According to this determination, each part was diligent in making provision; inviting their friends to help, and drawing forth into the field all that lay in garrison.

The issue of this battle might have been foretold without help of witchcraft. Matho and his followers had nothing whereon to presume, save their daring spirits, which had been well cooled by the many late skirmishes, wherein they had learned how to run away. The Carthaginians had reason to dare, as having often been victorious; and in all points else they had the better of their enemies, especially (which is worth all the rest) they had such a commander, as was not easily to be matched in that age. Neither was it likely that the desire of liberty should work so much in men accustomed to servitude, as the honour of their state would in citizens, whose future and present good lay all at once engaged in that adventure. So the Carthaginians won a great victory, wherein most of the Africans their enemies were slain; the rest fled into a town which was not to be defended, and therefore they all yielded; and Matho himself was taken alive. Immediately, upon this vic-

[a] Liv. Dec. 3. l. 1.

tory, all the Africans that had rebelled made submission to their old masters; Utica only and Hippagreta stood out, as knowing how little they deserved of favour: but they were soon forced to take what conditions best pleased the victors. Matho and his fellows were led to Carthage in triumph; where they suffered all torments that could be devised in recompense of the mischiefs which they had wrought in this war. The war had lasted three years and about four months when it came to this good end; which the Carthaginians, whose subjects did not love them, should with less expense, by contenting their mercenaries, have prevented in the beginning.

SECT. IV.

How the mercenaries of the Carthaginians, that were in Sardinia, rebelled; and were afterwards driven out by the islanders. The faithless dealing of the Romans with the Carthaginians in taking from them Sardinia, contrary to the peace.

WHILST Matho and Spendius were making this terrible combustion in Afric, other mercenaries of the Carthaginians had kindled the like fire in Sardinia; where, murdering Bostar the governor, and other Carthaginians, they were in hope to get and hold that island to their own use. Against these one Hanno was sent with a small army, (such as could be spared in that busy time,) consisting likewise of mercenaries levied on the sudden. But these companions that followed Hanno, finding it more for their safety and present profit to join themselves with those that were already revolted, than to endanger themselves by battle for the good of that commonweal of which they had no care, began to enter into practice with the Sardinian rebels; offering to run one course of fortune with them in their enterprise. This their offer was kindly taken, but their faith was suspected: wherefore, to take away all jealousy and distrust, they resolved to hang up their commander Hanno, and performed it. A common practice it hath been in all ages, with those that have undertaken the quarrel of an unjust war, to enjoin the performance of some notorious and

villainous act to those that come into them as seconds, with offer to partake and to assist the impious purposes which they have in hand. It is indeed the best pawn that desperate men can deliver to each other, to perform some such actions as are equally unpardonable to all.

By such a kind of cruelty did the ungrateful Mantineans murder a garrison of Achaians, sent unto them for their defence against the Lacedæmonians by Aratus; who, when he had formerly possessed himself of their city, by right of war, did not only spare the sack and spoil thereof, but gave them equal freedom with the rest of the cities united. These revolts are also common in our court wars; where, in the conquests of new fortunes, and making of new parties and factions, without the depression or destruction of old friends, we cannot be received and trusted by old enemies: *Ce sont les coups de vieille escrime;* "These," say the French, "be the blows of the old art of fencing."

These mercenaries in Sardinia were no wit less violent in their purpose, than were Spendius and his associates; only they wanted a Matho among them to negotiate with the inhabitants of the province. The islanders were no less glad than the soldiers, that the Carthaginians were expelled the country; but they could not agree about the profit of the victory. The Sardinians thought that it was enough, if they rewarded the soldiers for their pains taken. Contrariwise the soldiers were of opinion, that the title of the Carthaginians to that isle was devolved unto themselves by right of conquest. The same quarrel would (in likelihood) have risen between Spendius with his mercenaries, and their African friends, if the common desire of both had once taken effect; unless the riches of Carthage had served to content them all. But in Sardinia, where there was none other valuable reward than possession and rule of the country, the matter was not easily taken up. So they fell to blows, which how they were dealt, I know not; but finally the mercenaries were driven out, and compelled to save themselves in Italy. Before their departure out of Sardinia, they had invited the Romans into it; with as good right as

the Mamertines had called them into Sicily. Yet this offer was refused upon reasons that follow.

Some Italian merchants had relieved Matho and Spendius with corn; of whom the Carthaginians took almost five hundred, and held them in prison. Hereof was made a great complaint; so that the Romans sent ambassadors to Carthage, requiring satisfaction. It was no time for the Carthaginians to dispute; they quietly yielded to release them all. This was so kindly taken, that they forbade all their merchants to trade thenceforth with the rebels; admonishing them to carry all provisions to Carthage. And upon the same reason did they forbear to meddle with Sardinia, or to accept the city of Utica, offering itself unto their subjection. This might have served as a notable example of the Roman faith to all posterity; had not the issue proved that it was mere regard of greater profit which kept them so temperate, no longer than the hope lasted of thriving better thereby, than they should have done by open breach of faith. The whole estate of Carthage depended, at that time, upon the virtue of Amilcar; who had he been overthrown by Spendius or Matho in one main battle, that mighty city must either have fallen into the barbarous hands of merciless villains, or have humbled herself under protection of the Romans, with whom she had lately striven for superiority. That extreme necessity whereinto Matho reduced the city, by the fortune of one sally made out of Tunis, is enough to prove that Carthage was not far from such a miserable choice. Wherefore it was not unwisely done of the Romans, to make such demonstration of kindness and honourable dealing, as might invite a rich, but sinking ship, to run herself aground upon their shore. But when all was well ended in Afric, and the Carthaginians began to prepare for the recovery of Sardinia, then did ambition put off her goodly vizor. The Romans perceiving that Carthage, beyond their hope, had recovered her feet again, began to strike at her head. They entertained the proffer of those mercenaries that were fled out of Sardinia; and they denounced war against this enfeebled and impo-

verished city, under a shameless pretence, "that the pre-"parations made for Sardinia were made indeed against "Rome itself." The Carthaginians knew themselves unable to resist, and therefore yielded to the Romans' demand; renouncing unto them all their right in Sardinia. But this was not enough: they would have twelve hundred talents, in recompense belike (for I see not what reason they could allege) of the great fear which they had endured of an invasion from Carthage. It is indeed plain, that they impudently sought occasion of war: but necessity taught the Carthaginians patience; and the money was paid, how hardly soever it was raised. From this time forward let not Rome complain of the Punic faith, in breach of covenants; she herself hath broken the peace already, which Amilcar purposeth to make her dearly repent; but what Amilcar lives not to perform, shall be accomplished by Hannibal, his renowned son.

SECT. V.

How the affairs of Carthage went between the African rebellion, and the second Punic war.

THE injurious dealing of the Romans, expressing their desire to pick a quarrel, served to instruct the Carthaginians in a necessary lesson: that either they must make themselves the stronger, or else resolve to be obedient unto those that were more mighty. In a city long accustomed to rule, the braver determination easily took place; and the best means were thought upon for the increase of puissance and empire. The strength and the jealousy of the Romans forbade all attempts upon the Mediterranean seas; but the riches of Spain, that lay upon the ocean, were unknown to Rome: wherefore that province might serve, both to exercise the Carthaginians in war, and to repair their decayed forces with all needful supplies. Of this Spanish expedition, the charge and sovereign trust was committed unto Amilcar, upon whom his country did wholly repose itself; in hope to recover strength by his means that had saved it from ruin.

Hanno, with some other envious men that were of his

faction, took little pleasure in the general love and honour which daily increased towards Amilcar and his friends. Yet could they not deny him to be the most worthy of command in all the city; only they commended peace and quietness, advising men to beware of provoking the Romans, in whose amity they said that the felicity of Carthage did consist. By such discourses, harsh to the ears of good citizens who had feeling of the wrong done to their commonweal, they got none other reputation than of singularity; which the ignorant sort suspected to be wisdom.

But the glory of Amilcar was continually upheld and enlarged by many notable services that he did, to the singular benefit of his country. He passed the Straits of Hercules, (now called the Straits of Gibraltar,) and landed on the western coast of Spain; in which country, during nine years that he lived there, he subjected unto the state of Carthage the better part of all those provinces. But finally, in a battle that he fought with a nation in Portugal, called the Vettones, (defending himself a long time with an admirable resolution,) he was environed and slain; carrying with him to the grave the same great honour and fame by which, in many signal victories, he had acquired the name of a second Mars.

After the death of Amilcar, Asdrubal his son-in-law was made general of the Carthaginian forces in Spain. This was a good man of war; but far better in practice and cunning than in deeds of arms. By his notable dexterity in matter of negotiation, he greatly enlarged the dominion of Carthage; adding so many subjects and confederates thereunto, that the Romans began to grow jealous again of this hasty increase. He built a goodly city upon a commodious haven in the kingdom of Granada, opposite to that of Oran in Africa, and gave it the name of New Carthage, which to this day it nearly retaineth, being called now [b]Carthagena. With this success of the Carthaginians in Spain

[b] The Spaniards have since built a city of the same name in the West Indies; which being peopled by them in the year 1532, was sacked by the English in the year 1585.

the Romans were not a little troubled; but begin to cause [curse] their own negligence. For whereas they had formerly taken so much pains to beat them out of the isle of Sicily, as suspecting their neighbourhood there; they had now, by cumbering themselves in a war of far less importance, (whereof I shall speak anon,) given them leisure, without interruption, to recover upon their own continent a dominion by far exceeding, both in the bodies of men and in revenue, that which the Romans had taken from them. But how to help this at the present they knew not; for they daily expected to be invaded by the Gauls, their ancient enemies, and nearest neighbours to the west. But he needeth little help of force that knoweth himself to be feared; it is enough if he request, since his request shall have the virtue of a command.

Yet were the Romans utterly destitute of all good colour that might help them to intermeddle in Spain: the Spaniards were then unacquainted with Rome, whereof (in probability) they scarce had heard the name; so that there were no Mamertines, nor other such rebels, to call in Roman succours. But in the enterprise of Sardinia the Romans had learned an impudent pretence, that might also serve their turn in Spain. For though it were apparent, that the Spanish affairs had no relation to the peace between these two cities; and though it were nothing likely that Asdrubal had any purpose to extend his victories unto the gates of Rome, or to any of the Roman frontiers, yet (as if some such matter had been suspected) they sent unto him, requiring that he should forbear to proceed any further than to the river of Iberus. In addressing their messengers rather to Asdrubal than to the city of Carthage, they seem to have hoped, that howsoever the generality of the Carthaginians had sweetly swallowed many bitter pills, to avoid all occasion of war with Rome; yet the bravery of one man might prove more fastidious, and, resenting the injury, return such answer as would entangle his whole country in the quarrel that they so much desired; and might embrace at leisure, when once they had found appa-

rent cause. But Asdrubal finely deluded their expectation: he pretended no manner of dislike at all; and whereas they would have this insolent covenant inserted into the articles of peace, he took upon him to do it of his own power, with such appearance of conformity to their will, that they went their ways contented, and sought no further.

If it had been so, that the state of Carthage, thereunto pressed by the Romans for fear of present war, had ratified this new composition made by Asdrubal, yet should it not have stood bound in honour to observe the same carefully, unless an oath had also been extorted to make all sure. But since all passed quietly under the bare authority of Asdrubal, this capitulation was none other in effect than a second breach of peace, whereof the Romans might be accused more justly, than they could accuse the Carthaginians of perjury, (as they after did,) for refusing to stand to it.

By this treaty with Asdrubal, the Romans won some reputation in Spain. For when it was once conceived by the Spaniards, that the city which would needs be mistress over them stood in fear herself of receiving blows from a stouter dame, there were soon found some that, by offering themselves to the protection of Rome, became (as they thought) fellow-servants with Carthage. But the Carthaginians will shortly teach them another lesson. The Saguntines, a people on the south side of Iberus, entered into confederacy with the Romans, and were gladly accepted. Surely it was lawful unto the Romans to admit the Saguntines, or any other people, (neither subject nor open enemy in war to the Carthaginians,) into their society; and unlawful it was unto the Carthaginians to use violence towards any that should thus once become confederate with Rome. Nevertheless, if we consider the late agreement made with Asdrubal, we shall find that the Romans could have none other honest colour of requiring it, than an implicit covenant of making the river Iberus a bound, over which they themselves would not pass in any discovery or conquest by them intended to be made upon Spain; in which regard they might have some honest pretence to require the like of the Carthagin-

ians, though Rome as yet had no foot on the one side of Iberus, whereas Carthage, on the other side of that river, held almost all the country. Howsoever it were, this indignity was not so easily digested as former injuries had been. For it was a matter of ill consequence, that the nations, which had heard of no greater power than the Carthaginian, should behold Saguntum resting securely among them, upon confidence of help from a more mighty city. Wherefore either in this respect, or for that the sense is most feeling of the latest injuries, or rather for that now the Carthaginians were of power to do themselves right; war against Saguntum was generally thought upon, let the Romans take it how they list. In such terms were the Carthaginians when Asdrubal died, after he had commanded in Spain eight years; (being slain by a slave, whose master he had put to death;) and the great Hannibal, son of the great Amilcar, was chosen general in his stead.

SECT. VI.

The estate of Greece, from the death of Pyrrhus to the reign of Philip, the son of Demetrius, in Macedon.

IN the long term of the first Punic war, and the vacation following between it and the second, the estate of Greece, after the death of Pyrrhus, was grown somewhat like unto that wherein Philip of Macedon had found it, though far weaker, as in an after-spring. The whole country had recovered by degrees a form of liberty; the petty tyrannies (bred of those inferior captains, which in the times of general combustion had seized each upon such towns as he could get) were by force or accident extirpated and reformed; and some states were risen to such greatness, as not only served to defend themselves, but to give protection to others. This conversion to the better, proceeded from the like dissensions and tumults in Macedon, as had been in Greece, when Philip first began to encroach upon it. For after many quarrels and great wars, about the kingdom of Macedon, between Antigonus the elder, Cassander, Demetrius, Lysimachus, Seleucus, Pyrrhus, and the Gauls; Antigonus

the son of Demetrius finally got and held it, reigning six and thirty years; yet so that he was divers times thence expelled, not only by the Gauls and by Pyrrhus, as hath been already shewed, but by Alexander the son of Pyrrhus the Epirot, from whose father he had hardly won it. This happened unto him by the revolt of his soldiers, even at such time as having overthrown with great slaughter an army of the Gauls, he was converting his forces against the Athenians, whom he compelled to receive his garrisons. But his young son Demetrius raised an army, wherewith he chased Alexander, not only out of Macedon, but out of his own Epirus, and restored his father to the kingdom.

By the help of this young prince Demetrius, (though in another kind,) Antigonus got into his possession the citadel of Corinth, which was justly termed *the fetter of Greece*. This citadel, called Acrocorinthus, stood upon a steep rocky hill on the north side of the town, and was by nature and art so strong, that it seemed impregnable. It commanded the town, which was of much importance, as occupying the whole breadth of the isthmus, that, running between the Ægean and Ionic seas, joineth Peloponnesus to the main of Greece. Wherefore he that held possession of this castle, was able to cut off all passage by land from one half of Greece unto the other, besides the commodity of the two seas, upon both of which this rich and goodly city had commodious havens. Alexander the son of Polysperchon, and after his death Cratesipolis his wife, had gotten Corinth in the great shuffling of provinces and towns that was made between Alexander's princes. Afterwards it passed from hand to hand, until it came, I know not how, to one Alexander, of whom I find nothing else, than that he was thought to be poisoned by this Antigonus, who deceived his wife Nicæa thereof, and got it from her by a trick. The device was this: Antigonus sent his young Demetrius to Corinth, willing him to court Nicæa, and seek her marriage. The foolish old widow perceived not how unfit a match she was for the young prince, but entertained the fancy of marriage, whereto the old king was even as ready to consent, as was

his son to desire it, and came thither in person to solemnize it. Hereupon all Corinth was filled with sacrifices, feasts, plays, and all sorts of games; in the midst of which Antigonus watched his time, and got into the castle, beguiling the poor lady, whose jealousy had been exceeding diligent in keeping it. Of this purchase he was so glad, that he could not contain himself within the gravity beseeming his old age. But as he had stolen it, so was it again stolen from him; neither lived he to revenge the loss of it, being already spent with age.

Demetrius the son of this Antigonus succeeding unto his father, reigned ten years. He made greater proof of his virtue before he was king, than after. The Dardanians, Ætolians, and Achæans held him continually busied in war, wherein his fortune was variable, and for the more part ill. About these times the power of the Macedonians began to decay, and the Grecians to cast off their yoke.

Philip, the only son of Demetrius, was a young child when his father died, and therefore Antigonus his uncle had the charge of the kingdom during the minority of the prince, but he assumed the name and power of a king, though he respected Philip as his own son, to whom he left the crown at his death; this Antigonus was called the *tutor*, in regard of his protectorship, and was also called *Doson*, that is, as much as *Will-give*, because he was slow in his liberality. He repressed the Dardanians and Thessalians, which molested his kingdom in the beginning of his reign. Upon confidence of this good service he took state upon him, as one that rather were king in his own right, than only a protector. Hereupon the people fell to mutiny, but were soon appeased by fair words and a seeming unwillingness of his to meddle any more with the government. The Achaians took from him the city of Athens soon after Demetrius's death, and likely they were to have wrought him out of all or most that he held in Greece, if their own estate had not been endangered by a nearer enemy. But civil dissension, which had overthrown the power of Greece when it flourished most, overthrew it easily now again,

when it had scarcely recovered strength after a long sickness, and gave to this Antigonus no less authority therein, than Philip the father of Alexander got by the like advantage.

These Achaians, from small beginnings had increased in short time to great strength and fame, so that they grew the most redoubted nation of all the Greeks. By the equality of their laws, and by their clemency, (notwithstanding that they were a long time held under by the Macedonians and Spartans,) they did not only draw all others by their love and alliance, but induced, through their example, the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus to be governed by one law, and to use one and the same sort of weights, measure, and money.

Aratus the Sicyonian was the first that united them again, and gave them courage, after that they had been by the Macedonian captains divided into many principalities. In elder times they were governed by kings, as most of the great cities of Greece were; to which kind of rule they first subjected themselves after the descent of the Heraclidæ, when Tisamenus the son of Orestes possessed the territory of Achaia. In this estate they continued to the time of Gyges, after whom, when his sons sought to change the legal government of their predecessors into tyranny, they expelled them, and made their state popular, as seeming most equal. This form of commonweal had continuance, with some small changes, according to the diversity of times, till the reign of Philip and Alexander, kings of Macedon, who tempest-like overturned all things in that part of the world. For those twelve cities, called the Cities of Alliance, whereof Helice, and Bura, or Olenus, the sea had eaten up a little before the battle of Leuctres, were, by disturbance of the Macedonians divided from each other, and trained into a war, no less foolish than cruel, among themselves. But in the one hundred and four and twentieth Olympiad, in which, or near it, Ptolomy the son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolomy Ceraunus left the world; two of the ten remaining cities and people, namely, the Patrenses

and the Dimæi, united themselves, and laid the foundation of that general accord and reunion which after followed. For having been some of them partisans with sundry Macedonian captains, and others having been governed by petty kings, they began to fasten themselves in a strong league of amity, partly in the Olympiad before spoken of, and partly at such time as Pyrrhus made his first voyage into Italy. Now after the uniting of the Patrenses and Dimæi, to whom also the cities of Tritæa and Phara joined themselves, Ægira chased out her garrisons; and the Burians, killing their kings, entered with the Ceraunians into the same confederacy. These cities for twenty and five years used the same form of government with the Achaians, who, by a senatory and two pretors, ordered all things in their commonweal; and, soon after, by one pretor or commander; of which Marcus Carynensis was the first, and Aratus the second.

This Aratus was a noble young gentleman of Sicyon, who living at Argos in exile, whilst his country was oppressed by tyrants, found means, through the help of other banished men, to enter their own city by night with ladders, whence they chased the tyrant, and restored the people to liberty. This was in the time of Antigonus Gonatas king of Macedon, a prince more busy in watching what to get among the Greeks, than wise in looking to his own. For fear of Antigonus, the Sicyonians entered into the Achaian league; which, though at that time it received more increase by their accession than it added strength to them, yet the benefit of this conjunction served well enough against Antigonus, whose subtlety was somewhat greater than his valour. As the industry and counsel of Aratus delivered his country from bondage, and fortified it by the Achaian league; so further by his great liberality, with the exceeding great cost of one hundred and fifty talents, he pacified the inexplicable controversies between the banished Sicyonians, which returned with him, and the other citizens that had possession of these men's lands; as also with the same money he drew many others to assist him in those enterprises following, that redounded to the singular good of all Achaia.

The money he obtained of Ptolomy Euergetes king of Egypt, who partly had a desire to hold some strong and sure friendship in Greece, partly was delighted with the conversation of Aratus himself, that made a dangerous voyage to him into Egypt, and fed his pleasure in goodly pictures, with the gift of many curious pieces, wherein the workmen of Sicyon excelled.

The first of Aratus's great attempts was the surprise of the Acrocorinthus, or citadel of Corinth, which he wan by night, being thereinto guided by some thieves that he had hired for the purpose; who, living in the place, had practised to rob Antigonus's treasury, passing in and out by a secret path among the rocks. Yet was he fain to fight for it, ere he could get it; though indeed Antigonus's soldiers were rather overcome by their own fear, than by any force of the assailants; as mistrusting lest the Achaians were more in number than in truth they were, and having lost the advantages of the place already, upon which they had presumed, before they were aware of any enemy.

In these kind of night-services, ambushments, surprises, and practices, Aratus was very cunning, adventurous, and valiant; in open field and plain battle he was as timorous. By this strange mixture of cowardice and courage he ministered argument of disputation to philosophers and others, whether a valiant man (as he was esteemed, and in some cases approved) might look pale and tremble, when he began battle, and whether the virtue of fortitude were diversified by the sundry natures of men, and in a manner confined unto several sorts of action. In resolving which doubts it may be said, that all virtue is perfected in men by exercise, wherein they are trained by occasion; though a natural inclination standeth in need of little practice; whereas the defect hereof must be supplied with much instruction, use, good success, and other help, yet hardly shall grow absolute in general. Such was Aratus in matter of war. In sincere affection to his country he was unreprovable, and so acknowledged, as his following actions will testify.

When Acrocorinthus was taken, and joined unto the com-

monwealth of Achaia, the Megarians revolted soon after from Antigonus, and entered into the same corporation. So did the Troezenians and the Epidaurians, whereby this new erected state grew so powerful, that it adventured to take Athens from the Macedonians, and Argos and Megalopolis from tyrants that held them. The enterprise upon Athens was of none effect. For though Aratus wasted the isle of Salamis to shew his strength, and sent home the Athenian prisoners without ransom, to allure the city by show of love; yet the Athenians stirred neither against him nor for him, as being now grown honest slaves to the Macedonians. Upon Argos the adventure was carried more strongly. The Achaians came sometimes to the gates of the city, but the people stirred not; once they entered it, and might have won it, if the citizens would have lent any help to the recovery of their own freedom; sundry times, and with diverse event, they fought with the tyrants (who rose up one after another in Argos) in open field, and slew one of them in battle; but all sufficed not; until at length Aristomachus the tyrant was so terrified, persuaded, and hired by Aratus, that he consented to resign his estate. The like did Xenon the tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus that had oppressed the Phliasians. Whilst this business with the Argives was on foot, Lysiadas the tyrant of Megalopolis was so well handled by Aratus, that without compulsion he gave liberty to his city, and annexed it to the council of Achaia; whereby he got such credit, that he was chosen general of their forces (which was a yearly office, and might not be held two years together by one man) every second year for a certain while, he and Aratus succeeding one another by turns. But those late tyrants and new citizens, Lysiadas and Aristomachus, were carried with private passion from care of the general good, in which courses they opposed Aratus, to the great hurt of Achaia, as shall appear in due time.

The Achæans having obtained so much puissance and reputation, that Ptolomy king of Egypt was become patron of their alliance, and (in title of honour) general of

their forces by sea and land; made open war upon Demetrius, the son of Antigonus Gonatas, for the liberty of Athens. It is strange, and worthy of noting, that when Aratus in this quarrel had lost a battle, the Athenians wore garlands, in sign of joy, to flatter their good lords the Macedonians, that had won the victory. Such were now the Athenians become; in whom the rule was verified that holds true in general of the multitude, *Aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur;* "It is either base in service, or insolent in command." Nevertheless, when Demetrius was dead, Aratus performed that by money which he could not by force; and, corrupting the captain of the Macedonian garrison, purchased liberty to the Athenians, who thenceforth held good correspondence with the Achæans, loving them, and speaking well of them; which was all that they could do; but into their corporation they entered not, scorning it belike, in regard of their own outworn glory.

Now as the commonwealth of Achaia daily increased within Peloponnesus, by justice and honesty; so did the Ætolians, in the utter part of Greece, yea and within Peloponnesus itself, wax very powerful, by sturdiness of body and rude courage in fight, without help of any other virtue. They had stoutly defended themselves against Antipater and Craterus; partly by daring to do and suffer much, partly by the natural strength and fastness of their country, but especially by the benefit of the time, which called away these famous captains to other business, as hath been related. They had molested Cassander in favour of Antigonus, and were themselves as much plagued by him, and by the Acarnanians, a little, but stout nation, that took his part. Afterwards they had to do with Demetrius, the son of the first Antigonus, and more or less with all the kings of Macedon succeeding him. They likewise held often war with the Acarnanians, Athamanians, Epirots, and many cities in Peloponnesus; so that they were hardened with perpetual travail, seldom putting off their armour. But their hardiness ill deserved the name of valour, seeing they had no regard of honesty or friendship; measuring all

things by their own insolent will, and thinking all people base-minded that were not as fierce and outrageous as themselves.

These Ætolians had lately made great spoils in Peloponnesus, and occupied a good part of the country. They had invaded the friends of the Achæans, taken and sacked Pallene; where although they were soundly beaten by Aratus, yet their desire of gain made them greedy of a new voyage thither, as to a country wherein somewhat was to be gotten. But they were forced to look another way, by Demetrius the son of Antigonus Gonatas; who pressed them so hardly, that they were driven to seek help of the Achæans, which they obtained. The war which the Achæans made upon Demetrius, without Peloponnesus, in Attica, though it tended to expelling the Macedons out of Greece, yet the benefit thereof redounded chiefly unto the Ætolians, at whose instance it was set on foot; for thereby were the Macedonian forces diverted from them. Neither was this good turn unacknowledged; though very basely the Ætolians, giving thanks in words, devised how to requite the benefit with some great mischief. They saw that the Achæans were desirous to bring all Peloponnesus into their alliance and corporation; of which intent the Lacedæmonians were very jealous. Wherefore these Ætolians laboured earnestly to set the Lacedæmonians and Achæans together by the ears; hoping, that if this might come to pass, they themselves should be called in to help, (it skilled not on what side,) and so get no small share, both in booty and territory. Neither did they forbear to communicate this their device unto Antigonus; offering to make him partaker of their gain, whom they knew to be offended with the many losses that his kingdom had sustained by the Achæans. Of this plot Aratus was aware; who therefore determined to suffer many indignities, rather than to give the Lacedæmonians cause to take arms. But this resolution was taken somewhat too late, and not altogether in his own power to hold. He had been meddling with the Arcadians, that were dependants of Lacedæmon, and thereby had provoked

the Lacedæmonians to look about them; seeing that all Peloponnesus, excepting themselves, the Eleans, and a few Arcadians their friends, (who also were attempted,) was already become Achæan.

The city of Sparta was in ill case about these times, and subject to the injuries of any stronger neighbour. Pyrrhus had greatly weakened it; the Ætolians, entering Laconia with an army, had carried away fifty thousand slaves; and, which was worse, their discipline was corrupted, avarice and luxury reigned among them, the poor was oppressed by the rich, and the generosity of spirit, that had sometime been their general virtue, was hardly now to be found among the best of them. There were left in Sparta no more than seven hundred natural citizens, of whom not above one hundred had lands; all the rest were needy people, and desirous of innovation. Hereupon followed intestine sedition, which endangered the city most of all. Agis, a good king, who sought to reform the disorders of the state, exhorted the people to a strict observation of Lycurgus's laws. To which purpose he caused them to pass an act, for the abolishing of all debts, and equal division of lands. All the younger and the poorer sort were glad of this; but the rich men opposed it. They had recourse unto Leonidas, the other king, (for in Sparta were two kings,) who took their part; being himself a dissolute man, as one trained up in the court of Syria, whence also he had his wife. In this contention, Leonidas was expelled the city, and a new king chosen in his stead. But Agis's friends and counsellors in this enterprise abused his good meaning to their own private commodity. They were hasty to take away all debts, and cancel bonds; for they themselves were deeply indebted: but the division of lands they afterwards hindered, because their own possessions were great. Hence arose a tumult in Sparta, which these men increased by their foul oppression of the poorer citizens. So that in fine Leonidas was brought home, and restored to his kingdom, and the two adverse kings driven to take sanctuary; out of which Cleombrotus, the late-made king, was dismissed into

exile; but Agis was trained forth, drawn into prison, and there by his enemies condemned and strangled, together with his mother, and his old grandmother. The like to this was never known in Sparta; and (which is the more odious) this cruelty proceeded from the ephori, magistrates that should have given patronage to the laws, using their power, and more power than to them belonged, against a king, that had proceeded orderly in reforming the city, as the laws required.

The death of Agis was much lamented by all good citizens, and served to establish the impotent rule of a few tyrannical oppressors. In which case Aratus might well hope to adjoin Lacedæmon to the Achæan commonwealth; though it were great injustice to take such advantages, and attempt by force that which would have redounded to the general good of Peloponnesus, and to the benefit of Sparta itself, if it could have been wrought by persuasion.

But the same man who redressed the disorders of Sparta, and revenged the death of Agis, did also requite the unjust attempts of the Achæans, even in their own kind; obtruding upon them by force an union of all Peloponnesus, though little to their good liking, for that the Lacedæmonians and their king should have been the principal, not they and their pretor. Leonidas having thus caused Agis to be slain, took his wife, that was very rich and beautiful, and gave her in marriage (perforce) to his own son Cleomenes. This young prince fell greatly enamoured on his wife, and sought to win her affection, as well as he had her person. He discoursed much with her about the purpose of her former husband Agis, and, by pitying his misfortune, began to entertain a desire of accomplishing that wherein Agis had failed. So coming himself to be king, whilst he was very young, he gladly embraced all occasions of war; for that he hoped by strong hand to effect that, which Agis, by proceeding formally, in so corrupt an estate of the city, had attempted to his own ruin. Therefore, when the ephori gave him in charge to take and fortify Athenæum, a temple on the marches of Laconia, to which both they and the Me-

galopolitans pretended title, he readily performed it. Hereof Aratus made no complaint, but sought to take by surprise Tegea and Orchomenus, cities then confederate with the Lacedæmonians; wherein his intelligence failing, he lost the labour of a painful night's travail, and discovered his enmity to Sparta; of which Cleomenes was nothing sorry. By these degrees the war began: in the entrance whereto Aratus had discovered the Ætolian practice, and therefore would have stayed the quarrel from proceeding too far. But Lysiadas and Aristomachus would needs fight, and he could do none other than be ruled by them, especially seeing Cleomenes was so urgent. Aristomachus was at that time general of the Achæans, (he and Lysiadas being of great account since they had abandoned their tyranny,) who sent unto Aratus, lying then in Athens, and required his assistance in a journey to be made into Laconia. No dissuasions of Aratus would serve; therefore he came in person, and took part of a business, little pleasing him in the present, and less in the future. When he met with Cleomenes, he durst not fight; but opposed himself against Aristomachus, who desired to give battle. Yet had the Achæans twenty thousand foot and one thousand horse in their army; whereas Cleomenes had no more than five thousand in all. This gave reputation to the Lacedæmonian, and raised an ill report upon Aratus; which Lysiadas helped to make worse, by accusing his cowardice. Nevertheless the Achæans would not fall out with Aratus their benefactor, but chose him their general the year following, against Lysiadas his accuser, that sued for the place. Being general himself, it behoved him to confute with deeds the slanderous words of Lysiadas. Therefore he purposed to set upon the Eleans; but was met withal on the way, near unto the mount Lycæus, by Cleomenes; who vanquished him in a great battle, and drave him to hide himself all night for fear, so that he was thought to have been slain. This misadventure Aratus recompensed by a trick of his own more natural occupation; performing with his broken army that which could hardly have been expected, had he been

victorious. For whilst there was no suspicion of any great matter that he could undertake, he secretly wrought with some of the Mantinæans, who did let him into their city. The Mantinæans had once before joined themselves with the Achaians; but shortly, upon fear, or some other passion, they gave themselves to the Ætolians; and from the Ætolians, presently after this victory, to Cleomenes, from whom immediately they were thus won. For this their levity they were not punished, but freely admitted now again into the Achæan society. As this good success repaired the credit of Aratus, so another battle almost ruined it. Cleomenes and he encountered near unto Megalopolis; where the Achæans had somewhat the better at the first, but their general durst not follow his advantage. Thereupon Lysiadas, of whom we spake before, grew somewhat impatient with anger; and, taking with him all the horse, brake upon the Lacedæmonians, whom he routed at the beginning, but pursuing them too far into places of hard passage, he was slain by them, and his followers driven back upon their own companions; in such sort, that finally all the army was disordered, and put to flight. This was a great loss, and incensed the Achæans against Aratus; yet their indignation proceeded no further, than that they refused to make any longer contribution towards the pay of those mercenaries which he had waged. This, Aratus took patiently, and followed the war nevertheless; wherein though Cleomenes won some towns, and Aratus got the better in one small fight, yet little of importance was done; the Achæans being weary, and the Spartan king intentive to another business.

Cleomenes, having led into the field all that were like to hinder his purpose, and tired them with painful journeys, forsook the Achæan war on a sudden, and came unexpected home to Sparta, where he slew the ephori, and restored by force the ancient discipline of Lycurgus. Then gave he an account of his doings: and shewing by what degrees the ephori had encroached upon the power of kings, and many disorders had grown in the city, he justified his proceed-

ings, and forthwith began to make equal division of the lands, reducing all to the first institution. He also supplied the defect of citizens, by choosing new out of such as were friends to the state, and valiant men; so that henceforth his country might not altogether stand in need of mercenary help, as it lately had done, to save itself from the Ætolians, Illyrians, and other enemies. All this was despatched in great haste; the Spartans well satisfied, and Cleomenes himself ready in the field, ere his enemies could take advantage of these his domestical troubles.

The Achæans, hearing of this great alteration in Sparta, thought that it would be long ere Cleomenes durst issue forth of the city, for fear of some rebellion. But it was not long ere they heard that he had wasted all the country of Megalopolis, had ranged over all Arcadia at his pleasure, and was admitted into Mantinæa; and ready to take other places, even of Achaia. These news displeased them not a little; but they must patiently endure to hear worse. For when Cleomenes had shaken off the power of the ephori, that curbed his authority, he proceeded more roundly in his work; being better obeyed, and by better men. His Lacedæmonians resumed their ancient courage, and he himself had the heart to demand the principality of Greece. He did not therefore henceforth contend about the possession of a few towns, but adventured to win or lose all. The Ætolians, in favour of his attempt, declared themselves on his side; and whereas he had gotten Mantinæa, Tegea, and other places, to which they had some title, they willingly renounced all their interest unto him.

Aratus did apprehend the danger of his country, and saw that Antigonus with the Ætolians, or perhaps without them, would shortly make an end of that which Cleomenes had thus begun. Therefore he devised how to provide against the worst, and either to repair all, or (if it could not be) to save all from utter ruin. The office of general, when it was next put upon him, he refused; fearing to be so far pressed as to hazard in one battle all the force of his country, to which as he had never any affection, nor perchance courage,

so was his manner of warfare otherwise. For he commonly attempted by surprise, and defended upon the advantage of place, after the manner of the Irish, and of all other nations overcharged with numbers of men. Yet he did not forsake the care of the weal public, though, in aiming at the general good, it seems that private passion drew him into an ill course. He saw that Megalopolis could not be defended without making a dangerous hazard of battle; that Mantinæa had not only opened her gates unto Cleomenes, but slain the Achæan garrison that lay therein; that other towns had yielded unto him without compulsion; and that Aristomachus, once tyrant of Argos, and since general of the Achæans, was now revolted unto the enemy, following the fortune of Cleomenes. Ptolomy was too far off to help; and the nearness of Antigonus was very dangerous; yet might be useful, if this king would, (as Polybius saith,) like others, be friend or enemy, as should best agree with his own profit. To make trial hereof, Aratus practised with some of Megalopolis, whom he found apt unto his purpose, and instructed them how to deal with both Antigonus and the Achæans.

The city of Megalopolis had been well affected to the Macedonians ever since the time of Philip the father of Alexander, who had obliged it unto him by some especial benefits. At this time it lay nearest unto the danger; was very faithful, and therefore deserved succour; yet could not well be relieved by the Achæans, with their own proper strength. Wherefore it was thought meet, that ambassadors should be sent unto the general council of Achaia, requesting leave and good allowance to try the favour of Antigonus in their necessity. This was granted for lack of what else to answer; and the same ambassadors despatched away to Antigonus. They did their own errand briefly; telling him of the good-will and respect which their city had of long time borne unto him and his predecessors; of their present need; and how it would agree with his honour to give them aid. But when they delivered the more general matter, wherein Aratus had given them instruction, shew-

ing how the ambition of Cleomenes, and violence of the Ætolians, might redound to his own great loss or danger, if the one and the other were not in time prevented; how Aratus himself did stand affected; and what good likelihood there was of reducing the Achæans under the patronage of Macedon: then began Antigonus to lend a more attentive ear to their discourse. He embraced the motion; and, to give it the more life, he wrote unto the Megalopolitans, that his help should not be wanting, so far forth as it might stand with the Achæans' good liking. Particularly he commended himself by these messengers to Aratus; assuring them, that he thought himself highly bound to this honourable man, whose former actions he now perceived not to have been grounded upon any hatred to the Macedonians, but only upon a just and worthy love to his own nation. With this answer they return to Megalopolis; and are presently sent away to the counsel of Achaia, there to make some speedy conclusion, as the necessity of the time required.

The Achæans were glad to hear that Antigonus was so inclinable to their desire, and therefore were ready to entertain his favour with all good correspondence. Hereunto Aratus gave his consent, and praised the wisdom of his countrymen, that so well discerned the best and likeliest means of their common safety; adding nevertheless, that it were not amiss first of all to try their own ability; which if it failed, then should they do well to call in this gracious prince, and make him their patron and protector. Thus he shewed himself moderate in that which himself of all others did most wish, to the end that he might not afterward sustain the common reprehension, if any thing fell out amiss; since it might appear, that he had not been author of this decree, but only followed, and that leisurably, the general consent.

Nevertheless, in true estimation, this finesse of Aratus might have been used, with his greater commendation, in a contrary course: for it had been more honourable to make an end of the war, by yielding unto Cleomenes that power

which they gave unto Antigonus; since thereby he should both have freed his country from all further trouble, and withal should have restored unto the universal state of Greece that honourable condition whereof the Macedonians had bereft it. But it is commonly found, (which is great pity,) that virtue, having risen to honour by degrees, and confirmed itself (as it were) in the seat of principality by length of time and success of many actions, can ill endure the hasty growth of any other's reputation, wherewith it sees itself likely to be overtopped. Other cause to despise the Lacedæmonians there was none, than that they lately had been in dangerous case; neither could any reason be found, why Aratus should prefer Antigonus before Cleomenes, than that he had stood in doubt of the one, when he thought himself more mighty than the other. Wherefore he was justly plagued, when he saw his own honours reversed by the insolent Macedonians; and instead of living as a companion with Cleomenes, that was descended of a long race of kings, the posterity of Hercules, was fain to do sacrifice unto Antigonus as unto a god, and was finally poisoned by Philip, whose nobility was but of five descents, and whom perhaps he might have seen his fellows, if he had not made them his lords. By this inclination to the Macedonians the love of Ptolomy was lost, who forthwith took part with Cleomenes, though he did not supply him with such liberality as he had used to the Achæans; being warned, as may seem, by their example, to be more wary both in trusting and disbursing. Cleomenes himself, whilst this business with Antigonus was afoot, passed through Arcadia with an army, and laboured by all means to draw the Achæans to battle. At the city of Dymes in Achaia were assembled all the remaining forces of the nation; with which it was concluded to make trial, whether perhaps they might amend their estate without seeking help of the Macedonian. Thither went Cleomenes, and there fought with them; where he had so great a victory, that the enemy was no longer able to keep the open field. The calamity was such, that Aratus himself durst not take upon him to be

their general, when his turn came in the next election. Wherefore the Achæans were compelled to sue for peace; which was granted upon this easy condition: that they should not arrogate unto themselves the command of Peloponnesus, but suffer the Lacedæmonians (as in former ages) to be their leaders in war. Hereunto if they would condescend, he promised unto them that he would presently restore all places taken from them, and all his prisoners ransom free; also that they should enjoy their own laws and liberties without molestation. This gentle offer of Cleomenes was very pleasing to the Achæans; who desired him to come unto the city of Lerna, where a parliament should be held for the conclusion of the war.

Now seemed the affairs of Greece likely to be settled in better order than they had ever been since the beginning of the Peloponnesian wars, yea or since the Persian invasion; when God, who had otherwise disposed of these matters, hindered all with a draught of cold water, which Cleomenes drank in a great heat, and thereupon fell extreme sick, and so could not be present at Lerna, but caused the parliament to be deferred to another time. Nevertheless he sent home the chief of his prisoners, to shew that he meant none other than good faith. By this fair dealing he confirmed the Achæans in their desire of his friendship, who assembled again at Argos, there to establish the league. But Aratus was violently bent against it, and sought by great words and terrible threats to make his countrymen afraid of resolving. When all would not serve turn, he betook himself to his cunning, and sent word to Cleomenes, that he should do well to leave his army behind him, and come alone into Argos, receiving hostages for safety of his person. Cleomenes was already far on his way when he met with this advertisement, and took it in ill part that he should be thus deluded. For it had been an easy matter to have told him so much at the first, and not have made him come so far with an army, which afterwards he must dismiss. Yet that which chiefly seems to have troubled him was the drift of his oppugners, who sought thereby

either to make him wait without the gates, and deal only with themselves and their messengers; or if he would adventure himself into the city, then to deprive him of all royal show that might breed respect of him in the multitude. This was that indeed which Aratus feared, and for which he sought to hinder his coming thither in person; lest the people, hearing the promises of Cleomenes ratified by his own mouth, should presently be won with his gentle words, and finish the bargain without more ado. Therefore Cleomenes wrote unto the whole council, bitterly complaining against these juggling tricks; and Aratus was not far behind with him in as bitter an oration. So, between fear of the one, and reverence of the other, the assembly knew not how to proceed, but abruptly brake up, leaving all as it were to fortune. Cleomenes took his advantage of their present weakness, and renewed the war. Many cities yielded unto him willingly; many he forced; and partly by force, partly by terror, he won Argos, which never king of Sparta before him could do. In this case Aratus sent his own son to Antigonus, entreating him to defer no time, but come presently to relieve the distressed Achæans. Antigonus gave as good words as could be wished; saving that he utterly refused to do any thing, unless he might first have Acrocorinthus put into his hand. This demand was somewhat like unto that of the hunter, who promised to help the horse against his enemy the stag; but with condition, that the horse should suffer himself to be saddled and bridled. Aratus was herewithal contented, but wanted all honest colour to do it, seeing the Corinthians had no way deserved to be thus given away to the Macedonians. Yet at length an occasion was found; for that the Corinthians, perceiving what he intended, were minded to arrest him. So he withdrew himself out of their city, and sent word to Antigonus, that the castle should be ready to let him in. The Corinthians on the other side ran to Cleomenes, who lost no time, but made haste with them to Corinth, where he sought how to get possession of their castle, or at least to save it from Antigonus, by surrounding it

with trenches, that none might issue nor enter without his leave. Whilst this was in doing, he took special order that Aratus's house and goods within the town should be safely kept for the owner, to whom he sent messenger after messenger, desiring him to come to agreement, and not to bring in the barbarous Macedonians and Illyrians to Peloponnesus; promising that if he would hearken to these persuasions, then would he give him double the same pension which he had been wont to receive of king Ptolomy. As for the castle of Corinth, which was the gate of Peloponnesus, and without which none could hold assured sovereignty of the country, he desired that it might not be committed unto his own disposition, but be jointly kept by the Lacedæmonians and Achæans. All this entreaty served to no purpose: for Aratus, rejecting utterly the motion, sent his own son as an hostage to Antigonus, and laboured with the Achæans to put Acrocorinthus into his hands. Which when Cleomenes understood, he seized upon the goods of Aratus in Corinth, and wasted all the country of Sicyon, whereof this his adversary was native.

Antigonus in the mean time drew near to the Isthmus, having passed with his army through Eubœa, because the Ætolians held the straits of Thermopylæ against him. This they did, either in favour of Cleomenes, which they pretended, or in doubt of the greatness whereunto the Macedonians might attain by the good success of this journey. At his coming thither he found the Lacedæmonians ready to forbid his entrance, and that with sufficient strength; yet with no purpose to hazard battle, but rather to weary him thence with hunger, against which he came not well provided. Antigonus therefore laboured hard to make his way by force; but he was not able so to do: he secretly got into the Corinthian haven, but was violently driven out again with great loss of men; finally, he resolved to turn aside, and seek a passage over the gulf of Corinth to Sicyon, or some other part of Achaia; but this required much time, and great preparation, which was not easily made.

In this perplexity, news from Argos came by sea, that

greatly comforted Antigonus, and no less troubled his enemies. The Achæans were gotten into that city; and the garrison which Cleomenes had left therein, though it was not driven out of the citadel, yet was hardly distressed, and stood in need of present help. Argos had always been enemy to Sparta, and well affected to the kings of Macedon. When Cleomenes took it, he forbare to chase out those whom he most suspected; partly at the entreaty of friends, and partly for that they all made show to be glad of his prosperity. They were glad indeed of Cleomenes's victories, both in Argos and elsewhere, as many as hoped that he would cause all debtors to be discharged from their creditors, as he had lately done in Sparta. But that which Cleomenes had done in Sparta was agreeable to the Spartan institution; in other places, where it would have been tyrannical, he did it not. Thereupon, such as were disappointed of their unjust hopes began to turn good commonwealths-men; and called him tyrant for his doings at home, because he would not do the like abroad. So they took their time; invited the Achæans, assailed his garrison, cut in pieces the rescue that he sent, and compelled him at length to forsake the defence of Corinth, and look unto the enemies that were behind his back. For when he understood by continual messages that his men which held the citadel at Argos were almost lost, he began to fear lest his labour in guarding the entry should grow frivolous, the Achæans in the mean while spoiling all that lay within. Therefore he forsook his custody of the Isthmus, and made all haste towards Argos; which, if he could save, he meant to trust fortune with the rest. And so far he prevailed at his coming to Argos, that both Argives and Achæans were glad to house themselves, leaving him master of the streets; when the horsemen of Antigonus were discovered afar off, hasting to relieve the citizens; and Antigonus himself (to whom Corinth was yielded as soon as the Spartan had turned his back) following apace with the body of his army. Cleomenes therefore had no more to do than to make a safe retreat. This he did, and got him home into

Laconia; losing in short space all or most of that which he had been long in getting.

Antigonus having shewed himself at Argos, and commended the citizens, went into Arcadia; where he won such castles as were held for Cleomenes, and restored them to the old possessors. This done, he took his way to Ægium, where was held a parliament by the Achæans; to whom he declared the cause of his coming, and spake brave words, that filled them with hope. The Achæans were not behind with him; but made him captain-general over them and their confederates; and further entered into covenant with him, that they should not deal with any prince or state, either by writing or ambassador, without his consent. All this while, and somewhat longer, Aratus was the only man that seemed to rule the king's heart; carrying him to Sicyon, his own town, (for winter was come on,) where he not only feasted him as a great prince, but suffered more than human honours, as sacrifices and the like, to be done unto him. This example of Aratus and his Sicyonians was followed by the rest of Achaia; which had made (forsooth) a very wise bargain, if instead of Cleomenes, that would have been a king, it had obtained the protection of a god. But this god was poor; and wanting wherewith to pay his Macedonians, imposed the burden upon the Achæans. This was hardly taken; yet worse must be endured in hope of better. Neither was Aratus himself over-carefully respected, when the statues of those tyrants, which he had thrown down in Argos, were again erected by Antigonus; or when the statues, which he had erected, of those that had taken Acrocorinthus with him, were all thrown down by the same king, and one only left unto himself at his earnest entreaty. It might therefore appear that this god was also spiteful. Nevertheless, in taking revenge upon those that offended him, Aratus did satisfy his own passion by the aid of these Macedonians. For with extreme torments he did put Aristomachus to death, who had been once tyrant of Argos, afterwards general of the Achæans; and from them revolting unto Cleomenes, did fall at length into their hands. In

like sort handled he (though not as yet) the Mantinæans, for their ingratitude and cruelty shewed to the Achæans. For he slew all the principal citizens, and sold the rest, men, women, and children, all for bondslaves, dividing the spoil, two parts to the Macedonians, and the third to the Achæans. The town itself was given by Antigonus to the Argives, who peopled it with a colony of their own; and Aratus, having charge of this business, caused it to be new named Antigonia. Surely of this cruelty there can be no better excuse, than even the flattery which Aratus was driven to use to Antigonus; forasmuch as it was a token of servility, whereinto they had urged and brought him, whom he, as in revenge thereof, did thus requite. But leaving to speak of this change, which the coming in of the Macedonian wrought in the civil state of the Achæans, let us return unto his war against the Lacedæmonians.

The next summer Antigonus won Tegea, Mantinæa, Orchomenus, Heræa, and Telphussa. Mantinæa he dispeopled, as was said before; in Orchomenus he placed a garrison of his Macedonians, the rest he restored to the Achæans, with whom he wintered at Ægium, where they held a parliament. Once only Cleomenes had met him this year, and that was on the borders of Laconia, where he lay ready to defend his own territory. The reason why he stirred no further, nor followed Antigonus to Mantinæa, and to those other towns that he won, was this: he had few soldiers, and not money enough to wage more. Ptolomy the Egyptian promised much, but would perform nothing, unless he might have Cleomenes's own mother and his children in pledge. These were sent into Egypt, yet the aid came not. For Ptolomy was slow, as dealing in the business of Greece rather for his mind's sake, than upon any apprehension of necessity. Cleomenes therefore provided for himself, as well as his own ability would serve. He manumised all the Helots, which were the Macedonian slaves, taking money for their liberty, and arming two thousand of them after the Macedonian fashion. Having thus increased his forces, he came on the sudden to Megalopolis,

that lay secure, as having defended itself in more dangerous times, and having now Antigonus near at hand in Ægium. The town he won; but after he was entered, all that were fit to bear arms rose hastily against him, and, though they could not drive him out, yet saved the multitude, to whom they gave a port free for their escape. He sent after the citizens, offering their town and goods to them again, if they would be of his party. But they bravely refused his offer; wherefore he sacked and ruined it, carrying with him to Sparta a great booty that he found therein. These news astonished the Achæans at Ægium, who thereupon brake up their parliament. Antigonus sent hastily for his Macedonians out of their wintering places; but they were so long in coming, that Cleomenes was safely gone home. Therefore he returned them back to their lodgings, and went himself to Argos, there to pass the rest of his unlucky winter, somewhat further from the eyes of the grieved Achæans. When he had lain a while at Argos, Cleomenes was at the gates with no great number of men, yet with more than Antigonus had then about him. The Argives, perceiving that their country would be spoiled, if Antigonus did not issue into the field, were very earnest with him to go forth and fight. But he was wiser than to be moved with their clamours; and suffered them to see their villages burnt, to bid him resign his office of protector unto some that were more valiant, and to satisfy their passions with foolish words, rather than he would be overcome in fight, and thereby lose more honour than could easily be repaired. By this, Cleomenes had his desire in weakening the reputation of his enemy; though he thereby added neither followers nor other strength unto Lacedæmon.

Afterwards, when the season was more fit for war, Antigonus gathered together all his troops, meaning to requite these bravados of his enemy with the conquest of Sparta. Cleomenes on the other side laboured to keep the war from his own gates, and therefore entered upon the country of Argos, where he made such havoc as drew Antigonus thither from his intended invasion of Laconia. Many great

affronts the Macedonian was fain to endure in coasting the Spartan king, that ranging over the country of the Argives, Phliasians, and Orchomenians, drave a garrison of his out of Oligyrtis, and did sacrifice, as it were, before his face, in the suburbs of Argos, without the temple of Juno, that was shut up, sending unto him in scorn to borrow the keys. These were light things, yet served to dishearten the Achæan side, and to fill the enemy with courage, which was no matter of light importance. Therefore he concluded to lay apart all other regard of things abroad, and to put all to hazard, by setting up his rest without more delay upon Sparta itself. He had in his army eight and twenty thousand foot and twelve hundred horse, collected out of sundry nations, as Macedonians, Illyrians, Gauls, Epirots, Bœotians, Acarnanians, and others, together with the Achæans and their friends of Peloponnesus. Cleomenes had of all sorts twenty thousand, with which he lay at Selasia, fortifying slightly the other passages into Laconia, through which the Macedonians were not likely to seek entrance. Antigonus coming to Selasia, found his enemy so strongly encamped upon and between the hills of Eva and Olympus, that he was constrained to spend much time there before he could advance any one foot; neither lay it in his power to come hastily to blows, which he greatly desired, without the hazard of his whole army in assailing their well-defenced camp. But at length, (as it happens when men are weary both of their hopes and fears,) both kings being resolved to make an end one way or other, Antigonus attempted with his Illyrians to force that part which lay on the hill Eva; but his Illyrians were so ill seconded by the Achæan foot, that the Spartan horse and light-armed foot, encamped in the strait valley between those hills, issuing forth, fell upon their skirts, and not only disordered them, but were like to have endangered all the rest. If Cleomenes himself had stood in that part of the battle, he would have made great use of such a fair beginning: but Euclidas his brother, a more valiant than skilful soldier, commanded in that wing; who neither followed his advan-

tage, nor took such benefit as the ground afforded whereon he lay. Philopœmen the Arcadian of Megalopolis, who afterwards proved a famous captain, served then on horse, as a private young man, among the Achæans. He seeing that all was like to go to rout, if their Illyrians were driven to fall back upon the army following them, persuaded the captains of the Achæan horse to break upon the Spartan mercenaries. But they would not, partly despising his youth and want of charge; partly, for that Antigonus had given order that they should keep their places until they received a sign from him, which was not as yet. Philopœmen, perceiving them to be more orderly than well advised, entreated some of his own countrymen to follow him, gave a charge upon the Spartans, and forced them, not only to leave the Illyrians, but seek how to save themselves. Being so far advanced, he found the place, which the Illyrians had attempted, like enough to be won through the unskilfulness of him that held it. Wherefore he alighted, and persuaded the men at arms his companions to do the like; the folly of Euclidas being manifest, who kept the top of the hill, and stirred not to hinder those that ascended, but waited for them in a plain, where they might fight upon even terms. So he recovered the hill-top, where, though he was sore hurt, yet he made good the place that he had gotten, until the whole army came up to him, by which the Lacedæmonians were beaten from it with great slaughter of them in their descent. This overthrow and death of Euclidas made Cleomenes lose the day; who, fighting bravely on the other side upon Olympus against Antigonus himself, was like to have been surrounded and lost, if he had not withdrawn himself with an extraordinary speed. In this battle ended the glory of Lacedæmon, which, as a light ready to go out, had, with a great but not long blaze, shined more brightly of late than in many ages past.

Cleomenes fled unto Sparta, where he had no desire to stay, finding only two hundred left of six thousand Spartans that he had led unto this battle, and most of his hired soldiers dead, or gone away. So he persuaded his people to

yield themselves unto Antigonus, and promising to do all that should at any time lie in his own power for their good, he hasted away to the sea-side, (where he had shipping long before provided against all that might happen,) and embarked himself for Egypt. He was lovingly entertained by Ptolomy Euergetes, who undertook to restore him to his kingdom, and perhaps meant no less, as being much delighted with his gallant behaviour and qualities. In the mean season he had a pension allowed him of four and twenty talents yearly. But this Ptolomy died, and his son Ptolomy Philopater succeeded him; a vicious young prince, wholly governed by lewd women and base men, unmindful of all virtue, and hating any in whom it was found. When therefore Cleomenes was desirous to return into Greece, whither the troubles in Peloponnesus did seem to invite him, Ptolomy and his minions would neither give him aid, nor yet dared to dismiss him (as he desired) to try his own friends in Greece, because he was too well acquainted with the weakness of Egypt; nor well knew how to detain him against his will. At length they devised matter against him, and made him prisoner. The last act of him was, that with thirty of his countrymen he undertook a desperate enterprise, breaking out of the prison, and provoking the Alexandrians to rebel, and seek their liberty. In which attempt he slew some enemies of his that he met, and, having walked up and down the streets without resistance, (no man offering to take his part, or, which is very strange, to fight against him on the king's behalf,) he and his companions agreed together to be ministers of their own death. Upon his dead body Ptolomy was bold to shew his indignation, and slew his mother and children, that had been sent thither as hostages, together with the wives of his adherents, as many as were there, attending upon the old queen. Such was the end of Cleomenes, a generous prince, but son of Leonidas, who had caused Agis, with his mother and grandmother, to come to such a bloody end as now befell his own wife, son, and grandchildren.

After the victory at Sellasia, Antigonus without resist-

ance entered Sparta; whereinto never the force of any enemy before him could make way. He kindly entreated the citizens, and left them to their own laws and government, tarrying there no longer than two or three days; after which he hastened out of Peloponnesus, and never returned. The cause of his speedy departure was, an advertisement that he received out of Macedon, how the Illyrians overran and destroyed the country. Had these news come a little sooner, or had Cleomenes either deferred the fight a few days longer, or at leastwise tarried a few days after the fight in Sparta, the kingdom of Lacedæmon would have stood, and perhaps have extended itself over all Greece: but God had otherwise determined.

Antigonus fought a great battle with the Illyrians, and overcame them. Yet therein he caught his bane; not by any wound, but by overstraining his voice, wherewith he brake a vein, that bled inwardly, and in short space finished his life, who was troubled before with a consumption of the lungs. His kingdom descended unto Philip the son of Demetrius, being then a boy; as also about the same time it was, that Antiochus, surnamed (I know not why) the Great, and Ptolomy Philopater began to reign in Asia and Egypt, boys all. Of these, Ptolomy, though old enough to love harlots when he first was king, yet continued a boy all the seventeen years of his reign. The unripe age of Philip and Antiochus bred such intestine inconvenience to their kingdoms, as is usual in the minority of princes; but their elder years brought them acquainted with the Romans, upon which occasion, when it comes, we shall more seasonably speak of them and of their kingdoms more at large.

SECT. VII.

How the Illyrians infested the coast of Greece, and how they were subdued by the Romans.

WHILST things thus passed in Greece, and whilst the Carthaginians were busy in their conquest of Spain, the Romans had found themselves work among the Sardinians and Corsicans, that were easily subdued at first, and easily

vanquished again when they rebelled. They made also war with the Illyrians, wherein they got much honour with little pain. With the Gauls they had much ado, that lasted not long; being rather, as [b] Livy saith, a tumult than a war. So that by all these light exercises their valour was hardly kept from rust. How they got the islands in the Mediterranean sea, it hath been shewed before; of their dealings with the Illyrians and Gauls it is not meet to be utterly silent.

The Illyrians inhabited the country now called Slavonia, a troublesome nation, impatient of rest, and continually making war for gain, without other regard of friend or foe. They were invited by Demetrius king of Macedon to help the Mydionians, his friends, that were besieged by the Ætolians, for that they refused to be of their society. Before the Illyrian succours came, the Mydionians were so far spent, that the Ætolians contended about the booty; the old pretor, or chief magistrate of their nation, who was going out of his office, claiming to have the honour of the victory, and the division of the spoil to be referred unto him, for that he had in a manner brought the siege to an end, and won the town; others, that were in hope to be chosen into the office, contradicting this, and desiring that old orders might be kept. It was a pretty strife, and somewhat like to that of the French in later ages, who thought upon dividing the prey before they had won the victories, which anon they lost, at Poictiers and at Agincourt. The Ætolians wisely compounded the difference, ordering it thus: that the old and the new pretor should be jointly entitled in the victory, and have equal authority in distribution of the gettings. But the Illyrians finished the strife much more elegantly, and after another fashion. They arrived, and landed, ere any was aware of them; they fell upon the Ætolians; and though good resistance was made, yet got the victory, partly by force of their own multitude, partly by help of the Mydionians, that were not idle in their own business, but stoutly sallied out of the town. Many of the

[b] Livy, l. 21.

Ætolians were slain, more were taken, their camp and all their baggage was lost; the Illyrians took the spoil, and went their way, the Mydionians erected a trophy, inscribing the names both of their old and new magistrate, (for they also chose new officers at the same time,) as the Ætolians had directed them by example.

The success of this voyage highly pleased Agron king of the Illyrians; not only in regard of the money wherewith Demetrius had hired his assistance, or of the booty that was gotten, but for that, having vanquished the stoutest of the Greeks, he found it not uneasy to enrich himself by setting upon the less warlike. For joy of this he feasted and drank so immoderately, that he fell in a pleurisy, which in few days ended his life. His kingdom, together with his great hopes, he left unto Teuta his wife.

Teuta gave her people free liberty to rob all nations at sea, making no difference between friend and foe, as if she had been sole mistress of the salt waters. She armed a fleet, and sent it into Greece, willing her captains to make war where they found advantage, without any further respect. These fell with the western coast of Peloponnesus, where they invaded the Eleans and Messenians. Afterwards they returned along by Epirus, and stayed at the city of Phœnice to take in victuals and other necessaries. There lay in Phœnice eight hundred Gauls, that having been mercenaries of the Carthaginians, went about to betray, first Agrigentum, then Eryx to the Romans; but failing to do either, they nevertheless revolted, and were for their misdeeds disarmed, and sent to sea by the Romans, yet entertained by these Epirots, and trusted to lie in garrison within their town. The Gauls were soon grown acquainted with the Illyrians, to whom they betrayed Phœnice, which deserved none other in trusting them. All Epirus was presently in arms, and hastened to drive out these unwelcome guests. But whilst the Epirots lay before the town, there came news into their camp of another Illyrian army that was marching thitherward by land, under one Scerdilaïdas, whom queen Teuta had sent to help his fellows. Upon this advertise-

ment a part of them is sent away towards Antigonia, to make good that town and the straits adjoining, by which these new comers must enter into their country; another part of them remains at Phœnice, to continue the siege. Neither the one nor the other sped well in their business: for Scerdilaïdas found means to join with his fellows, and they that were besieged within Phœnice sallied out of the town, and gave such an overthrow to the Epirots, as made them despair of saving their country without great and speedy help from abroad. Wherefore ambassadors were sent to the Achæans and Ætolians, craving their help with very pitiful terms of entreaty. They obtained their suit; neither was it long before an army, sent by these two nations, was ready in Epirus to present battle unto Scerdilaïdas. But Scerdilaïdas was called home by letters from Teuta the queen, that signified a rebellion of some Illyrians against her, so that he had no mind to put his forces to hazard, but offered composition, which was accepted. The agreement was, that the Epirots might ransom the town, and all their people that were prisoners; and that the Illyrians should quietly depart, with all their booty and slaves. Having made this profitable and honourable bargain, the Illyrians returned into their own country by land, sending their booty away by sea.

At their coming home, they found no such great trouble as that which they brought, or had occasioned in this voyage: for, in fulfilling the commandment of their queen, they had taken many Italian merchants whilst they lay at Phœnice, and made them good prize. Hereof the complaints made unto the Roman senate were so frequent, that ambassadors were sent to require of Teuta that she should abstain from doing such injuries. These ambassadors found her very jolly; both for the riches which her fleet had brought in, and for that she had in short space tamed her rebels, and brought all to good order, save only the town of Issa, which her forces held straitly besieged. Swelling with this prosperity, she could hardly afford a good look to the unmannerly Romans, that found fault with her doings

and calling them by a true name, *piracy*, required amends. Yet when their speech was ended, she vouchsafed to tell them, that injury in public she would do them none; as for private matters, no account was to be made of them, neither was it the manner of kings to forbid their subjects to get commodity how they best could by sea. But (said the younger of the two ambassadors) we Romans have a manner, and a very laudable one, to take revenge in public of those private wrongs that are borne out by public authority; therefore we shall teach you, God willing, to reform your kingly manners, and learn better of us. These words the queen took so impatiently, that no revenge could satisfy her but the death of him that had spoken them. Wherefore, without all regard of the common law of nations, she caused him to be slain; as if that had been the way to set her heart at rest, which was indeed the mean to disquiet and afflict it ever after.

The Romans, provoked by this outrage, prepare two great armies; the one by sea, consisting of two hundred sail, commanded by C. Fulvius; the other by land, led by A. Posthumus. They trouble not themselves any more with requiring satisfaction; for this injury is of such nature as must be requited with mortal war. It is indeed contrary to all human law, to use violence towards ambassadors; the reason and ground whereof seems to be this; that since without mediation there would never be an end of war and destruction, therefore it was equally received by all nations, as a lesson taught by nature, that ambassadors should pass freely, and in safety, between enemies. Nevertheless, as I take it, this general law is not without limitation: for if any king, or state, lay hold upon ambassadors sent by their enemies, not unto themselves, but unto some third, whom they should draw into the quarrel; then is it as lawful to use violence to those ambassadors, (thus employed to make the war more terrible,) as it is to kill the men of war, and subjects of an enemy. And so might the Athenians have answered it, when they slew the Lacedæ-

monian ambassadors that were sent to Xerxes, to draw him into a war upon the Athenians. Neither are those ambassadors, which practise against the person of that prince in whose countries they reside, warranted by any law whatsoever. For whereas the true office of an ambassador residing is the maintenance of amity; if it be not lawful for one prince to practise against the life of another, much less may an ambassador do it, without incurring justly the same danger of punishment with other traitors; in which case his place gives him no privilege at all. But we will leave this dispute to the civilians, and go on with the revenge taken by the Romans for the slaughter of their ambassador Coruncanus.

The Illyrian queen was secure of the Romans, as if they would not dare to stir against her. She was indeed in an error, that hath undone many of all sorts, greater and less than she, both before and since, *having more regard unto fame than unto the substance of things*. The Greeks were at that time more famous than the Romans; the Ætolians and Epirots had the name of the most warlike people in Greece: these had she easily vanquished, and therefore thought that with the Romans she should be little troubled. Had she considered that her whole army, which wrought such wonders in Greece, was not much greater than of ten thousand men; and that nevertheless it prevailed as much by odds of number, as by valour or skill in arms; she would have continued to use her advantage against those that were of more fame than strength, with such good caution, that she should not have needed to oppose her late-gotten reputation against those that were more mighty than herself. But she was a woman, and did what she listed. She sent forth a greater fleet than before, under Demetrius of Pharos; with the like ample commission to take all that could be gotten. This fleet divided itself; and one part of it fell with [c] Dyrrachium, the other

[c] Dyrrachium, sometime called Epidamnus, and now Durazzo, seated upon the Adriatic sea, between the islands of Pharos and Corcyra.

with Corcyra. Dyrrachium was almost surprised by the Illyrians, yet was it rescued by the stout citizens. In [d] Corcyra the Illyrians landed; wasted the isle, and besieged the town. Hereupon the Ætolians and Achæans were called in to help; who came, and were beaten in a fight at sea; losing, besides others of less note, Marcus Carynensis, the first pretor of Achaia, whom Aratus succeeded. The town of Corcyra, dismayed with this overthrow, opened the gates unto Demetrius Pharius; who took possession of it with an Illyrian garrison, sending the rest of his forces to besiege Dyrrachium. In the mean season, Teuta was angry with her captain Demetrius; I know not why, but so as he resolved to try any other course, rather than to trust her.

The Romans were even ready to put to sea, though uncertain which way to take, when advertisement was brought to C. Fulvius the consul, of Demetrius's fear and discontent. Likely it was, that such an occasion might greatly help to advance the business in hand. Wherefore the consul sailed thither; where he found the town of Corcyra so well prepared to his hand by Demetrius, that it not only received him willingly, but delivered into his power the Illyrian garrison, and submitted itself unto the Roman protection.

After this good beginning, the consul sailed along the coast to [e] Apollonia; accompanied with Demetrius, whom he used thenceforth as his counsellor and guide. To Apollonia came also Posthumus, the other consul, with the land-army, numbered at twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. Thence they hasten towards Dyrrachium, which the Illyrians had besieged; but upon news of the Roman army they disperse themselves. From thence the Romans enter Illyria, and take Parthenia; beat the Illyrians by sea, take twenty of their ships, and enforce the queen Teuta to forsake the coast, and to cover herself in Rison, far within the land. In the end, part of the Romans haste them home-

[d] Corcyra, an island of the Adriatic sea, not far from Durazzo; called now Corfu, and in the possession of the Venetians.

[e] Apollonia, a city near Dyrrachium, or Durazzo, upon the sea-coast. Pinetus calls it Sissopolis.

ward, and leave the best places of Illyria in the hands of Demetrius; another part stays behind, and prosecutes the war in such sort, that Teuta was forced to beg peace, which she obtained upon miserable conditions; to wit, that she should quit the better part of Illyria, and pay tribute for the rest, and from thenceforth never send any of her ships of war towards the coasts of Greece, beyond the island of Lissa, except it were some one or two vessels unarmed, and by way of trade.

After this Illyrian war, the Romans sent ambassadors into divers parts of Greece, signifying their love to the country, and how, for good-will thereunto, they had made war with good success upon Teuta, and her people. They hoped, belike, that some distressed cities would take this occasion to desire their patronage; which if it happened, they were wise enough to play their own games. But no such matter fell out. The ambassadors were only rewarded with thanks; and a decree made at Corinth, that the Romans thenceforth might be partakers of the Isthmian pastimes. This was an idle courtesy, but well meant by the vain Greeks, and therefore well taken by the Romans; who by this Illyrian expedition got nothing in Greece, save a little acquaintance, that shall be more hereafter.

SECT. VIII.

Of the war between the Romans and Gauls, somewhat before the coming of Hannibal into Italy.

THE Gauls that dwelt in Lombardy were the next against whom the Romans took arms. These were a populous nation, and often molested Rome; sometimes with their own forces, and sometimes with the assistance of those that inhabited France. Once their fortune was good, when they took Rome, and burnt it; though the issue of that war proved not answerable to the beginning, if we may give credit unto Roman historians. In following times their success was variable, and commonly bad. Many overthrows they received; and if they got any victory it yielded them no profit, but was soon extorted out of their hands. They

were indeed more fierce than well advised; lightly stirred up to war, and lightly giving over. At the first brunt they were said to be more than men; but when that was past, less than women. The Romans were acquainted with their temper by long experience, and knew how to handle them; yet gave always careful heed to their approach, were it only bruited. For the danger of them was sudden and uncertain, by reason of their neighbourhood, and want of intelligence among them. Few of their attempts upon Rome were called wars, but *tumultus Gallici*; "tumults of the "Gauls;" and rightly. For they gave many alarms to Italy, and used to rise with great armies; but after a few days' march, and sometimes before their setting forth, any small occasion served to disperse them. Having received an overthrow, they would rest ten or twelve years, sometimes twenty or thirty; till they were stirred up again by younger heads, unacquainted with the danger. Whilst they rested, the state of Rome, that against these made only defensive war, had leisure to grow by setting upon others. Herein God provided well for that monarchy, which he intended to raise, that the Gauls never fell upon Italy, with a mighty power, in the time of any other great and dangerous war. Had they attempted to conquer it whilst Pyrrhus was travailing in the same enterprise, or in either of the two former Punic wars, it may be doubted what would have become of this imperious city. But it seems that the Gauls had no better intelligence in the affairs of Italy, than strangers had in Gaul. At least they knew not how to use their times; and were therefore like to smart, whensoever the enemies, whom they had much provoked and little hurt, should find leisure to visit them at their own home; which was now after the first Punic war. Once before this, the Romans had been bold to set upon the Gauls in their own country; and that was three years before the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy. At that time the Senones, a tribe of the Gauls, invading Hetruria and besieging Arretium, had won a great battle, and slain L. Cæcilius with the most of his army. Manius Curius, the new consul, sent ambassa-

dors to them, to treat about ransom of prisoners: but these ambassadors they slew. Therefore when fortune turned to the better, the Romans followed it so well, that they expelled these Senones out of their country, and sent a colony of their own to inhabit it. This caused the [f] Boii, another people of Gaul, to fear the like measure; who thereupon took arms, and drew the Hetrurians to their side. But the Romans overthrew them in two great battles; and thereby made them sue for peace, which lasted until this end of the Illyrian war.

It vexed the Gauls to see a Roman colony planted in their country, who had been accustomed to enlarge their bounds, by driving out their neighbours perforce. Wherefore they laboured with the Transalpines (so the Romans called those in France, as lying from them beyond the Alps, though to us they are nearer; like as they called Cisalpines, or *by-hither the Alps*, those who dwelt between them and the mountains) to draw them to their party; reasonably presuming, that as their disjunction had caused their loss, so their union might recompense it with large amends. But the business was so foolishly carried, that the Cisalpines and Transalpines fell together by the ears; putting the Romans only to a tumult, without further trouble of war. Soon after, they were urged by a greater indignity to go more substantially to work: for C. Flaminius, a popular man in Rome, proposed a decree, which was ratified by the people, that besides one colony already planted in the territory of the Senones, as many more should be carried thither, as would serve to people the whole country between Ancona and Ariminum, exterminating utterly those Gauls. Such an offer, were it made in England, concerning either Virginia or Guiana itself, would not overjoy the multitude: but the commonalty of Rome took this in so good part, notwithstanding all danger joined with the benefit, that Flaminius had ever after their good-will.

[f] There were divers nations of the Boii, as in Pannonia, Illyria, Germany, in Bourbonois, in France, and in Aquitane; but these Boii were of the French race, and dwelt at this time about the mouth of the river of Po.

This dreadful precedent extremely displeased the Boii; who being neighbours to Ariminum, feared the like displantation. And because all the rest of the Gauls had reason to resolve, that themselves also should be rooted out by degrees; the great nation of the Insubrians, which inhabited the duchy of Milan, joined with the Boii, and upon a common purse entertained the Gessates, nations about Rhodanus, wageable as the Switzers in these times. The Gessates having received a great imprest, come to the field under the conduct of their kings, Concolitanus and Aneroestus; who with the Boii and Insubrians compound an army of fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and those of the best men, and best appointed, that ever invaded the Roman territory; to whom the Senogalli, that had been beaten out of their possessions, gave a great increase of strength. On the contrary side, the Venetians and the [h] Cenomanni adhered to the Romans, as better believing in their prosperity and rising fortune. For fear of whose incursions, therefore, the Gauls were forced to leave a good part of their army on the frontier of Milan: with the rest of their forces they entered into Tuscany. The Romans, hearing of this danger, send Æmilius to Rimine, to stop their passage; and in the place of C. Attilius their other consul, who then was in Sardinia, they employ one of their pretors for the defence of Tuscany.

Being at this time greatly troubled with the consideration of this powerful army which the Gauls had assembled, they caused a view to be taken, as well of all their own forces as of those of their allies, who were no less willing than themselves to oppose the incursions of the barbarous people; fearing, as they had cause, that their own destruction could not be prevented otherwise than by the good fortune of Rome. The numbers found in this muster deserve to be recorded, because they set out the power of the Romans in those days. With the consuls they sent forth to the war

[h] Cenomanni are the people about Bergamo, on the north side of the river Po in Italy. There were also of these Cenomanni in France, and inhabited the county of Main.

four legions of their own, every legion consisting of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse; and of their allies, thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. There were also appointed for supplies, (if any misadventure came to these,) of the Sabines and Hetrurians, fifty thousand foot and four thousand horse; which army was to be lodged in the border of Hetruria. Of the Umbri and Sarsinates, which inhabited the Apennines, there were twenty thousand, and of the Venetians and Cenomans other twenty thousand; which latter armies were directed to invade the Boii, that forcing them to defend their own territories, the general army of the Gauls should be thereby greatly diminished. There were besides these, to be ready against all uncertain chances of war, thirty thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, garrisoned in Rome itself, of their own people; and of their allies, thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. Over and above these great troops, in the roll of the Latins that was sent unto the senate, there were numbered fourscore thousand foot and five thousand horse; in that of the Samnites, seventy thousand foot, and of horse seven thousand; in that of the [h] Iapyges and Messapyges, fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse; the Lucans sent a list of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; the [i] Marsi, [k] Marrucini, [l] Ferentani, and the Vestini, of twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. The Romans had also two legions in Sicily and about Tarentum, containing eight thousand four hundred foot and four hundred horse. So as of the Romans and Campans jointly, reckoning men armed and fit to bear arms, there were registered two hundred and fifty thousand foot, and of horse three and twenty thousand; of which, reckoning the Romans apart, there were an hundred and fifty thousand foot, and about six thousand horse. Casting up the whole forces

[h] Iapyges and Messapyges seem to be one nation; who are also called Salentines, Peucecians, Apulians, and Calabrians. The country is now Apulia, containing the northernmost headland of Calabria.

[i] A people of the kingdom of Naples.

[k] Ptolomy calls them a people of Italy.

[l] A people of Campania, called to this day Ferentines, saith Leander.

of all the provinces in Italy, both of the Romans and their confederates, it amounted to seven hundred thousand foot and seventy thousand horse. But the number is somewhat miscast by Polybius, not with a purpose to enrich himself by the dead pays; for where he reckons nine hundred horse too many, he falls short nine thousand two hundred of the foot.

How great soever this muster was, it seems to have been like unto that which Lodowick Sforza made, when Louis the Twelfth invaded Milan; at what time, the better to encourage himself and his subjects, he took a roll of all persons able to bear arms within the duchy, though indeed he were never able to bring a tenth part of them into the field. Certain it is, that the battles of Trebia, Thrasymene, and Cannæ, did not consume any such proportion as was answerable to this large account. Yet were the Romans fain to arm their slaves, even for want of other soldiers, after their overthrow at Cannæ. Wherefore the marvel is not great, that the Carthaginians and others were little terrified with report of such a multitude. For all heads are not fit for helmets; though the Roman citizens were in general as good fighting men as elsewhere might be found.

Notwithstanding all these counter preparations, the Gauls keep on their way; and entering into Tuscany, destroy, and put to fire and sword, all that lay before them. From thence they march directly towards Rome, hoping to find the Romans rather in deliberation, than in the field. But their intelligence fails them: for the Roman army sent into Tuscany, having taken some other way than they did, and finding that it had missed of them, came again fast after them, to arrest them in their journey. Hereof when they heard the rumour, fearing to be charged on their backs, they turned head; and in the same evening discovered the Roman army, by whom they encamped. It was now a matter of apparent necessity that fight they must; wherefore they helped themselves with a stratagem, that shewed no great fineness of wit, but such as well beseemed those that had none other occupation than war, and stood them in good stead at the present. In the dead of the night they

cause their foot to march away, but not far, leaving their horse in guard; to whom they give order to come off at the first light of day, with such a speed, as might rather argue a running away than a retreat, as if they had not dared to abide battle. The Romans, interpreting this their hasty departure as the Gauls desired they should, follow them in disorder. The Gauls return, charge them, and kill six thousand upon the place; the rest take a piece of ground of advantage, and defend themselves till L. Æmilius, being at Ariminum, comes to their succour. Upon the coming of the consul, the Gauls consult whether they should give the Romans battle, or forbear. In which dispute, Aneroestus, one of their kings, persuades them rather to return into their own countries; where after they had disposed of the great spoils and riches which they had gotten, they should then renew the war, being without carriage, pester, or other impediment. This advice they all embrace; for seeing they that were mercenaries had obtained what they came for, to wit, the spoils of their enemies, they thought it wisdom to hazard neither it nor themselves any further.

This indeed had been a good resolution, if they had taken it before the enemy had been in sight. But, as well in the wars of these latter ages as in former times, it hath ever been found extreme dangerous to make a retreat in the head of an enemy's army. For although they that retire do often turn head; yet in always going on from the pursuing enemy, they find within a few miles either strait, hedge, ditch, or place of disadvantage, which they are enforced to pass in disorder. In such cases the soldier knows it as well as the captain, that he which forsakes the field perceives and fears some advantage of the enemy's. Fear, which is the betrayer of those succours that reason offereth, when it hath once possessed the heart of man, it casteth thence both courage and understanding. They that make the retreat are always in fear to be abandoned; they that lead the way fear to be engaged; and so the hindmost treads on his heels that is foremost, and consequently all disband, run, and perish, if those that favour the retreat be

not held to it by men of great courage. The miserable overthrow that the French received in Naples in the year 1503, upon a retreat made by the marquis of Sal, doth testify no less. For although a great troop of French horse sustained the pursuing enemy a long time, and gave the foot leisure to trot away; yet, being retarded by often turnings, the Spanish foot overtook, and defeated them utterly. During the wars between the imperials and the French, Boisi and Mont were lost at Brignolles, who in a bravery would needs see the enemy before they left the field. So was Strossi overthrown by the marquis of Marignan, because he could not be persuaded to dislodge the night before the marquis's arrival. Therefore did the French king, Francis the First, wisely, when, without respect of point of honour, he dislodged from before Landersey by night; as many other, the most advised captains, (not finding themselves in case to give battle,) have done: *Je ne trouve point*, saith the marshal Monluc, *au fait des armes chose si difficile, qu'une retraite*; "I find nothing in the art of war so "difficult, as to make a safe retreat." A sure rule it is, that there is less dishonour to dislodge in the dark, than to be beaten in the light. And hereof Mons. de la Noue gives this judgment of a day's retreat, made in France presently before the battle of Moncontour. For, saith he, staying upon our reputation in show not to dislodge by night, we lost our reputation indeed by dislodging by day; whereby we were forced to fight upon our disadvantage, and to our ruin. And yet did that worthy gentleman count Lodowick of Nassau, brother to the late famous prince of Orange, make the retreat at Moncontour with so great resolution, as he saved the one half of the protestant army, then broken and disbanded, of which myself was an eyewitness; and was one of them that had cause to thank him for it.

Now the Gauls, embracing the safe advice (as they take it) of one of their kings, turn their backs to the enemy, and their faces homeward. Æmilius follows them as near as he can, without engaging himself, attending his advantage. In the mean while, C. Attilius, the other consul, with the le-

gions of Sardinia, lands at Pisa; so as the Gauls, enclosed between two armies, are forced to fight. They therefore equally strengthen their rear and front. To sustain Æmilius, they appoint the Gessates and the Milanois; in the front they range the Piemontois, and the rest of the Gauls inhabiting upon the river of Po. The manner of the fight Polybius describeth at large; which was well fought of all hands. But in the end the Gauls fell, and so did Attilius the consul; who died in the place, accompanied with the two kings of the Gauls, Concolitanus and Aneroestus, with forty thousand of their vassals.

After this fatal overthrow, the Gauls lost courage, and, ere long, all that they held in Italy; for they were invaded the year following this overthrow by the new consuls, Fulvius and Manlius. The Romans knew well how to use their victory; they gave not ten, twenty, or thirty years time to the Gauls, to repair their forces, as the Gauls had done to them. These new consuls beat the Boii; but by reason of the great rains that fell, and the great pestilence that reigned, they were compelled for that present to surcease. In the second year, Furius and Flaminius invade the Milanois, and prevail very far, being strongly assisted by the Cenomanni and the Venetians. Nevertheless, these consuls were revoked out of their province by the senate of Rome, and compelled to resign their office; because the augurs, or soothsayers, had found, that some token or other of the birds (in which, and all sorts of their divination, the Romans were extremely superstitious) had not only foreshewed little good when they were chosen, but had also nullified the election. C. Flaminius receiving letters of this revocation from the senate, and being otherwise advertised of the contents, was not hasty to open them; but first gave battle unto the enemies, vanquished them, and spoiled their country; then perused the letters, and returning home obtained a triumph, sore against the will of the senate, and not altogether with good liking of the people, who yet bare him out, for that he sided in faction with the commonalty, though a man of great nobility.

This was that Flaminius who had propounded the decree for dividing the country of the Senones among the people of Rome. He was the first, or one of the first, that, understanding the majesty of Rome to be indeed wholly in the people, and no otherwise in the senate than by way of delegacy, or grand commission, did not stand highly upon his birth and degree, but courted the multitude, and taught them to know and use their power over himself and his fellow-senators, in reforming their disorders. For this the commons highly esteemed him, and the senators as deeply hated him. But he had the surer side, and found imitators that rose by the same art; which in process of time grew the only or chief way to preferment.

Flaminius and his colleague being deposed, M. Claudius Marcellus, and Cn. Cornelius Scipio, were chosen consuls for the rest of that year. The Gauls about this time desired peace, and were like to have obtained it; though the new consuls were against it, as fearing to want work. But when thirty thousand of the Gessates, following their king Britomarus, were come over the Alps, and joined with the Insubrians, all other discourse than of present war was at an end. So the consuls hasted into their province, where they besieged Acerræ, a town not far from Novaro, (so far had the Romans pierced already,) in the duchy of Milan. To divert them from this siege, Britomarus sat down before Clastidium, a town in the same tract, with great part of his forces; leaving the rest, with the Insubrians, to attend upon the consuls at Acerræ, and to look to the defence of Milan. But this would not suffice to make the Romans break up their siege. Marcellus, taking with him the greatest part of the horse, and six hundred foot lightly armed, thought to deal well enough with those at Clastidium. Britomarus heard of the consul's coming, and met him upon the way so suddenly, that the Romans had no leisure to rest themselves after their journey, but were compelled instantly to fight. Herein Britomarus had done well, if he had not forthwith, in a rash bravery, lost his game at a cast. He had advantage enough in number, both of horse

and foot; but he thought so well of his own personal valour, that he rode out single before his army, provoking any one to fight with him. Marcellus was no less daring than the barbarous king; whether more wise in this action, I will not dispute; he was more fortunate, and that sufficed to commend him. He slew and disarmed Britomarus in presence of both armies; whereby his own men took such courage, and his enemies were so dismayed, that without much trouble of fight the Romans obtained a great victory.

This was the third and last time that ever any Roman general slew the general of the enemy's with his own hand. To this kind of victory belonged a peculiar triumph, whereof only Romulus, Cossus, and this Marcellus had the honour; yet I dare say, that the two Scipios, and divers other Roman captains, especially Cæsar, were better men of war than any of these three; though they never offered up to Jupiter *opima spolia*, "the armour of a general slain "by themselves, when they were generals," nor perhaps affected so to do.

After this victory Acerræ was yielded to the Romans, and Milan soon after; with all that belonged to the Cisalpines, or Gauls, that dwelt in Lombardy. Thus was that valiant and mighty nation, that had for so many years vexed the state of Rome, and in former times taken the city itself, brought to nothing in a short time; their pleasant and fertile territory possessed by the Romans, and the remainder of their nation inhabiting Italy, so many as would not subject their necks to the Roman yoke, either forced to abandon their countries, or to hide themselves in the cold and barren mountains, like outlaws and thieves. And thus did the Romans spend the three and twenty years following the peace made with Carthage. In part of which time they were at such leisure, that they closed up the temple of Janus; which they never did before, (it standing always open when they had any war,) save once in the reign of Numa; nor in long time after, until the reign of Augustus. But this their present happiness was not to last long; a

dangerous war, and perhaps the greatest that had ever been, was to come unto their gates; which being well ended, they might boldly undertake to extend their monarchy as far as their ambition could reach.

CHAP. III.

Of the second Punic war.

SECT. I.

The wars of Hannibal in Spain. Quarrels between the Romans and Carthaginians. Hannibal besiegeth and taketh Saguntum, whilst the Romans are busied with the Illyrians. War proclaimed between Rome and Carthage.

HANNIBAL, the son of Amilcar, was about six and twenty years old when he was chosen general of the Carthaginian forces in Spain. He was elected by the army as soon as Asdrubal was dead, and the election was ratified by the state at Carthage; wherewith Hanno and his complices were nothing pleased. This was now the third of the Barchine family (so called of Amilcar, whose surname was Barchas) that had command in chief over the men of war. Which honour would perhaps have been less envied by these domestical enemies, if the allies and friends of the Barchine house had not also borne the whole sway in government, and been the only men regarded both by the senate and the people. This general good-will, as it was first purchased by the most worthy deserts of Amilcar, in saving his country from imminent ruin, enlarging the dominion thereof, and enriching it with treasures and great revenues; so was it retained by the same good arts among his friends and followers. Hanno therefore, and his partisans, being neither able to tax the virtue of their enemies, that was unreprovable, nor to perform the like services unto the commonweal, had nothing left whereby to value themselves, excepting the general reprehension of war, and cautelous advice of not provoking the Romans. This they seasoned

other whiles with detraction, saying, that the Barchine faction went about to oppress the liberty of the city. But their malicious words were unregarded; and if it were factious to bear ill-will to Rome, then were all the citizens (very few excepted) no less Barchine than Hannibal himself. For it was long since apparent, that the oath of the Romans to the articles of peace afforded no security to Carthage, were she never so quiet and officious, unless she would yield to become their subject. Since therefore the peace was like to hold no longer than until the Romans could find some good advantage to renew the war, it was rather desired by the Carthaginians, that whilst their own state was in good case the war should begin, than that in some unhappy time of famine or pestilence, or after some great loss of army or fleet, they should be driven to yield unto the impudent demands of their enemies, and to give away basely their lands and treasures, as they had lately done, or miserably fight upon terms of disadvantage.

This disposition of his countrymen Hannibal well understood. Neither was he ignorant (for his father and other friends had long time devised of this business) that, in making war with the Romans, it was no small advantage to get the start of them. If once he could bring an army into Italy without molestation, there was good hope that he should find friends and assistants, even of those people that helped to increase the Roman armies in foreign wars. But this could never be effected, if the matter were openly disputed at Carthage. For it was to be doubted, that the Carthaginians, how glad soever they would be to hear that he had set the war on foot, would nevertheless be slow and timorous, as commonly men are in the beginning of great enterprises, if the matter were referred to their deliberation. Which if it should happen, then were the Romans like to be made acquainted, not only with the generalities of his purpose, but with such particulars as must be discoursed of in procuring allowance to his design. This might suffice to disorder the whole project. Wherefore he resolved to lay siege unto Saguntum, which might seem not greatly to con-

cern the Romans, and would highly please the Carthaginians, that had fresh in mind the indignity of that Spanish town's alliance with their false friends. So should he assay both the patience of his enemies and the disposition of his own citizens.

Having thus concluded, he nevertheless went fair and orderly to work; and beginning with those that lay next in his way, approached unto Saguntum by degrees. This he did, saith Livy, to give some colour to his proceedings; as if he had not principally intended the war against Saguntum, but had been drawn thither by course of business. Yet reason teacheth plainly, that without regard of such formalities, it was needful to finish the conquest of the rest, before he did any thing that should provoke the Romans. First therefore he entered upon the territory of the [m] Olcades, and having besieged Althæa, (Livy calleth it Carteia,) their chief city, he became in a few days master, not only thereof, but of all the other towns of their country. This nation, which he first undertook, being subdued, and the winter at hand, he rested his army in New Carthage, or Carthagena, and imparted liberally to the soldiers the spoils he had gotten in his late conquest.

In the spring following he pursued the war against the [n] Vaccæi, and without any great difficulty won first Salmantica, now called Salamanca; and, after it, [o] Arbucala by assault, though not without a long siege, and great difficulty. But in his return he was put to the height, both of his courage and of his martial judgment: for all such of the Vaccæi as were able to bear arms, being made desperate by the spoil of their country, with those of Salamanca and of the Olcades that had escaped in the late overthrow, joining themselves with the Toletans, compounded an army of an hundred thousand able men, and stayed Hannibal on the banks of the river Tagus, which runneth to the sea by Lis-

[m] A people, saith Stephanus, near the river of Ebro. But in the old description of Spain, in Ortelius, they are found near Tagus; and by Suidas, not far from New Carthage.

[n] A people of Castile the old.

[o] Arbucala, or Albricala, an inland city of the Vaccæi in Arragon.

bon in Portugal. These four nations having had experience of Hannibal's invincible courage, and that he never saw enemy upon whom he durst not give charge, were throughly resolved that his natural valour would at this time no less neglect the cold advice of discretion, than at other times it had seemed to do, when the like great occasion persuaded him to use it. But he that makes himself a body of crystal, that all men may look through him, and discern all the parts of his disposition, makes himself (withal) an ass, and thereby teacheth others either how to ride or drive him. Wise men, though they have single hearts in all that is just and virtuous, yet they are like coffers with double bottoms, which when others look into, being opened, they see not all that they hold on the sudden and at once. It is true, that this subtle Carthaginian, when he served under Asdrubal, was of all the men of mark in the army the most adventurous. But that which may beseem a captain or inferior commander doth not always become a chief, though it hath sometime succeeded well with such great ones as have been found more fortunate than wise. At this time our great man of war knew as well how to dissemble his courage, as at other times to make it good. For he withdrew himself from the river side, as if fearful to ford it, thereby to draw over that great multitude from their banks of advantage. The Spaniards, apprehending this in such sort as Hannibal desired that they should, thrust themselves in fury and disorder into the swift stream, with a purpose to charge the Carthaginians, abandoning (as they thought, for fear) the defences on the contrary side. But when Hannibal saw them in their way, and well near over, he turned back his elephants to entertain them at their landing, and thrust his horsemen, both above and beneath them, into the river. These carrying a kind of *lance de gay*, sharp at both ends, which they held in the midst of the staff, had such an advantage over the foot that were in the river under their strokes, clattered together, and unable to move or shift their bodies as on firm ground, that they slew all those (in a manner) without resistance which were

already entered into the water, and pursued the rest, that fled like men amazed, with so great a slaughter, as from that day forward there was not any Spaniard on that side the river of Iberus, (the Saguntines excepted,) that had the daring to lift up their hands against the Carthaginians.

The Saguntines perceiving the danger towards them, cried before they were hurt. They sent ambassadors to Rome, and bemoaned themselves, as likely to suffer that which afterwards they suffered indeed, only because of their alliance and friendship with this honourable city, which the Carthaginians hated. This tale moved the senate; but much more a report that Saguntum was already besieged. Hereupon some cry out, that war should be proclaimed by land and sea; as also that the two consuls should be sent with armies, the one into Spain, the other into Afric. But others went more Roman-like to work, and carried it. So it was only concluded, that ambassadors should be sent into Spain to view the state of their confederates, which were indeed none other than the Saguntines. For if Hannibal intended war against Rome, it was likely that he would give them, ere it were long, a more plausible occasion to take arms against him; if he had no such purpose, yet would it be in their power to determine what they listed themselves, upon the report of these ambassadors; and this their gravity, in being not too rash at first, would serve to countenance their following decree. Of these ambassadors Livy reports, that they found Hannibal before Saguntum, but could not get audience of him, and therefore went to Carthage, where also they were not regarded nor heard. But Polybius, an historian of sincerity less questionable, tells, that they found him at Carthagena, and had conference with him, though such as left them doubtful. This is more agreeable to the rest of Hannibal's whole course. And surely we might wonder why the Carthaginians should afterward admit a more peremptory embassage, (as Livy confesseth,) and fall to disputation about the covenants of peace, if they had rejected that which was sent upon none other pretence than prevention of war.

Whilst the ambassadors passed to and fro, Hannibal prepared not only his forces, but some Roman pretences against Saguntum. He found out Mamertines, or people that should do as the Mamertines in Sicily had done for the Romans, and implore his help against the Saguntines. These were the Turdetani, a nation adjoining to Saguntum, and having many quarrels with them, (as happens commonly among neighbours,) of which Hannibal himself had hatched some. Finding therefore such an occasion, whatsoever it was, as made him able to say, that the Saguntines had first provoked him, ere he meddled with them, he made no more ado, but sat down with his whole power before their town. He was now more secure than he had formerly been of his own citizens; for that they had not entertained the Roman ambassadors with any trembling reverence, as of late years they had been wont. Nevertheless he was glad of any handsome colour to shadow his actions; not only because the war which he so much desired was not proclaimed, but that he might not be checked in his course as an open enemy, before he could set foot in Italy. The Romans had the like, though contrary desire. They were glad of the quarrel, as hoping that Carthage, with all thereto belonging, should thereby in short space become their own. Yet were they not hasty to threaten before they were ready to strike, but meant to temporize, until they had an army in readiness to be sent into Spain, where they thought to make Saguntum the seat of the war.

In the mean while Demetrius Pharius, whom the Romans had made king over a great part of Illyria, rebelled against them; either for that he found himself overstraitly tied up by them with hard conditions, or rather because he was of an unthankful disposition. The commotion of the Gauls, and afterward the fame of the Carthaginian war, emboldened him to despise his benefactors and patrons, whom he ought to have defended and aided in all perils, even with the hazard of his whole estate, which he had received of their gift. But he was a traitor to his own queen, and therefore dealt, according to his kind, with those that had

rewarded him for being such. First he built ships, and spoiled the isles of Greece, against the covenants to which he was bound. Then he adventured further, and seized upon some places that the Romans kept in their own hands. If he had begun sooner, or rather if he had stayed somewhat longer, he might have sped better: for the business with the Gauls was ended, with Hannibal not throughly begun, when he declared himself by his doings an enemy, and was vanquished. The Roman consul Æmilius was sent against him, who in seven days won the strong town of Dimalum, and thereby brought such terror upon the country round about, that ambassadors were sent from all places to yield themselves, without putting him to further pains. Only the city of Pharus, in which Demetrius lay, prepared to resist; which it might have done long, if the hot-headed rebel had not been too foolish. Æmilius landed a great part of his army in the isle of Pharus by night, and bestowed them in covert, presenting himself the next morning with twenty ships before the town, and offering to force the haven. Demetrius with all his power issued out against the consul, and was soon intercluded from the town by those that lay in ambush. Wherefore he fled away through by-paths to a creek, where he had shipping ready for him, and embarked himself, leaving all his estate unto them, of whose liberality he first had it.

This business, though it were soon despatched, yet prevented it not the siege of Saguntum, before which Hannibal sat down, ere Æmilius was landed in Illyria. In the beginning of the siege, the Carthaginians were much discouraged by reason of the brave sallies made by the Saguntines; in one of which their general received a dangerous wound in the thigh, that caused him to lie many days unable to move. Nevertheless he was not unmindful of his work in the mean while, but gave order to raise certain moveable towers, that might equal those which were built on the walls of the city, and to prepare to batter the curtains, and make a breach. These, being finished and applied, had soon wrought their effect. A great and large breach was made by the fall of

divers towers, and a great length of wall, whereat an hot assault was given; but it was so well sustained by the Saguntines, as the Carthaginians were not only beaten from the breach, and out of some ground within the town, which upon the first fury they had won, but they were pursued even to their own trenches and camp. Nevertheless the Carthaginian army, wherein were about an hundred and fifty thousand men, did so weary the townsmen with continual travail, that at length it got within the walls, and was only hindered from taking full possession of the city by some counter-works of the Saguntines, that were also ready to be won. In this extremity there was one Alcon, a Saguntine, that conveyed himself out of the town, to treat with Hannibal for some accord. But the conditions which the Carthaginian offered were so severe, and without all compass of honour, as Alcon durst not return to propound them to his countrymen. For Hannibal demanded all that they had, gold, silver, plate, and other riches within the city; yea, the city itself to be abandoned by the citizens, promising, that he would assign some other place for their habitation; not allowing them to carry out with them any other thing, wherewith to sustain themselves, than the clothes on their backs; or other arms to defend them, than their nails and teeth. Yet might they far better have submitted themselves unto this miserable appointment, (seeing thereby they might have enjoyed their lives, and saved the honour of their wives and daughters,) than to have rested at the discretion of the conqueror, as soon after they did, by whom their wives and daughters were defloured before their faces, and all put to sword that were above fourteen years of age. For it was a poor comfort which a great number of them took, when, not daring to fight, and sell their blood at the dearest rate, they shut themselves up like most wretched creatures in their own houses, and therein burnt themselves with all that they had, so dying unrevenged. The treasures found in Saguntum, which were very great, Hannibal kept, therewith to pay his army; the slaves and other booty he divided among his soldiers, re-

serving some things of choice, wherewith to present his friends at Carthage, and to animate them unto the war.

These tidings exceedingly vexed the Romans, who had good cause to be angry at their own slowness, in forbearing to send help unto the Saguntines, that held out eight months, looking still for succour in vain. Wherefore they determined to repair their honour by taking sharp revenge. To this end they sent ambassadors again to Carthage; demanding only, whether it were by general consent and allowance of the Carthaginians, that Hannibal had made war upon Saguntum; which if they granted, (as it seemed they would,) then to give them defiance. Hereunto answer was made, in the senate of Carthage, to this effect; That this their second embassage, howsoever qualified with mild words, was indeed more insolent than the former. For in that, they only required justice against Hannibal; but in this, the very state and commonwealth of Carthage was urged to plead Guilty or Not guilty. But (said the Carthaginian speaker) whether the general of our army in Spain, in besieging Saguntum, have only followed his own counsel; or whether he did it by direction from us, it is not the question which the Romans ought to ask us. That which is indeed worthy examination or dispute is, whether it were lawful or unlawful for Hannibal to do as he hath done: for it belongs to us to call our own commanders in question, and to punish them according to their faults and errors; to you, to challenge us, if we have done any thing contrary to our late league and contract. It is true, that in our negotiation with Luctatius the consul, the allies of both nations were comprehended; but the Saguntines were not then of your allies, and therefore no parties to the peace then made; for of your allies in the future, or of ours, there was no dispute. As touching the last agreement between you and Asdrubal, wherein you will say that the Saguntines were comprehended by name, it is you that have taught us how to answer that particular. For whatsoever you found in the treaty between us and Luctatius to your own disadvantage, you cast it upon your consul's presumption, as

promising those things for which he had no warrant from the senate and people of Rome. If then it be lawful for the Romans to disavow the actions of their consuls and commanders, concluding any thing without punctual and precise warrant; the same liberty may we also assume, and hold ourselves no way bound in honour to perform those bargains which Asdrubal hath made for us without our commandment and consent.

This was an impertinent answer, and little better than a mere cavil. For Luctatius the consul, in his treaty of peace with the Carthaginians, had expressly referred the allowance thereof to the people of Rome. It had been therefore much better to have dealt plainly, and to have alleged, that after this league was made and confirmed on both parts, it was broken by the Romans in robbing the Carthaginians of the isle of Sardinia, and withal of twelve hundred talents; which perjury the state of Carthage, being now grown able, would revenge with open war. As for the Saguntines, it little skilled that the Romans had admitted them into confederacy, and forthwith inserted their names into the treaty of peace with Asdrubal; seeing that the treaty with Asdrubal, and all other business between Rome and Carthage, following the violence and breach of peace in taking away Sardinia, were no better than Roman injuries; as implying this commination, Do whatsoever we require, else will we make war without regard of our oath, which we have already broken.

But this the Carthaginians did not allege, forgetting in heat of contention (as Polybius takes it) the best of their plea. Yet since Livy himself doth remember and acknowledge, that the taking of Sardinia from the Carthaginians did inflame the spirit of Amilcar with desire of revenge; we may reasonably think that the mention of this injury was omitted, not so much upon forgetfulness, as for that it was not thought convenient, by ripping up such ancient matter of quarrel, to shew that the war now towards had long been thought upon, and like to be made with extraordinary force, in other manner than heretofore. In conclu-

sion, the Carthaginian senate moved the Roman ambassadors to deliver unto them in plain terms the purposes of those that sent them, and the worst of that which they had long determined against them: as for the Saguntines, and the confining of their armies within Iberus, those were but their pretences. Whereupon Q. Fabius gathering up the skirt of his gown, as if somewhat had been laid in the hollow thereof, made this short reply: "I have here," quoth he, "in my gown-skirt both peace and war; make you (my "masters of the senate) election of these two, which of them "you like best, and purpose to embrace." Hereat all cried out at once, "Even which of them you yourself have a "fancy to offer us." "Marry then," quoth Fabius, "take "the war, and share it among you." Which all the assembly willingly accepted.

This was plain dealing. To wrangle about pretences, when each part had resolved to make war, it was merely frivolous. For all these disputes of breach of peace have ever been maintained by the party unwilling or unable to sustain the war. The rusty sword and the empty purse do always plead performance of covenants. There have been few kings or states in the world that have otherwise understood the obligation of a treaty, than with the condition of their own advantage; and commonly (seeing peace between ambitious princes and states is but a kind of breathing,) the best advised have rather begun with the sword than with the trumpet. So dealt the Arragonois with the French in Naples, Henry the Second of France with the Imperials, when he wrote to Brisac, to surprise as many places as he could, ere the war brake out; don John with the Netherlands; and Philip the Second of Spain with the English, when in the great embargo he took all our ships and goods in his ports.

But Hannibal, besides the present strength of Carthage, and the common feeling of injuries received from these enemies, had another private and hereditary desire that violently carried him against the Romans. His father Amilcar, at what time he did sacrifice, being ready to take his

journey into Spain, had solemnly bound him by oath, to pursue them with immortal hatred, and to work them all possible mischief, as soon as he should be a man, and able. Hannibal was then about nine years old when his father caused him to lay his hand upon the altar, and make this vow; so that it was no marvel if the impression were strong in him.

That it is inhuman to bequeath hatred in this sort, as it were by legacy, it cannot be denied: yet, for mine own part, I do not much doubt, but that some of those kings with whom we are now in peace have received the like charge from their predecessors, that, as soon as their coffers shall be full, they shall declare themselves enemies to the people of England.

SECT. II.

Hannibal takes order for the defence of Spain and Afric. His journey into Italy.

WAR being thus proclaimed, Hannibal resolved not to put up his sword, which he had drawn against the Saguntines, until he had therewith opened his passage unto the gates of Rome. So began the second Punic war, second to none that ever the senate and people of Rome sustained. Hannibal wintered at Carthagena, where he licensed his Spanish soldiers to visit their friends, and refresh themselves against the spring. In the mean while he gave instructions to his brother Asdrubal for the government of Spain in his absence. He also took order to send a great many troops of Spaniards into Afric, to equal the numbers of Africans formerly drawn thence into Spain, to the end, that so the one nation might remain as pledges and gages for the other. Of the Spaniards, he transported into Afric thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot, and twelve hundred horse, also eight hundred slingers of the [p] Baleares. Besides these, he selected four thousand foot, all young men, and of quality, out of the best cities of Spain, which he appointed to be garrisoned in Carthage itself, not so much in regard of their forces, as that they might serve for hostages;

[p] Majorca and Minorca.

for among those four thousand the best of the Spanish citizens, and those that swayed most in their several states, had their sons or kinsmen. He also left with his brother, to guard the coast and ports, fifty and seven galleys; whereof thirty-seven were presently armed, and appointed for the war. Of Africans, and other nations strangers, he left with him above twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse, besides one and twenty elephants.

Having in this sort taken order for the defence of Spain and Afric, he sent discoverers before him to view the passages of the Pyrenean mountains and of the Alps. He also sent ambassadors to the mountaineers of the Pyrenees, and to the Gauls, to obtain a quiet passage; that he might bring his army entire into Italy, and not be compelled to diminish his forces by any war in the way, till he came to encounter the Romans. His ambassadors and discoverers being returned with good satisfaction, in the beginning of the spring he passed over the river of Iberus with an army consisting of fourscore and ten thousand foot and twelve thousand horse. All those parts of Spain into which he had not entered before, he now subdued; and appointed Hanno (not that old enemy of his house, who sat still at Carthage) to govern Spain on the east side of Iberus, to whom he left an army of ten thousand foot and one thousand horse. Being arrived at the borders of Spain, some of his Spanish soldiers returned home without asking leave; which that others might not also do, or attempt, he courteously dismissed many more, that seemed willing to be gone. Hereby it came to pass, that the journey seemed the less tedious unto those that accompanied him, as being not enforced by compulsion. With the rest of his army, consisting now but of fifty thousand foot and nine thousand horse, he passed the Pyrenees, and entered into Gaul. He found the Gauls, that bordered upon Spain, ready in arms to forbid his entrance into their country; but won them, with gentle speech, and rich presents that he bestowed upon their leaders, to favour his expedition. So without any molestation he came to the bank of Rhodanus, where dwelt, on each side of the river,

a people called Volcæ. These were unacquainted with the cause of his coming, and therefore sought to keep him from passing over the water. But he was greatly assisted by some of those Gauls that inhabited on the west side of Rhodanus, to wit, by those of Vivaretz and Lionnois. For although many of them had transported themselves and their goods into the country of Dauphiny, thinking to defend the further bank against him; yet such as remained, being desirous to free their country of so many ill guests, were better pleased to have their countrymen beaten, which had abandoned them, than to have their own store of corn and cattle wasted by the long stay of so great an army as lay upon them. For which reason, they helped him to make boats; informed him of another more easy passage higher up the river, and lent him guides. When the vessels for transportation of his army were in readiness, he sent Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, up the river; himself in the mean while making countenance to enter the ford below. The end of this labour was, that Hanno charging the Gauls unawares upon their own side, and Hannibal at the same time passing the river in their faces, the further bank was won, though with some difficulty, and the enemies dispersed. Yet was he greatly troubled in conveying over his elephants, who marvellously feared the water. He was therefore driven to make rafts of trees, and cover them with earth and turf; whereof he fastened one to each bank, that might serve as a bridge to and from another of the same sort, but loose, upon which the beasts were towed over.

Having passed this first brunt, and overcome both the rage of the river, and of those that defended it, he was visited by the princes of the Gauls Cisalpines, that inhabited Piedmont and Milan, who lately had revolted from the Romans. These informed him of the passages of the Alps, that they were not so difficult as common report made them; and from these he received guides, with many other encouragements. All which notwithstanding, he found himself extremely encumbered by the Savoyans; and lost, both of his carriages and of his Carthaginians, more than willingly he

would, or had formerly thought that he should. For he was twice mainly assailed by them before he could recover the plain countries on the other side. And whereas this journey over the mountains cost him fifteen days travel, he was every day, more or less, not only charged by those mountaineers, but withal extremely beaten with grievous weather and snow; it being in the beginning of winter when he began and overcame this passage. But the fair and fertile plains, which were now ready to receive them, with the assistance and conduct of the Cisalpine Gauls, who by their proper forces had so often invaded the Roman territory, gave them great comfort, and encouragement to go on; having nothing else of difficulty remaining, but that which from the beginning they made account to overcome by their proper valour and resolution; namely, the Roman armies and resistance.

SECT. III.

How the Romans in vain solicited the Spaniards and Gauls to take their part. The rebellion of the Cisalpine Gauls against the Romans.

THE countries of Spain and Gaul, through which the Carthaginians marched thus far, had been solicited before by the same Roman ambassadors who had denounced the war at Carthage. These, as they were instructed by the senate, took Spain in their way homeward from Carthage, with a purpose to draw into the Roman alliance as many of the cities and princes as they could; at least to dissuade them from contracting any friendship with the Carthaginians. The first which they attempted were the Volscians, a people in Spain; from whom, in open assembly, they received by one that spake for the rest this uncomfortable answer: "With what face," saith he, "can ye Romans persuade us to "value your alliance, or to prefer it before the friendship of "the Carthaginians; seeing we are taught by the example of "the Saguntines to be more wise than so? For they, relying "on your faith and promised assistance, have been utterly "rooted out and destroyed by the Carthaginians, whom they

" might else have held their assured friends and good neigh-
" bours, as we and other of the people of Spain have found
" them. Ye may therefore be gone with this resolution from
" us, that, for our parts, (and so, I think, I may answer for
" the rest of our countrymen,) the Romans henceforth are not
" to expect any kindness at our hands, who are resolved never
" to make account of their protection nor amity." From the Volscians, the ambassadors took their way towards the Gauls, using their best arguments to persuade them not to suffer the Carthaginians to pass into Italy through their territory; and withal greatly glorifying themselves, their strength, and large dominion. But the Gauls laughed them to scorn, and had hardly the patience to hear them speak. " For
" shall we," said one of their princes, " by resisting Han-
" nibal's passage into Italy, entertain a war which is not
" meant to be made against us? Shall we hold the war
" among ourselves, and in our own territory, by force, which
" marcheth with a speedy pace from us towards our ancient
" enemies? Have the Romans deserved so well of us, and
" the Carthaginians so ill, that we should set fire on our
" own houses, to save theirs from burning? No, we know it
" well, that the Romans have already forced some nations
" of ours out of their proper territory and inheritance, and
" constrained others, as free as themselves, to pay them
" tribute. We will not therefore make the Carthaginians
" our enemies, who have no way as yet offended us, nor
" we them."

With this unpleasing answer the ambassadors returned home, carrying no good news of friends likely to help them, but rather some assurance from the people of Massilia, which were confederates with Rome, that the Gauls were determined to take part with their enemy. Of this inclination the Cisalpine Gauls gave hasty proof: for when the news was brought into Italy, that the Carthaginians had passed Iberus, and were on the way towards Rome; this alone sufficed to stir up the Boii and Insubrians against the Romans. These people were lately offended at the plantation of new Roman colonies at Cremona and Placentia, within their

territories. Relying therefore upon the Carthaginian succour, which they supposed to be now at hand, they laid aside all regard of those hostages which they had given to the Romans, and fell upon the new colonies. The towns it seems that they could not win; for Hannibal shortly after failed to get them. But they forced the Roman commissioners (who belike were abroad in the country) to fly to Modena, where they besieged them. The siege of Modena had continued some small time, when the Gauls, having little skill in assaulting cities, waxed weary, and seemed desirous to have peace, and to come to some good accord with the Romans. This they did of purpose to draw on some meeting, that they might therein lay hand upon the Roman deputies, thereby to redeem their hostages in way of exchange. And it fell out in part according to their wish. For the Romans sent out ambassadors to treat with them, and to conclude a peace, whom they detained. Manlius the pretor, who lay in these quarters with an army, hearing this outrage, marched in all haste to the relief of the besieged. But the Gauls, having laid a strong ambush in a wood joining to the way, fell upon the pretor so opportunely, as he was utterly overthrown, and all his followers left dead in the place, a few excepted, that recovered, by fast running, a little village, but defensible, upon the river of Po. When this was heard at Rome, C. Attilius, another of the pretors, was hastily sent to relieve the besieged with one legion and five thousand of the Roman associates; which forces were taken out of the consul's army, and supplied by a new levy.

As the Gauls were too rash and hasty, so were the Romans too slow, and indeed too ill advised in the beginning of this war. They were not persuaded that Carthage, which had almost servilely endured so many indignities in time of the late peace, would be so brave and courageous on the sudden as to attempt the conquest of Italy itself. Wherefore they appointed one of their consuls to make war in Spain, the other in Afric, resting secure of all danger at home. Titus Sempronius took his way toward Afric, with

an hundred and threescore *quinqueremes*, or galleys of five to an oar; which preparation may seem to threaten even the city of Carthage, to which it shall not come near. P. Cornelius Scipio, the other consul, made all possible haste by the way of Genoa into Provence, and used such diligence, having the wind also favourable, as in five days he recovered Massilia. There he was advertised of Hannibal's having passed the river of Rhodanus, whom he thought to have found busy yet a while in Spain: Hannibal had also news of the consul's arrival; whereof he was neither glad nor sorry, as not meaning to have to do with him. Each of them sent forth scouts, to discover the other's number and doings; Hannibal, about five hundred Numidians; Scipio, three hundred of his better appointed Roman horse. These met, and fought; and the Numidians were beaten; yet could not the Romans greatly brag, having slain only two hundred, and lost of their own one hundred and forty. But when Scipio drew near to have met with the Carthaginians, he found that they were gone three days before, and that (as he then found assuredly true) with an intent to look upon the walls of Rome. This interrupted his intended voyage into Spain. Nevertheless, he sent away thither his brother Cn. Cornelius Scipio, with the greatest part of his fleet and army, to try what might be done against Asdrubal and the other Carthaginian lieutenants in that country. He himself, taking with him a few choice bands, returned by sea to Pisa, and so passing through Tuscany into Lombardy, drew together the broken troops of Manlius and Attilius, that lately had been beaten by the Gauls; with which forces he made head against the enemy, thinking to find him overlaboured with travail of his painful journey.

SECT. IV.

Scipio the Roman consul overcome by Hannibal at Ticinum. Both of the Roman consuls beaten by Hannibal in a great battle at Trebia.

FIVE months Hannibal had spent in his tedious journey from Carthagena; what great muster he could make, when

he had passed the Alps, it is not easily found. Some reckon his foot at an hundred thousand, and his horse at twenty thousand; others report them to have been only twenty thousand foot and six hundred horse. Hannibal himself, in his monument which he raised in the temple of Juno Lacinia, agreeth with the latter sum. Yet the Gauls, Ligurians, and others, that joined with him, are likely to have mightily increased his army in short space. But when he marched eastward from the banks of Rhodanus, he had with him eight and thirty thousand foot and eight thousand horse; of which all, save those remembered by himself in the inscription of his altar in Juno's temple, are like to have perished by diseases, enemies, rivers, and mountains; which mischiefs had devoured each their several shares.

Having newly passed the Alps, and scarce refreshed his wearied army in the country of Piedmont, he sought to win the friendship of the [q] Taurini, who lay next in his way. But the Taurini held war at that time with the Insubrians, which were his good friends, and refused (perhaps for the same cause) his amity. Wherefore he assaulted their town, and won it by force in three days. Their spoil served well to hearten his army, and their calamity to terrify the neighbour places. So the Gauls, without more ado, fell unto his side; many for fear, many for good-will, according to their former inclination. This disposition ran through the whole country, which joined, or was all in a readiness to join, with the Carthaginians, when the news of Scipio the consul's arrival made some to be more advised than the rest. The name of the Romans was terrible in those quarters; what was in the Carthaginians, experience had not yet laid open. Since therefore the Roman consul was already gotten through the most defensible passages, ere any speech had been heard of his approach, many sat still for very fear, who else would fain have concluded a league with these new-come friends; and some for greater fear offered their service against the

[q] These dwelt about Turin, a goodly city, now subject unto the duke of Savoy, which from them took the name of Augusta Taurinorum.

Carthaginians, whom nevertheless they wished well to speed.

This wavering affection of the province whereinto they were entered made the two generals hasten to the trial of a battle. Their meeting was at Ticinum, now called Pavia, where each of them wondered at the other's great expedition; Hannibal thinking it strange that the consul, whom he had left behind him on the other side of the Alps, could meet him in the face before he had well warmed himself in the plains; Scipio admiring the strange adventure of passing those mountains, and the great spirit of his enemy. Neither were the senate at Rome little amazed at Hannibal's success and sudden arrival. Wherefore they despatched a messenger in all haste unto Sempronius the other consul, that was then in Sicilia, giving him to understand hereof, and letting him further know, that, whereas he had been directed to make the war in Africa, it was now their pleasure that he should forbear to prosecute any such attempt, but that he should return the army under his charge, with all possible speed, to save Italy itself. According to this order, Sempronius sent off his fleet from Lilybæum, with direction to land the army at Ariminum, a port town not far from Ravenna, quite another way from Carthage, whither he was making haste. In the mean while Scipio and Hannibal were come so near, that fight they must, ere they could part asunder. Hereupon both of them prepared the minds of their soldiers by the best arguments they had; unto which Hannibal added the rhetoric of a present example, that he shewed upon certain prisoners of the Savoyans, which he brought along with him, fitted for the purpose, into Italy. For these, having been no less miserably fettered and chained than sparingly fed, and withal so often scourged on their naked bodies, as nothing was more in their desire than to be delivered from their miseries by any kind of present death, were brought into the middle of the army; where it was openly demanded, which of them would fight hand to hand with some other of his companions, till the one of them were slain, with condition, being the victor, to re-

ceive his liberty, and some small reward. This was no sooner propounded, than all of them together accepted the offer. Then did Hannibal cause lots to be cast, which of them should enter the list, with such weapons as the chieftains of the Gauls were wont to use in single combats. Every one of these unhappy men wished that his own lot might speed; whereby it should at least be his good fortune to end his miseries by death, if not, to get a reward by victory. That couple, whose good hap it was to be chosen, fought resolvedly, as rather desiring than fearing death, and having none other hope than in vanquishing. Thus were some few couples matched, it skilled not how equally; for all these poor creatures were willing, upon whatsoever uneven terms, to rid themselves out of slavery. The same affection that was in these combatants, and in their fellows which beheld them, wrought also upon the Carthaginians, for whom the spectacle was ordained. For they deemed happy, not only him that by winning the victory had gotten his liberty, together with an horse and armour; but even him also, who being slain in fight, had escaped that miserable condition unto which his companions were returned. Their general, perceiving what impression this dumb show had wrought in them, began to admonish them of their own condition, speaking to this effect: That he had laid before them an example of their own estates, seeing the time was at hand, wherein they were all to run the same fortune that these slaves had done; all to live victorious and rich, or all to die, or (which these prisoners esteemed far more grievous) to live in a perpetual slavery: that none of them all, in whom was common sense, could promise to himself any hope of life by flight, since the mountains, the rivers, the great distance from their own countries, and the pursuit of merciless enemies, must needs retrench all such impotent imaginations. He therefore prayed them to remember, that they, who had even now praised the fortune both of the victor and of the vanquished, would make it their own case, seeing there was never any in the world, appointed with such a resolution, that had ever been broken or beaten by their enemies. On the con-

trary, he told them, that the Romans, who were to fight upon their own soil, and in view of their own towns; who knew as many ways to save themselves by flight, as they had bodies of men to fight withal, could no way entertain such a resolution as theirs, seeing the same necessity (to which nothing seems impossible) did no way press them or constrain them. In this sort did Hannibal, with one substantial argument, *that there was no mean between victory and death*, encourage his companions. For, saith a great captain of France, *la commodité de la retraite avance la fuite*; "the commodity of a retreat doth greatly advance "a flat running away."

Scipio, on the other side, after that he had given order for the laying of a bridge over the river of Ticinus, did not neglect to use the best arguments and reasons he could, to encourage the army he led, putting them in mind of the great conquests and victories of their ancestors; against how many nations they had prevailed, and over how many princes, their enemies, they had triumphed. As for this army commanded by Hannibal, although it were enough to tell them that it was no better than of Carthaginians, whom in their late war they had so often beaten by land and sea; yet he prayed them withal to consider, that at this time it was not only so diminished in numbers, as it rather seemed a troop of brigands and thieves, than an army like to encounter the Romans; but so weatherbeaten and starved, as neither the men nor horses had strength or courage to sustain the first charge that should be given upon them. "Nay," said he, "ye yourselves may make judgment what "daring they have now remaining, after so many travails and "miseries; seeing when they were in their best strength, after "they had passed the Roan, their horsemen were not only "beaten by ours, and driven back to the very trenches of "their camp, but Hannibal himself, fearing our approach, "ran headlong towards the Alps; thinking it a less disho- "nour to die there by frost, famine, and precipitation, than "by the sharp swords of the Romans, which had so often "cut down his people, both in Africa and in Sicily."

It was not long after this, ere the two generals met, each being far advanced before the gross of his army with his horse; and the Roman having also with him some light-armed foot, to view the ground, and the enemy's countenance. When they discovered the approach one of the other, Scipio sent before him his horsemen of the Gauls to begin the fight, and bestowing his darters in the void ground between their troops to assist them, himself, with his Roman men at arms, following softly in good order. The Gauls (whether desirous to try the mettle of the Carthaginians, or hoping thereby to get favour of the Romans) behaved themselves courageously, and were as courageously opposed. Yet their foot, that should have aided them, shrank at the first brunt, or rather fled cowardly away, without casting a dart, for fear of being trodden down by the enemy's horse. This notwithstanding, the Gauls maintained the fight, and did more hurt than they received, as presuming that they were well backed. Neither was the consul unmindful to relieve them, their hardiness deserving his aid; and the hasty flight of those that should have stood by them admonishing him that it was needful. Wherefore he adventured himself so far, that he received a dangerous wound, and had been left in the place, if his son (afterward surnamed Africanus) had not brought him off; though others give the honour of this rescue to a Ligurian slave. Whilst the Romans were busied in helping their consul, an unexpected storm came driving at their backs, and made them look about how to help themselves. Hannibal had appointed his Numidian light horse to give upon the Romans in flank, and to compass them about, whilst he with his men at arms sustained their charge, and met them in the face. The Numidians performed this very well, cutting in pieces the scattered foot that ran away at the first encounter, and then falling on the backs of those whose looks were fastened upon Hannibal and Scipio. By this impression the Romans were shuffled together and routed, so that they all betook them to their speed, and left unto their enemies the honour of the day.

When Scipio saw his horse thus beaten, and the rest of his army thereby greatly discouraged, he thought it a point of wisdom, having lost so many of his fleet upon the first puff of wind, to take port with the rest, before the extremest of the tempest overtook him. For he saw by the lowering morning what manner of day it was like to prove. Therefore his battle of foot being yet unbroken, he in a manner stole the retreat, and recovered the bridge over Ticinus, which he had formerly built. But, notwithstanding all the haste that he made, he left six hundred of his rear behind him; who were the last that should have passed, and stayed to break the bridge. Herein he followed this rule of a good man of war, *Si certamen quandoque dubium videatur, tacitam miles arripiat fugam: fuga enim aliquando laudanda:* which must be understood in this sort; "If a "general of an army, by some unprosperous beginnings, "doubt the success, or find his army fearful or wavering, "it is more profitable to steal a safe retreat, than to abide "the uncertain event of battle."

It was two days after, ere Hannibal could pass the river; Scipio the whilst refreshing his men, and easing himself of his wound in Placentia. But as soon as Hannibal presented his army before the town, offering battle to the Romans, who durst not accept it, nor issue forth of their camp, the Gauls, that hitherto had followed Scipio for fear, gathered out of his fear courage to forsake him. They thought that now the long desired time was come, in which better chieftains and soldiers than Aneroestus, Britomarus, and the Gessates were come to help them, if they had the hearts to help themselves. Wherefore the same night they fell upon the Roman camp, wounded and slew many, especially of those guards that kept watch at the gate, with whose heads in their hands they fled over to the Carthaginians, and presented their service. Hannibal received them exceeding courteously, and dismissed them to their own places, as men likely to be of more use to him in persuading the rest of the nation to become his confederates, than in any other service at the present.

About the fourth watch of the night following, the consul stole a retreat, as he had done before, but not with the like ease and security. Hannibal had a good eye upon him, and ere he could get far, sent the Numidians after him, following himself with all his army. That night the Romans had received a great blow, if the Numidians, greedy of spoil, had not stayed to ransack their camp, and thereby given time to all, save some few in rear that were slain or taken, to pass the river of Trebia, and save themselves. Scipio being both unable to travel by reason of his wound, and withal finding it expedient to attend the coming of his fellow-consul, encamps himself strongly upon the banks of Trebia. Necessity required that he should so do; yet this diminished his reputation. For every day more and more of the Gauls fell to the Carthaginian side, among whom came in the Boii, that brought with them the Roman commissioners, which they had taken in the late insurrection. They had hitherto kept them as pledges, to redeem their own hostages, but now they deliver them up to Hannibal, as tokens and pledges of their affections towards him; by whose help they conceived better hope of recovering their own men and lands. In the mean while Hannibal, being in great scarcity of victuals, attempted the taking of Clastidium, a town wherein the Romans had laid up all their store and munition. But there needed no force, a Brundusian, whom the Romans had trusted with keeping it, sold it for a little money.

The news of these disasters brought to Rome, filled the senate and people rather with a desire of hasty revenge, than any great sorrow for their loss received; seeing that in a manner all their foot, wherein their strength and hope consisted, were as yet entire. They therefore hasted away Sempronius, that was newly arrived, towards Ariminum, where the army, by him sent out of Sicily, awaited his coming. He therefore hasted thither, and from thence he marched speedily towards his colleague, who attended him upon the banks of Trebia. Both the armies being joined in one, the consuls devised about that which remained to

be done; Sempronius receiving from Scipio the relation of what had passed since Hannibal's arrival, the fortune of the late fight, and by what error or misadventure the Romans were therein foiled, which Scipio chiefly laid on the revolt and treason of the Gauls.

Sempronius, having received from Scipio the state of the affairs in those parts, sought by all means to try his fortune with Hannibal before Scipio were recovered of his wounds, that thereby he might purchase to himself the sole glory of the victory which he had already in his imagination certainly obtained. He also feared the election of the new consuls, his own time being well near expired. But Scipio persuaded the contrary, objecting the unskilfulness of the new-come soldiers; and withal gave him good reason to assure him, that the Gauls, naturally unconstant, were upon terms of abandoning the party of the Carthaginians; those of them inhabiting between the rivers of Trebia and Po being already revolted. Sempronius knew all this, as well as Scipio; but, being both guided and blinded by his ambition, he made haste to find out the dishonour which he might otherwise easily have avoided. This resolution of Sempronius was exceeding pleasing to Hannibal, who feared nothing so much as delay, and loss of time. For the strength of his army consisting in strangers, to wit, in Spaniards and Gauls, he no less feared the change of affection in the one, than the impatience of the other, who being far from their own home, had many passions moving them to turn their faces towards it. To further the desire of Sempronius, it fell out so, that about the same time the Gauls, inhabiting near unto Trebia, complained of injuries done by the Carthaginians. They did not supply Hannibal with necessaries, as he supposed that they might have done, although he daily reprehended their negligence, telling them, that for their sakes, and to set them at liberty, he had undertaken this expedition. Seeing therefore how little they regarded his words, he was bold to be his own carver, and took from them by force as much as he needed of that which they had. Hereupon they fly to the Romans for help; and, to

make their tale the better, say that this wrong is done them, because they refused to join with Hannibal. Scipio cared not much for this; he suspected their falsehood, and was assured of their mutability. But Sempronius affirmed, that it stood with the honour of Rome to preserve the confederates from suffering injury, and that hereby might be won the friendship of all the Gauls. Therefore he sent out a thousand horse, which coming unlooked-for upon Hannibal's foragers, and finding them heavy loaden, cut many of them in pieces, and chased the rest even into their own camp. This indignity made the Carthaginians sally out against them, who caused them to retire faster than they came. Sempronius was ready to back his own men, and repelled the enemies. Hannibal did the like. So that at length all the Roman army was drawn forth, and a battle ready to be fought, if the Carthaginian had not refused it.

This victory (for so the consul would have it called) made the Romans in general desirous to try the main chance in open field, all the persuasions of Scipio to the contrary notwithstanding. Of this disposition Hannibal was advertised by the Gauls, his spies, that were in the Roman camp. Therefore he bethought himself how to help forward the victory, by adding some stratagem to his forces. He found in the hollow of a watercourse, overgrown with high reed, a fit trench to cover an ambush. Thereinto he cast his brother Mago, with a thousand choice horse and as many foot. The rest of his army, after they had well warmed and well fed themselves in their camp, he led into the field, and marched towards the consul. Early in the morning he had sent over Trebia some companies of Numidian light horse to brave the enemy, and draw him forth to a bad dinner, ere he had broken his fast. Sempronius was ready to take any opportunity to fight, and therefore not only issued out of his camp, but forded the river of Trebia in a most cold and miserable day, his foot being wet almost to the arm-holes; which, together with the want of food, did so enfeeble and cool their courages, as they wanted force to handle the arms they bare. Strong they were in

foot, as well of their own nation as of the Latins, having of the one sixteen, of the other twenty thousand. The mass of these they ranged in a gross battalion, guarded on the flanks with three thousand horse; thrusting their light-armed and darters in loose troops in the head of the rest, in the nature of a vanguard. The Carthaginian numbers of foot were in a manner equal to their enemies; in horse they had by far the better, both in number and goodness. When therefore the Roman horse, ranged on the flanks of their foot, were broken by the Numidians; when their foot were charged both in front and flank by the Spaniards, Gauls, and elephants; when finally the whole army was unawares pressed in the rear by Mago and his two thousand, that rose out of their place of ambush; then fell the Romans by heaps under the enemies' swords; and being beaten down, as well fighting in disorder as flying towards the river, by the horsemen that pursued them, there escaped no more of six and thirty thousand, than ten thousand of all sorts, horse and foot.

Three great errors Sempronius committed, of which every one deserved to be recompensed with the loss that followed. The first was, that he fought with Hannibal in a champain, being by far inferior in horse, and withal thereby subject to the African elephants, which in enclosed or uneven grounds, and woodlands, would have been of no use. His second error was, that he made no discovery of the place upon which he fought, whereby he was grossly overreached, and ensnared, by the ambush which Hannibal had laid for him. The third was, that he drenched his footmen with empty stomachs, in the river of Trebia, even in a most cold and frosty day, whereby in effect they lost the use of their limbs. For, as one saith well, "there is "nothing more inconvenient and perilous, than to present "an army tired with travel to an enemy fresh and fed; "since where the strength of body faileth, the generosity "of mind is but as an unprofitable vapour."

The broken remainder of the Roman army was collected by Scipio, who got therewith into Placentia, stealing away

the same night, which was exceeding rainy, from the Carthaginians, who either perceived him not, because of the showers, or would not perceive him, because they were overwearied. Sempronius escaped with extreme danger, flying through the country that was overrun by the enemy's horse. He was attended by more than were requisite in a secret flight, yet by fewer than could have made resistance, if the enemy had met with him. Nevertheless he got away, and came to Rome, where he did his office in choosing new consuls for the year following, and then returned into his province with a fresh supply against Hannibal.

SECT. V.

The departure of Hannibal from the Cisalpine Gauls into Hetruria. Flaminius the Roman consul slain, and his army destroyed by the Carthaginians, at the lake of Thrasymene.

THE winter growing on apace, was very sharp, and unfit for service, to the great contentment of the Romans, who being not able to keep the field, lay warm in Placentia and Cremona. Yet Hannibal did not suffer them to rest very quiet, but vexed them with continual alarms, assailing divers places, taking some, beating the Gauls their adherents, and winning the Ligurians to his party, who presented him, in token of their faithful love, with two Roman questors, or treasurers, two colonels, and five gentlemen, the sons of senators, which they had intercepted. These, and in general all such prisoners as he had of the Romans, he held in strait places, loaden with irons, and miserably fed; those of their followers he not only well entreated, but sent them to their countries without ransom, with this protestation, That he therefore undertook the war in Italy to free them from the oppression of the Romans. By these means he hoped, and not in vain, to draw many of them to his party and assistance. But the Gauls were not capable of such persuasions. They stood in fear, lest he should make their country the seat of the war, and perhaps take it from them. They were also more grieved than reason willed them, at his feeding upon them, and wasting their territory. Wherefore some of them conspired against his life, others

admonished him of the danger; and these that gave him the advice, were ready soon after to practise against him, but were in like sort detected. He was therefore glad to use periwigs of hair, and false beards of divers colours, to the end that he might not be described nor known to those that should undertake to make him away. Fain he would have passed the Apennines upon the first appearance of spring, but was compelled by the violence of weather to tarry among the Gauls, till he had seen more swallows than one. At length, when the year was somewhat better opened, he resolved to take his leave of these giddy companions, and bring the war nearer to the gates of Rome. So away he went, having his army greatly increased with Ligurians and Gauls, more serviceable friends abroad than in their own country. That the passage of the Apennine mountains was troublesome, I hold it needless to make any doubt; yet, since the Roman armies found no memorable impediment in their marches that way, the great vexation which fell upon Hannibal when he was travelling through and over them, ought in reason to be imputed rather to the extremity of winter, that makes all ways foul, than to any intolerable difficulty in that journey. Nevertheless, to avoid the length of way, together with the resistance and fortifications which may not improbably be thought to have been erected upon the ordinary passages towards Rome, he chose at this time, though it were with much trouble, to travel through the fens and rotten grounds of Tuscany. In those marishes and bogs he lost all his elephants, save one, together with the use of one of his eyes, by the moistness of the air, and by lodging on the cold ground, and wading through deep mire and water. In brief, after he had with much ado recovered the firm and fertile plains, he lodged about Arretium, where he somewhat refreshed his wearied followers, and heard news of the Roman consuls.

C. Flaminius and Cn. Servilius had of late been chosen consuls for this year; Servilius, a tractable man, and wholly governed by advice of the senate; Flaminius, an hot-headed popular orator, who having once been robbed (as he thought) of his consulship, by a device of the senators,

was afraid to be served so again, unless he quickly finished the war. This jealous consul thought it not best for him to be at Rome when he entered into his office, lest his adversaries, by feigning some religious impediments, should detain him within the city, or find other business for him at home, to disappoint him of the honour that he hoped to get in the war. Wherefore he departed secretly out of the town; and meant to take possession of his office, when the day came, at Ariminum. The fathers, (so the senators were called,) highly displeased with this, revoked him by ambassadors; but he neglected their injunction; and hasting to meet with the Carthaginians, took his way to Arretium, where he shortly found them.

The fiery disposition of this consul promised unto Hannibal great assurance of victory. Therefore he provoked, with many indignities, the vehement nature of the Roman; hoping thereby to draw him unto fight, ere Servilius came with the rest of the army. All the country between Fesulæ and Arretium he put to fire and sword, even under the consul's nose; which was enough to make him stir, that would not have sitten still though Hannibal had been quiet. It is true, that a great captain of France hath said, *Pays gasté n'est pas perdu*; "A wasted country is not "thereby lost." But by this waste of the country, Flaminius thought his own honour to be much impaired; and therefore advanced towards the enemy. Many advised him (which had indeed been best) to have patience a while, and stay for his colleague. But of this he could not abide to hear; saying, that he came not to defend Arretium, whilst the Carthaginians went, burning down all Italy before them, to the gates of Rome. Therefore he took horse, and commanded the army to march. It is reported as ominous, that one of their ensigns stuck so fast in the ground as it could not be plucked up by the ensign-bearer. Of this tale, whether true or false, Tully makes a jest, saying, that the cowardly knave did faintly pull at it, (as going now to fight,) having hardly pitched it into the earth. Neither was the answer of Flaminius (if it were true) disagreeable hereto:

for he commanded that it should be digged up, if fear had made the hands too weak to lift it; asking withal, whether letters were not come from the senate to hinder his proceedings. Of this jealousy both he, and the senate that gave him cause, are likely to repent.

All the territory of Cortona, as far as to the lake of Thrasymene, was on a light fire; which whilst the consul thought to quench with his enemy's blood, he pursued Hannibal so unadvisedly, that he fell, with his whole army, into an ambush cunningly laid for him between the mountains of Cortona and the lake. There was he charged unawares on all sides, (save only where that great lake of Perusia permitted neither his enemies to come at him, nor him to fly from them,) knowing not which way to turn or make resistance. So was he slain in the place, accompanied with fifteen thousand dead carcasses of his countrymen. About six thousand of his men, that had the vanguard, took courage, as for the most part happens out of desperation, and breaking through the enemies that stood in their way, recovered the tops of the mountains. If these had returned, and given charge upon the Carthaginians' backs, it was thought that they might have greatly amended, if not wholly altered, the fortune of the day. But that violence of their fear, which, kindled by necessity, had wrought the effects of hardiness, was well assuaged, when they ceased to despair of saving their lives by flight. They stood still, in a cold sweat, upon the hill-top, hearing under them a terrible noise, but not discovering how things went, because of the great fog that held all the morning. When it grew toward noon, the air was cleared, and they might plainly discern the lamentable slaughter of their fellows. But they stayed not to lament it; for it was high time, they thought, to be gone, ere they were descried, and attacked by the enemy's horse. This they should have thought upon sooner, since they had no mind to return unto the fight: for descried they were, and Maharbal sent after them; who overtook them by night in a village, which he surrounded with his horse; and so they yielded the next day, rendering their

arms, upon his promise of their lives and liberties. This accord Hannibal refused to confirm, saying, that it was made by Maharbal without sufficient warrant, as wanting his authority to make it good. Herein he taught them (yet little to his own honour) what it was to keep no faith; and fitted them with a trick of their own. For if it were lawful unto the Romans to alter covenants, or add unto them what they listed; if the Carthaginians must be fain to pay certain hundreds, and yet more hundreds of talents, besides their first bargain; as also to renounce their interest in Sardinia, and be limited in their Spanish conquests, according to the good pleasure of the Romans, whose present advantage is more ample than the conditions of the late concluded peace; then can Hannibal be as Roman as themselves, and make them know, that perfidiousness gaineth no more in prosperity than it loseth in the change of fortune. Fifteen thousand Italian prisoners, or thereabout, he had in his hands; of which all that were not Romans he set free without ransom, protesting, as he had done before, that it was for their sakes, and to free them and others from the Roman tyranny, that he had undertaken this war. But the Romans he kept in strait prison and in fetters, making them learn to eat hard meat. This was a good way to breed in the people of Italy, if not a love of Carthage, yet a contempt of Rome; as if this war had not concerned the general safety, but only the preserving of her own neck from the yoke of slavery, which her overstrong enemies would thrust upon her in revenge of her oppressions. But an ancient reputation, confirmed by success of many ages, is not lost in one or two battles: wherefore more is to be done, ere the Carthaginian can get any Italian partisans.

Presently after the battle of Thrasymene, C. Centronius, with four thousand Roman horse, drew near unto the camp of Hannibal. He was sent from Ariminum by Servilius, the other consul, to increase the strength of Flaminius; but, coming too late, he increased only the misadventure. Maharbal was employed by Hannibal to intercept this company; who, finding them amazed with report which they

had newly heard of the great overthrow, charged them, and brake them; and killing almost half of them, drove the rest unto an high piece of ground, whence they came down, and simply yielded to mercy the next day. Servilius himself was in the mean while skirmishing with the Gauls, against whom he had wrought no matter of importance, when the news were brought him, of his colleague's overthrow and death in Hetruria, that made him hasten back to the defence of Rome.

In these passages, it is easy to discern the fruits of popular jealousy, which persuaded the Romans to the yearly change of their commanders in the wars; which greatly endangered and retarded the growth of that empire. Certain it is, that all men are far better taught by their own errors than by the examples of their foregoers. Flaminius had heard in what a trap Sempronius had been taken but the year before by this subtile Carthaginian, yet suffered he himself to be caught soon after in the same manner. He had also belike forgotten how Sempronius, fearing to be prevented by a new consul, and ambitious of the sole honour of beating Hannibal in battle, without help of his companion Scipio, had been rewarded with shame and loss; else would he not, contrary to all good advice, have been so hasty to fight before the arrival of Servilius. If Sempronius had been continued in his charge, it is probable that he would have taken his companion with him the second time, and have searched all suspected places proper to have shadowed an ambush: both which this new consul Flaminius neglected. We may boldly avow it, that by being continued in his government of France ten years, Cæsar brought that mighty nation, together with the Helvetians and many of the Germans, under the Roman yoke; into which parts had there been every year a new lieutenant sent, they would hardly, if ever, have been subdued. For it is more than the best wit in the world can do, to inform itself, within one year's compass, of the nature of a great nation, of the factions, of the places, rivers, and of all good helps whereby to prosecute a war to the best effect. Our

princes have commonly left their deputies in Ireland three years; whence, by reason of the shortness of that their time, many of them have returned as wise as they went out; others have profited more, and yet when they began but to know the first rudiments of war and government, fitting the country, they have been called home, and new apprentices sent in their places, to the great prejudice both of this and that estate. But it hath ever been the course of the world, rather to follow old errors than to examine them; and of princes and governors, to uphold their slothful ignorance by the old examples and policy of other ages and people, though neither likeness of time, of occasion, or of any other circumstance have persuaded the imitation.

SECT. VI.

How Q. Fabius the Roman dictator sought to consume the force of Hannibal by lingering war. Minutius, the master of the horse, honoured and advanced by the people for bold and successful attempting, adventures rashly upon Hannibal, and is like to perish with his army, but rescued by Fabius.

GREATLY were the Romans amazed at this their ill success, and at the danger apparent, which threatened them in more terrible manner than ever did war since Rome itself was taken. They were good soldiers; and so little accustomed to receive an overthrow, that when Pyrrhus had beaten them, once and again, in open field, all Italy was strangely affected with his success, and held him in admiration as one that could work wonders. But Pyrrhus's quarrel was not grounded upon hate; he only sought honour, and fought (as it were) upon a bravery; demeaning himself like a courteous enemy. This Carthaginian detested the whole Roman name, against which he burned with desire of revenge. Ticinum, Trebia, and Thrasymene witnessed his purpose and his ability: which to withstand, they fled unto a remedy that had long been out of use, and created a dictator. The dictator's power was greater than the consul's, and scarcely subject unto control of the whole city. Wherefore this officer was seldom chosen

but upon some extremity, and for no longer time than six months. He was to be named by one of the consuls at the appointment of the senate; though it were so, that the consul (if he stood upon his prerogative) might name whom he pleased. At this time, the one consul being dead, and the other too far off, the people took upon them, as having supreme authority, to give the dignity by their election to Q. Fabius Maximus, the best reputed man of war in the city: *Novum factum, novum consilium expetit*; "Contrary "winds, contrary courses." Q. Fabius chose M. Minutius Rufus master of the horse; which officer was customarily as the dictator's lieutenant; though this Minutius grew afterwards famous by taking more upon him.

The first act of Fabius was the reformation of somewhat amiss in matter of religion; a good beginning, and commendable, had the religion been also good. But if it were true (as [a] Livy reports it) that the books of Sibyl were consulted, and gave direction in this business of devotion, then must we believe, that those books of Sibyl, preserved in Rome, were dictated by an evil spirit. For it was ordained, that some vow, made in the beginning of this war to Mars, should be made anew, and amplified, as having not been rightly made before; also that great plays should be vowed unto Jupiter, and a temple to Venus, with other such trumpery. This vehemency of superstition proceeds always from vehemency of fear. And surely this was a time when Rome was exceedingly distempered with passion; whereof that memorable accident, of two women that suddenly died, when they saw their sons return alive from Thrasymene, may serve to bear witness, though it be more properly an example of motherly love. The walls and towers of the city were now repaired and fortified; the bridges upon rivers were broken down, and all care taken for defence of Rome itself. In this tumult, when the dictator was newly set forth against Hannibal, word was brought that the Carthaginian fleet had intercepted all the supply that was going to Cn. Scipio in Spain. Against these Car-

[a] Liv. l. 22.

thaginians, Fabius commanded Servilius the consul to put to sea, and, taking up all the ships about Rome and Ostia, to pursue them; whilst he, with the legions, attended upon Hannibal. Four legions he had levied in haste; and from Ariminum he received the army which Servilius the consul had conducted thither.

With these forthwith he followed apace after Hannibal, not to fight, but to affront him. And, knowing well what advantage the Numidian horse had over the Romans, he always lodged himself on high grounds, and of hard access. Hannibal in the mean while, pursuing his victory, had ranged over all the country, and used all manner of cruelty towards the inhabitants, especially to those of the Roman nation, of whom he did put to the sword all that were able to bear arms. Passing by Spoletum and Ancona, he encamped upon the Adriatic shores, refreshed his diseased and overtravelled companies, armed his Africans after the manner of the Romans, and made his despatches for Carthage, presenting his friends, which were in effect all the citizens, with part of the spoils that he had gotten. Having refreshed his army, fed his horses, cured his wounded soldiers, and (as Polybius hath it) healed his horse-heels of the scratches, by washing their pasterns in old wine; he followed the coast of the Adriatic sea towards Apulia, a northern province of the kingdom of Naples, spoiling the Marrucini, and all other nations lying in his way. In all this ground that he overran, he had not taken any one city; only he had assayed Spoletum, a colony of the Romans; and, finding it well defended, presently gave it over.

The malice of a great army is broken, and the force of it spent, in a great siege. This the protestant army found true at Poictiers a little before the battle of Moncontour; and their victorious enemies, anon after, at St. Jean d'Angeley. But Hannibal was more wise: he would not engage himself in any such enterprise as should detain him, and give the Romans leave to take breath. All his care was to weaken them in force and reputation; knowing, that when once he was absolute master of the field, it would not be

long ere the walled cities would open their gates without expecting any engine of battery. To this end he presented Fabius with battle as soon as he saw him, and provoked him with all manner of bravados. But Fabius would not bite: he well knew the differences between soldiers bred up, ever since they were boys, in war and in blood, trained and hardened in Spain, made proud and adventurous by many victories there, and of late by some notable acts against the Romans; and such, as had no oftener seen the enemy than been vanquished by him. Therefore he attended the Carthaginian so near as he kept him from straggling too far, and preserved the country from utter spoil. He inured his men by little and little, and made them acquainted with dangers by degrees; and he brought them first to look on the lion afar off, that in the end they might sit on his tail.

Now Minutius had a contrary disposition, and was as fiery as Flaminius, taxing Fabius with cowardice and fear. But all stirred not this well-advised commander: for wise men are no more moved with such noise, than with wind bruised out of a bladder. There is nothing of more indiscretion and danger than to pursue misfortune; it wasteth itself sooner by sufferance than by opposition. It is the invading army that desires battle; and this of Hannibal was both the invading and the victorious. Fabius therefore suffered Hannibal to cross the Apennines, and to fall upon the most rich and pleasant territory of Campania; neither could he by any arguments be persuaded to adventure the Roman army in battle; but being far too weak in horse, he always kept the hills and fast grounds. When Hannibal saw he could by no means draw this wary dictator to fight; that the winter came on, and that the towns stood firm for the Romans, whose legions were in sight, though afar off; he resolved to rest his army, that was loaden with spoil, in some plentiful and assured place, till the following spring. But ere this can be done, he must pass along by the dictator's camp, that hung over his head upon the hills of Callicula and Casilinum; for other way there was none by which

he might issue out of that goodly garden-country, which he had already wasted, into places more abundant of provision for his wintering. It was by mere error of his guide, that he first entered within these straits. For he would have been directed unto Cassinum, whence he might both assay the fair city of Capua, which had made him friendly promises under hand, and hinder the Romans from coming near it to prevent him. But his guide misunderstood the Carthaginian pronunciation, and conducted him awry another way from Cassinum to Casilinum, whence Fabius hoped that he should not easily escape. Now began the wisdom of Fabius to grow into credit, as if he had taken the Carthaginians in a trap, and won the victory without blows. But Hannibal reformed this opinion, and freed himself, by a slight invention, yet serving the turn as well as a better. In driving the country, he had gotten about two thousand kine; whose horns he dressed with dry fagots, and setting fire to them in the dark night, caused them to be driven up the hills. The spectacle was strange, and therefore terrible, especially to those that knew it to be the work of a terrible enemy. What it should mean, Fabius could not tell, but thought it a device to circumvent him, and therefore kept within his trenches. They that kept the hill-tops were horribly afraid when some of these fiery monsters were gotten beyond them; and ran therefore hastily away, thinking that the enemies were behind their backs, and fell among the light-armed Carthaginians, that were no less afraid of them. So Hannibal, with his whole army, recovered sure ground without molestation; where he stayed till the next morning, and then brought off his light footmen, with some slaughter of the Romans, that began to bold them in skirmish. After this, Hannibal made semblance of taking his journey towards Rome; and the dictator coasted him in the wonted manner, keeping still on high grounds between him and the city, whilst the Carthaginian wasted all the plains. The Carthaginian took Geryon, an old ruinous town in Apulia, forsaken by the inhabitants, which he turned into barns and storehouses for winter, and

encamped under the broken walls. Other matter of importance he did none; but the time passed idly, till the dictator was called away to Rome about some business of religion, and left the army in charge with Minutius, the master of the horse.

Minutius was glad of this good occasion to shew his own sufficiency. He was fully persuaded that his Romans, in plain field, would be too hard for the Africans and Spaniards, by whom if they had been foiled already twice or thrice, it was not by open force, but by subtilty and ambush, which he thought himself wise enough to prevent. All the army was of his opinion, and that so earnestly, as he was preferred, by judgment of the soldiers, in worthiness to command before the cold and wary Fabius. In this jollity of conceit he determined to fight. Yet had he been peremptorily forbidden so to do by the dictator, the breach of whose command was extreme peril of death. But the honour of the victory, which he held undoubtedly his own; the love of the army, and the friends that he had at home bearing office in Rome, were enough to save him from the dictator's rods and axes, took he the matter never so heinously. Hannibal, on the other side, was no less glad, that he should play with a more adventurous gamester: therefore he drew near, and, to provoke the Romans, sent forth a third part of his army to waste the country. This was boldly done, seeing that Minutius encamped hard by him; but it seems that he now despised those whom he had so often vanquished. There was a piece of high ground between the two camps, which because it would be commodious to him that could occupy it, the Carthaginians seized upon by night, with two thousand of their light-armed. But Minutius by plain force won it from them the next day, and, entrenching himself thereupon, became their nearer neighbour.

The main business of Hannibal at this time was, to provide abundantly, not only for his men, but for his horses, which he knew to be the chief of his strength, that he might keep them in good heart against the next summer; if, besides this, he could give the Romans another blow, it

would increase his reputation, encourage his own men, terrify his enemies, and give him leave to forage the country at will. Since therefore Minutius did not in many days issue forth of his camp, the Carthaginian sent out (as before) a great number of his men to fetch in harvest. This advantage Minutius wisely espied, and took: for he led forth his army, and, setting it in order, presented battle to Hannibal, that was not in case to accept it, even at his own trenches. His horse, and all his light armature, divided into many companies, he sent abroad against the foragers, who being dispersed over all the fields, and loaden with booty, could make no resistance. This angered Hannibal, that was not able to help them; but worse did it anger him, when the Romans took heart to assail his trenches. They perceived that it was mere weakness which held him within his camp, and therefore were bold to despise his great name, that could not resist their present strength. But in the heat of the business, Asdrubal came from Geryon with four thousand men, being informed of the danger by those that had escaped the Roman horse. This emboldened Hannibal to issue forth against the Romans, to whom nevertheless he did not such hurt as he had received.

For this piece of service Minutius was highly esteemed by the army, and more highly by the people at Rome, to whom he sent the news, with somewhat greater boast than truth. It seemed no small matter, that the Roman army had recovered spirit, so far forth that it dared to set upon Hannibal in his own camp, and that in so doing, it came off with the better. Every man therefore praised the master of the horse, that had wrought this great alteration, and consequently they grew as far out of liking with Fabius, and his timorous proceedings, thinking that he had not done any thing wisely in all his dictatorship, saving that he chose such a worthy lieutenant, whereas indeed in no other thing he had so greatly erred. But the dictator was not so joyful of a little good luck, as angry with the breach of discipline, and fearful of greater danger thereon likely to ensue. He said that he knew his own place, and what was

to be done; that he would teach the master of the horse to do so likewise, and make him give account of what he had done, if he were dictator: speaking it openly, That good success, issuing from bad counsel, was more to be feared than calamity; forasmuch as the one bred a foolish confidence, the other taught men to be wary. Against these sermons every one cried out, especially Metellus, a tribune of the people; which office warranted him to speak and do what he list, without fear of the dictator. "Is it not "enough," said he, "that this our only man, chosen to be "general and lord of the town, in our greatest necessity, "hath done no manner of good, but suffered all Italy to "be wasted before his eyes, to the utter shame of our state; "unless he also hinder others from doing better than him- "self can, or dares? it were good to consider what he means "by this. Into the place of C. Flaminius he hath not "chosen any new consul all this while; Servilius is sent "away to sea, I know not why; Hannibal and he have, "as it were, taken truce, Hannibal sparing the dictator's "grounds," (for Hannibal had indeed forborne to spoil some grounds of Fabius, that so he might bring him into envy and suspicion,) "and the dictator giving him leave to spoil "all others without impeachment. Surely his drift is even "this: he would have the war to last long, that he himself "might be long in office, and have the sole government "both of our city and armies. But this must not be so. "It were better that the commonalty of Rome, which gave "him this authority, should again take it from him, and "confer it upon one more worthy. But lest, in moving the "people hereto, I should seem to do him injury, thus far "forth I will regard his honour; I will only propound, "that the master of the horse may be joined in equal "authority with the dictator; a thing not more new, nor "less necessary, than was the electing of this dictator by "the people."

Though all men, even the senators, were ill persuaded of the course which Fabius had taken against Hannibal, as being neither plausible, nor seeming beneficial at the present, yet

was there none so injurious as to think that his general intent and care of the weal public was less than very honourable. Whereas therefore it was the manner in passing of any act, that some man of credit and authority, besides the propounder, should stand up and formally deliver his approbation, not one of the principal citizens was found so impudent as to offer that open disgrace, both unto a worthy personage, and therewithal unto that dignity, whose great power had freed the state at several times from the greatest dangers. Only C. Terentius Varro, who the year before had been pretor, was glad of such an opportunity to win the favour of the multitude. This fellow was the son of a butcher, afterwards became a shopkeeper, and being of a contentious spirit, grew, by often babblings, to take upon him as a pleader, dealing in poor men's causes. Thus by little and little he got into office, and rose by degrees, being advanced by those who in hatred of the nobility favoured his very baseness. And now he thought the time was come for him to give an hard push at the consulship, by doing that which none of the great men, fearing or favouring one another, either durst or would. So he made an hot invective, not only against Fabius, but against all the nobility, saying, that it grieved them to see the people do well, and take upon them what belonged unto them in matter of government; that they sought to humble the commons by poverty, and to impoverish them by war, especially by war at their own doors, which would soon consume every poor man's living, and find him other work to think upon than matter of state. Therefore he bade them to be wise, and since they had found one (this worthy master of the horse) that was better affected unto them and his country, to reward him according to his good deserts, and give him authority accordingly, as was propounded by the tribune, that so he might be encouraged and enabled to proceed as he had begun. So the act passed.

Before this busy day of contention, Fabius had despatched the election of a new consul, which was M. Attilius Regulus, in the room of C. Flaminius; and having finished all requi-

site business, went out of town, perceiving well, that he should not be able to withstand the multitude in hindering the decree. The news of Minutius's advancement was at the camp as soon as Fabius; so that his old lieutenant and new colleague began to treat with him as a companion, asking him at the first in what sort he thought it best to divide their authority; whether that one one day, and the other the next, or each of them successively, for some longer time, should command in chief. Fabius briefly told him, that it was the pleasure of the citizens to make the master of the horse equal to the dictator, but that he should never be his superior: he would therefore divide the legions with him by lot, according to the custom. Minutius was not herewith greatly pleased, for that with half of the army he could not work such wonders, as otherwise he hoped to accomplish. Nevertheless he meant to do his best, and so, taking his part of the army, encamped about a mile and an half from the dictator. Needful it was (though Livy seems to tax him for it) that he should so do. For where two several commanders are not subordinate one unto the other, nor joined in commission, but have each entire and absolute charge of his own followers, then are the forces (though belonging unto one prince or state) not one, but two distinct armies; in which regard one camp shall not hold them both without great inconvenience. Polybius neither finds fault with this disjunction, nor yet reports, that Fabius was unwilling to command in chief successively (as the two consuls used) with Minutius by turns. He saith, that Minutius was very refractory, and so proud of his advancement, that continually he opposed the dictator; who thereupon referred it to his choice, either to divide the forces between them, as is said before, or else to have command over all by course. This is likely to be true. For natures impatient of subjection, when once they have broken loose from the rigour of authority, love nothing more than to contest with it, as if herein consisted the proof and assurance of their liberty.

It behoved the master of the horse to make good the

opinion which had thus advanced him: therefore he was no less careful of getting occasion to fight, than was Fabius of avoiding the necessity. That which Minutius and Hannibal equally desired, could not long be wanting: the country lying between them was open and bare, yet as fit for ambush as could be wished, for that the sides of a naked valley adjoining had many and spacious caves, able, some one of them, to hide two or three hundred men. In these lurking-places Hannibal bestowed five hundred horse and five thousand foot, thrusting them so close together, that they could not be discovered. But lest by any misadventure they should be found out, and buried in their holes, he made offer betimes in the morning to seize upon a piece of ground that lay on the other hand, whereby he drew the eyes and thoughts of the Romans from their more needful care, to business little concerning them. Like unto this was the occasion, which not long before had provoked Minutius to adventure upon the Carthaginians. Hoping therefore to increase his honour, in like sort as he got it, he sent first his light armature, then his horse, and at length (seeing that Hannibal seconded his own troops with fresh companies) he followed in person with the legions. He was soon caught, and so hotly charged on all sides, that he knew neither how to make resistance nor any safe retreat. In this dangerous case, whilst the Romans defended themselves, losing many, and those of their best men, Fabius drew near, in very good order, to relieve them. For this old captain, perceiving afar off into what extremity his new colleague had rashly thrown himself and his followers, did the office of a good citizen, and, regarding more the benefit of his country than the disgrace which he had wrongfully sustained, sought rather to approve himself by hasting to do good, than by suffering his enemy to feel the reward of doing ill. Upon Fabius's approach Hannibal retired, fearing to be well wetted with a shower from the cloud (as he termed the dictator) that had hung so long on the hill-tops. Minutius forthwith submitted himself to Fabius, by whose benefit he confessed his life to have been saved. So from this time forwards

the war proceeded coldly, as the dictator would have it, both whilst his office lasted, which was not long, and likewise afterwards, when he delivered up his charge unto the consuls that followed his instructions.

Servilius the consul had pursued in vain a Carthaginian fleet, to which he came never within kenning. He ran along all the coast of Italy, took hostages of the Sardinians and Corsicans, passed over into Afric, and there, negligently falling to spoil the country, was shamefully beaten aboard his ships, with the loss of a thousand men. Weighing anchor therefore in all haste, he returned home by Sicily, and (being so required by the dictator's letters) repaired to the camp with his fellow-consul, where they took charge of the army.

SECT. VII.

The Roman people, desirous to finish the war quickly, choose a rash and unworthy consul. Great forces levied against Hannibal. Hannibal taketh the Romans' provisions in the castle of Cannæ. The new consuls set forth against Hannibal.

WITH little pleasure did they of the poorer sort in Rome hear the great commendations that were given to Fabius by the principal citizens. He had indeed preserved them from receiving a great overthrow; but he had neither finished the war, nor done any thing in appearance thereto tending. Rather it might seem, that the reputation of this his one worthy act was likely to countenance the slow proceedings, or perhaps the cowardice (if it were no worse) of those that followed him, in protracting the work to a great length. Else, what meant the consuls to sit idle the whole winter, contrary to all former custom, since it was never heard before, that any Roman general had willingly suffered the time of his command to run away without any performance, as if it were honourable to do just nothing? Thus they suspected they knew not what, and were ready every man to discharge the grief and anger of his own private loss upon the ill administration of the public.

This affection of the people was very helpful to C. Terentius Varro in his suit for the consulship. It behoved

him to strike whilst the iron was hot; his own worth being little or none, and his credit over-weak, to make way into that high dignity. But the commonalty were then in such a mood, as abundantly supplied all his defects. Wherein to help, he had a kinsman, Bibius Herennius, then tribune of the people, who spared not to use the liberty of his place, in saying what he listed, without all regard of truth or modesty. This bold orator stuck not to affirm, that Hannibal was drawn into Italy, and suffered therein to range at his pleasure by the noblemen; that Minutius indeed, with his two legions, was likely to have been overthrown, and was rescued by Fabius with the other two; but had all been joined together, what they might have done it was apparent by the victory of Minutius, when he commanded over all as master of the horse; that without a plebeian consul the war would never be brought to an end; that such of the plebeians as had long since been advanced to honour by the people, were grown as proud as the old nobility, and contemned the meaner sort, ever since themselves were freed from contempt of the more mighty; that therefore it was needful to choose a consul who should be altogether a plebeian, a mere new man, one that could boast of nothing but the people's love, nor could wish more, than to keep it by well deserving of them. By such persuasions the multitude was won to be wholly for Terentius, to the great vexation of the nobles, who could not endure to see a man raised for none other virtue, than his detracting from their honour, and therefore opposed him with all their might. To hinder the desire of the people, it fell out, or at least was alleged, that neither of the two present consuls could well be spared from attending upon Hannibal to hold the election. Wherefore a dictator was named for that purpose; and he again deposed, either (as was pretended) for some religious impediment, or because the fathers desired an interregnum, wherein they might better hope to prevail in choice of the new consuls. This interregnum took name and being in Rome at the death of Romulus, and was in use at the death of other kings. The order of it was this:

All the fathers, or senators, who at the first were an hundred, parted themselves into tens, or decuries, and governed successively by the space of five days, one decury after another in order; yet so, that the lictors, or virgers, carrying the fasces, or bundles of rods and axes, waited only upon the chief of them with these ensigns of power. This custom was retained in times of the consuls, and put in use when by death, or any casualty, there wanted ordinary magistrates of the old year, to substitute new for the year following. The advantage of the fathers herein was, that if the election were not like to go as they would have it, there needed no more than to let slip five days, and then was all to begin anew; by which interruption the heat of the multitude was commonly well assuaged. Upon such change of those that were presidents of the election, it was also lawful unto new petitioners to sue for the magistracies that lay void; which otherwise was not allowed, but a time limited, wherein they should publicly declare themselves to seek those offices. But no device would serve against the general favour borne unto Terentius. One interregnum passed over, and the malice of the fathers against the virtue (as it was believed) of this mean, but worthy man, seemed so manifest, that when the people had urged the business to despatch, only Terentius was chosen consul; in whose hand it was left to hold the election of his colleague. Hereupon all the former petitioners gave over. For whereas men of ordinary mark had stood for the place before, it was now thought meet, that, both to supply the defect, and to bridle the violence of this unexpert and hotheaded man, one of great sufficiency and reputation should be joined with him, as both companion and opposite. So L. Æmilius Paulus, he who few years since had overcome the Illyrians, and chased Demetrius Pharius out of his kingdom, was urged by the nobility to stand for the place, which he easily obtained, having no competitor. It was not the desire of this honourable man to trouble himself any more in such great business of the commonwealth. For, notwithstanding his late good service, he, and M. Livius, that had been his com-

panion in office, were afterwards injuriously vexed by the people, and called unto judgment; wherein Livius was condemned, and Æmilius hardly escaped. But of this injustice they shall put the Romans well in mind, each of them in his second consulship, wherein they shall honourably approve their worth, the one of them nobly dying in the most grievous loss, the other bravely winning, in the most happy victory that ever befell that commonwealth.

These new consuls, Varro and Paulus, omitted no part of their diligence in preparing for the war; wherein, though Varro made the greater noise, by telling what wonders he would work, and that he would ask no more than once to have a sight of Hannibal, whom he promised to vanquish the very first day; yet the providence and care of Paulus travailed more earnestly toward the accomplishment of that whereof his fellow vainly boasted. He wrote unto the two old consuls, Servilius and Attilius, desiring them to abstain from hazard of the main chance, but nevertheless to ply the Carthaginians with daily skirmish, and weaken them by degrees; that when he and his colleague should take the field with the great army which they were now levying, they might find the four old legions well accustomed to the enemy, and the enemy well weakened to their hands. He was also very strict in his musters, wherein the whole senate assisted him so carefully, as if in this action they meant to refute the slanders with which Terentius and his adherents had burdened them. What number of men they raised it is uncertain: fourscore thousand foot, at the least, and six thousand horse, they were strong in the field, when the day came which Varro had so greatly desired of looking upon Hannibal.

Hiero, the old king of Syracuse, as he had relieved the Carthaginians when they were distressed by their own mercenaries, so did he now send help to Rome, a thousand archers and slingers, with great quantity of wheat, barley, and other provisions; fearing nothing more than that one of these two mighty cities should destroy the other, whereby his own estate would fall to ruin, that stood upright by

having them somewhat evenly balanced. He gave them also counsel to send forces into Africa, if perhaps by that means they might divert the war from home. His gifts and good advice were lovingly accepted, and instructions were given to Titus Octacilius the pretor, which was to go into Sicily, that he should accordingly pass over into Afric, if he found it expedient.

The great levies which the Romans made at this time do much more serve to declare their puissance than any, though larger, account by poll, of such as were not easily drawn into the field, and fitted for service. For besides these armies of the consuls, and that which went into Sicily, twenty-five thousand with L. Posthumius Albinus, another of the pretors, went against the Gauls, to reclaim that province which the passage of Hannibal through it had taken from them. The contemplation of this their present strength might well embolden them to do as they did. They sent ambassadors to Philip the son of Demetrius, king of Macedon, requiring him to deliver into their hands Demetrius Pharius; who, having been their subject and rebel, was fled into his kingdom. They also sent to the Illyrians to demand their tribute, whereof the day of payment was already past. What answer they received, it is not known; only this is known, that Demetrius Pharius was not sent unto them, and that Philip henceforth began to have an eye upon them little to their good. As for the Illyrian money, by the shifts that they were driven soon after to make, it will appear, that the one half of it (how little soever) would have been welcome to Rome, and accepted without any cavil about forfeiture for nonpayment of the whole.

Whilst the city was busied in these cares, the old consuls lay as near unto Hannibal as possibly they could, without incurring the necessity of a battle. Many skirmishes they had with him, wherein their success, for the most part, was rather good than great. Yet one mischance not only blemished the honour of their other services, but was indeed the occasion to draw on the misery following. Hannibal,

for the most part of that time, made his abode at Geryon, where lay all his store for the winter. The Romans, to be near him, lodged about Cannusium, and, that they might not be driven to turn aside for all necessaries, to the loss of good opportunities, they bestowed much of their provisions in the castle of Cannæ, for the town was razed the year before. This place Hannibal won, and thereby not only furnished himself, but compelled his enemies to want many needful things, unless they would be troubled with far carriage. Besides this, and more to his advantage, he enabled himself to abide in that open country, fit for the service of his horse, longer than the Romans, having so many mouths to feed, could well endure to tarry, without offering battle, which he most desired. Of this mishap when Servilius had informed the senate, letting them understand how this piece, taken by Hanibal, would serve him to command no small part of the country adjacent, it then seemed needful, even unto the fathers themselves, to adventure a battle with the Carthaginian, rather than suffer him thus to take root in the ground of Italy. Nevertheless, answer was returned unto Servilius, that he should have patience yet a while, for that the consuls would shortly be there, with a power sufficient to do as need required.

When all things were ready in the city, and the season of the year commodious to take the field, the two consuls, with their army, set forth against Hannibal. This was always done with great solemnity, especially whensoever they went forth to war against any noble or redoubted enemy. For sacrifices and solemn vows were made unto Jupiter, and the rest of their gods, for good success and victory; which being performed, the generals, in warlike attire, with an honourable train of the principal men, not only such as were of their kindred and alliance, or followed them to the war as voluntaries for love, but a great number of others that meant to abide at home, were accompanied on their way, and dismissed with friendly leave-taking and good wishes. At this time all the fathers and the whole nobility waited upon Æmilius Paulus, as the only man whom they

thought either worthy of this honour, or likely to do his country remarkable service. Terentius's attendants were the whole multitude of the poorer citizens, a troop no less in greatness than the other was in dignity. At the parting, Fabius the late dictator is said to have exhorted the consul Paulus, with many grave words, to shew his magnanimity, not only in dealing with the Carthaginians, but (which he thought harder) in bridling the outrageous folly of his fellow-consul. The answer of Paulus was, That he meant not again to run into danger of condemnation by offending the multitude; that he would do his best for his country; but if he saw his best were likely to be ill taken, he would think it less rashness to adventure upon the enemy's sword, than upon the malice of his own citizens.

SECT. VIII.

Dissension between the two Roman consuls. Whether it be likely that Hannibal was upon point of flying out of Italy, when the Romans pressed him to fight. The great battle of Cannæ.

THESE new generals arriving at the camp, dismissed M. Attilius, one of the last year's consuls, requesting it, because of his age and weakness; Servilius they retained with them as their assistant. The first thing that Æmilius thought necessary was to hearten his soldiers with good words, who, out of their bad success hitherto, had gathered more cause of fear than of courage. He willed them to consider, not only now, their victories in times past against the Carthaginians, and other more warlike nations than were the Carthaginians, but even their own great numbers, which were no less than all that Rome at the present was able to set forth. He told them in what danger their country stood, how the state and safety thereof rested upon their hands; using some such other common matter of persuasion. But the most effectual part of his oration was, that Hannibal, with this his terrible army, had not yet obtained one victory by plain force and valour; but that only by deceit and ambush he had stolen the honour which he had gotten at Trebia and Thrasymene. Herewithal he

taxed the inconsiderate rashness of Sempronius and Flaminius, of whom the one saw not his enemies until he was surrounded by them, the other scarce saw them when they struck off his head, by reason of the thick mist, through the darkness whereof he went groping (as it were blindfold) into their snares. Finally, declaring what advantages they had against the enemy, and how destitute the enemy was of those helps by which he had hitherto prevailed against them, he exhorted them to play the men, and do their best. They were easily persuaded; for the contemplation of their own multitude, and confidence of the Roman virtue in matter of arms, gave them cause to think, that under a captain so well experienced, and every way sufficient, as Æmilius was known to be, they should easily prevail against the Carthaginians, that came far short of them in all things else, save craft, which would not always thrive. But in one thing they mistook the meaning of their general: it was his desire that they should have heart to fight, not that they should lose the patience of awaiting a convenient season. But they, having preconceived a victory, thought all delays to be impediments, and thereby sought to rob themselves of their best help, which was, good conduct. They remembered what talk they had heard at Rome, and were themselves affected with the vulgar desire of ending the war quickly, wherein since Æmilius had acknowledged, that the advantage was theirs, why did he make them forbear to use it? Thus thought the common soldier, and thus also thought the consul Terentius, who was no less popular in the camp than he had been in the city. Expectation is always tedious, and never more than when the event is of most importance. All men longed, both at Rome and in the army, to be freed from the doubtful passions of hope and fear; therefore Terentius, who hastened their desire to effect, was likely to win more thanks than should his colleague, though greater in the performance.

Thus, while the Romans think themselves to have the better of their enemies, they fall into an inconvenience, than which few are more dangerous; dissension of their

chief commanders. Varro would fight; Æmilius would so too, but said that it was not yet time; why? because the enemy must shortly dislodge, and remove hence into places less fit for his horse. But shall the Romans wait till Hannibal, having eaten up his last year's provisions, return into Campania to gather a second harvest? This would, said Varro, savour too much of Q. Fabius; and your haste, said Paulus, doth savour no less of C. Flaminius. Their deeds were like their words; for they commanded by turns interchangeably every day. Æmilius lodged six miles from Hannibal, where the ground was somewhat uneven. Thither if the Carthaginians would take pains to come, he doubted not to send them away in such haste, as they should not leave running till they were out of Italy. But they came not. Terentius therefore the next day descended into the plains, his colleague holding him, and beseeching him to stay. Nevertheless he sat down close by Hannibal; who, as an unbidden guest, gave him but a rude welcome and entertainment. The Carthaginian horse and light armature fell upon the Roman vancouriers, and put the whole army in tumult whilst it was yet in march; but they were beaten off, not without loss, for that the Romans had, among their velites, some troops weightily armed, whereas the Carthaginians had none. The day following, Æmilius, who could not handsomely withdraw the army out of that level ground, encamped upon the river Aufidus, sending a third part of his forces over the water, to lie upon the eastern bank, where they entrenched themselves. He never was more unwilling to fight than at this present, because the ground served wholly for the advantage of his enemy; with whom he meant to deal when occasion should draw him to more equal terms. Therefore he stirred not out of his trenches, but fortified himself; expecting when Hannibal should dislodge, and remove towards Geryon, Cannæ, or some other place where his store lay, for want of necessaries; whereof an army, foraging the country, was not likely to carry about with it sufficient quantity for any long time.

Here it should not be passed over with silence, that Livy differeth much in his relation from Polybius; telling many strange tales of the misery into which Hannibal had been driven, and of base courses that he devised to take, if the Romans could have retained their patience a little longer. He had, saith Livy, but ten days' provision of meat: he had not money to pay his soldiers. They were an unruly rabble, gathered out of several nations, so that he knew not how to keep them in order; but that from murmuring they fell to flat exclamations, first about their pay and provand, and afterwards for very famine. Especially the Spaniards were ready to forsake him, and run over to the Roman side. Yea Hannibal himself was once upon the point to have stolen away into Gaul with all his horse, and left his foot unto their miserable destinies. At length, for lack of all other counsel, he resolved to get him as far as he could from the Romans, into the southernmost parts of Apulia; to the end, that both his unfaithful soldiers might find the more difficulty in running from him, and that his hunger might be relieved with the more early harvest. But whilst he was about to put this device in execution, the Romans pressed him so hard, that they even forced him unto that which he most desired, even to fight a battle upon open champaign ground, wherein he was victorious. It was not uncommendable in Livy, to speak the best of his own citizens; and where they did ill, to say, that, without their own great folly, they had done passing well. Further also he may be excused, as writing only by report. For thus he saith, [1] *Hannibal de fuga in Galliam* [*dicitur*] *agitasse*; "Hanni-"bal [is said] to have bethought himself of flying into "Gaul:" where he makes it no more than a matter of hearsay; as perhaps was all the rest of this relation. As for the process itself, it is very incredible. For if Hannibal, coming out of Gaul through the marshes and bogs of Hetruria, could find victuals enough, and all things needful unto his army, the summer foregoing; what should hinder

[1] Liv. l. 22.

him to do the like this year, especially seeing he had played the careful husband in making a great harvest, since he had long been master of the open field; and besides, had gotten, by surprise, no small part of the Romans' provisions? Suitable hereunto is all the rest. If Hannibal had taken nothing but corn and cattle, his soldiers might perhaps have fallen into mutiny for pay. But he brought gold with him into Italy; and had so well increased his stock since he came into that country, that he had armed his African soldiers all Roman-like, and loaden his followers with spoil; having left wherewith to redeem as many of his own as were taken by the enemy; when the Romans were not willing, as finding it not easy, to do the like. In this point, therefore, we are to attend the general agreement of historians; who give it as a principal commendation unto Hannibal, that he always kept his army free from sedition, though it were composed of sundry nations; no less different in manners, religion, and almost in nature, than they were in languages: and well might he so do, having not only pronounced, that which of his men soever fought bravely with an enemy, was thereby a Carthaginian; but solemnly protested, and swore, (besides other rewards,) to make as many of them, as should deserve and seek it, free citizens of Carthage. The running away into Gaul was a senseless device: Hannibal, being there with his whole army, took so little pleasure in the country and people, that he made all haste to get him out of it. And what should he now do there with his horse? or how could he be trusted, either there or elsewhere? yea, how could he desire to live, having betrayed all his army, and relinquished his miserable foot to the butchery of their enemies? This tale therefore Plutarch omitteth; who, in writing the Life of Hannibal, takes in a manner all his directions from Livy. But of this and the like, it is enough to say, that all historians love to extol their own countrymen; and where a loss cannot be dissembled, nor the honour of the victory taken from the enemy, and given unto blind fortune, there to lay all the blame on

some strange misgovernment of their own forces; as if they might easily have won all, but lost all through such folly, as no enemy can hope to find in them another time.

Now let us return back to the two armies, where they lay encamped on the river Aufidus. Varro was persuaded, that it concerned him in honour to make good his word unto the people of Rome; and since he had thus long waited in vain to get the consent of Paulus, now at length to use his own authority; and, without any more disputing of the matter, to fight when his own day came. When therefore it was his turn to command, at the first break of day he began to pass the river, without staying to bid his colleague good-morrow. But Paulus came to him, and sought, as in former times, to have dissuaded him from putting the estate of his country to a needless hazard. Against whose words and substantial arguments, Terentius could allege none other than point of honour. Hannibal had presented them battle at their trenches; should they endure this bravado? he had sent his Numidians over the river but even the day before, who fell upon the Romans that were fetching water to the lesser camp; and drave them shamefully to run within their defences, which also they made offer to assail; must this also be suffered? he would not endure it, for it could not but weaken the spirit of the Roman soldier, which as yet was lively, and full of such courage as promised assured victory. When Æmilius perceived that he could not hinder the obstinate resolution of his companion, he took all care, that what he saw must be done might be done well. Ten thousand Roman foot he caused to be left behind in the greater camp, opposite unto the Carthaginian; to the intent, that either Hannibal might be compelled to leave behind him some answerable number for defence of his trenches, (which out of his paucity he was less able to spare from the battle than were the Romans,) or that these ten thousand, falling upon the Carthaginian camp when the fight began, and taking it with all the wealth therein, might thereby (as commonly do such accidents) terrify and distract the enemies in the heat of fight. This done, the two

consuls went over the water with their army to the lesser camp, whence also they drew forth their men, and ranged them in order of battle; the ground on the east part of the river seeming perhaps more fit for marshalling of their army. Hannibal was glad of this, as he had great cause; and without any delay passed likewise over, somewhat higher up the stream, which ran from the south; leaving in his own camp so many as he thought would serve to defend it, and no more. To encourage his men, he bade them look about them, and view the ground well upon which they were to fight. They did so: "And could you," said he, "pray for "any greater fortune, than to join battle with the Romans "upon such a level ground, where the stronger in horse are "sure to prevail?" they all assented to him, and shewed by their countenances that they were very glad of it. "Well "then," said he further, "ye are first of all to thank the "gods that have brought them hither; and then us, that have "trained them along, and drawn them into necessity of "playing for their lives, where they are sure to lose them. "As for these Romans, I was fain to encourage you against "them, when ye met them first; but now ye may even en- "courage yourselves, by calling to mind that they are the "men whom ye have as often beaten as seen. Of one thing "only I will put you in mind, That whereas hitherto you "fought for other respects, as, to drive them before you "out of Gaul, and to win the open country and fields of "Italy, both of which ye have obtained; now are ye to "fight for the towns themselves, and all the riches within "them, which this victory shall make yours. Therefore "play the stout soldiers, and, ere many hours pass, ye shall "be lords of all that the Romans hold."

When he had said this, his brother Mago came to him, whom he had sent to view the countenance of the enemy. Hannibal asked him, What news; and what work they were likely to have with these Romans? "Work enough," answered Mago, "for they are an horrible many." "As hor- "rible a many as they are," thus Hannibal replied, "I tell "thee, brother, that among them all, search them never so

"diligently, thou shalt not find one man whose name is "Mago." With that he fell a laughing, and so did all that stood about him; which gladded the soldiers, who thought their general would not be so merry without great assurance. Whether it were so, that Hannibal, in the pride of his victories already gotten, valued one Mago above many thousand Romans; or whether he intimated, that the Romans were no less troubled with thinking upon Mago and his companions, than was Mago with beholding their huge multitude; or whether he meant only to correct the sad mood of his brother with a jest, and shew himself merry unto the soldiers; this his answer was more manly, than was the relation of his discoverer. But if Hannibal himself had been sent forth by Mago to view the Romans, he could not have returned with a more gallant report in his mouth, than that which captain Gam, before the battle of Agincourt, made unto our king Henry the Fifth; saying, that of the Frenchmen there were enough to be killed, enough to be taken prisoners, and enough to run away. Even such words as these, or such pleasant jests as this of Hannibal, are not without their moment; but serve many times, when battle is at hand, to work upon such passions as must govern more of the business, especially where other needful care is not wanting; without which they are but vain boasts.

In this great day the Carthaginian excelled himself, expressing no less perfection of his military skill, than was greatness in his spirit and undertakings. For, to omit the commodiousness of the place, into which he had long before conceived the means to draw his enemies to battle, he marshalled his army in such convenient order, that all hands were brought to fight where every one might do best service. His darters and slingers of the Baleares, he sent off before him, to encounter with the Roman velites. These were loose troops, answerable in a manner to those which we call now by a French name *enfans perdus*; but when we used our own terms, *the forlorn hope*. The gross of his army following them he ordered thus: his Africans, armed after the Roman manner, with the spoils which they had

gotten at Trebia, Thrasymene, or elsewhere, and well trained in the use of those weapons, that were of more advantage than those wherewith they had formerly served, made the two wings, very deep in file. Between these he ranged his Gauls and Spaniards, armed each after their own country manner; their shields alike, but the Gauls using long broadswords, that were forcible in a downright stroke; the Spaniards, short and well-pointed blades, either to strike or thrust; the Gauls, naked from their navel upwards, as confident in their own fierceness; the Spaniards wearing white cassocks embroidered with purple. This medley of two nations, differing as well in habit and furniture as in quality, made a gallant show; and terrible, because strange. The Gauls were strong of body, and furious in giving charge; but soon wearied, as accustomed to spend their violence at the first brunt, which disposition all that come of them have inherited to this day. The Spaniards were less eager, but more wary; neither ashamed to give ground when they were overpressed, nor afraid to return, and renew the fight upon any small encouragement. As the roughness of the one and the patience of the other served mutually to reduce each of them to a good and firm temper, so the place which they held in this battle added confidence jointly unto them both. For they saw themselves well and strongly flanked with Carthaginians and other Africans, whose name was grown terrible in Spain by their conquests, and in Gaul by this their present war. Since therefore it could not be feared that any great calamity should fall upon them whilst the wings on either side stood fast, these barbarians had no cause to shrink, or forbear to employ the utmost of their hardiness, as knowing that the enemy could not press far upon them, without further engaging himself than discretion would allow. Hereunto may be added that great advantage which the Carthaginian had in horse, by which he was able, if the worst had happened, to make a good retreat. The effect of contraries is many times alike. Desperation begetteth courage; but not greater, nor so lively, as doth assured confi-

dence. Hannibal therefore caused these Gauls and Spaniards to advance; leaving void the place wherein they had stood, and into which they might fall back when they should be overhardly pressed. So casting them into the form of a crescent, he made them as it were his vanguard: the two points of this great half-moon, that looked toward the empty space from which he had drawn it, being narrow and thin, as serving only to guide it orderly back, when need should require; the foremost part of the ring, swelling out toward the enemy's, being well strengthened and thickened against all impression. The circle hereof seemeth to have been so great, that it shadowed the Africans who stood behind it: though such figures, cut in brass, as I have seen of this battle, present it more narrow; with little reason, as shall anon appear; as also in the same figures it is omitted, that any companies of Africans, or others, were left in the rear to second the Gauls and Spaniards, when they were driven to retreat; though it be manifest, that Hannibal in person stood between the last ranks of his long battalions, and in the head of his rear, doubtless well accompanied with the choice of his own nation. Between the left battalion and the river Aufidus were the Gauls and Spanish horse, under the command of Asdrubal; on the right wing, toward the wide plains, was Hanno, (Livy saith Maharbal,) with the Numidian light-horse. Hannibal himself, with his brother Mago, had the leading of the rear. The whole sum of Hannibal's army in the field this day was ten thousand horse and forty thousand foot; his enemies having two to one against him in foot, and he five to three against them in horse.

The Roman army was marshalled in the usual form, but somewhat more narrow and deep than was accustomed; perhaps, because this had been found convenient against the Carthaginians in the former war. It was indeed no bad way of resistance against elephants, to make the ranks thick and short, but the files long; as also to strengthen well the rear, that it might stand fast compacted as a wall, under shelter whereof the disordered troops might rally

themselves. Thus much it seems that Terentius had learned of some old soldiers; and therefore he now ordered his battles accordingly, as meaning to shew more skill than was in his understanding. But the Carthaginians had here no elephants with them in the field; their advantage was in horse; against which, this manner of embattling was very unprofitable, forasmuch as their charge is better sustained in front than upon a long flank. As for Æmilius, it was not his day of command; he was but an assistant; and in such cases it happens often, that wise men yield for very weariness unto the more contentious. Upon the right hand, and toward the river, were the Roman horsemen, under the consul Paulus; on the left wing was C. Terentius Varro, the other consul, with the rest of the horse, which were of the Latins and other associates: Cn. Servilius, the former year's consul, had the leading of the battle. The sun was newly risen, and offended neither part; the Carthaginians having their faces northward, the Romans toward the south.

After some light skirmish between the Roman velites and Hannibal's darters and slingers of the Baleares, Asdrubal brake upon the consul Paulus, and was roughly encountered, not after the manner of service on horseback used in those times, wheeling about Alman-like, but each giving on in a right line, pouldron to pouldron, as having the river on the one hand, and the shoulder of the foot on the other hand; so that there was no way left but to pierce and break through. Wherefore they not only used their lances and swords, but rushing violently amongst the enemies, grasped one another; and so, their horses running from under them, fell many to the ground; where starting up again, they began to deal blows like footmen. In conclusion, the Roman horse were overborne, and driven by plain force to a staggering recoil. This the consul Paulus could not remedy. For Asdrubal, with his boisterous Gauls and Spaniards, was not to be resisted by these Roman gentlemen, unequal both in number and in horsemanship. When the battles came to joining, the Roman legionaries

found work enough, and somewhat more than enough, to break that great crescent, upon which they first fell; so strongly for the while did the Gauls and Spanish foot make resistance. Wherefore the two points of their battle drew towards the midst, by whose aid these opposites were forced to disband, and fly back to their first place. This they did in great haste and fear; and were with no less haste and folly pursued. Upon the Africans that stood behind them, they needed not to fall foul; both for that there was void room enough, and forasmuch as the rear, or horns of this moon, pointed into the safe retreat where Hannibal with his Carthaginians was ready to reinforce them when time should require. In this hasty retreat, or flight, of the Gauls and Spaniards, it happened, as was necessary, that they who had stood in the limb, or utter compass of the half-moon, made the innermost or concave surface thereof, (disordered and broken though it were,) when it was forced to turn the inside outward; the horns or points thereof, as yet, untouched, only turning round and recoiling very little. So the Romans, in pursuing them, were enclosed in an half circle, which they should not have needed greatly to regard, (for that the sides of it were exceeding thin and broken, and the bottom of it none other than a throng of men routed, and seeming unable to make resistance,) had all the enemy's foot been cast into this one great body, that was in a manner dissolved. But whilst the legions, following their supposed victory, rushed on upon those that stood before them, and thereby unwittingly engaged themselves deeply within the principal strength of the enemies, hedging them in on both hands; the two African battalions on either side advanced so far, that, getting beyond the rear of them, they enclosed them, in a manner, behind; and forward they could not pass far, without removing Hannibal and Mago, which made that way the least easy. Hereby it is apparent, that the great crescent, before spoken of, was of such extent as covered the Africans, who lay behind it undiscovered until now. [u] For it is agreed, that the Romans

[u] Plut. in Vit. Hannib.

were thus empaled unawares; and that they behaved themselves as men that thought upon no other work than what was found them by the Gauls. Neither is it credible, that they would have been so mad as to run headlong, with the whole bulk of their army, into the throat of slaughter, had they seen those weapons bent against them at the first, which, when they did see, they had little hope to escape. Much might be imputed to their heat of fight, and rashness of inferior captains; but since the consul Paulus, a man so expert in war, being vanquished in horse, had put himself among the legions, it cannot be supposed that he and they did wilfully thus engage themselves. Asdrubal, having broken the troops of Roman horse that were led by the consul Paulus, followed upon them along the river side, beating down and killing as many as he could, (which were almost all of them,) without regard of taking prisoners. The consul himself was either driven upon his own legions, or willingly did cast himself among them, as hoping by them to make good the day, notwithstanding the defeat of his horse. But he failed of this his expectation: nevertheless he cheered up his men as well as he could, both with comfortable words, and with the example of his own stout behaviour; beating down and killing many of the enemies with his own hand. The like did Hannibal among his Carthaginians, in the same part of the battle, and with better success. For the consul received a blow from a sling that did him great hurt; and though a troop of Roman gentlemen, riding about him, did their best to save him from further harm; yet was he so hardly laid at, that he was compelled, by wounds and weakness, to forsake his horse. Hereupon all his company alighted, thinking that the consul had given order so to do; as in many battles the Roman men at arms had left their horses to help their foot in distress. When Hannibal (for he was near at hand) perceived this, and understood that the consul had willed his horsemen to dismount, he was very glad of it, and pleasantly said, "I had rather he would have delivered them "unto me bound hand and foot;" meaning, that he had

them now almost as safe as if they were so bound. All this while C. Terentius Varro, with the horse of the associates in the left wing, was marvellously troubled by Hanno (or Maharbal) and the Numidians; who, beating up and down about that great sandy plain, raised a foul dust; which a strong south wind, blowing there accustomarily, drove into the eyes and mouths of the Romans. These, using their advantage both of number and of lightness, wearied the consul and his followers exceedingly; neither giving nor sustaining any charge, but continually making offers and wheeling about. Yet at the first they seemed to promise him an happy day of it. For when the battles were even ready to join, five hundred of these Numidians came pricking away from their fellows, with their shields cast behind their backs, (as was the manner of those which yielded,) and, throwing down their arms, rendered themselves. This was good luck to begin withal, if there had been good meaning. Varro had not leisure to examine them; but caused them, unweaponed as they were, to get them behind the army, where he bade them rest quietly till all was done. These crafty adventurers did as he bade them for a while, till they found opportunity to put in execution the purpose for which they had thus yielded. Under their jackets they had short swords and poniards; besides which, they found other scattered weapons about the field, of such as were slain, and therewithal flew upon the hindmost of the Romans, whilst all eyes and thoughts were bent another way; so that they did great mischief, and raised yet a greater terror. Thus Hannibal, in a plain level ground, found means to lay an ambush at the back of his enemies. The last blow, that ended all fight and resistance, was given by the same hand which gave the first. Asdrubal, having in short space broken the Roman troops of horse, and cut in pieces all, save the company of Æmilius, that rushed into the gross of his foot, and a very few besides, that recovered some narrow passage, between the river and their own battalions, did not stay to charge upon the face of the legions, but fell back behind the rear of his own, and fetching about, came

up to the Numidians; with whom he joined, and gave upon Terentius. This fearful cloud, as it shewed at the first appearance what weather it had left behind it on the other side; so did it prognosticate a dismal storm unto those upon whom it was ready now to fall. Wherefore Terentius's followers, having wearied themselves much in doing little, and seeing more work toward than they could hope to sustain, thought it the best way to avoid the danger by present flight. The consul was no less wise than they, in apprehending the greatness of his own peril; nor more desperate in striving to work impossibilities; it being impossible, when so many shrank from him, to sustain the impression alone, which he could not have endured with their assistance. Now he found that it was one thing to talk of Hannibal at Rome, and another to encounter him. But of this, or of ought else, excepting hasty flight, his present leisure would not serve him to consider. Close at the heels of him and his flying troops followed the light Numidians; appointed by Asdrubal unto the pursuit, as fittest for that service. Asdrubal himself, with the Gauls and Spanish horse, compassing about, fell upon the backs of the Romans, that were ere this hardly distressed, and in a manner surrounded on all parts else. He brake them easily; who before made ill resistance, being enclosed and laid at on every side, not knowing which way to turn. Here began a pitiful slaughter; the vanquished multitude thronging up and down they knew not whither or which way, whilst every one sought to avoid those enemies whom he saw nearest. Some of the Roman gentlemen that were about Æmilius got up to horse, and saved themselves; which though it is hardly understood how they could do, yet I will rather believe it, than suppose that Livy so reporteth, to grace thereby his history with this following tale: "Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, galloping along by a place "where he saw the consul sitting all bloodied upon a stone, "entreated him to rise and save himself, offering him his "assistance and horse. But Paulus refused it, willing Len-"tulus to shift for himself, and not to lose time; saying,

" that it was not his purpose to be brought again into " judgment by the people, either as an accuser of his col- " league, or as guilty himself of that day's loss. Further, he " willed Lentulus to commend him to the senate, and in " particular to Fabius; willing them to fortify Rome as " fast and well as they could; and telling Fabius, that he " lived and died mindful of his wholesome counsel." These words, (peradventure,) or some to like purpose, the consul uttered to Lentulus, either when against his will he was drawn to that battle, or when he beheld the first defeat of his horse; at what time he put himself in the head of his legions. For I doubt not but Hannibal knew what he said a good while before this; when he thought the consul and his troop in little better case than if they had been bound. The whole gross of the Romans was enclosed indeed as within a sack; whereof the African battalions made the sides; the Spaniards, Gauls, and Hannibal with his Carthaginians, the bottom; and Asdrubal with his horse closed up the mouth; in which part, they first of all were shuffled together, and began the rout, wherein all the rest followed. Æmilius therefore, who could not sit his horse, whilst the battle yet lasted, and whilst the spaces were somewhat open, by which he might have withdrawn himself, was now (had he never so well been mounted) unable to fly, having in his way so close a throng of his own miserable followers, and so many heaps of bodies as fell apace in that great carnage. It sufficeth unto his honour, that in the battle he fought no less valiantly than he had warily before both abstained himself, and dissuaded his fellow-consul from fighting at all. If, when the day was utterly lost, it had lain in his power to save his own life unto the good of his country, never more needing it, I should think, that he either too much disesteemed himself, or, being too faintly-minded, was weary of the world, and his unthankful citizens. But if such a resolution were praiseworthy in Æmilius, as proceeding out of Roman valour, then was the English virtue of the lord John Talbot, viscount Lisle, son to that famous earl of Shrewsbury, who died in the battle of Chastillon,

more highly to be honoured. For Æmilius was old, grievously, if not mortally wounded, and accountable for the overthrow received; Talbot was in the flower of his youth, unhurt, easily able to have escaped, and not answerable for that day's misfortune, when he refused to forsake his father; who foreseeing the loss of the battle, and not meaning to stain his actions past by flying in his old age, exhorted this his noble son to be gone, and leave him.

In this terrible overthrow died all the Roman foot, save two or three thousand, who (as Livy saith) escaped into the lesser camp; whence, the same night, about six hundred of them brake forth, and joining with such of those in the greater camp as were willing to try their fortune, conveyed themselves away ere morning, about four thousand foot and two hundred horse, partly in whole troops, partly dispersed, into Cannusium: the next day the Roman camps, both less and greater, were yielded unto Hannibal by those that remained in them. Polybius hath no mention of this escape; only he reports, that the ten thousand, whom Æmilius had left on the west side of Aufidus, (as was shewed before,) to set upon the camp of Hannibal, did as they were appointed; but ere they could effect their desire, which they had well-near done, the battle was lost; and Hannibal, coming over the water to them, drave them into their own camp; which they quickly yielded, having lost two thousand of their number. Like enough it is, that at the first sight of Hannibal, coming upon them with his victorious army, a great number of these did fly; and thereby escaped, whilst their fellows, making defence in vain, retired into their camp, and held the enemy busied. [x] For about two legions they were, (perhaps not half full, but made up by addition of others, whose fault or fortune was like,) that, having served at Cannæ, were afterwards extremely disgraced by the state of Rome, for that they had abandoned their companions fighting. Of the Roman horse what numbers escaped it is uncertain; but very few they were that saved themselves in the first charge by getting

[x] Liv. l. 19.

behind the river; and Terentius the consul recovered Venusia, with threescore and ten at the most in his company. That he was so ill attended, it is no marvel; for Venusia lay many miles off to the southward; so that his nearest way thither had been through the midst of Hannibal's army, if the passage had been open. Therefore it must needs be, that when once he got out of sight, he turned up some by-way, so disappointing the Numidians that hunted *contre*. Of such as could not hold pace with the consul, but took other ways, and were scattered over the fields, two thousand, or thereabouts, were gathered up by the Numidians, and made prisoners; the rest were slain, all save three hundred, who dispersed themselves in flight, as chance led them, and got into sundry towns. There died in this great battle of Cannæ, besides L. Æmilius Paulus the consul, two of the Roman questors or treasurers, and one and twenty colonels or tribunes of the soldiers, fourscore senators, or such as had borne office, out of which they were to be chosen into the senate. Many of these were of especial mark, as having been ædiles, pretors, or consuls; among whom was Cn. Servilius, the last year's consul, and Minutius, late master of the horse. The number of prisoners taken in this battle Livy makes no greater than three thousand foot and three hundred horse; too few to have defended, for the space of one half-hour, both the Roman camps, which yet the same Livy saith to have been overcowardly yielded up. We may therefore do better to give credit unto one of the prisoners, whom the same historian shortly after introduceth speaking in the senate, and saying that they were no less than eight thousand. It may therefore be, that these three thousand were only such as the enemy spared when the fury of execution was past; but to these must be added about five thousand more, who yielded in the greater camp when their company were either slain or fled. So the reckoning falls out right; which the Romans, especially the consul Varro, had before cast up (as we say) without their host; nothing so chargeable, as now they find it. On the side of Hannibal there died some four

thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horse, or thereabouts; a loss not sensible, in the joy of so great a victory; which if he had pursued, as Maharbal advised him, and forthwith marched away towards Rome, it is little doubted but that the war had presently been at an end. But he believed not so far in his own prosperity; and was therefore told, that "he knew "how to get, not how to use a victory."

SECT. IX.

Of things following the battle at Cannæ.

NOT without good cause doth Polybius reprehend those two historians, Fabius the Roman, and Philinus the Carthaginian; who regarding more the pleasure of them unto whose honour they consecrated their travails, than the truth of things, and information of posterity, magnified indifferently, whether good or bad, all actions and proceedings, the one of his Carthaginians, the other of his Roman quirites and fathers conscript. No man of sound judgment will condemn this liberty of censure which Polybius hath used. For to recompense his juniority, (such as it was,) he produceth substantial arguments to justify his own relation, and confuteth the vanity of those former authors, out of their own writings, by conference of places ill cohering: which pains it is to be suspected that he would not have taken, had he been born in either of these two cities, but have spared some part of his diligence, and been contented to have all men think better, and more honourably than it deserved of his own country. The like disease it is to be feared that we shall hereafter find in others; and shall have cause to wish, that either they were somewhat less Roman, or else that some works of their opposite writers were extant, that so we might at least hear both sides speak: being henceforth destitute of Polybius's help, that was a man indifferent. But since this cannot be, we must be sometimes bold to observe the coherence of things; and believe so much only to be true, as dependeth upon good reason, or (at least) fair probability. This attentive circumspection is

needful even at the present; such is the repugnancy, or forgetfulness, which we find in the best narration of things following the battle of Cannæ. For it is said, that four thousand foot and horse gathered together about the consul Terentius at Venusia; that others, to the number of ten thousand, got into Cannusium, choosing for their captains young P. Scipio and Ap. Claudius; yet that the consul Terentius Varro, joining his company unto those of Scipio at Cannusium, wrote unto the senate, that he had now well near ten thousand men about him; that these letters of the consul were brought to Rome, when the senate was newly risen, that had been taking order for pacifying those tumults in the city, which grew upon the first bruit of the overthrow; and yet, that ambassadors from Capua (after some consultation, whether it were meet to send any, or, without further circumstance, to side with Hannibal) were sent unto Terentius, and found him at Venusia, a pretty while before he wrote those letters, which overtook (in a manner) at Rome the first news of the overthrow. Among such incoherences, I hold it the best way to omit so much as hath not some particular connexion with matter ensuing; mutual dependency in things of this nature being no small argument of truth.

When Hannibal had sacked the Roman camp, and trussed up the spoils, forthwith he dislodged, and marched away into Samnium; finding a disposition in the Hirpines, and many other people thereabout, to forsake the Roman party, and make alliance with Carthage. The first town that opened the gates unto him was Cossa, where he laid up his baggage; and leaving his brother Mago to take in other places, he hasted into Campania. The general affection of the multitude, in all the cities of Italy, was inclinable unto him; not only in regard of their grievous losses sustained abroad in the fields, which the Romans themselves, who could not hinder him from spoiling the country, especially the poorer sort of them, did hardly endure; but in a loving respect unto that great courtesy (as it seemed) which he used unto such of them as became his prisoners.

For as at other times, so now also, after his great victory at Cannæ, he had lovingly dismissed as many of the Italian confederates of Rome as fell into his hands; rebuking them gently for being so obstinate against him that had sought to deliver them from bondage. Neither spared he to win their love with gifts; pretending to admire their valour, but seeking indeed, by all ways and means, to make them his, whilst all other motives were concurrent. At this time also he began to deal kindly (though against his nature) with his Roman prisoners; telling them, that he bore no mortal hatred unto their estate, but, being provoked by injuries, sought to right himself and his country; and fought with them to try which of the two cities, Rome or Carthage, should bear sovereign rule, not which of them should be destroyed. So he gave them leave to choose ten of their number, that should be sent home to treat with the fathers about their ransom; and together with these he sent Carthalo, a nobleman of Carthage, and general of his horse, to feel the disposition of the senate; whether it were bowed as yet by so much adversity, and could stoop unto desire of peace. But with the Romans these arts prevailed not, as shall be shewed in due place. The people of Italy, all or most of them, save the Roman colonies, or the Latins, were not only weary of their losses past, but entertained a deceivable hope of changing their old society for a better. Wherefore, not only the Samnites, Lucans, Brutians, and Apulians, ancient enemies of Rome, and not until the former generation, utterly subdued, began to reassume their wonted spirits; but the Campans, a nation of all other in Italy most bound unto the state of Rome, and by many mutual affinities therewith as straitly conjoined as were any, save the Latins, changed on a sudden their love into hatred; without any other cause found than change of fortune.

Campania is the most goodly and fruitful province of Italy, if not (as some then thought) of all the earth: and the city of Capua, answerable unto the country whereof it was head, so great, fair, and wealthy, that it seemed no less convenient a seat of the empire, than was either Rome or

Carthage. But of all qualities, bravery is the least requisite unto sovereign command. The Campans were luxurious, idle, and proud; and valuing themselves, like jays by their feathers, despised the unfortunate virtue of the Romans, their patrons and benefactors. Yet were there some of the principal among them, as in other cities, that bore especial regard unto the majesty of Rome, and could not endure to hear of innovation. But the plebeian faction had lately so prevailed within Capua, that all was governed by the pleasure of the multitude; which wholly followed the direction of Pacuvius Calavius, an ambitious nobleman, whose credit grew and was upheld by furthering all popular desires, whereof the conjunction with Hannibal was not the least. Some of the Capuans had offered their city to the Carthaginians shortly after the battle of Thrasymene; whereupon chiefly it was that Hannibal made his journey into Campania; the dictator Fabius waiting upon him. At that time, either the nearness of the Roman army, or some other fear of the Capuans, hindered them from breaking into actual rebellion. They had indeed no leisure to treat about any articles of new confederacy; or had leisure served, yet were the multitude (whose inconstant love Hannibal had won from the Romans by gentle usage, and free dismissing of some prisoners in good account among them) unable to hold any such negotiation without advice of the senate, which mainly impugned it. So they that had promised to yield up their town to Hannibal, and to meet him on the way with some of their nobility, that should assure him of all faithful meaning, were driven to sit still in a great perplexity; as having failed to let in this their new friend, yet sufficiently discovered themselves to draw upon them the hatred of the Romans. In this case were no small number of the citizens; who thereupon grew the more incensed against their senate, on whom they cast all the blame, easily pardoning their own cowardice. The people, holding so tender a regard of liberty, that even the lawful government of magistrates grieved them with an imaginary oppression, had now good cause to fear, lest the senators

would become their lords indeed, and, by help of the Romans, bring them under a more strait subjection than ever they had endured. This fear, being ready to break into some outrage, Pacuvius made use of to serve his own ambition. He discoursed unto the senate, as they sat in council, about these motions troubling the city; and said, that he himself had both married a Roman lady, and given his daughter in marriage to a Roman, but that the danger of forsaking the Roman party was not now the greatest; for that the people were violently bent even to murder all the senate, and afterward to join themselves with Hannibal; who should countenance the fact, and save them harmless. This he spake as a man well known to be beloved himself by the people, and privy unto their designs. Having throughly terrified the senate by laying open the danger hanging over them, he promised nevertheless to deliver them all, and to see things in quiet, if they would freely put themselves into his hands; offering his oath, or any other assurance that they should demand, for his faithful meaning. They all agreed: then shutting up the court, and placing a guard of his own followers about it, that none might enter, nor issue forth without his leave, he called the people to assembly; and speaking as much ill of the senate as he knew they would be glad to hear, he told them, that these wicked governors were surprised by his policy, and all fast, ready to abide what sentence they would lay upon them. Only thus much he advised them, as a thing which necessity required, that they should choose a new senate, before they satisfied their anger upon the old. So rehearsing unto them the names of one or two senators, he asked what their judgment was of those. All cried out, that they were worthy of death; choose then, said he, first of all, some new ones into their places. Hereat the multitude, unprovided for such an election, was silent; until at last some one or other adventured to name whom he thought fit. The men so nominated were utterly disliked by the whole assembly; either for some known fault, baseness, and insufficiency; or else even because they were unknown, and

therefore held unworthy. This difficulty in the new election appearing more and more, whilst more were to be chosen, (the fittest men to be substituted having been named among the first, and not thought fit enough,) Pacuvius entreated, and easily prevailed with the people, that the present senate might for this time be spared, in hope of amends hereafter; which doubtless they would make, having thus obtained pardon of all offences past. Henceforth, not only the people, as in former times, honoured Pacuvius, and esteemed him their patron, but the senators also were governed by him; to whom they acknowledged themselves indebted for saving all their lives. Neither did the senate fail after this by all obsequiousness to court the people; giving the reins unto their lawless will, who else were likely to cast them down; all the city being thus of one mind, only fear of the Romans kept them from opening their gates to Hannibal. But after the battle at Cannæ this impediment was removed; and few there were that would open their mouths to speak against the rebellion. Yet, forasmuch as three hundred principal gentlemen of the Campans did then serve the Romans in the isle of Sicily, the parents and kinsmen of these prevailed so far, that ambassadors were sent unto Terentius the consul, to see his present case, and what it could minister of hope or fear. These, wheresoever they found him, found him weakly attended, and as weak in spirit as in followers. Yet they offered him formally the service of their state, and desired to know what he would command them. But he most basely lamented unto them the greatness of the Roman misfortune, saying, that all was lost; and that the Campans must now not help the Romans, who had nothing left wherewith to help themselves, but make war in their defence against the Carthaginians; as the Romans had sometimes done for the Campans against the Samnites. Hereunto he is said to have added a foolish invective against Hannibal and his Carthaginians; telling, how he had taught them to make bridges of slaughtered carcasses, and to feed upon man's flesh; with such other stuff as only bewrayed his own fear. As for the

Campans themselves, he put them in mind of their present strength; they having thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse, with money, and all provisions, in abundance. Thus he dismissed them prouder than they came, and filled them with conceit of getting a great lordship; whereas before they were somewhat timorous in adventuring to seek their own liberty. Having reported this at Capua, the same ambassadors were despatched away to Hannibal, with whom they easily made alliance, upon these conditions: That the Campans should be absolutely free, and ruled by their own laws; that no citizen of theirs should be subject unto any Carthaginian magistrate, in what case soever, whether in war or peace; and that Hannibal should deliver unto the Campans three hundred Roman prisoners, such as they themselves would choose, whom they might exchange for their gentlemen which were in Sicily.

Against all this negotiation Decius Magius, an honourable citizen, opposed himself earnestly; using in vain many persuasions to the wilful and headstrong multitude, whom he put in mind of Pyrrhus and the Tarentines, wishing them not to change old friends for new acquaintance. This did he when they were sending ambassadors to Hannibal; and this also did he when the new alliance was concluded; but most earnestly when a Carthaginian garrison was entering the town; at which time he gave advice either to keep it out, or to fall upon it and cut it in pieces, that, by such a notable piece of service, they might make amends unto the Romans, whom they had forsaken.

Advertisement hereof was given to Hannibal; who, lying about Naples, not far off, sent for Magius to come speak with him in the camp. This Magius refused; alleging that he was, by the late concluded articles, free from subjection unto any Carthaginian, and therefore would not come. Hannibal thereupon hasted himself towards Capua, forbearing to attempt any further upon Naples; which he thought to have taken in his way by Scalado, but found the walls too high, and was not well provided to lay siege unto it. At Capua he was entertained with great solemnity and

pomp; all the people issuing forth of the town to behold that great commander, which had won so many noble victories. Having taken his pleasure in the sight of that goodly city, and passed over his first entertainments, he came into their senate, where he commended their resolution in shaking off the Roman yoke; promising that ere long all Italy, and Rome itself, should be driven to acknowledge Capua as chief, and receive law from thence. As for Decius Magius, who openly took part with the Romans their enemies, he prayed them, that they would not think him a Campan, but a traitor to the state; and use him accordingly, giving sentence out of hand upon him, as he deserved. This was granted, and Magius delivered unto Hannibal; who, unwilling to offend the Capuans at his first coming, by putting so great a man to death, yet fearing that they might sue for his liberty, if he kept him alive, thought it best to send him away to Carthage. Thus Hannibal settled his friendship with the Campans; among whom, only this Decius Magius had openly dared to speak against him, being assisted by Perolla, the son of Pacuvius. This Perolla would have murdered Hannibal whilst he was at supper, the first night of his coming, had not his father's authority kept him from making any such attempt. All the town besides were so earnest in the love of their new society, that they are said to have murdered all the Romans, upon whom at the present they could lay hand, or (which is all one) to have smothered them to death in an hot bath.

The same course of fortune with those of Capua ran some other towns thereabouts, which depended on this as their mother city. Nola, Nuceria, Naples, Casiline, and Acerræ, were the cities next adjoining, that stood out for the Romans. Against these Hannibal went, thinking to find them weakly manned; as they were indeed, though stoutly defended.

The Romans at this time were not in case to put garrisons into all their walled towns, but were fain to leave all places, except a few of the most suspected, unto the faith and courage of the inhabitants. Rome itself was in ex-

treme fear of Hannibal's coming at the first report of the overthrow at Cannæ; and the grief of that loss was so general and immoderate, that it much disturbed the provision against apparent danger. It was hard to judge, whether the loss already received, or the fear of destruction presently threatening, were the more terrible. All the senators found work enough to stint the noise and lamentable bewailings, whereof the streets were full. Couriers were sent forth, to bring assured tidings how all went; whereof when letters from the consul Varro had throughly informed them, they were so amazed, that they ran into barbarous superstition; and taking direction, as was said, from their fatal books, buried alive two men and women, Gauls and Greeks, in their ox-market. If the books of Sibyl gave them such instructions, we may justly think that Sibyl herself was instructed by the Devil: yet is it not improbable, that extremity of fear caused them to hearken to wicked soothsayers; whose detestable counsels they afterwards, for their own honour, (as ashamed of such authors,) imputed to the books of Sibyl. An ambassador was sent to Delphi to consult the oracle of Apollo, and inquire with what prayers and supplications they might pacify the gods, and obtain an end of these calamities. This is enough to discover the greatness of their fear, though not serving to give remedy. At the same time came letters out of Sicily from the pretor Octacilius; whom the senate had appointed, if he found it meet, to pass over into Afric. In these were contained news of one Carthaginian fleet, that wasted the kingdom of Hieron, their good friend and confederate; and of another fleet, riding among the isles Ægateis, which was in readiness to set upon Lilybæum, and the rest of the Roman province, if the pretor stirred aside to the rescue of Hieron.

In the midst of these extremities, it was thought needful to call home Terentius the consul, that he might name a dictator to take sovereign charge of the weal public, with absolute power, as necessity required. It must needs seem strange, that all sorts of people went forth to meet the consul, and bid him welcome home, giving him thanks for that

he had not despaired of the weal public. But this was done (as may seem) by order from the senate; which therein doubtless provided wisely for upholding the general reputation. If his coming into the city had renewed the lamentations and outcries of the people, what else would have followed than a contempt of their wretchedness, among those that were subject unto their dominion. Now in finding this occasion (though indeed he gave it not) of bestowing upon him their welcome and thanks, they noised abroad a fame, which came perhaps unto the ears of Hannibal, of their magnanimity and confidence, that might seem grounded on their remaining strength. This therefore was wisely done; but whereas Livy would have us think that it was done generously, and out of great spirit, let me be pardoned, if I believe him not. It was done fearfully, and to cover their grief; had they dared to shew their indignation, they would have struck off his head; as, in few years after, [y] Cn. Fulvius had his life brought into question, and was banished by them, being less blameworthy, for a smaller offence. M. Junius, by appointment of the senate, was nominated dictator; and T. Sempronius, master of the horse. These fell presently to mustering of soldiers, of whom they raised [z] four new legions, and a thousand horse; though with much difficulty, as being fain to take up some that were very boys. These four legions are elsewhere forgotten, in account of the forces levied by this dictator; and [a] two legions only set down, that had been enrolled in the beginning of the year for custody of the city. Wherefore it may be, that these two legions being drawn into the field, four new ones of *prætextati*, or striplings, were left in their places. In such raw soldiers, and so few, little confidence was to be reposed; for which reason they increased their number, by adding unto them eight thousand sturdy slaves, that were put in hope of liberty if they should deserve it by manful service. This not sufficing, the dictator proclaimed, that whosoever owed money, and could not pay it, or had committed any capital offence, should forth-

[y] Liv. l. 26. [z] Liv. l. 22. [a] Liv. l. 23.

with be discharged of his debt, or punishment, if he would serve in the war. To arm these companies they were fain to take down, out of their temples and porches, the spoils of their enemies that had been there set up; among which were six thousand armours of the Gauls, that had been carried in the triumph of C. Flaminius, a little before the beginning of this war. To such mockery had God brought the pride of the Romans, as a due reward of their insolent oppressions, that they were fain to issue forth of their own gates in the habit of strangers, when Hannibal was ready to encounter them with his Africans, armed Roman-like.

About the same time it was that Carthalo, with the agents of the prisoners taken at Cannæ, came to Rome. Carthalo was not admitted into the city, but commanded, whilst he was on the way, to be gone ere night out of the Roman territory. To the messengers of the captives, audience was given by the senate. They made earnest petition to be ransomed at the public charge; not only the tears and lamentation of their poor kinsfolk, but the great need wherein the city then stood of able soldiers, commending their suit; which yet they obtained not. Besides the general custom of the Romans, (held by long tradition, and strengthened by a notable precedent, when Regulus was overthrown and taken prisoner in the former war,) not to be too tender of such as had yielded to the enemy, much was alleged against these who now craved ransom; but the special point was, that they were wilfully lost, since they might have saved themselves, as others did. It sufficed not unto these poor men to say, that their offence was no greater than the consul's; they were told, that this was great presumption. The truth was, the state wanted money; and therefore could not want excuses, whereby to avoid the disbursement; whether it were so or not, that any such plea was held about this matter of redemption, as we find recorded. Neither must we regard it, that the slaves, which were armed for the war, are said to have cost more than the sum did amount unto that would have ransomed these prisoners. For this is but a tale, devised to countenance the Roman proceed-

ings, as if they had been severe; when as indeed they were suitable to the present fortune, poor, and somewhat beggarly. Hereof it is no little proof, that Hannibal valued those Roman slaves, whom he had taken in the camp among their masters, at no more than every one the third part of a common soldier's ransom; and likely it is, that he offered them at the price whereat he thought them current. But if we should suppose, that by trading with Hannibal a better bargain for slaves might have been made, than was by the state at home in dealing with private men; yet must we withal consider, that these private men did only lend these slaves for a while unto the commonwealth, and were afterwards contented [b] to forbear the price of them, (when by order from the senate they were enfranchised,) until the war should be ended. If Hannibal would have given such long day of payment, it is likely that the Romans would have been his chapmen; but seeing he dealt only for ready money, they chose rather to say, We will not give, than, We cannot. The like austerity, upon the same reason, but contrary pretence, was used toward the soldiers that escaped from that great battle. These were charged for having fled, as the prisoners were for not flying, when they might have done so. True it is, that in such cases, if ever, that which they call *raggione del stato* may serve for an excuse; when the commonwealth being driven to a miserable exigent, is fain to help itself by doing injuries to private men. And so dealt the Romans now; condemning all those that had served at Cannæ to be transported into Sicily; and there to serve, not, as others did, until they had fulfilled twenty years in the wars, or else were fifty years of age; but until this war should be ended, how long soever it lasted, and that without reward. The same thrifty censure was afterwards laid upon others for their misbehaviour; but never upon any man of quality, save only (a good while after this, at better leisure) upon Cæcilius Metellus, and a few other hairbrained fools, his companions; who, being frighted out of their wits with the terror of so great a loss,

[b] Livy, l. 24.

were devising, after the battle, which way to run out of Italy, when Hannibal as yet had scarce one town within it. The inequality of this rigour grew shortly distasteful to the commonalty, and was openly blamed by [c] a tribune of the people; nevertheless it was quietly digested, the excuse being no less apparent than the fault.

M. Junius the dictator, having despatched all needful business within the city, took the field with five and twenty thousand men. What he did with this army, I cannot find; nor more of him than this, that he spent the time about Campania; where (as may be presumed) he was not idle. To him therefore perhaps it may be ascribed, that Hannibal did no greater evil; for of any evil done to Hannibal by the Romans, in this their weak estate, only Marcellus had the honour. Marcellus, being then one of the pretors, lay at Ostia with a fleet, ready to set sail for Sicily, having one legion aboard his ships, and fifteen hundred other soldiers newly taken up; with which forces he was to defend that island, and do what harm he could in Afric. But hearing of the overthrow at Cannæ, he sent these of his new levy to Rome, for defence of the city, and marched hastily with his legion toward Cannusium; delivering the fleet, empty of soldiers, to P. Furius his colleague. Thence was he called by the magistrates and chief citizens of Nola, to help them; who were like to be forced by the multitude (affected as were the rest of the Campans) to let in the Carthaginian; and knew not how to avoid this, otherwise, than by seeming to deliberate about the articles of this new confederacy. Wherefore he made great journeys thitherward, and arrived even time enough to prevent the enemy. Many idle walks Hannibal made betwixt Nola and Naples; assaying by fair words and terrible threats the one and the other city. Naples was strong, and not infected with any the least touch of disloyalty; it had also a sure haven, whereby it stood in the less fear of sustaining much inconvenience by spoil of the lands and villages abroad in the country. But at Nola it was

[c] Livy, l. 25.

thought a valuable consideration, that Hannibal was master of the field; which if he laid waste, all the poor people were utterly undone. So thought the multitude; and such talk used some, that had little fear of their own private want or poverty, but a great desire to gratify the Carthaginian. Of these, one L. Bantius was chief; a stout young gentleman, and soldier of especial mark, well beloved in the city, and one that had done good service to the Romans; but was found by Hannibal half dead at Cannæ, and after much gentle usage, good attendance, and cure of his wounds, friendly dismissed with liberal gifts. He therefore thought that it concerned him in honour, to return the greatest thanks he could unto so courteous an enemy. Marcellus perceiving this, wrought upon the same easy nature of the gentleman; and taking notice of him, as if it had been by chance, seemed to wonder why one that had so well deserved of the Roman state had not repaired unto him the pretor, who desired nothing more than such acquaintance. So with many commendations, gifts, and loving entertainment, being himself also a man highly reputed for his personal valour, he made this Bantius so far in love with him, that nothing could be attempted within Nola against the Romans, whereof he had not presently advertisement. At the coming of Marcellus, Hannibal removed from about Nola, and assayed, as formerly he had done, the Neapolitans; but they had lately taken in a Roman garrison, upon confidence whereof they gave him a peremptory answer to his discontent. Thence went he to Nuceria, which he took by composition, and so returned back again to Nola. He was not ignorant what good affection the common people of Nola bore unto him; who although they durst not stir in his quarrel, being overawed by the Roman garrison, yet if they saw Marcellus hardly bestead, and forced to turn his care from watching them within, to repelling the enemies assailing him without, like enough it seemed that they would not be wanting unto the accomplishment of their own desires. He therefore brought his army close to the town, and skirmished often with Marcellus; not in hope thereby

to do much good, but only to make show of a meaning to force the town; which he sought in the mean while to take by intelligence. In the night-time there passed messages between him and the citizens his partakers; whereby it was concluded, that if once Marcellus, with all his forces, could be trained into the field, the multitude within the town should presently rise, and seizing upon the gates, exclude him as an enemy. Of this negotiation Marcellus was advertised; and fearing, lest the conspirators would shortly adventure even to find him busied within the city, whilst the Carthaginians should scale the walls, he thought it the surest way, to cut off the enemy's hope, and send him away betimes. Wherefore ordering his men in three companies, within three several gates looking towards the enemy, he gave a strait command, that all the citizens should keep their houses. Thus he lay close a good part of the day, to the enemy's great wonder; against whom he had customarily issued forth before more early, every day, to skirmish. But when it was further noted that the walls were bare, and not a man appearing on them; then thought Hannibal that surely all was discovered, and Marcellus now busied with the citizens. Whereupon he bade his men bring ladders, and make ready for the assault; which was done in all haste. But when the Carthaginians were at the very walls, and thought nothing less than that the Romans would meet them in the field, suddenly the middle gate was opened, whereat Marcellus, with the best and oldest of his soldiers, brake forth upon them with a great noise, to make his unexpected sally the more terrible: whilst the Carthaginians, much out of order, were some of them flying before Marcellus, the rest making head against him; the other two gates opened, whereat in like sort issued they of the new-levied companies upon the enemy's backs. The sudden terror was more available unto the Romans than their force; yet the execution was so great, that this was accounted as a victory, and reputed one of the bravest acts performed in all that war; forasmuch as hereby it was first proved, that Hannibal might be overcome. After this,

Marcellus, being freed from his enemies that were departed, took a strict account of the citizens of Nola; condemning above threescore and ten of high treason, whose heads he struck off; and so, leaving the town in quiet obedience unto their senate, went and encamped hard by about Suessula. Hannibal in the mean season was gone to Acerræ; where, being excluded, he thought it no wisdom to lose time in persuasions, but laid siege unto it, and began on all sides to close it up. This terrified the people, who knew themselves unable to hold out: therefore, before his works were finished, and they quite surrounded, they stole out by night, and left him the town empty; which he sacked and burnt. Then hearing news of the dictator, that he was about Casiline, thither went Hannibal, as being unwilling that an enemy so near should disquiet him at Capua, where he meant to winter. It seems, or rather indeed it is plain, that the late victory of Marcellus had nothing abated the spirit of the Carthaginian; who durst with a small part of his army seek out the dictator, that had with him the heart of the Roman strength. Wherefore the joy of his enemies, upon so slight an occasion as the death of some two thousand of his men at the most, and those not slain in plain battle, but by a sudden eruption, witnesseth chiefly in what great fear they stood of Hannibal, and how crest-fallen they were; that having three years since demanded at Carthage the body of Hannibal to be delivered unto their pleasure by his own citizens, could now please themselves, as with good news, to hear, that in a skirmish not far from Rome he appeared to be a man, and not resistless. At Casilinum the dictator was not; but many companies of Italians, confederates of Rome, were gotten into the town, and held it. Five hundred of the Prænestines there were, and above four hundred of Perusia, with some of the Latins. All these had the good hap to come too late to the battle of Cannæ, being sent by their several states to the camp; whither whilst they were marching, the tidings of that great misfortune encountered them, and sent them back sorrowful; for they loved well their lords the Romans, under

whose government they lived happily. So came they all, one after another, to Casiline, where they met and stayed. Neither had they stayed there long, ere they heard news from Capua, how that great city became the ringleader of all the Campans into rebellion. The people of Casiline were affected as they of Capua, and therefore sought how to rid their hands of those Prænestines and their fellows; but the soldiers were too hard for them, and after many trains laid one for another, at last they slew all the townsmen in a night, and fortified the western part of the town (for it was divided by the river Vulturnus) against the enemy. If they had run away with the goods, and pretended that these of Casiline were, as the rest of the Campans, all traitors; they themselves might have been reputed as no better than the Mamertines. But their constancy, in defence of the place, witnesseth upon what honest reasons they surprised it. Hannibal came thither, thinking to have encountered with greater forces; but these few found him more work than he expected. Divers assaults he gave, but was still repelled with loss; and many sallies they made, with variable event. The enemy mined, and they countermined; opposing so much industry to his force, that he was driven to close them up, and seek to win them by famine. T. Sempronius Gracchus, that was master of the horse, lay with the Roman army higher up the river; who fain would have relieved Casiline, but that the dictator, being gone to Rome about some matters of religion, had given him express charge not to fight till his return. Marcellus from Suessula could not come, his way being stopped by the overflowings of Vulturnus; the Nolans also beseeching him not to leave them, who were in danger of the Campans, if he departed. Thus it is reported; but if the water stayed his journey, such entreaties were needless. Neither is it like that the dictator tarried at Rome so long, as till extreme famine had consumed the garrison in Casiline. Wherefore it may be thought that the town was lost, because the Romans durst not adventure to raise the siege. Barrels of corn were sent by night, floating down the river; and when some of these,

being carried awry by an eddy of the water, stuck among the willows on the bank; whereby this manner of relief was discovered and prevented, Gracchus cast a great quantity of nuts into the stream, which faintly sustained the poor besieged men. At length, when all food was spent, and whatsoever grew green under the walls was gathered for sallads, the Carthaginians ploughed up the ground; whereon the besieged presently sowed rape seed. Hannibal seeing this, admired their patience, and said, that he meant not to stay at Casiline until the rapes were grown. Wherefore though hitherto he had refused to hearken unto any composition, as intending to make them an example to all others by punishing their obstinacy; yet now he was content to grant them their lives at an indifferent ransom, which when they had paid, he quietly dismissed them according to his promise. Seven hundred Carthaginians he placed in Casiline, as a garrison for defence of the Campans; unto whom he restored it. To the Prænestine soldiers great thanks were given, and loving rewards; among which they had offer, in regard of their virtue, to be made citizens of Rome. But their present condition pleased them so well, that they chose rather to continue as they were, in Præneste; which is no weak proof of the good estate wherein the cities flourished that were subject to the Roman government. The siege of Casiline was not a little beneficial to the Romans; as having long detained Hannibal, and consumed much of his time, that might otherwise have been better spent. For winter overtook him long before he could despatch the business: which how to quit with his honour he knew not, when he was once engaged. Therefore he wintered at Capua; where he refreshed his army, or rather corrupted it, as all historians report, and made it effeminate; though, effeminate as it was, he therewithal did often beat the Romans in following times, as shall appear hereafter.

SECT. X.

Of the great supply that was decreed at Carthage to be sent to Hannibal in Italy. How by the malice of Hanno, and sloth or parsimony of the Carthaginians, the supply was too long deferred. That the riches of the Carthaginians grew faster than of the Romans. Of Fabius, and other old Roman historians, how partial they were in their writings.

WHEN Mago the son of Amilcar had spent some time about the taking in of such Italians as fell from the Romans after the battle at Cannæ, his brother Hannibal sent for him at Capua, and thence despatched him away to Carthage, with the joyful message of victory. He told the Carthaginian senate, with how many Roman generals his brother had fought, what consuls he had chased, wounded, or slain; how the stout Romans, that in the former war never shunned any occasion of fight, were now grown so calm, that they thought their dictator Fabius the only good captain, because he never durst adventure to come to battle; that, not without reason, their spirits were thus abated, since Hannibal had slain of them above two hundred thousand, and taken above fifty thousand prisoners. He further told them of the Brutians, Apulians, Samnites, Lucans, and other people of Italy, that, following the fortune of those great victories, had revolted unto the Carthaginians. Among the rest he magnified Capua, as a goodly city, and fit to be not only (as already it was) head of all the Capuans, but the chief seat of their dominion in Italy; and there he informed them, how lovingly his brother had been entertained, where he meant to rest that winter, attending their supply. As for the war, he said it was even at an end, if they would now pursue it closely, and not give the Romans any breathing time wherein to recollect themselves, and repair their broken forces. He willed them to consider, that the war was far from home, in the enemy's country; that so many battles had much diminished his brother's army, that the soldiers, who had so well deserved, ought to be considered with liberal rewards, and that it was not good to burden their new Italian friends with exactions

of money, corn, and other necessaries, but that these things must be sent from Carthage, which the victory would requite with large amends. Finally, he caused the golden rings, taken from the fingers of the Roman knights that were slain, to be poured out openly in the court; which, being measured, filled (as some say) three bushels, or (as others would rather have it) no more than one; adding, that by this might appear the greatness of the Roman calamity, forasmuch as none but the [d] principal of that order were accustomed to wear that ornament.

Whoso considers the former Punic war may easily find that the state of Carthage never did receive, in all the durance thereof, any such hopeful advertisements from their captains abroad. Wherefore it is no marvel, if the errand of Mago found extraordinary welcome. In the vehemency of this joy, Himilco, a senator adverse to the faction of Hanno, is said to have demanded of that great persuader unto peace with Rome, whether he were still of opinion, that Hannibal should be yielded up unto the Romans; or, whether he would forbid them to give thanks unto the gods for this their good success. Hereunto, though it be not likely that Hanno made the same formal answer which Livy puts into his mouth, calling the Carthaginian senators *patres conscripti*, by a term proper to the Romans, and putting them in mind of his own shameful overthrow received at the islands Ægateis; yet the sum of his speech appears to have been no less malicious than it is set down, forasmuch as Hannibal himself, at his departure out of Italy, exclaimed against the wickedness of this Hanno; saying, that his hatred against the Barchines had oppressed their family, when otherwise it could not, with the ruin of Carthage. Therefore it may well be, that he made such a jest of these victories as is reported, saying, it ill beseemed him, who had vanquished the Romans, to call for more help, as if he had been beaten; or him, that had taken their

[d] Thus Livy reports it; and credible it is, that while Rome was poor, the bravery of private men was not altogether so great as the law would have permitted, though otherwise *jus annuli*, "the wearing of the ring," was the general privilege of the Roman equites.

camp, filled forsooth with spoil, to make request for meat and money. To these cavils, if answer were needful, it might be said, that other booty than of horses and slaves, little was to be found in the Roman camp; the best of the soldiers carrying no other wealth into the field than a few [c] silver studs in the bridles and trappings of their horses. If Hannibal had taken any main convoy of money and provisions, going to supply all wants of a great army in some other province, (as the two Scipios are afterwards said to have done, when they won the camp of Asdrubal, that carried along with him all the wealth of Spain, in his journey towards Italy,) then might such an objection more justly have been made unto his demand of a supply. But the most likely part of Hanno's oration, and wherein he best might hope to prevail, contained a persuasion to use their fortune with moderation, and now to seek peace, whilst they had so much the better in war.

What would have been the issue of this counsel, if it had been followed, it were not easy to say. For though it be likely that the Roman pride would have brooked much indignity in freeing Italy from the danger of war, yet it is not likely that the faith, so often broken to the Carthaginians in former times, would have been kept entire, when any opinion of good advantage had called for revenge of so many shameful overthrows; since, after this war ended, and a new league concluded, no submissive behaviour could preserve Carthage from ruin, longer than until such time as Rome was at leisure from all other wars. This counsel therefore of Hanno, though it might seem temperate, was indeed very pestilent, and served only to hinder the performance of a noble resolution. For it was concluded by a main consent of the senate, that forty thousand Numidians, forty elephants, and great abundance of silver, should be sent over to Hannibal; and that, besides these, twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse should be levied in Spain, not only to supply, as need should require, the armies in that province, but to be transported into Italy.

[c] Liv. l. 22.

This great aid, had it been as carefully sent as it was readily decreed, the Roman historians would not have found cause to tax the retchless improvidence of Hannibal, in forbearing to march directly from Cannæ to Rome, or in refreshing his army among the delights of Capua; the next year's work would have finished the business with less dangerous adventure, and the pleasures which his men enjoyed among the Campans would have been commended as rewards by him well thought upon, wherewith to animate both them and others, that were to be employed in the following war. But either the too much carelessness of those that were loath to make haste in laying out their money before extreme necessity required it, or the crafty malice of Hanno and his fellows, working upon the private humours of men that had more feeling of their own commodity than sense of the public need, utterly perverted, and made unprofitable in the performance, the order that had been so well set down. The [f] elephants were sent, and some money peradventure, uncertain it is how long after: but those great forces of threescore thousand foot and four thousand horse came not into Italy till much was lost of that which already had been gotten, and a great part of the old Carthaginian army was first consumed by time and sundry accidents of war. Only some small numbers, no way answering unto the proportion decreed, were sent into Spain; and the journey of Asdrubal thence through France into Italy much talked of, but he not enabled thereunto till many years were past, and the Romans had recovered their strength.

Here we may note what great riches the Carthaginians drew into their city, both by the tributes received from their subjects, and by their wealthy trade of merchandise. For it is not long since the war of the mercenaries, and the perfidious tyranny of the Romans, extorting in time of greatest necessity twelve hundred talents, had exceedingly impoverished Carthage, which was before brought into great want, even by the expense of so much money as was

[f] Liv. l. 26.

to be disbursed for redeeming of peace, after the loss at Ægateis. Yet we see what great armies of Numidians and Spaniards, besides those already on foot, are appointed to the service in Italy, and how little the Carthaginians fear the want of money in these chargeable undertakings; whereas the Romans, on the other side, having three or four years together been forced to some extraordinary cost, are fain to go upon credit, even for the price of those slaves which they bought of their own citizens to arm for their defence. Such advantage, in means to enrich their treasury, had the wealthy merchants of Carthage, trading in all parts of the Mediterranean sea, even from Tyrus, their mother-city in the bottom of the straits, unto the great ocean, above the Romans; who lived on the fruits of their ground, and received their tributes from people following the same course of life. When time therefore was come, that the hatred of Rome found leisure to shew itself in the destruction of Carthage, the impudence of Roman falsehood, in seeking an honest colour wherewith to shadow the intended breach of faith, discovered plainly whence the jealousy was bred, that this mighty city would again rebel. For the Carthaginians, having given up hostages, even before the Roman army did set forth, to perform whatsoever should be enjoined them, with condition that their city might not be destroyed; and having accordingly, when they were so required, yielded up all their weapons and engines of war, the Romans told them plainly, that the city of Carthage, which was the body of the citizens, should be friendly dealt withal, but the town must needs be demolished, and removed into some other place, that should be twelve miles distant from the sea. "For," said the Romans, "this trade of merchandise, by which ye now live, is not so "fit for peaceable men, such as ye promise to become here-"after, as is the trade of husbandry, an wholesome kind of "life, and enduing men with many laudable qualities, which "enable their bodies, and make them very apt for conversa-"tion." This villainous dealing of the Romans, though sugared with glossing words, plainly shews what good observa-

tion the elder Cato had made of the hasty growth of Carthage in riches. For when being demanded his opinion in the senate about any matter, whatsoever it were, he added still this conclusion, "Thus I think; and that Carthage should be "destroyed;" he may seem not only to have had regard unto that present wealth, which at his being there he had found in the city, but much more unto these times, and the great height whereunto it rose, even suddenly as we see, out of many calamities, whilst the Romans thought that it had not been in case to dare so terrible a war.

But as the Carthaginians in gathering wealth were more industrious and skilful than the Romans, so came they far short of them in the honourable care of the public good; having every one, or most of them, a more principal regard of his own private benefit. This made them, (besides the negligence commonly found in victors,) when the first heat of their affection, wherein they concluded to pursue the war strongly, was overpast, go more leisurely to work than had been requisite in the execution. It was easy for Hanno to persuade covetous men, that they should first of all defend their own in Spain. This might be done with little charges: afterwards, when that province was secured, they might send an army into Italy, so going to work orderly by degrees. For it were no wisdom to commit all the strength of the commonwealth to one hazard of fortune against the enemies, or (which perhaps were worse) to the government of an ambitious man and his brethren, who having once (if they could so do) finished the war, might easily make [s] Hannibal a king, and subdue Carthage with the forces that she had given them to the conquest of Rome.

By such malicious working of Hanno, and by their own slackness, incredulity, dulness, or niggardise, the Carthaginians were persuaded rather to make small disbursements in Spain, than to set up all their rest at once in Italy. Yet

[s] Of such ambition Hanno directly accused Hannibal, saying, that he made war upon war, that so he might live compassed with legions, as knowing no other way to make himself a king. Liv. l. 21.

was it indeed impossible to hold a country of so large extent, and so open a coast as that of Spain, free from all incursion of the enemy; especially the affection of the naturals being (as in a new conquest) ill established. A better way therefore it had been to make a running war, by which the Romans might have been found occupied, even with the ordinary Carthaginian garrisons, or some little addition thereunto. For if it were thought meet to defer the prosecution of their main intendment against Rome itself, until such time as every little thorn were pulled out of the sides of so great a province, then must Emporiæ have been besieged and forced; which, by reason of alliance with the Massilians, gave unto the Romans, at all times when they pleased, a ready and secure harbour. But the town of Emporiæ was too strong to be won in haste; it had long defended itself against the Barbarians, having not above four hundred paces of wall to the main land, and exceedingly well fortified; a great Spanish town of the same name lying without it, that was three miles in compass, very strong likewise, and friend unto the Grecians, though not overmuch trusted. Wherefore to force this town of Emporiæ, that was, besides the proper strength, like to be so well assisted by the Massilians, Romans, and some Spaniards, would have been a work of little less difficulty than was the Roman war (in appearance) after the battle at Cannæ; yea it had been in effect none other than to alter the seat of the war, which Hannibal had already fixed, with better judgment, near unto the gates of Rome. The difficulty of this attempt being such as caused it altogether to be forborne, great folly it was to be much troubled about expelling the Romans utterly out of Spain; whom they might more easily have diverted thence, and drawn home to their own doors, by making strong war upon their city. For even so the Romans afterwards removed Hannibal into Afric, by sending an army to Carthage; and by taking the like course, they now endeavoured to change the seat of the war, transferring it out of Italy into Spain. But the private affections of men, regarding the common good no

otherwise than as it is accessary to their own purposes, did make them easily wink at opportunities, and hope that somewhat would fall out well of itself, though they set not to their helping hands. Hanno was a malicious wretch; yet they that thought him so were well enough contented to hearken unto his discourses as long as they were plausible, and tended to keep the purse full. In the mean while they suffered Hannibal and all the noble house of Amilcar to weary themselves in travail for the commonwealth; which all Carthage in general highly commended, but weakly assisted, as if the industry of these Barchines had been somewhat more than needful. Surely the Carthaginians, in general, were far less honourable than the people of Rome; not only in government of their subject provinces, but in administration of their own estate; few of them preferring the respect of the weal public above their private interest. But as they thrived little in the end by their parsimony used toward their own mercenaries, when the former Roman war was finished; so the conclusion of this war present will make them complain, with feeling sighs, of their negligence in supplying Hannibal, after the victory at Cannæ; when gladly they would give all their treasures to redeem the opportunity that now they let pass, as if it were cost enough to send a few handfuls into Spain.

That both the Spanish business and the state of Afric itself depended wholly, or for the most part, upon success of things in Italy, the course of actions following will make manifest. Particularly how matters were ordered in Spain by the Carthaginian governors, it is very hard, and almost impossible to set down. For though we must not reprehend, in that worthy historian Livy, the tender love of his own country, which made him give credit unto Fabius and others; yet must we not, for his sake, believe those lies which the unpartial judgment of Polybius hath condemned in the writers that gave them original. It were needless to rehearse all that may be found in [h] Polybius concerning the untruth of that Roman historian Fabius.

[h] Polyb. l. 1.

One example may suffice: he saith of Amilcar and his men at Eryx, in the former war, that having clean spent their strength, and being even broken with many miseries, they were glad to submit themselves unto the Romans. Contrary hereunto, we find in the Life of Amilcar, set down by Æmilius Probus, that Eryx was in such sort held by the Carthaginians, that it seemed to be in as good condition as if in those parts there had not been any war. These words being referred to the brave resolution of the Carthaginian soldiers, and the singular virtue of their general infusing such spirit into them, may be taken as not overliberal. For in the treaty of peace between Amilcar and Catulus, when the Roman first of all required that this garrison of Eryx should lay down their arms, and forsake Sicily, threatening that otherwise he would not talk of any composition; Amilcar boldly bade him choose whether he would talk of it or no; for that the arms which his country had put into his hands to use against her enemies, it was not his purpose to yield up unto them. Now since the Romans, contrary to their custom upon like advantages, were content to let Amilcar have his will, and not to stand with him upon point of honour, whilst otherwise they might quietly rid their hands of him; plain enough it is, that they were far from thinking him a man consumed with miseries, as Fabius would have him seem. Hereunto agrees the relation of Polybius; who flatly, and by name, chargeth Fabius with untruth, saying, that howsoever Amilcar and his soldiers had endured all extremity, yet they behaved themselves as men that had no sense thereof; and were as far from being either vanquished or tired as were their enemies. Such being the difference between Fabius, (as also perhaps between other old writers of the Roman story,) and those that had more regard of truth than of flattering the mighty city of Rome; we must take it in good part, that howsoever Livy introduceth Hanno in one place, joining very foolishly his own shameful overthrow at the islands [1] Ægateis, with the great services of Amilcar at Eryx, as if

[1] Ægateis insulas, Erycemque ante oculos proponite, &c. *Liv.* l. 21.

both of them had had a like event; yet [k] elsewhere he forbeareth not to put a more likely tale (though with as impudent a commemoration of his own unhappy conduct) into the same Hanno's mouth, making him say, that the affairs of Carthage went never better than a little before the loss of their fleet in that battle at sea, wherein himself was general. Now concerning the doings of the Scipios in Spain, there is cause to wish that this Fabius, with Val. Antias, and others of the like stamp, had either written (if they could not write more temperately) nothing at all, or that the tender affection of Livy to his Rome had not caused him to think too well of their relations; which are such as follow.

SECT. XI.

Strange reports of the Roman victories in Spain, before Asdrubal the son of Amilcar followed thence his brother Hannibal into Italy.

IT hath been shewed already, how P. Cornelius Scipio the consul, returning from Gaul into Italy, to encounter with Hannibal at his descent from the Alps, sent before him his brother Cneus, with part of his fleet and army into Spain. Two Roman legions, with fourteen thousand foot of the confederates, and twelve hundred horse, had been allotted unto this consul, therewith to make war in Spain against Hannibal; who since he was marching into Italy with the strength of his army, P. Scipio believed that a good part of these his own forces might well be spared from the Spanish expedition; and therefore made bold to carry some of the number back with him, sending on his brother with the rest, as his lieutenant. Publius himself remained in Italy all the time of his consulship; which being expired, he was sent proconsul into Spain by the senate, with an army of eight thousand men, and a fleet of thirty galleys.

The acts of these two brethren in their province were very great, and, as they are reported, somewhat marvellous. For they continually prevailed in Spain against the Carthaginians; whom they vanquished in so many battles,

[k] Liv. l. 23.

and withdrew from their alliance so many of the Spaniards their confederates, that we have cause to wonder how the enemy could so often find means to repair his forces, and return strong into the field. But as the Romans, by pretending to deliver the country from the tyranny of Carthage, might easily win unto their confederacy as many as were galled with the African yoke, and durst adventure to break it; so the ancient reputation of the first conquerors might serve to arm the naturals against these invaders, and to reclaim those that had revolted unto the Romans, were it only by the memory of such ill success as the like rebellions in former times had found. Hereto may be added the Carthaginian treasure, which easily raised soldiers among those valiant, but (in that age) poor and gold-thirsty nations. Neither was it of small importance, that so many of the Spaniards had their children, kinsmen, and friends abroad with Hannibal in his Italian wars, or serving the Carthaginians in Afric. And peradventure, if we durst be bold to say it, the victories of the Scipios were neither so many nor so great as they are set out by Livy. This we may be bold to say, that the great captain Fabius, or Livy in his person, maketh an objection unto Scipio, which neither Scipio nor Livy for him doth answer; "[1] That if Asdrubal were vanquished, as Scipio would say, by him in Spain; strange it was, and as little to his honour, as it had been extremely dangerous to Rome, that the same vanquished man should invade Italy." And it is indeed an incredible narration, that Asdrubal being closed in on all sides, and not knowing how to escape out of a battle, save only by the steep descent of rocks, over a great river that lay at his back, ran away with all his money, elephants, and broken troops over Tagus, directly toward the Pyrenees, and so toward Italy; upon which he fell with more than threescore thousand armed soldiers. Neither do I see how it hangs well together, that he chose a piece of ground very defensible, but most incommodious for his retreat, if he should happen to be vanquished; and yet, that he sent all

[1] Liv. l. 28.

his money and elephants away before him, as not intending to abide the enemy; or how it could be true that these his elephants, being so sent before, could hinder the Romans (for so are they said to have done in the last battle between him and Scipio) from breaking into his camp. Wherefore we can no more than be sorry, that all Carthaginian records of this war, and Spanish, (if there were any,) being utterly lost, we can know no more thereof than what it hath pleased the Romans to tell us; unto whom it were no wisdom to give too much credit. In this regard I will summarily run over the doings of the Scipios in Spain, not greatly insisting on particulars, whereof there is no great certainty.

Cn. Cornelius landed at Emporiæ, an haven-town not far within the Pyrenees, retaining still the same name with little inflexion. That by the fame of his clemency he allured many nations to become subject unto Rome, as the story begins of him, I could easily believe, if I understood by what occasion they had need to use his clemency, or he to give such famous example thereof, being a mere stranger, and having no jurisdiction in the country. Yet is it certain, that he was a man very courteous, and one that could well insinuate himself into the love of the Barbarians; among whom, his dexterity in practice had the better success, for that he seemed to have none other errand than setting them at liberty. This pretext availed with some; others were to be hired with money; and some he compelled to yield by force or fear, especially when he had won a battle against Hanno. Into all treaties of accord, made with these people, likely it is that he remembered to insert this article, which the Romans in their alliances never forgot, unless in long times past, and when they dealt with the Carthaginians or their superiors: [m] *Majestatem pop. Rom. comiter conservent;* which is, as Tully interprets it, "That they should "gently (or kindly) uphold the majesty of the people of "Rome." This was in appearance nothing troublesome; yet implied it indeed an obscure covenant of subjection.

[m] Orat. pro Corn. Balbo.

And in this respect it may be true, that the Spaniards became [n] *ditionis Romanæ*, "of the Roman jurisdiction;" though hereafter they will say, they had no such meaning. That part of the country wherein Scipio landed was newly subdued by Hannibal in his passage toward Italy, and therefore the more easily shaken out of obedience. Particularly in the Bargutians, Hannibal had found, at his coming among them, such an apprehension of the Roman greatness, as made him suspect, that any light occasion would make them start from the Carthaginians. Wherefore he not only appointed Hanno governor over them, as over the rest of the province between Iberus and the [o] Pyrenees, but made him also their lord; that is, (as I conceive it, for I do not think he gave the principality of their country unto Hanno and his heirs,) he made him not only lieutenant-general over them in matters of war, and things concerning the holding them in obedience to Carthage, but took from them all inferior officers of their own, leaving them to be governed by Hanno at his discretion. These therefore had good cause to rejoice at the coming of Scipio; with whom others also (no doubt) found reasons to join; it being the custom of all conquered nations, in hatred of their present lords, to throw themselves indiscreetly into the protection of others, that many times prove worse than the former. So were the Neapolitans and Milanois, in the age of our grandfathers, weary by turns of the Spaniards and French, as more sensible still of the present evil which they felt, than regardful of the greater mischief whereinto they ran by seeking to avoid it. This bad affection of his province would not suffer Hanno to temporise. Ten thousand foot and a thousand horse Hannibal had left unto him; besides which it is like that some forces he was able to raise out of his province: therefore he adventured a battle with Scipio, wherein he was overthrown and taken. Following this victory, Scipio besieged Stissum, a town hard by, and won it. But Asdrubal having passed Iberus, and coming too late to the relief of Hanno, with eight thousand foot

[n] Liv. l. 21. [o] Polyb. l. 3.

and a thousand horse, fell upon the Roman sea-forces that lay not far about Tarracon, whom he found careless, as after a victory, roving abroad in the country, and with great slaughter drave them aboard their ships. This done, he ran up into the country, where he withdrew the Illergetes from the Roman party, though they had given hostages to Scipio. Scipio in the mean season was gone to visit and aid his fleet; where having set things in order, he returned back, and made toward Asdrubal, who durst not abide his coming, but withdrew himself again over Iberus. So the Illergetes were compelled by force, having lost Athanagia their chief city, to pay a fine to the Romans, and increase the number of their hostages. The Ausetani likewise, confederates of the Carthaginians, were besieged in their chief town, which they defended thirty days, hoping in vain that the sharp winter, and great abundance of snow that fell, would have made the Romans to dislodge. But they were fain at length to yield; and for this their obstinacy they were amerced twenty talents of silver. During the siege, the Lacetani came to help their distressed neighbours, and were beaten home by Scipio, leaving twelve thousand of their company dead behind them. I cannot but wonder how these Lacetani, that are said to be the first which embraced the friendship of Scipio, should, without any cause remembered, become Carthaginian on the sudden in the next news that we hear of them. As also it is strange, that all the sea-coast northward of Iberus, having lately become voluntarily [p] *ditionis Romanæ*, "sub-"ject unto Rome," should, in continuance of the story, after a few lines, hold war against Scipio, without any assistance of the Carthaginians. Neither can I believe that Asdrubal, as it were by a charm, stirred up the Illergetes, making them lay aside all care of their hostages, and take arms in his quarrel, whilst himself had not the daring to stand against Scipio, but ran away, and saved himself beyond Iberus. Philinus perhaps, or some Carthaginian writer, would have told it thus: That Scipio, adventuring

[p] Liv. l. 21.

too far into the country, was beaten by Asdrubal back to his ships, whence he durst not stir until winter came on; at what time this Carthaginian returned into the heart of his province, leaving some few garrisons to defend those places that after Scipio won, by returning upon them, unlooked-for, through a deep snow. As for the Lacetani, Illergetes, and the rest, we may reasonably think that they sought their own benefit, helping themselves one while by the Romans against the Carthaginians; and contrariwise, upon sense of injuries received, or apprehension of more grievous tyranny, under which they feared to be brought by these new masters, hearkening again unto the comfortable promises of those that had ruled them before. For that it was their intent to live under their own country laws, and not under governors sent from Rome or Carthage, their demeanour in all ages following may testify; even from henceforth unto the days of Augustus Cæsar, till when they were never throughly conquered.

The year following this, Cn. Scipio had a victory against the Carthaginians in fight at sea; or rather came upon them unlooked-for, while they rode at anchor, most of their men being on shore. All their ships, that ran not too far on ground, he took, and thereby grew master of the whole coast; landing at pleasure, and doing great hurt in all places that were not well defenced. After this victory, above one hundred and twenty nations, or petty estates, in Spain, are said to have submitted themselves unto the Romans, and given hostages; whereby Asdrubal was compelled to fly into the utmost corners of the land, and hide himself in Lusitania. Yet it follows, that the Illergetes did again rebel; that Asdrubal hereupon came over Iberus; and that Scipio (though having easily vanquished the Illergetes) went not forth to meet him, but stirred up against him the Celtiberians, that lately were become his subjects, and had given him hostages. These took from the Carthaginian three towns, and vanquished him in two battles; wherein they slew fifteen thousand of his men, and took four thousand prisoners. Then arrived P. Scipio, with

the supply before mentioned; and henceforward the two brethren jointly administered the business in Spain.

The Carthaginians being occupied in the Celtiberian war, the two Scipios did, *haud cunctanter*, "without fear "or doubt," pass over Iberus, and besiege Saguntum. Little cause of doubt had they, if Cn. had already subdued many nations beyond it, and, among many others, the same Celtiberians that with their proper forces were able to vanquish Asdrubal. Bostar, the governor of Saguntum, a simple man, suffered himself to be persuaded by one Acedux, a Spaniard, that the only way to get the favour and hearty good-will of the country was by freely restoring unto them their hostages; as resting, without any pledge, assured of their faith. But the crafty Spaniard, being trusted with this message and restitution of the hostages, carried them all to the Roman generals; persuading them, as he had done Bostar, to make the liberality their own. Hereby the Romans purchased much love, if the tale were true; and if it were not rather true, as afterwards, and ere this we find, that all the Spanish hostages were left in new Carthage. I am weary of rehearsing so many particularities, whereof I can believe so few. But since we find no better certainties, we must content ourselves with these.

The year following was like unto this: Asdrubal must be beaten again. The two Scipios divide their forces; Cn. makes war by land, P. by sea. Asdrubal, with much labour and entreaty, hath gotten four thousand foot and five hundred horse out of Afric; he repairs his fleet, and provides every way to make resistance. But all his chief seamen, and masters of his ships, revolt unto the Romans; because they had been chidden the last year for their negligence, which had betrayed the navy. The revolt of these shipmasters animates to rebellion the Carpesians, or Carpetani, an inland people about Toledo, in the very centre of Spain. These do much mischief, so that Asdrubal is fain to make a journey to them. His sudden coming cuts off some of them that were found scattered abroad in the fields. But they, making head, so valiantly assail him, that

they drive him, for very fear, to encamp himself strongly on an high piece of ground, whence he dares not come forth to give them battle. So they take a town by force, wherein he had laid up all his provisions, and shortly make themselves masters of the country round about. This good success breeds negligence, for which they dearly pay. Asdrubal comes upon them, takes them unprepared, beats them, kills the most of them, and disperseth the rest; so that the whole nation yieldeth to him the next day. Then come directions from Carthage, that Asdrubal should lead his army forthwith into Italy; which we may wonder why the Carthaginians would appoint him to do, if they had been informed by his letters in what hard case he was, and had so weakly supplied him, as is shewed before. But thus we find it reported; and that upon the very rumour of this his journey, almost all Spain was ready to fall to the Romans. Asdrubal therefore sends word presently to Carthage, that this must not be so; or, if they will needs have it so, that then they must send him a successor, and well attended with a strong army, which to employ they should find work more than enough; such notable men were the Roman generals. But the senate of Carthage is not much moved with this excuse: Asdrubal must needs be gone; and Himilco, with such forces as are thought expedient for that service, both by land and sea, is sent to take the charge of Spain. Wherefore Asdrubal hath now no more to do than to furnish himself with store of money, that he might have wherewithal to win the friendship of the Gauls; through whose countries he must pass, as Hannibal had done before him. The Carthaginians were greatly to blame for not remembering to ease him of this care. But since it can be no better, he lays great impositions upon all the Spaniards his subjects; and having gotten together as much treasure as he could, onward he marcheth toward Iberus. The Scipios, hearing these news, are careful how to arrest him on the way. They besiege Ibera, (so called of the river's name running by it,) the richest town in all those quarters that was confederate with Asdrubal; who

thereupon steps aside to relieve it. The Romans meet him, and fight a battle with him; which they win the more easily, for that the Spaniards, his followers, had rather be vanquished at home than get the victory, and afterwards be haled into Italy. Great numbers are slain; and few should have escaped, but that the Spaniards ran away ere the battles were throughly joined. Their camp the Romans take and spoil, whereby (questionless) they are marvellously enriched; all the money that could be raked together in Spain being carried along in this Italian expedition. This day's event joins all Spain to the Romans, if any part of the country stood in doubt before; and puts Asdrubal so far from all thought of travelling into Italy, that it leaves him small hope of keeping himself safe in Spain. Of these exploits advertisement is sent to Rome; and letters to the senate, from [p]P. and Cn. Scipio, whereof the contents are, that they have neither money, apparel, nor bread, wherewith to sustain their army and fleet; that all is wanting; so as, unless they may be supplied from Rome, they can neither hold their forces together, nor tarry any longer in the province. These letters come to Rome in an evil season; the state being scarcely able, after the loss at Cannæ, to help itself at home. Yet relief is sent; how hardly, and how much to the commendation of that love and care which the private citizens of Rome bare unto the commonwealth, shall be inserted elsewhere, into the relation of things whereof the truth is less questionable. At the coming of this supply, the two Scipios pursue Asdrubal, and hunt him out of his lurking-holes. What else can we think, that remember the last news of him, and how fearfully he mistrusted his own safety? They find him, and Mago, and Amilcar the son of Bomilcar, with an army of threescore thousand men, besieging Illiturgi; (which the learned Ortelius and others probably conjecture to have stood where Carinnena is now, in the kingdom of Arragon; for there was Illiturgis, afterward called Forum Julii, quite another way,) a town of the Illergetes, their nearest neighbours, for having revolted

[p] Liv. l. 23.

unto the Romans. The town is greatly distressed; but most of all with want of victuals. The Romans therefore break through between the enemy's camps with terrible slaughter of all that resist them; and, having victualled the place, encourage the townsmen to defend their walls as stoutly, as they should anon behold them fighting manfully with the besiegers in their behalf[q]. So they issue forth, about sixteen thousand against threescore thousand; and killing more of the enemies than themselves were in number, drive all the three Carthaginian commanders every one out of his quarter; and take that day, besides prisoners and other booty, fifty and eight ensigns. The Carthaginian army, being thus beaten from Illiturgi, fall upon Incibili, that stood a little southward from the mouth of Iberus. The Spaniards are blamed, as too greedy of earning money by war, for thus reinforcing the broken Carthaginians. But it may be wondered whence the Carthaginians had money to pay them; since Asdrubal was lately driven to poll the country, wanting money of his own; and being beaten in this journey, had lost his wealthy carriages when his camp was taken after the battle by Ibera. Howsoever it happens, the Carthaginians (according to their custom) are beaten again at Incibili; where there are of them above [r]thirteen thousand slain, and above three thousand taken, besides two and forty ensigns and nine elephants. After this, (in a manner,) all the people of Spain fell from them unto the Romans. Thus could Fabius, Valerius, Antias, or some other historian, to whom Livy gave credit, conquer all Spain twice in one year, by winning famous victories; whereof these good captains, P. and Cn. Scipio, perhaps were not aware.

The Romans, notwithstanding this large access of dominion, winter on their own side of Iberus. In the beginning of the next year great armies of the Spaniards rise against Asdrubal, and are overthrown by him. P. Scipio, to help these his friends, is forced to make great haste over the river. At Castrum Altum, a place in the midway between

[q] Liv. l. 23. [r] Ibid.

New Carthage and Saguntum, famous by the death of the great Amilcar, P. Scipio encampeth, and stores the place with victuals, being strong and defensible; as intending to make it his seat for a while. But the country round about is too full of enemies: the Carthaginian horse have charged the Romans in their march, and are gone off clear; falling also upon some stragglers, or such as lagged behind their fellows in march, they have cut off two thousand of them. Hereupon it is thought behoveful to retire unto some place more assured: so Pub. withdraws himself unto Mons Victoriæ, that, rising somewhat eastward from Incibili, overlooks the southern outlet of Iberus. Thither the Carthaginians pursue him; his brother Cn. repairs unto him, and Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, with a full army, arrives to help his companions. As they lie thus near encamped together, P. Scipio, with some light-armed, going closely to view the places thereabouts, is discovered by the enemies; who are like to take him, but that he withdraws himself to an high piece of ground; where they besiege him, until his brother Cn. fetch him off. After this, (but I know not why,) Castulo, a great city of Spain, whence Hannibal had taken him a wife, joineth with the Romans; though being far distant from them, and seated on the head of the river Bœtis. Nevertheless, the Carthaginians pass over Iberus, to besiege Illiturgi again, wherein lodgeth a Roman garrison, hoping to win it by famine. We may justly wonder what should move them to neglect the rebellion of Castulo, yea and the Roman army lying so close by them, and to seek adventures further off, in that very place wherein they had been so grievously beaten the year before. But thither they go, and thither follows them Cn. Scipio with one legion; who enters the town by force, breaks out upon them the next day, and in two battles kills above twelve thousand, and takes more than a thousand of them prisoners, with six and thirty ensigns. This victory, doubtless, is remarkable; considering that the greatest Roman legion at this time consisted of no more than five thousand men. The vanquished Carthaginians besiege Bigarra; but that

siege is also raised by Cn. Scipio. Thence the Carthaginians remove to Munda, where the Romans are soon at their heels. There is a great battle fought, that lasteth four hours, wherein the Romans get a notable victory; and a more notable would have gotten, had not Cn. Scipio been wounded. Thirty-nine elephants are killed, and twelve thousand men; three thousand prisoners taken, and seven and fifty ensigns. The Carthaginians fly to Auringes, and the Romans pursue them. Cn. Scipio in a litter is carried into the field, and vanquisheth the Carthaginians again, but kills not half so many of them as before; good cause why, for there are fewer of them left to fight[s]. Notwithstanding all these overthrows, the Spaniards, a people framed even by nature to set war on foot, quickly fill up the broken troops of Asdrubal; who, having also hired some of the Gauls, adventures once more to try his fortune with the Romans. But he is beaten again, and loseth eight thousand of his men, besides prisoners, elephants, ensigns, and other appurtenances. After so many victories, the Romans are even ashamed to leave Saguntum enthralled unto the Carthaginians; since, in behalf of that city, they had at first entered into this war. And well may we think it strange, that they had not recovered it long before, since we may remember, that long before this they had won all the country once and again. But it must not be forgotten that they had ere now besieged Saguntum, and were fain (as appears) to go their way without it; so as they need not to blush, for having so long forborne to do that which ere now they had attempted, but were unable to perform. At the present they win Saguntum, and restore the possession thereof unto such of the poor dispersed citizens as they can find out. They also waste and destroy the country of the Turdetani, that had ministered unto Hannibal matter of quarrel against the Saguntines. This last action, questionless, was much to their honour; and wherein we may be assured that the Carthaginians would have disturbed them, if they had been able.

[s] Liv. l. 24.

But overlooking now this long continuance of great victories which the Romans have gotten in Spain, other print or token of all their brave exploits we can perceive none, than this recovery of Saguntum, excepting the stopping of Asdrubal's journey; which was indeed of greatest importance, but appertaining to their own defence. For they have landed at Emporiæ, an haven town, built and peopled by a colony of the Phocæans, kin to the Massilians, friends to the Romans: they have easily won to their party, lost, recovered, and lost again, some petty bordering nations of the Spaniards, that are carried one while by persuasion, other whiles by force, and sometimes by their own unsettled passions; and now finally they have won a town, whereof the Carthaginians held entire possession, who had rooted out the old inhabitants. Wherefore we may easily believe, that when they took Saguntum, (if they took it not by surprise; which is to be suspected, since in this action we find no particulars remembered, as when the same place was taken by Hannibal,) they had gotten the better of their enemies in some notable fight. In like sort also must we think, that all those battles lately remembered, after every one of which Asdrubal sat down before some place that had rebelled, or seemed ready to rebel, were prosperous unto the Carthaginians. For it is not the custom of armies vanquished to carry the war from town to town, and beleaguer cities of their enemies; but to fortify themselves within their own places of strength, and therein to attend the levy and arrival of new supplies. And surely, if the Romans had been absolute masters of the field when they won Saguntum, they would not have consumed a whole year following in practising only with the Celtiberians, the next adjoining people: yet made they this little less than two years' business. Of these Celtiberians we hear before, that they have yielded up themselves unto the Romans; for security of their faith given hostages to Scipio; and, at his appointment, made war against the Carthaginians with their proper forces. Wherefore it is strange, that they are now thus hardly wrought; and, not without express condition of a great

sum, hired to serve in the Roman camp. How this may hold together, I cannot perceive; unless perhaps in those days it were the Roman custom, or rather the custom of some bad author whom Livy follows, to call every messenger, or straggler, that entered their camp, an hostage of that people from whom he came.

The Celtiberians at length, hired with great rewards, send an army of thirty thousand to help the Romans; out of which three hundred the fittest men are chosen, and carried into Italy, there to deal with their countrymen that follow Hannibal in his wars. But if any of these three hundred return back into Spain, it is to be feared that he brings with him such news of the riches and welfare of Hannibal's men, that all his fellows at home are the less unwilling to follow Asdrubal, when he shall next have a desire to lead them into Italy. Hereof we find more than probability, when these mercenary Celtiberians meet the Carthaginian army in the field. The two Scipios, presuming on this access of strength, divide their forces, and seek out the enemy's, who lie not far off with three armies. Asdrubal, the son of Amilcar, is nearest at hand, even among the Celtiberians at Anitorgis. With him Cn. Scipio doubts not to take good order; but the fear is, that this one part of the Carthaginian forces being destroyed, Mago, and Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, hearing the news, will make use of their distance, which is five days' march, and, by running into the furthest parts of the country, save themselves from being overtaken. Publius therefore must make the more haste, and take with him the better soldiers, that is, two parts of the old Roman army; leaving the third part, and all the Celtiberians to his brother. He that hath the longer journey to make comes somewhat the sooner to his life's end. Mago, and Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, are not studying how to run away; they find no such necessity. They join their forces together, meet with P. Scipio, and lay at him so hardly, that he is driven to keep himself close within his trenches; wherein he thinks himself not well assured. Especially he is vexed by Masanissa,

prince of the Massæsyli, Numidians bordering upon Mauritania, in the region called now Tremizen; to whom the chief honour of this service is ascribed, for that he becomes afterward confederate with the Romans. In this dangerous case, P. Scipio gets intelligence, that Indibilis, a Spanish prince, is coming with seven thousand and five hundred of the Suessetani, to join with his enemies. Fearing therefore to be strait shut up and besieged, he issues forth by night, to meet with Indibilis upon the way; leaving T. Fonteius, his lieutenant, with a small company, to defend the camp. He meets with Indibilis; but is not able, according to his hope, to defeat him at the first encounter. The fight continues so long, that the Numidian horse appear, (whom he thought to have been ignorant of his departure,) and fall upon the Romans on all sides; neither are the Carthaginians far behind, but come so fast upon him in rear, that P. Scipio, uncertain which way to turn, yet fighting, and animating his men where need most requireth, is struck through with a lance, and slain; very few of his army escaping the same destiny, through benefit of the dark night. The like end hath Cn. Scipio within nine and twenty days after. At his meeting with Asdrubal, the Celtiberian mercenaries all forsake him; pretending that they had war in their own country. If Anitorgis, where Asdrubal then lay, were as Ortelius, following Beuterus, takes it, a Celtiberian town, this was no vain pretence, but an apparent truth. But we may justly believe that they were won by Asdrubal, and easily persuaded to take as much money for not fighting, as they should have had for hazarding their lives. Cn. Scipio therefore, being unable to stay them, and no less unable, without their help, either to resist the enemy or to join with his brother, makes a very violent retreat; herein only differing from plain flight, that he keeps his men together. Asdrubal presseth hard upon him; and Mago, with Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, having made an end of Publius, hasten to despatch his brother after him. Scipio steals from them all by night; but is overtaken the next day by their horse, and arrested in an open place of

hard stony ground, where grows not so much as a shrub, unfit for defence of his legions against such enemies. Yet a little hill he finds, of easy ascent on every side, which he takes for want of a more commodious place, and fortifies with pack-saddles, and other luggage, for default of a better palisado. These weak defences the Carthaginians soon tear in sunder, and, breaking in on all hands, leave very few of them alive; that saving themselves, I know not how, within some woods adjoining, escape unto T. Fonteius, whom Publius had left in his camp, as is before said. It is a terrible overthrow, they say, out of which no man escapes. Yet how they that were thus hemmed in on every side, in so bare a ground as afforded not a shrub to cover them, could break out and shroud themselves within woods adjoining, I should much wonder, did not a greater miracle following call away mine attention. T. Fonteius is in P. Scipio's camp, on the north side of Iberus, fearful (as may be supposed) of his own life; since his general, with two parts of the Roman army, had little hope to remain long safe within it. Thither comes L. Martius, a young Roman gentleman of a notable spirit, who, having gathered together the scattered soldiers, and drawn some companies out of their garrisons, makes a pretty army. The soldiers being to choose a general by most voices, prefer this L. Martius before Fonteius the lieutenant; as well they may. For Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo, coming upon them, this L. Martius so encourageth his men, (fondly weeping when he led them forth, upon remembrance of their more honourable generals lately slain,) and admonisheth them of their present necessity, that he beats the Carthaginians into their trenches. A notable victory perhaps he might have gotten, but that he wisely sounds the retreat; reserving the fury of his soldiers to a greater occasion. The Carthaginians are at first amazed, and wonder whence this new boldness grows in enemies lately vanquished, and now again little better than taken: but when they see that the Roman dares not follow his advantage, they return to their former security; and, utterly despising him, set neither *corps du*

garde, nor sentinel, but rest secure, as if no enemy were near. Martius therefore animates his soldiers with lively words; and tells them, that there is no adventure more safe, than that which is furthest from suspicion of being undertaken. They are soon persuaded to follow him, in any desperate piece of service: so he leads them forth by night, and steals upon the camp of Asdrubal; where finding no guard, but the enemies fast asleep, or very drowsy, he enters without resistance, fires their cabins, and gives a terrible alarm; so that all affrighted, the Carthaginians run headlong one upon another, they know not which way. All passages out of their camp Martius hath prepossessed, so that there is no way to escape, save by leaping down the rampart; which as many do as can think upon it, and run away toward the camp of Asdrubal, the son of Amilcar, that lay six miles off. But Martius hath waylaid them. In a valley between their two camps he hath bestowed a Roman cohort, and I know not what number of horse; so that into this ambush they fall every one, and are cut in pieces. But lest perchance any should have escaped, and give the alarm before his coming, Martius hastens to be there as soon as they. By which diligent speed, he comes early in the morning upon this further camp, which with no great difficulty he enters; and, partly by force, partly by apprehension of danger which the enemies conceived, when they beheld the Roman shields, foul and bloodied with their former execution, he drives headlong into flight all that can save themselves from the fury of the sword. Thirty-seven thousand of the enemies perish in this night's work; besides a thousand eight hundred and thirty, that are taken prisoners. Hereunto Valerius Antias adds, that the camp of Mago was also taken, and seven thousand slain: and that in another battle with Asdrubal there were slain ten thousand more, besides four thousand three hundred and thirty taken prisoners. Such is the power of some historians. Livy therefore hath elsewhere well observed, that there is none so intemperate as Valerius Antias, in multiplying the numbers that have fallen in battles. That,

whilst Martius was making an oration to his soldiers, a flame of fire shone about his head, Livy reporteth as a common tale, not giving thereto any credit; and temperately concludeth, that this captain Martius got a great name; which he might well do, if with so small forces, and in such distress, he could clearly get off from the enemies, and give them any parting blow, though it were far less than that which is here set down.

Of these occurrents L. Martius sent word to Rome, not forgetting his own good service, whatsoever it was, but setting it out in such wise, as the senate might judge him worthy to hold the place of their vicegerent in Spain; which the better to intimate unto them, he styled himself *propretor*. The fathers were no less moved with the tidings than the case required; and therefore took such careful order for supplying their forces in Spain, that although Hannibal came to the gates of Rome ere the companies levied to serve in that province could be sent away; yet would they not stay a tide for defence of the city itself, but shipped them in all haste for Spain. As for that title of propretor, which Martius had assumed, they thought it too great for him, and were offended at his presumption in usurping it; foreseeing well, that it was a matter of ill consequence to have the soldiers abroad make choice, among themselves, of those that should command armies and provinces. Therefore C. Claudius Nero was despatched away, with all convenient haste, into Spain; carrying with him about six thousand of the Roman foot, and as many of the Latins, with three hundred Roman horse, and of the Latins eight hundred.

It happened well, that about these times the affairs of Rome began to prosper in Italy, and afforded means of sending abroad such a strong supply; otherwise the victories of Martius would ill have served, either to keep footing in Spain, or to stop the Carthaginian armies from marching towards the Alps. For when Claudius, landing with his new forces, took charge of that remainder of the army which was under Martius and Fonteius, he found surer tokens of the overthrows received, than of those miraculous

victories whereof Martius had made his vaunts unto the senate. The Roman party was forsaken by most of the Spanish friends; whom how to reclaim, it could not easily be devised. Yet Claudius advanced boldly towards Asdrubal, the brother of Hannibal, whom he found among the Ausetani, near enough at hand, encamped in a place called Lapides Atri; out of which there was no issue, but only through a strait, whereon the Roman seized at his first coming. What should have tempted any man of understanding to encamp in such a place, I do not find; and as little reason can I find in that which followed. For it is said that Asdrubal, seeing himself thus locked up, made offer to depart forthwith out of Spain, and quit the province to the Romans, upon condition that he and his army might be thence dismissed; that he spent many days in entertaining parley with Claudius about this business; that night by night he conveyed his footmen (a few at a time) through very difficult passages, out of the danger; and that finally taking advantage of a misty day, he stole away with all his horse and elephants, leaving his camp empty. If we consider that there were at the same time, besides this Asdrubal, two other Carthaginian generals in Spain, we shall find no less cause to wonder at the simplicity of Claudius, who hoped to conclude a bargain for so great a country with one of these three chieftains, than at the strange nature of those passages, through which the footmen could hardly creep out by night; the horse and elephants easily following them in a dark misty day. Wherefore in giving belief to such a tale, it is needful that we suppose, both the danger wherein the Carthaginians were, and the conditions offered for their safe departure, to have been of far less value. Howsoever it was, neither this, nor ought else that the Romans could do, served to purchase any new friends in Spain, or to recover the old which they had lost. Like enough it is, that the old soldiers, which had chosen Martius their propretor, took it not well, that the senate, regardless of their good deserts, had repealed their election, and sent a propretor whom they fancied not so well. Some such occa-

derly than was requisite. Yet it might have been well enough defended, if some fishermen of Tarracon had not discovered unto Scipio a secret passage unto the walls; whereof the townsmen themselves were either ignorant, or thought (at least) that their enemies could have no notice. This city of New Carthage resembled the old and great Carthage in situation; standing upon a demi-island, between an haven and a great lake. All the western side of the walls, and somewhat of the north, was fenced with this lake, which the fishermen of Tarracon had sounded; and finding in some part thereof a shelf, whereon at low water men might pass knee-deep, or (at most) wading up to the navel, Scipio thrust thereinto some companies of his men, who recovered the top of the walls without resistance; the place being left without guard, as able to defend itself by the natural strength. These falling suddenly upon the backs of the Carthaginians within the city, easily forced a gate, and gave free entrance to the Roman army. What booty was found within the town, Livy himself cannot certainly affirm; but is fain to say, that some Roman historians told lies without measure, in way of amplification. By that small proportion of riches which was afterward carried by Scipio into the Roman treasury, we may easily perceive how great a vanity it was to say, that all the wealth of Afric and Spain was heaped up in that one town. But therein were bestowed all the Spanish hostages, (or at least of the adjoining provinces,) whom Scipio entreated with singular courtesy; restoring them unto their kindred and friends in such gracious manner, as doubled the thanks due to so great a benefit. Hereupon a prince of the Celtiberians, and two petty kings of the Illergetes and Lacetani, nearest neighbours to Tarracon, and dwelling on the north side of Iberus, forsook the Carthaginian party, and joined with the Romans. The speech of Indibilis, king of the Illergetes, is much commended; for that he did not vaunt himself, as commonly fugitives use, of the pleasure which he did unto the Romans in revolting from their enemies; but rather excused this his changing side, as being thereto

compelled by injuries of the Carthaginians, and invited by the honourable dealing of Scipio. This temperate estimation of his new professed friendship was indeed no unsure token that it should be long lasting. But if the Illergetes had long ere this (as we have heard before) forsaken the Carthaginian party, and stoutly held themselves as friends to Cn. Scipio, then could nothing have been devised more vain, than this oration of Indibilis their king; excusing, as new, his taking part with the same, when he should have rather craved pardon for his breach of alliance, formerly contracted with the father and the uncle. Most likely therefore it is, that howsoever the two elder Scipios had gotten some few places among these their neighbours, and held them by strength; yet were the Romans never masters of the country, till this worthy commander, by recovering their hostages from the Carthaginians, and by his great munificence in sending them home, won unto himself the assured love and assistance of these princes. The Carthaginian generals, when they heard of this loss, were very sorry; yet nevertheless they set a good face on the matter, saying, that a young man having stolen a town by surprise, was too far transported and overjoyed; but that shortly they would meet with him, and put him in mind of his father and uncle; which would alter his mood, and bring him to a more convenient temper.

Now, if I should here interpose mine own conjecture, I should be bold to say, that the Carthaginians were at this time busy in setting forth towards Italy, and that Scipio, to divert them, undertook New Carthage, as his father and uncle upon the like occasion sat down before Ibera. And in this respect I would suppose, that it had not been much amiss, if the passage over the lake had been undiscovered, and the town held out some longer while. For howsoever that particular action was the more fortunate in coming to such good issue upon the first day, yet in the generality of the business between Rome and Carthage, it was more to be wished, that Asdrubal should be stayed from going into Italy, than that half of Spain should be taken from him.

Whereas therefore he had nothing left to do that should hinder his journey, Mago, and Asdrubal the son of Gisgo, were thought sufficient to hold Scipio work in that lingering war of taking and retaking towns, whilst the main of the Carthaginian forces, under Asdrubal the son of Amilcar, went to a greater enterprise, even to fight in trial of the empire. But the Roman historians tell this after another fashion, and say, that Asdrubal was beaten into Italy, whither he ran for fear, as thinking himself ill assured of the Spaniards, as long as they might but hear the name of Scipio. Scipio, say they, coming upon Asdrubal, his vancouriers charged so lustily the Carthaginian horse, that they drave them into their trenches; and made it apparent, even by that small piece of service, how full of spirit the Roman army was, and how dejected the enemy. Asdrubal therefore by night retired out of that even ground, and occupied an hill compassed on three sides with a river, very steep of ascent, and not easy of access on the foreside; by which himself got up, and was to be followed by the Romans. On the top of it there was a plain, whereon he strongly encamped himself; and in the midway between the top and root of the hill was also another plain, into which he descended, more upon bravery, that he might not seem to hide himself within his trenches, than for that he durst adventure his army to the hazard of a battle, for which this was no equal ground. But such advantage of place could not save him from the Romans. They climbed up the hill to him, they recovered even footing with him, drove him out of this lower plain up into his camp on the hill-top; whither although the ascent were very difficult, and his elephants bestowed in the smoothest places to hinder their approach, yet compassing about, and seeking passage where it was hardest to be found, but much more strongly breaking their way where the Carthaginians had got up before them, they drave both men and elephants headlong I know not whither; for it is said, that there was no way to fly. Out of such a battle, wherein he lost eight thousand men, Asdrubal is said to have escaped, and, gathering together

his dispersed troops, to have marched towards the Pyrenees, having sent away his elephants ere the fight began. Nevertheless Mago, and Asdrubal the son of Gisgon, are reported after this to have consulted with him about this war, and finally to have concluded, that go he needs must, were it but to carry all the Spaniards as far as might be from the name of Scipio. How likely this was to have been true, it shall appear at his coming into Italy, whence these incoherent relations of the Spanish affairs have too long detained us.

SECT. XII.

The great troubles that Hannibal raised in all quarters to the city of Rome. Posthumius the Roman general, with his whole army, is slain by the Gauls. Philip king of Macedon enters into a league with Hannibal against the Romans. The Romans, joining with the Ætolians, make war upon Philip in Greece; and afterwards conclude a peace with him, the better to intend their business against the Carthaginians.

WE left Hannibal wintering at Capua, where he and his new confederates rejoiced (as may be thought) not a little, to hear the good news from Carthage of such mighty aid, as was decreed to be sent thence unto him. In former times he had found work enough to carry the Romans' corn into his own barns, and to drive away their cattle to Geryon; his victories affording him little other profit than sustenance for his army, by making him master of the open field. He might perhaps have forced some walled towns, in like sort as he did Geryon and the castle of Cannæ; but had he spent much time about the getting of any one place well defended, the hunger that his army must have endured the winter and spring following, until corn were ripe, would have grievously punished him for such employment of the summer. This may have been the reason why he forbore to adventure upon Rome after his victory at Cannæ. For had he failed (as it was a matter of no certainty) to carry the city at his first coming, want of victuals would have compelled him to quit the enterprise. Yea many of the people that opened so hastily their gates unto him, upon

the fresh bruit of his glorious success, would have taken time of deliberation, and waited perhaps the event of another battle; if being, either for want of means to force the city, or of necessaries to continue a siege before it, repelled (as might seem) from the walls of Rome, he had presented himself unto them with a lessened reputation, somewhat later in the year, when time to force their obedience was wanting, unless they would freely yield it. But this great part of the care and travail was past, when so many states of Italy were become his; the year following, the Samnites, and other old enemies of Rome, were like to receive a notable pleasure of their new alliance with Carthage, by helping to lay siege unto that proud city, which so long had held them in subjection. Thus the winter was passed over joyfully, saving that there came not any tidings of the preparations, to second the welcome report of those mighty forces that were decreed and expected. The spring drew on; and of the promised supply there arrived no more, than only the elephants. How late it was ere these came, I find not; only we find, that after this he had above thirty of them; whereas all, save one, that he brought over the Alps, had been lost in his journey through the marishes of Hetruria. Very bad excuse of this exceeding negligence they that brought the elephants could make unto Hannibal. If they were his friends, they told him truly what mischiefs the persuasion of Hanno wrought among the too niggardly Carthaginians. Otherwise, they might perhaps inform him, that it was thought a safer, though a further way about, to pass along through Spain and Gaul, as he himself had done, and increase the army by hiring the Barbarians in the journey, than to commit the main strength of their city to the hazard of the seas; especially wanting a commodious haven to receive the fleet that should carry such a number of men, horses, and elephants, with all needful provisions. With these allegations Hannibal must rest content, and seek, as well as he can, to satisfy his Italian confederates. Therefore, when time of the year served, he took the field; and having finished what rested to be done at Casilinum,

sought to make himself master of some good haven-town thereabout, that might serve to entertain the Carthaginian fleet, or take from his enemies at home all excuse which they might pretend by want thereof. To the same purpose, and to do what else was needful, he sent Himilco unto the Locrians, and Hanno to the Lucans; not forgetting at once to assay all quarters of Italy, yea the isles of Sicily and Sardinia, since the siege of Rome must needs be deferred unto another year. Hanno made an ill journey of it, being met, or overtaken, by T. Sempronius Longus, who slew about two thousand of his men, with the loss of fewer than three hundred Romans. But Himilco sped far better: by help of the Brutians, his good friends, he won Petellia, or Petilia, by force, after it had held out some months. He won likewise Consentia, and Croton, that was forsaken by the inhabitants. Also the city of Locri, which was of great importance, yielded unto him; as did all other places thereabout, except only the town of Rhegium, over against Sicily.

The great faith of the Petilians is worthy to be recorded, as a notable testimony of the good government under which the Roman subjects lived. As for the Samnites, Campans, and others, whose earnestness in rebellion may seem to prove the contrary, we are to consider, that they had lately contended with Rome for sovereignty, and were now transported with ambition, which reason can hardly moderate, or benefits allay. The Petilians, in the very beginning of their danger, did send to Rome for help; where their messengers received answer from the senate, that the public misfortunes had not left means to relieve their associates that were so far distant. The Petilian messengers (ambassadors they are termed, as were all others publicly sent from cities of the Roman subjection that had a private jurisdiction within themselves) fell down to the ground, and humbly besought the fathers not to give them away, promising to do and suffer whatsoever was possible in defence of their town against the Carthaginians. Hereupon the senate fell to consultation again, and having

throughly considered all their forces remaining, plainly confessed, that it was not in their power to give any relief. Wherefore these ambassadors were willed to return home, and to bid their citizens provide hereafter for their own safety, as having already discharged their faith to the utmost. All this notwithstanding, the Petilians (as was said) held out some months; and, having striven in vain to defend themselves when there was no apparent possibility, gave to the Carthaginians a bloody victory over them, being vanquished as much by famine as by any violence of the assailants.

The Romans at this time were indeed in such ill case, that Hannibal, with a little help from Carthage, might have reduced them into terms of great extremity. For whereas in a great bravery, before their loss at Cannæ, they had shewed their high minds by entertaining the care of things far off, notwithstanding the great war that lay upon them so near at hand; it now fell out miserably all at once, that their fortune abroad was no wit better than at home. L. Posthumius Albinus, their pretor, they had sent, with an army of five and twenty thousand, into Gaul; to the Illyrian king Pineus they had sent for their tribute due, whereof the pay-day was past, willing him, if he desired forbearance, to deliver hostages for his performance of what was due; and to Philip king of Macedon, they had sent, to require that he should deliver up unto them Demetrius Pharius, their subject and rebel, whom he had received. But now from all quarters they hear tidings little suitable to their former glorious conceits. Posthumius, with all his army, was cut in pieces by the Gauls, in such sort that scarce ten men escaped. The manner of his overthrow was very strange. There was a great wood, called by the Gauls Litana, through which he was to pass: against his coming, the enemies had sawed the trees so far, that a little force would serve to cast them down. When therefore Posthumius, with his whole army, was entered into this dangerous passage, the Gauls, that lay about the wood, began to cast down the trees; which, falling one against another, bore all down so

fast, that the Romans were overwhelmed, men and horses, in such wise, that no more escaped than is said before. How this tedious work of sawing so many trees could take desired effect, and neither be perceived nor made frustrate, either by some wind that might have blown all down before the Romans entered, or by some other of those many accidents, whereto the device was subject, I do not well conceive: yet some such thing may have been done, and what failed in the stratagem, supplied with the enemy's sword. It is not perhaps worthy to be omitted, as a monument of the savage condition wherewith Lombardy, a country now so civil, was infected in elder times, that of Posthumius's skull, being cleansed and trimmed up with gold, a drinking cup was made, and consecrated in their principal temple, as an holy vessel for the use of the priest in their solemnities. Of this great overthrow when word was brought to Rome, the amazement was no less than the calamity. But sorrow could give no remedy to the mischief; and anger was vain, where there wanted forces to revenge. Tribute from the Illyrians there came none, neither do I find that any was a second time demanded; this we find, that with Pleuratus and Scerdiletus, Illyrian kings, as also with Gentius, who reigned within a few years following, the Romans dealt upon even terms, entreating their assistance against Philip and Perseus, not commanding their duty as vassals. The Macedonian troubled them yet a little further. For having assured his affairs in Greece, and enjoying leisure to look into the doings abroad, he sent ambassadors to Hannibal, with whom he made a league, upon these conditions, that the king in person should come into Italy, and with all his forces, by land and sea, assist the Carthaginians in the Roman war until it were finished; that Rome and all Italy, together with all the spoil therein to be gotten, should be left entire unto the state of Carthage; and that afterwards Hannibal with his army should pass into Greece, and there assist Philip, until he had subdued all his enemies, (which were the Ætolians, Thracians, king Antiochus, and others,) leaving semblably unto him the full possession

of that country, and the isles adjoining. But such predisposition of kingdoms and provinces is lightly controlled by the divine providence, which therein shews itself not (as Herodotus falsely terms it, and like an atheist) envious or malicious, but very just and majestical, in upholding that unspeakable greatness of sovereignty by which it rules the whole world, and all that therein is.

The first ambassadors that Philip sent, fell into the Romans' hands, in their journey towards Hannibal; and being examined what they were, adventured upon a bold lie, saying, that they were sent from the king of Macedon to Rome, there to make a league with the senate and people, and offer his help in this time of great necessity. These news were so welcome, that the joy thereof took away all care of making better inquiry. So they were lovingly feasted, and friendly dismissed, with guides that should lead them the way, and shew them how to avoid the Carthaginians. But they, being thus instructed concerning their journey, fell wilfully into the camp of Hannibal, who entertained them after a better fashion; and concluded the business about which they came, upon the points before remembered. In their return homeward, they happened again unluckily to be descried by the Roman fleet; which, mistrusting them to be of the Carthaginian party, gave them chase. They did their best to have escaped: but, being overtaken, they suffered the Romans to come aboard; and trusting to the lie that once had served them, said it again, that, having been sent from king Philip to make a league with the people of Rome, they were not able, by reason of the Carthaginians lying between, to get any further than to M. Valerius the pretor, unto whom they had signified the good affection of the king their master. The tale was now less credible than before; and (which marred all) Gisgo, Bostar, and Mago, with their followers, Carthaginians that were sent with them from Hannibal to ratify the agreement, being presently detected, made the matter apparent. Wherefore a little inquisition served to find all out; so that at length Hannibal's own letters to king Philip were delivered up,

and the whole business confessed. The ambassadors and their followers were sent close prisoners to Rome; where the chief of them were cast into prison, and the rest sold for bondslaves. Yet one of their ships, that escaped, carried word into Macedon of all that had happened. Whereupon a new embassage was sent, that went and returned with better speed; concluding as was agreed before, only with some loss of time.

The Romans were exceedingly perplexed; thinking with what heavy weight this Macedonian war, in an evil hour, was likely to fall upon them; when their shoulders were overburdened with the load of the Carthaginian. Yet they took a noble resolution; and suitable unto that, whereby they kept off the storm that else would have beaten upon them from Spain. They judged it more easy with small forces to detain Philip in Greece, than with all their strength to resist him in Italy. And herein they were in the right: for that the very reputation of a king of Macedon joining with Hannibal in such a time, would have sufficed to shake the allegiance, not only of the Latins, and other their most faithful subjects, but even of the Roman colonies that held all privileges of the city, it will appear by the following success of things. M. Valerius the pretor, with twenty *quinquereme* galleys, was appointed to attend upon the Macedonian, and to set on foot some commotion in Greece, or to nourish the troubles already therein begun. Philip was busy about the sea-towns that looked towards Italy, setting upon Apollonia, and thence falling upon Oricum; which he won, and so returned to Apollonia again. The Epirots craved help of M. Valerius, or rather accepted his kind offers, who had none other business to do. The garrison that Philip had left in Oricum was strong enough to hold the townsmen in good order, but not to keep out the Romans; of whose daring to attempt any thing against him, on that side the sea, Philip as then had no suspicion. Valerius therefore easily regained the town, and sent thence a thousand men under Nævius Crispus, an undertaking and expert captain, which got by night into Apollonia. These

made a notable sally; and brake into Philip's trenches with so great slaughter, that they forced him to forsake his camp, and raise the siege. The king purposed (as it is said) to have departed thence by sea; but Valerius, coming with his fleet from Oricum, stopped up the mouth of the river; so that he was fain to burn his ships, (which belike were no better than long boats,) and depart ill-furnished of carriages, by land. After this, Valerius dealt with the Ætolians, a nation always enemy to the crown of Macedon; and easily persuaded them (being so affected, as hath elsewhere been shewed) to make strong war on Philip, wherein he promised them great assistance from the Romans. That which most moved the troublesome spirits of the Ætolians was the hope of getting Acarnania; after which they had gaped long, and whereof the Roman was as liberal in making promise, as if already it had been his own. So a league was made between them, and afterward solemnly published at Olympia by the Ætolians, and by the Romans in their Capitol. The conditions were, that from Ætolia to Corcyra, in which space Acarnania was contained, all the country should be subdued, and left unto the Ætolians; the pillage only to be given to the Romans: and that if the Ætolians made peace with Philip, it should be with provision, to hold no longer, than whilst he abstained from doing injury to the Romans, or their associates. This was indeed the only point whereat Valerius aimed; who promised as much on the Romans' behalf, that they should not make peace with the Macedonian, unless it were with like condition of including the Ætolians. Into this league was place reserved for the Lacedæmonians and Eleans, as to those that had made or favoured the side of Cleomenes against the Macedonian, to enter at their pleasure. The like regard was had of Attalus, Pleuratus, and Scerdiletus; the first of which reigned at Pergamos, in Asia the Less, a prince hereafter much to be spoken of; the other two held some part of Illyria, about which the Romans were so far from contending with them, that gladly they sought to get their friendly acquaintance. But the names of these asso-

ciates are thrust into the treaty, rather to give it countenance, than for any readiness which they disclose to enter thereinto. The Ætolians alone, and chiefly Scopas their pretor, with Dorymachus and others, are yet a while the only men, of whom the Roman generals must make much; as the late French king, Henry the Fourth, when he had only the title of Navarre, was said to court the majors of Rochel. Philip was not idle, when he heard whereunto the Ætolians tended. He repaired his army, made a countenance of war upon the Illyrians, and other his borderers, that were wont in times of danger to infest the kingdom of Macedon; wasted the country about Oricum and Apollonia, and overrunning the Pelagonians, Dardanians, and others, whom he held suspected, came down into Thessaly, whence he made show as if he would invade Ætolia. By the fame of this expedition he thought to stir up all the Greeks adjoining against the Ætolians; whom they generally detested as a nest of robbers, troublesome to all the country. To which purpose, and to hinder the Ætolians from breaking into Greece, he left Perseus his son and heir, with four thousand men, upon their borders; with the rest of his army, before greater business should overtake and entangle him, he made a long journey into Thrace, against a people called the Medes, that were wont to fall upon Macedon whensoever the king was absent. The Ætolians, hearing of his departure, armed as many as they could against the Acarnanians, in hope to subdue those their daily enemies, and win their little country ere he should be able to return. Hereto it much availed, that the Romans had already taken Œniadæ and Naxos, Acarnanian towns, conveniently situated to let in an army; and consigned them unto the Ætolians, according to the tenor of the contract lately made with them. But the stout resolution of the Acarnanians to die (as we say) every mother's son of them in defence of their country, together with the great haste of the Macedonian (who laid aside all other business) to succour these his friends, caused the Ætolians to forsake their enterprise. When this expedition was given over, the Ro-

mans and Ætolians fell upon Anticyræ, which they took; the Romans assailing it by sea, the Ætolians by land. The Ætolians had the town, and the Romans the spoil.

For these good services M. Valerius was chosen consul at Rome, and P. Sulpicius sent in his stead to keep the war on foot in Greece. But besides the Roman help Attalus out of Asia came over to assist the Ætolians. He was chiefly moved by his own jealousy of Philip's greatness, though somewhat also tickled with the vanity of being chosen by the Ætolians their principal magistrate; which honour, though no better than titulary, he took in very loving part. Against the forces which Attalus and the Romans had sent, being joined with the main power of Ætolia, Philip tried the fortune of two battles, and was victorious in each of them. Hereupon these his troublesome neighbours desired peace of him, and used their best means to get it. But when the day, appointed for the conclusion thereof, was come, their ambassadors, instead of making submission, proposed unto him such intolerable conditions, as ill beseemed vanquished men to offer, and might therefore well testify that their minds were altered. It was not any love of peace, but fear of being besieged in their own towns, that had made them desirous of composition. This fear being taken away by the encouragements of Attalus and the Romans, they were as fierce as ever, and thrust a garrison of their own, and some Roman friends, into Elis, which threatened Achaia, wherein Philip then lay. The Romans, making a cut over the strait from Naupactus, wasted the country in a terrible bravery; wherein Philip requited them, coming upon them in haste from the Nemæan games, (which he was then celebrating,) and sending them faster away, but nothing richer, than they came.

In the heat of this contention, Prusias king of Bithynia, fearing the growth of Attalus, no less than Attalus held suspected the power of Philip, sent a navy into Greece to assist the Macedonian party. The like did the Carthaginians, and upon greater reason; as being more interested in the success of his affairs. Philip was too weak by sea;

and though he could man some two hundred ships, yet the vessels were such as could not hold out against the Roman *quinqueremes;* wherefore it behoved him to use the help of his good friends the Carthaginians. But their aid came somewhat too late; which might better at first have kept those enemies from fastening upon any part of Greece, than afterwards it could serve to drive them out, when they had pierced into the bowels of that country. Ere Philip could attempt any thing by sea, it was needful that he should correct the Eleans, bad neighbours to the Achaians his principal confederates. But in assailing their town, he was encountered by the Ætolian and Roman garrison, which drave him back with some loss. In such cases, especially where God intends a great conversion of empire, fame is very powerful in working. The king had received no great detriment in his retreat from Elis; rather he had given testimony of his personal valour, in fighting well on foot, when his horse was slain under him. He had also soon after taken a great multitude of the Eleans, to the number of four thousand; with some twenty thousand head of cattle, which they had brought together into a place of safety, as they thought, when their country was invaded. But it had happened, that, in his pursuit of the Roman foragers about Sicyon, his horse, running hastily under a low tree, had torn off one of the horns which (after the fashion of those times) the king wore in his crest. This was gathered up by an Ætolian, who carried it home, and shewed it as a token of Philip's death. The horn was well known, and the tale believed. All Macedon therefore was in an uproar; and not only the borderers ready to fall upon the country, but some captains of Philip easily corrupted; who, thinking to make themselves a fortune in that change of things, ran into such treason, as they might better hope to make good than to excuse. Hereupon the king returned home, leaving not three thousand men to assist his friends the Achæans. He also took order to have beacons erected, that might give him notice of the enemy's doings; upon whom he meant shortly to return. The affairs of Macedon his

presence quickly established; but in Greece all went ill-favouredly; especially in the isle of Eubœa, where one Plator betrayed to Attalus and the Romans the town of Oreum, ere Philip could arrive to help it; where also the strong city of Chalcis was likely to have been lost, if he had not come the sooner. He made such hasty marches, that he had almost taken Attalus in the city of Opus. This city, lying over against Eubœa, Attalus had won, more through the cowardice of the people, than any great force that he had used. Now because the Roman soldiers had defrauded him in the sack of Oreum, and taken all to themselves, it was agreed that Attalus should make his best profit of the Opuntians, without admitting the Romans to be his sharers. But whilst he was busy in drawing as much money as he could out of the citizens, the sudden tidings of Philip's arrival made him leave all behind him, and run away to the sea-side, where he got aboard his ships; finding the Romans gone before upon the like fear. Either the indignity of this misadventure, or tidings of Prusias the Bithynian's invasion upon the kingdom of Pergamus, made Attalus return home, without staying to take leave of his friends. So Philip recovered Opus, won Torone, Tritonos, Drymus, and many small towns in those parts; performing likewise some actions, of more bravery than importance, against the Ætolians. In the mean season Machanidas, the tyrant of Lacedæmon, had been busy in Peloponnesus, but hearing of Philip's arrival, was returned home.

The Lacedæmonians, hearing certain report of Cleomenes's death in Egypt, went about to choose two new kings, and to conform themselves to their old manner of government. But their estate was so far out of tune, that their hope of redressing things within the city proved no less unfortunate, than had been their attempts of recovering a large dominion abroad. Lycurgus, a tyrant, rose up among them; unto whom succeeded this Machanidas, and shortly after came Nabis, that was worse than both of them. They held on the Ætolian and Roman side for fear of the Achæans, that were the chief confederates of Philip, and

hated extremely the name both of tyrant and of Lacedæmonian. But of these we shall speak more hereafter.

Philip entering into Achaia, and seeing his presence had brought the contentment of assurance to that country, spake brave words to the assembly of their states, saying, that he had to do with an enemy that was very nimble, and made war by running away. He told how he had followed them to Chalcis, to Oreum, to Opus, and now into Achaia; but could no where find them, such haste they made, for fear of being overtaken. But flight, he said, was not always prosperous; he should one day light upon them, as ere this he sundry times had done, and still to their loss. The Achaians were glad to hear these words, and much the more glad, in regard of his good deeds accompanying them. For he restored unto their nation some towns that were in his hand, belonging to them of old. Likewise to the Megalopolitans, their confederates, he rendered Aliphera. The Dymæans, that had been taken by the Romans, and sold for slaves, he sought out, ransomed, and put in quiet possession of their own city. Further, passing over the Corinthian gulf, he fell upon the Ætolians, whom he drave into the mountains and woods, or other their strongest holds, and wasted their country. This done, he took leave of the Achæans, and returning home by sea, visited the people that were his subjects or dependants, and animated them so well, that they rested fearless of any threatening danger. Then had he leisure to make war upon the Dardanians, ill neighbours to Macedon, with whom nevertheless he was not so far occupied, but that he could go in hand with preparing a fleet of an hundred galleys, whereby to make himself master of the sea; the Romans (since the departure of Attalus) having not dared to meet or pursue him, when he lately ran along the coast of Greece fast by them where they lay.

This good success added much reputation to the Macedonian, and emboldened him to make strong war upon the Ætolians at their own doors. As for the Romans, either some displeasure conceived against their confederates, or some fear of danger at home, when Asdrubal was ready to

fall upon Italy, caused them to give over the care of things in Greece, and leave their friends there to their own fortunes. The Ætolians therefore being driven to great extremity, were fain to sue for peace unto Philip, and accept it upon whatever conditions it best pleased him. The agreement was no sooner made, than P. Sempronius, with ten thousand foot, a thousand horse, and thirty-five galleys, came over in great haste (though somewhat too late) to trouble it. Hearing how things went in Ætolia, he turned aside to Dyrrachium and Apollonia, making a great noise, as if with these his own forces he would work wonders. But it was not long ere Philip came to visit him, and found him tame enough. The king presented him battle, but he refused it; and, suffering the Macedonians to waste the country round about before his eyes, kept himself close within the walls of Apollonia, making some overtures of peace, which caused Philip to return home quietly. The Romans had not so great cause to be displeased with the Ætolians, as had Philip to take in evil part the demeanour of the Carthaginians. For notwithstanding the royal offer that he made them, to serve their turn in Italy, and assist them in getting their hearts' desire, before he would expect any requital; they had not sent any fleet, as in reason they ought, and as (considering his want of sufficient ability by sea) it is likely they were bound, either to secure the transportation of his army, or to free his coast from the Roman and Ætolian piracies. Only once they came to his help, which was at his last journey into Achaia. But they were gone again before his arrival, having done nothing, and pretending fear of being taken by the Romans, even at such time as Philip, with his own navy, durst boldly pass by sea, and found none that durst oppose him. This retchless dealing of the Carthaginians may therefore seem to have been one of Hanno's tricks, whereof Hannibal so bitterly complained. For it could not but grieve this malicious man exceedingly, to hear that so great a king made offer to serve in person under Hannibal, and required the assistance of the same Hannibal, as of a man likely to make monarchs, and alter

the affairs of the world at his pleasure. Therefore he had reason, such as envy could suggest, to persuade the Carthaginians unto a safe and thrifty course, which was, not to admit into the fellowship of their Italian wars so mighty a prince, whom change of affection might make dangerous to their empire; or his much affection unto Hannibal more dangerous to their liberty. Rather they should do well to save charges, and feed the Macedonian with hopes, by making many promises of sending a fleet, and some other succours. This would cost nothing; yet would it serve to terrify the Romans, and compel them to send part of their forces from home, that might find this enemy work abroad: so should the Roman armies be lessened in Italy; and Philip, when once he was engaged in the war, be urged unto the prosecution, by his own necessity, putting the Carthaginians to little or no charges, yea scarce to the labour of giving him thanks. Now if it might come to pass, as Hannibal every day did promise, that Rome and all Italy should within a while be at the devotion of Carthage, better it were that the city should be free, so as the troublesome Greeks might address their complaints unto the Carthaginians, as competent judges between them and the Macedonian, than that Hannibal, with the power of Afric, should wait upon Philip, as his executioner, to fulfil his will and pleasure in doing such injuries as would both make the name of a Carthaginian hateful in Greece, and oblige Philip to be no less impudent in fulfilling all requests of Hannibal. Whether the counsel of Hanno and his fellows were such as this, or whether the Carthaginians, of their own disposition, without his advice, were too sparing and careless, the matter (as far as concerned Philip) came to one reckoning. For they did him no manner of good, but rather dodged with him, even in that little courtesy which they most pretended. And this perhaps was part of the reason why he began the building of an hundred galleys, as if he would let them and others know whereto his proper strength would have reached, had he not vainly given credit to faithless promises. When therefore the Ætolians had submitted

themselves already, and when the Romans desired his friendship, as might be thought, for very fear of him, with reputation enough, and not as a forsaken client of the Carthaginians, but a prince able to have succoured them in their necessity, he might give over the war, and, without reprehension, leave them to themselves. For he had wilfully entered into trouble for their sakes, but they despised him, as if the quarrel were merely his own, and he unable to manage it. The vanity of which their conceits would appear unto them, when they should see, that with his proper strength he had finished the war, and concluded it highly to his honour. So the year following it was agreed, by mediation of the Epirots, Acarnanians, and others, that the Romans should retain three or four towns of Illyria, which they had recovered in this war, being part of the old Illyrian conquest; places no way belonging to the Macedonian, and therefore perhaps inserted into the covenants, that somewhat might seem to have been gotten. On the other side, the Atintanes were appointed to return under the obedience of Philip, who, if they were (as Ortelius probably conjectures) the people of the country about Apollonia, then did the Romans abandon part of their gettings; whereby it appears that they did not give peace, as they would seem to have done, but accepted it upon conditions somewhat to their loss.

The confederates and dependants of the Macedonian, comprehended in this peace, were Prusias king of Bithynia, the Achæans, Bœotians, Thessalians, Acarnanians, and Epirots. On the Roman side were named, first, the people of Ilium, as an honourable remembrance of the Romans' descent from Troy, then Attalus king of Pergamus, Pleuratus an Illyrian prince, and Nabis the tyrant of Lacedæmon; together with the Eleans, Messenians, and Athenians. The Ætolians were omitted, belike, as having agreed for themselves before. But the Eleans and Messenians, followers of the Ætolians, (and by them, as is most likely, comprised in their league with Philip,) were also inserted by the Romans, that were never slow in offering their friend-

ship to small and feeble nations. As for the Atheniana, they stood much upon their old honour, and loved to bear a part, though they did nothing, in all great actions. Yet the setting down of their name in this treaty served the Romans to good purpose, forasmuch as they were a busy people, and ministered occasion to renew the war, when means did better serve to follow it.

SECT. XIII.

How the Romans began to recover their strength by degrees. The noble affection of the Romans, in relieving the public necessities of their commonweal.

IT was a great fault in the Carthaginians, that, embracing so many enterprises at once, they followed all by the halves, and wasted more men and money to no purpose, than would have served (if good order had been taken) to finish the whole war in far shorter space, and make themselves lords of all that the Romans held. This error had been the less harmful, if their care of Italy had been such as it ought: but they suffered Hannibal to weary himself with expectation of their promised supplies, which being still deferred from year to year, caused as great opportunities to be lost, as a conqueror could have desired. The death of Posthumius, and destruction of his whole army in Gaul; the begun rebellion of the Sardinians; the death of Hiero their friend in Syracuse; with great alterations, much to their prejudice, in the whole isle of Sicily; as also that war, of which we last spake, threatened from Macedon, happening all at one time, and that so nearly after their terrible overthrow at Cannæ, among so many revolts of their Italian confederates, would utterly have sunk the Roman state, had the Carthaginians, if not the first year, yet at least the second, sent over to Hannibal the forces that were decreed. It is not to be doubted, that even this diversity of great hopes, appearing from all parts, administered matter unto Hanno, or such as Hanno was, whereupon to work. For though it were in the power of Carthage to perform all that was decreed for Italy, yet could not that proportion

hold, when so many new occurrences brought each along with them their new care, and required their several armies. This had not been a very bad excuse, if any one of the many occasions offered had been throughly prosecuted; though it stood with best reason, that the foundation of all other hopes and comforts, which was the prosperity of Hannibal in his Italian war, should have been strengthened, whatsoever had become of the rest. But the slender troops, wherewith the Carthaginians fed the war in Spain, the lingering aid which they sent to uphold the Sardinian rebellion, when it was already well near beaten down, their trifling with Philip, and (amongst all these their attempts) their hasty catching at Sicily, little deserved to be thought good reasons of neglecting the main point, whereto all the rest had reference. Rather every one of these actions, considered apart by itself, was no otherwise to be allowed as discreetly undertaken, or substantially followed, than by making supposition, that the care of Italy made the Carthaginians more negligent in all things else. Yet if these allegations would not serve to content Hannibal, then must he patiently endure to know, that his own citizens were jealous of his greatness, and durst not trust him with so much power as should enable him to wrong the state at home.

Whatsoever he heard or thought, Hannibal was glad to apply himself to necessity, to feed his Italian friends with hopes, and to trifle away the time about Nola, Naples, Cumæ, and other places; being loath to spend his army in an hard siege, that was to be reserved for a work of more importance. Many offers he made upon Nola, but always with bad success. Once Marcellus fought a battle with him there, yet under the very walls of the town, having the assistance of the citizens, that were grown better affected to the Roman side, since the heads that inclined them to rebellion were cut off. About a thousand men Hannibal in that fight lost, which was no great marvel, his forces being then divided, and employed in sundry parts of Italy at once. Naples was even in those days a strong city, and

required a year's work to have taken it by force. Wherefore the earnest desire of Hannibal to get it was always frustrate. Upon the town of Cumæ they of Capua had their plot, and were in hope to take it by cunning. They sent to the chief magistrates of the Cumans, desiring them (as being also Campans) to be present at a solemn sacrifice of the nation, where they would consult about their general good; promising to bring thither a sufficient guard, to assure the whole assembly from any danger that might come by the Romans. This motion the Cumans made show to entertain, but privily sent word of all to T. Sempronius Gracchus, the Roman consul.

Gracchus was a very good man of war, and happily chosen consul in so dangerous a time. His colleague should have been Posthumius Albinus, that was lately slain by the Gauls; after whose death Marcellus was chosen, as being judged the fittest man to encounter with Hannibal. But the Roman augurs either found some religious impediment that nullified the election of Marcellus, or at least they feigned so to have done, because this was the first time that ever two plebeian consuls were chosen together. Marcellus therefore gave over the place, and Q. Fabius Maximus, the late famous dictator, was substituted in his room. But Fabius was detained in the city about matters of religion, or superstition, wherewith Rome was commonly, especially in times of danger, very much troubled. So Gracchus alone, with a consular army, waited upon Hannibal among the Campans, not able to meet the enemy in field, yet intentive to all occasions that should be presented. The *volones*, or slaves, that lately had been armed, were no small part of his followers: these, and the rest of his men, he continually trained, and had not a greater care to make his army skilful in the exercises of war, than to keep it from quarrels that might arise by upbraiding one another with their base condition.

Whilst the consul was thus busied at Linternum, the senators of Cumæ sent him word of all that had passed between them and the Capuans. It was a good occasion to

flesh his men, and make them confident against the enemy, of whom hitherto they had bad experience. Gracchus therefore put himself into Cumæ, whence he issued at such time as the magistrates of that city were expected by the Campans. The sacrifice was to be performed by night, at a place called Hamæ, three miles from Cumæ. There lay Marius Alfius, the chief magistrate of Capua, with fourteen thousand men, not wholly intent either to the sacrifice, or to any danger that might interrupt it; but rather devising how to surprise others, than fearing himself to be assailed. The consul therefore, suffering none to go forth of Cumæ, that might bear word of him to the enemies, issued out of the town when it grew dark, his men being well refreshed with meat and sleep the day before, that they might hold out the better in this night's service. So he came upon the Capuans unawares, and slew more than two thousand of them, together with their commander, losing not above an hundred of his own men. Their camp he took, but tarried not long to rifle it, for fear of Hannibal, who lay not far off. By this his providence he escaped a greater loss than he had brought upon the enemies. For when Hannibal was informed how things went at Hamæ, forthwith he marched thither; hoping to find those young soldiers and slaves busied in making spoil, and loading themselves with the booty; but they were all gotten safe within Cumæ, which, partly for anger, partly for desire of gaining it, and partly at the urgent entreaty of the Capuans, Hannibal assailed the next day. Much labour, and with ill success, the Carthaginians and their fellows spent about this town. They raised a wooden tower against it, which they brought close unto the walls, thinking thereby to force an entry: but the defendants on the inside of the wall raised against this an higher tower, whence they made resistance, and found means at length to consume with fire the work of their enemies. While the Carthaginians were busy in quenching the fire, the Romans, sallying out of the town at two gates, charged them valiantly, and drave them to their trenches, with the slaughter of about fourteen hundred.

The consul wisely sounded the retreat, ere his men were too far engaged, and Hannibal in a readiness to requite their service. Neither would he, in the pride of this good success, adventure forth against the enemy, who presented him battle the day following near unto the walls. Hannibal therefore, seeing no likelihood to prevail in that which he had taken in hand, brake up the siege, and returned to his old camp at Tifata. About these times, and shortly after, when Fabius, the other consul, had taken the field, some small towns were recovered by the Romans, and the people severely punished for their revolt.

The Carthaginian army was too small to fill with garrisons all places that had yielded, and withal to abide (as it must do) strong in the field. Wherefore Hannibal, attending the supply from home, that should enable him to strike at Rome itself, was driven in the mean time to alter his course of war; and, instead of making (as formerly he had done) a general invasion upon the whole country, to pass from place to place, and wait upon occasions that grew daily more commodious to the enemy than to him. The country of the Hirpines and Samnites was grievously wasted by Marcellus in the absence of Hannibal; as also was Campania, by Fabius the consul, when Hannibal, having followed Marcellus to Nola, and received there the loss before mentioned, was gone to winter in Apulia. These people shewed not the like spirit in defending their lands, and fighting for the Carthaginian empire, as in former times they had done, when they contended with the Romans in their own behalf to get the sovereignty. They held it reason, that they should be protected by such as thought to have dominion over them; whereby at once they overburdened their new lords, and gave unto their old the more easy means to take revenge of their defection.

The people of Rome were very intentive, as necessity constrained them, to the work that they had in hand. They continued Fabius in his consulship; and joined with him M. Claudius Marcellus, whom they had appointed unto that honour the year before. Of these two, Fabius was

called *the shield*, and Marcellus *the Roman sword*. In Fabius it was highly, and upon just reason, commended, that being himself consul, and holding the election, he did not stand upon nice points of formality, or regard what men might think of his ambition, but caused himself to be chosen with Marcellus, knowing in what need the city stood of able commanders. The great name of these consuls, and the great preparations which the Romans made, served to put the Campans in fear that Capua itself should be besieged. To prevent this, Hannibal at their earnest entreaty came from Arpi; (where he lay, hearkening after news from Tarentum;) and, having with his presence comforted these his friends, fell on the sudden upon Puteoli, a sea-town of Campania, about which he spent three days in vain, hoping to have won it. The garrison in Puteoli was six thousand strong; and did their duty so well, that the Carthaginian, finding no hope of good success, could only shew his anger upon the fields there, and about Naples; which having done, and once more (with as ill success as before) assayed Nola, he bent his course to Tarentum; wherein he had very great intelligence. Whilst he was in his progress thither, Hanno made a journey against Beneventum; and T. Gracchus, the last year's consul, hasting from Nuceria, met him there, and fought with him a battle. Hanno had with him about seventeen thousand foot, Brutians and Lucans for the most part, besides twelve hundred horse; very few of which were Italians, all the rest Numidians and Moors. He held the Roman work four hours, ere it could be perceived to which side the victory would incline. But Gracchus's soldiers, which were all (in a manner) the late-armed slaves, had received from their general a peremptory denunciation, that this day, or never, they must purchase their liberty, bringing every man, for price thereof, an enemy's head. The sweet reward of liberty was so greatly desired, that none of them feared any danger in earning it; howbeit that vain labour, imposed by their general of cutting off the slain enemies' heads, troubled them exceedingly, and hindered the service, by employment of so

many hands in a work so little concerning the victory. Gracchus therefore, finding his own error, wisely corrected it; proclaiming aloud, that they should cast away the heads, and spare the trouble of cutting off any more; for that all should have liberty immediately after the battle, if they won the day. This encouragement made them run headlong upon the enemy, whom their desperate fury had soon overthrown, if the Roman horse could have made their part good against the Numidian. But though Hanno did what he could, and pressed so hard upon the Roman battle, that four thousand of the slaves (for fear either of him, or of the punishment which Gracchus had threatened before the battle unto those that should not valiantly behave themselves) retired unto a ground of strength; yet was he glad at length to save himself by flight, when the gross of his army was broken, being unable to remedy the loss. Leaving the field, he was accompanied by no more than two thousand, most of which were horse; all the rest were either slain or taken. The Roman general gave unto all his soldiers that reward of liberty which he had promised; but unto those four thousand which had recoiled unto the hill, he added this light punishment; that as long as they served in the wars, they should neither eat nor drink otherwise than standing, unless sickness forced them to break his order. So the victorious army returned to Beneventum; where the newly enfranchised soldiers were feasted in public by the townsmen; some sitting, some standing, and all of them having their heads covered (as was the custom of slaves manumised) with caps, or white wool. The picture of this feast (as a thing worthy of remembrance) was afterward hung up in a table by Gracchus in the temple of Liberty, which his father had built and dedicated. This was indeed the first battle, worthy of great note, which the Carthaginians had lost since the coming of Hannibal into Italy; the victories of Marcellus at Nola, and of this Gracchus before at Hamæ, being things of small importance.

Thus the Romans through industry, by little and little, repaired that great breach in their estate which Hannibal

had made at Cannæ. But all this while, and long after this, their treasury was so poor, that no industry nor art could serve to help it. The fruits of their grounds did only (and perhaps hardly) serve to feed their towns and armies, without any surplusage that might be exchanged for other needful commodities. Few they were in Italy that continued to pay them tribute; which also they could worse do than before; as living upon the same trade, and subject to the same inconveniences, which enfeebled Rome itself. Sicily and Sardinia, that were wont to yield great profit, hardly now maintained the Roman armies that lay in those provinces, to hold them safe and in good order. As for the citizens of Rome, every one of them suffered his part of the detriment which the commonwealth sustained, and could now do least for his country, when most need was; as also the number of them was much decreased; so as if money should be raised upon them by the poll, yet must it be far less than in former times. The senate therefore, diligently considering the greatness of the war within the bowels of Italy, that could not be thence expelled without the exceeding charge of many good armies; the peril wherein Sicily and Sardinia stood, both of the Carthaginians, and of many among the naturals declining from the friendship or subjection of Rome; the threats of the Macedonian, ready to land in the eastern parts of Italy, if they were not at the cost to find him work at home; the greater threats of Asdrubal, to follow his brother over the Alps, as soon as he could rid himself of the Scipios in Spain; and the poverty of the commonwealth, which had not money for any one of these mortal dangers, were driven almost even to extreme want of counsel. But being urged by the violence of swift necessity, signified in the letters of the two Scipios from Spain, they resolved upon the only course, without which the city could not have subsisted.

They called the people to assembly; wherein Q. Fulvius the pretor laid open the public wants; and plainly said, that in this exigent there must be no taking of money for victual, weapons, apparel, or the like things needful to the

soldiers; but that such as had stuff, or were artificers, must trust the commonwealth with the loan of their commodities and labours, until the war were ended. Hereunto he so effectually exhorted all men, especially the publicans, or customers, and those which in former times had lived upon their dealing in the common revenues, that the charge was undertaken by private men, and the army in Spain as well supplied as if the treasury had been full. Shortly after this, M. Atilius Regulus and P. Furius Philus, the Roman censors, taking in hand the redress of disorders within the city, were chiefly intentive to the correction of those that had misbehaved themselves in this present war. They began with L. Cæcilius Metellus; who, after the battle at Cannæ, had held discourse with some of his companions about flying beyond the seas, as if Rome and all Italy had been no better than lost. After him, they took in hand those, that having brought to Rome the message of their fellows made prisoners at Cannæ, returned not back to Hannibal, as they were bound by oath; but thought themselves thereof sufficiently discharged, in that they had stepped once back into his camp, with pretence of taking better notice of the captives' names. All these were now pronounced infamous by the censors; as also were a great many more; even whosoever had not served in the wars after the term which the laws appointed. Neither was the note of the censors at this time (as otherwise it had used to be) hurtful only in reputation; but greater weight was added thereunto by this decree of the senate following; "That all "such as were noted with infamy by these censors should "be transported into Sicily, there to serve until the end of "the war, under the same hard conditions that were im-"posed upon the remainder of the army beaten at Cannæ." The office of the censors was, to take the list and account of the citizens, to choose or displace the senators, and to set notes of disgrace (without further punishment) upon those whose unhonest or unseemly behaviour fell not within compass of the law. They took also an account of the Roman gentlemen; among whom they distributed the public horses of

service, unto such as they thought meet, or took them away for their misbehaviour. Generally, they had the oversight of men's lives and manners; and their censure was much reverenced and feared; though it extended no further than to putting men out of rank, or making them change their tribe; or (which was the most that they could do) causing them to pay some duties to the treasury from which others were exempted. But besides the care of this general tax, and matters of morality, they had the charge of all public works; as mending of highways, bridges, and watercourses; the reparations of temples, porches, and such other buildings. If any man encroached upon the streets, highways, or other places that ought to be common, the censors compelled him to make amends. They had also the letting out of lands, customs, and other public revenues, to farm; so that most of the citizens of Rome were beholding unto this office, as maintaining themselves by some of the trades thereto belonging. And this was no small help to conserve the dignity of the senate; the commonalty being obnoxious unto the censors; which were always of that order, and careful to uphold the reputation thereof. But the commonweal being now impoverished by war, and having small store of lands to let, or of customs that were worth the farming, Regulus and Philus troubled not themselves much with perusing the temples, or other decayed places, that needed reparations; or if they took a view of what was requisite to be done in this kind, yet forbore they to set any thing in hand, because they had not wherewith to pay. Herein again appeared a notable generosity of the Romans. They that had been accustomed, in more happy times, to undertake such pieces of work, offered now themselves as willingly to the censors as if there had been no such want; promising liberally their cost and travail, without expectation of any payment before the end of the war. In like sort, the masters of those slaves that lately had been enfranchised by Gracchus, were very well contented to forbear the price of them, until the city were in better case to pay. In this general inclination of the multitude to relieve,

as far forth as every one was able, the common necessity, all the goods of orphans, and of widows living under patronage, were brought into the treasury; and there the questor kept a book of all that was laid out for the sustenance of these widows and orphans, whilst the whole stock was used by the city. This good example of those which remained in the town, prevailed with the soldiers abroad; so that (the poorer sort excepted) they refused to take pay; and called those *mercenaries* that did accept it, when their country was in so great want.

The twelve hundred talents, wrongfully extorted from the Carthaginians, nor any injuries following, done by the Romans in the height of their pride, yielded half so much commodity as might be laid in balance against these miseries whereinto their estate was now reduced. Nevertheless, if we consider things aright, the calamities of this war did rather enable Rome to deal with those enemies whom she forthwith undertook, than abate or slacken the growth of that large dominion whereto she attained, ere the youngest of those men was dead, whose names we have already mentioned. For by this hammering, the Roman metal grew more hard and solid; and by paring the branches of private fortunes, the root and heart of the commonwealth was corroborated. So grew the city of Athens, when Xerxes had burnt the town to ashes, and taken from every particular citizen all hope of other felicity than that which rested in the common happiness of the universality. Certain it is, (as sir Francis Bacon hath judiciously observed,) that a state whose dimension or stem is small, may aptly serve to be foundation of a great monarchy; which chiefly comes to pass, where all regard of domestical prosperity is laid aside, and every man's care addressed to the benefit of his country. Hereof I might say, that our age hath seen a great example in the united provinces in the Netherlands; whose present riches and strength grew chiefly from that ill assurance, which each of their towns, or almost of their families, perceived itself to hold, whilst the generality was oppressed by the duke of Alva; were it so, that the

people had thereby grown as warlike, as by extreme industry, and straining themselves to fill their public treasury, they are all grown wealthy, strong at sea, and able to wage great armies for their services by land. Wherefore, if we value at such a rate as we ought, the patient resolution, conformity to good order, obedience to magistrates, with many other virtues, and, above all other, the great love of the commonweal, which was found in Rome in these dangerous times, we may truly say, that the city was never in greater likelihood to prosper. Neither can it be deemed otherwise, than that if the same affections of the people had lasted, when their empire, being grown more large and beautiful, should in all reason have been more dear unto them, if the riches and delicacies of Asia had not infected them with sensuality, and carried their appetites mainly to those pleasures wherein they thought their well-being to consist; if all the citizens and subjects of Rome could have believed their own interest to be as great, in those wars which these latter emperors made for their defence, as in these which were managed by the consuls; the empire, founded upon so great virtue, could not have been thrown down by the hands of rude Barbarians, were they never so many. But unto all dominions God hath set their periods; who, though he hath given unto man the knowledge of those ways by which kingdoms rise and fall; yet hath left him subject unto the affections, which draw on these fatal changes in their times appointed.

SECT. XIV.

The Romans win some towns back from Hannibal. Hannibal wins Tarentum. The siege of Capua. Two victories of Hannibal. The journey of Hannibal to the gates of Rome. Capua taken by the Romans.

AS the people of Rome strained themselves to the utmost, for maintaining the war; so their generals abroad omitted no part of industry, in seeking to recover what had been lost. The town of Casiline Fabius besieged: it was well defended by the Carthaginian garrison, and likely to

have been relieved by those of Capua, if Marcellus from Nola had not come to the assistance of his colleague. Nevertheless, the place held out so obstinately, that Fabius was purposed to give it over; saying, that the enterprise was not great, yet as difficult as a thing of more importance. But Marcellus was of a contrary opinion: he said, that many such things, as were not at first to have been undertaken by great commanders, ought yet, when once they were taken in hand, to be prosecuted unto the best effect. So the siege held on, and the town was pressed so hard, that the Campans dwelling therein grew fearful, and craved parley; offering to give it up, so as all might have leave to depart in safety whither they pleased. Whilst they were thus treating of conditions, or whilst they were issuing forth, according to the composition already made, (for it is diversely reported,) Marcellus, seizing upon a gate, entered with his army, and put all to sword that came in their way. Fifty of those that were first gotten out ran to Fabius the consul, who saved them, and sent them to Capua in safety; all the rest were either slain or made prisoners. If Fabius deserved commendations, by holding his word good unto these fifty, I know not how the slaughter of the rest, or imprisonment afterward of such as scaped the heat of execution, could be excused by Marcellus. It may be, that he helped himself, after the Roman fashion, with some equivocation; but he shall pay for it hereafter. In like sort was mount Marsam in Gascoigne taken by the marshal Monluc, when I was a young man in France. For, whilst he entertained parley about composition, the besieged ran all from their several guards, upon hasty desire of being acquainted with the conditions proposed. The marshal therefore, discovering a part of the walls unguarded, entered by scalado, and put all, save the governor, unto the sword. Herein that governor of mount Marsam committed two gross errors; the one, in that he gave no order for the captains and companies to hold themselves in their places; the other, in that he was content to parley, without pledges for assurance given and received. Some such oversight the governor of Casiline

seemeth to have committed; yet neither the advantage taken by Marcellus or by Monluc was very honourable. When this work was ended, many small towns of the Samnites, and some of the Lucans and Apulians, were recovered; wherein were taken, or slain, above five and twenty thousand of the enemies, and the country grievously wasted by Fabius, Marcellus lying sick at Nola.

Hannibal in the mean while was about Tarentum, waiting to hear from those that had promised to give up the town. But M. Valerius, the Roman propretor, had thrust so many men into it, that the traitors durst not stir. Wherefore the Carthaginian was fain to depart; having wearied himself in vain with expectation. Yet he wasted not the country; but contented himself with hope, that they would please him better in time following. So he departed thence toward Salapia, which he chose for his wintering-place; and began to victual it when summer was but half past. It is said, that he was in love with a young wench in that town; in which regard, if he began his winter more timely than otherwise need required, he did not like the Romans; whom necessity enforced to make their summer last as long as they were able to travel up and down the country.

About this time began great troubles in Sicily; whither Marcellus the consul was sent, to take such order for the province as need should require. Of the doings there, which wore out more time than his consulship, we will speak hereafter.

The new consuls chosen at Rome were Q. Fabius, the son of the present consul, and T. Sempronius Gracchus, the second time. The Romans found it needful for the public service to employ oftentimes their best able men; and therefore made it lawful, during the war, to recontinue their officers, and choose such as had lately held their places before, without regarding any distance of time, which was otherwise required. The old Fabius became lieutenant unto his son; which was perhaps the respect that most commended his son unto the place. It is noted, that when the old man came into the camp, and his son rode forth to meet

him, eleven of the twelve lictors, which carried each an axe with a bundle of rods before the consul, suffered him, in regard of due reverence, to pass by them on horseback; which was against the custom. But the son, perceiving this, commanded the last of his lictors to note it, who thereupon bade the old Fabius alight, and come to the consul on his feet. The father cheerfully did so, saying, "It was my mind, "son, to make trial, whether thou didst understand thyself "to be consul." Cassius Altinius, a wealthy citizen of Arpi, who, after the battle at Cannæ, had holpen the Carthaginian into that town, seeing now the fortune of the Romans to amend, came privily to this consul Fabius, and offered to render it back unto him, if he might be therefore well rewarded. The consul purposed to follow old examples, and to make this Altinius a pattern to all traitors; using him as Camillus and Fabricius had done those that offered their unfaithful service against the Falisci and king Pyrrhus. But Q. Fabius the father was of another opinion; and said, it was a matter of dangerous consequence, that it should be thought more safe to revolt from the Romans, than to turn unto them. Wherefore it was concluded, that he should be sent to the town of Cales, and there kept as prisoner; until they could better resolve what to do with him, or what use to make of him. Hannibal, understanding that Altinius was gone, and among the Romans, took it not sorrowfully; but thought this a good occasion to seize upon all the man's riches, which were great. Yet, that he might seem rather severe than covetous, he sent for the wife and children of Altinius into his camp; where having examined them by torment, partly concerning the departure and intentions of this fugitive, partly, and more strictly, about his riches, what they were, and where they lay, he condemned them, as partakers of the treason, to be burnt alive, and took all their goods unto himself. Fabius the consul shortly after came to Arpi; which he won by scalado, in a stormy and rainy night. Five thousand of Hannibal's soldiers lay in the town; and of the Arpines themselves there were about three thousand. These

were thrust foremost by the Carthaginian garrison, when it was understood that the Romans had gotten over the wall, and broken open a gate. For the soldiers held the townsmen suspected, and therefore thought it no wisdom to trust them at their backs. But after some little resistance, the Arpines gave over fight, and entertained parley with the Romans; protesting that they had been betrayed by their princes, and were become subject to the Carthaginians against their wills. In process of this discourse, the Arpine pretor went unto the Roman consul; and receiving his faith for security of the town, presently made head against the garrison. This notwithstanding, like it is, that Hannibal's men continued to make good resistance: for when almost a thousand of them, that were Spaniards, offered to leave their companions, and serve on the Roman side, it was yet covenanted that the Carthaginians should be suffered to pass forth quietly, and return to Hannibal. This was performed; and so Arpi became Roman again, with little other loss than of him that had betrayed it. About the same time, Cliternum was taken by Sempronius Tuditanus, one of the pretors; and unto Cneius Fulvius, another of the pretors, an hundred and twelve gentlemen of Capua offered their service; upon no other condition, than to have their goods restored unto them, when their city should be recovered by the Romans. This was a thing of small importance; but considering the general hatred of the Campans toward Rome, it served to discover the inclination of the Italians in those times; and how their affections recoiled from Hannibal, when there was no appearance of those mighty succours that had been promised from Carthage. The Consentines also, and the Thurines, people of the Brutians, that had yielded themselves to Hannibal, returned again to their old allegiance. Others would have followed their example, but that one L. Pomponius, who of a publican had made himself a captain, and gotten reputation by some petty exploits in foraging the country, was slain by Hanno, with a great multitude of those that followed him. Hannibal in the mean while had all his care bent upon Ta-

rentum; which if he could take, it seemed that it would stand him in good stead, for drawing over that help out of Macedon, which his Carthaginians failed to send. Long he waited, ere he could bring his desire to pass; and being loath to hazard his forces, where he hoped to prevail by intelligence, he contented himself with taking in some poor towns of the Salentines. At length, his agents within Tarentum found means to accomplish their purpose and his wish. One Phileas, that was of their conspiracy, who lay at Rome as ambassador, practising with the hostages of the Tarentines, and such as had the keeping of them, conveyed them by night out of the city. But he and his company were the next day so closely pursued, that all of them were taken and brought back to Rome; where they suffered death, as traitors. By reason of this cruelty, or severity, the people of Tarentum grew to hate the Romans more generally and earnestly than before. As for the conspirators, they followed their business the more diligently; as knowing what reward they were to expect, if their intention should happen to be discovered. Wherefore they sent again to Hannibal; and, acquainting him with the manner of their plot, made the same composition with him for the Tarentines, which they of Capua had made before. Nico and Philomenes, two the chief among them, used much to go forth of the town on hunting by night; as if they durst not take their pleasure by day, for fear of the Carthaginians. Seldom or never they missed of their game, for the Carthaginians prepared it ready for their hands, that they might not seem to have been abroad upon other occasion. From the camp of Hannibal it was about three days' journey to Tarentum, if he should have marched thither with his whole army. This caused his long abode in one place the less to be suspected; as also, to make his enemies the more secure, he caused it to be given out that he was sick. But when the Romans within Tarentum were grown careless of such his neighbourhood, and the conspirators had set their business in order, he took with him ten thousand, the most expedite of his horse and foot, and long before break

of day made all speed thitherward. Fourscore light horse of the Numidians ran a great way before him, beating all the ways, and killing any that they met, for fear lest he, and his troop following him, should be discovered. It had been often the manner of some few Numidian horse to do the like in former times. Wherefore the Roman governor, when he heard tell in the evening that some Numidians were abroad in the fields, took it for a sign that Hannibal was not as yet dislodged; and gave order, that some companies should be sent out the next morning to strip them of their booty, and send them gone. But when it grew dark night, Hannibal, guided by Philomenes, came close to the town; where, according to the tokens agreed upon, making a light to shew his arrival, Nico, that was within the town, answered him with another light, in sign that he was ready. Presently Nico began to set upon one of the gates, and to kill the watchmen. Philomenes went toward another gate, and, whistling, (as was his manner,) called up the porter; bidding him make haste, for that he had killed a great boar, so heavy, that scarce two men could stand under it. So the porter opened the wicket; and forthwith entered two young men, laden with the boar, which Hannibal had prepared large enough to be worthy the looking on. While the porter stood wondering at the largeness of the beast, Philomenes ran him through with his boar-spear, and, letting in some thirty armed men, fell upon all the watch; whom when he had slain, he entered the great gate. So the army of Hannibal, entering Tarentum at two gates, went directly toward the market-place; where both parts met. Thence they were distributed by their general, and sent into all quarters of the city, with Tarentines to be their guides. They were commanded to kill all the Romans, and not to hurt the citizens. For better performance hereof, Hannibal willed the conspirators, that, when any of their friends appeared in sight, they should bid him be quiet, and of good cheer. All the town was in an uproar; but few could tell what the matter meant. A Roman trumpet was unskilfully sounded by a Greek in the theatre; which helped the suspi-

cion, both of the Tarentines, that the Romans were about to spoil the town; and of the Romans, that the citizens were in commotion. The governor fled into the port, and, taking boat, got into the citadel, that stood in the mouth of the haven; whence he might easily perceive the next morning how all had passed. Hannibal, assembling the Tarentines, gave them to understand what good affection he bore them; inveighed bitterly against the Romans, as tyrannous oppressors; and spake what else he thought fit for the present. This done, and having gotten such spoil as was to be had of the soldiers' goods in the town, he addressed himself against the citadel; hoping, that if the garrison would sally out, he might give them such a blow, as should make them unable to defend the piece. According to his expectation it partly fell out: for when he began to make his approaches, the Romans in a bravery, sallying forth, gave charge upon his men; who fell back of purpose, according to direction, till they had drawn on as many as they could, and so far from their strength, as they durst adventure. Then gave Hannibal a sign to his Carthaginians, who lay prepared ready for the purpose; and, fiercely setting upon the enemy, drave him back, with great slaughter, as fast as he could run; so that afterwards he durst not issue forth. The citadel stood upon a demi-island, that was plain ground; and fortified only with a ditch and wall against the town, whereunto it was joined by a causey. This causey Hannibal intended to fortify in like sort against the citadel; to the end that the Tarentines might be able, without his help, to keep themselves from all danger thence. His work in few days went so well forward, without impediment from the besieged, that he conceived hope of winning the piece itself, by taking a little more pains. Wherefore he made ready all sorts of engines, to force the place: but whilst he was busied in his works, there came by sea a strong supply from Metapontum, which took away all hope of prevailing, and made him return to his former counsel. Now forasmuch as the Tarentine fleet lay within the haven, and could not pass forth whilst the Romans held the cita-

del; it seemed likely that the town would suffer want, being debarred of accustomed trade and provisions by sea; whilst the Roman garrison, by help of their shipping, might easily be relieved, and enabled to hold out. Against this inconvenience, it was rather wished by the Tarentines, than any way hoped, that their fleet could get out of the haven, to guard the mouth of it, and cut off all supply from the enemy. Hannibal told them, that this might well be done; for that their town standing in plain ground, and their streets being fair and broad, it would be no hard matter to draw the galleys over land, and launch them into the sea without. This he undertook, and effected; whereby the Roman garrison was reduced into great necessity; though with much patience it held out, and found Hannibal oftentimes otherwise busied than his affairs required.

Thus with mutual loss on both sides the time passed; and, the Roman forces growing daily stronger, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, with Appius Claudius, lately chosen consuls, prepared to besiege the great city of Capua. Three and twenty legions the Romans had now armed: this was a great and hasty growth from that want of men, and of all necessaries, whereinto the loss at Cannæ had reduced them. But, to fill up these legions, they were fain to take up young boys, that were under seventeen years of age, and to send commissioners above fifty miles round for the seeking out of such lads as might appear serviceable, and pressing them to the wars; making yet a law, that their years of service, whereunto they were bound by order of the city, should be reckoned for their benefit from this their beginning so young, as if they had been of lawful age. Before the Roman army drew near, the Campans felt great want of victuals, as if they had already been besieged. This happened partly by sloth of the nation, partly by the great waste and spoil which the Romans had in foregoing years made upon their grounds. They sent therefore ambassadors to Hannibal, desiring him to succour them, ere they were closed up, as they feared to be shortly: he gave them comfortable words, and sent Hanno with an army to

supply their wants. Hanno appointed them a day, against which they should be ready with all manner of carriages, to store themselves with victuals that he would provide. Neither did he promise more than he performed: for he caused great quantity of grain, that had been laid up in cities round about, to be brought into his camp, three miles from Beneventum. Thither at the time appointed came no more than forty carts or waggons, with a few pack-horses, as if this had been enough to victual Capua: such was the retchlessness of the Campans! Hanno was exceeding angry hereat, and told them they were worse than very beasts, since hunger could not teach them to have greater care. Wherefore he gave them a longer day, against which he made provision to store them throughly. Of all these doings word was sent to the Roman consuls from the citizens of Beneventum. Therefore Q. Fulvius the consul, taking with him such strength as he thought needful for the service, came into Beneventum by night, where with diligence he made inquiry into the behaviour of the enemy. He learned that Hanno, with part of his army, was gone abroad to make provisions; that some two thousand waggons, with a great rabble of carters and other varlets, lay among the Carthaginians in their camp, so that little good order was kept, all thought being set upon a great harvest. Hereupon the consul bade his men prepare themselves to assail the enemy's camp, and, leaving all his impediments within Beneventum, he marched thitherward so early in the morning, that he was there with the first break of day. By coming so unexpected, he had well near forced the camp on the sudden: but it was very strong, and very well defended; so that the longer the fight continued, the less desire had Fulvius to lose more of his men in the attempt, seeing many of them cast away, and yet little hope of doing good. Therefore he said, that it were better to go more leisurely and substantially to work; to send for his fellow-consul, with the rest of their army, and to lie between Hanno and home, that neither the Campans should depart thence, nor the Carthaginian be able to relieve them. Being thus discoursing, and about to sound the retreat, he saw

that some of his men had gotten over the enemy's rampart. There was great booty, or (which was all one to the soldier) an opinion of much that might be gotten in that camp. Wherefore some ensign-bearers threw their ensigns over the rampart, willing their men to fetch them out, unless they would endure the shame and dishonour following such a loss. Fear of such ignominy, than which none could be greater, made the soldiers adventure so desperately, that Fulvius, perceiving the heat of his men, changed purpose, and encouraged those that were somewhat backward to follow the example of them that had already gotten over the trenches. Thus the camp was won; in which were slain above six thousand, and taken above seven thousand, besides all the store of victuals and carriages, with abundance of booty that Hanno had lately gotten from the Roman confederates. This misadventure, and the nearer approach of both the consuls, made them of Capua send a pitiful embassage to Hannibal, putting him in mind of all the love that he was wont to protest unto their city, and how he had made show to affect it no less than Carthage. But now, they said, it would be lost, as Arpi was lately, if he gave not strong and speedy succour. Hannibal answered with comfortable words, and sent away two thousand horse to keep their grounds from spoil, whilst he himself was detained about Tarentum, partly by hope of winning the citadel, partly by the disposition which he saw in many towns adjoining to yield unto him. Among the hostages of the Tarentines that lately had fled out of Rome, and, being overtaken, suffered death for their attempt, were some of the Metapontines, and other cities of the Greeks inhabiting that eastern part of Italy, which was called of old Magna Græcia. These people took to heart the death of their hostages, and thought the punishment greater than the offence. Wherefore the Metapontines, as soon as the Roman garrison was taken from them to defend the citadel of Tarentum, made no more ado, but opened their gates to Hannibal. The Thurines would have done the like, upon the like reason, had not some companies lain in their town, which they feared that they should not be able to master. Never-

theless, they helped themselves by cunning, inviting to their gates Hanno and Mago, that were near at hand; against whom, whilst they proffered their service to Atinius the Roman captain, they drew him forth to fight, and, recoiling from him, closed up their gates. A little formality they used, in pretending fear, lest the enemy should break in together with the Romans, in saving Atinius himself, and sending him away by sea; as also in consulting a small while, (because perhaps many of their chief men were unacquainted with the practice,) whether they should yield to the Carthaginian or no. But this disputation lasted not long; for they, that had removed the chief impediment, easily prevailed in the rest, and delivered up the town to Hanno and Mago. This good success, and hope of the like, detained Hannibal in those quarters, whilst the consuls, fortifying Beneventum, to secure their backs, addressed themselves unto the siege of Capua.

Many disasters befell the Romans in the beginning of this great enterprise: T. Sempronius Gracchus, a very good man of war, that had of late been twice consul, was slain, either by treachery of some Lucans, that drew him into an ambush, or by some Carthaginian stragglers, among whom he fell unawares. His body, or his head, was very honourably interred, either by Hannibal himself, or (for the reports agree not) by the Romans, to whom Hannibal sent it. He was appointed to lie in Beneventum, there to secure the back of the army that should besiege Capua. But his death happened in an ill time, to the great hinderance of that business. The *volones*, or slaves, lately manumised, forsook their ensigns, and went every one whither he thought good, as if they had been discharged by the decease of their leader, so that it asked some labour to seek them out, and bring them back into their camp. Nevertheless, the consuls went forward with their work, and drawing near to Capua, did all acts of hostility which they could. Mago the Carthaginian, and the citizens of Capua, gave them an hard welcome, wherein above fifteen hundred Romans were lost. Neither was it long ere Hannibal came thither, who

fought with the consuls, and had the better, insomuch that he caused them to dislodge. They removed by night, and went several ways; Fulvius towards Cumæ, Claudius into Lucania. Hannibal followed after Claudius, who, having led him a great walk, fetched a compass about, and returned to Capua. It so fell out, that one M. Centenius Penula, a stout man, and one that with good commendations had discharged the place of a centurion, lay with an army not far from thence, where Hannibal rested when he was weary of hunting after Claudius. This Penula had made great vaunts to the Roman senate of wonders which he would work, if he might be trusted with the leading of five thousand men. The fathers were unwilling in such a time to reject the virtue of any good soldier, how mean soever his condition were. Wherefore they gave him the charge of eight thousand; and he himself being a proper man, and talking bravely, gathered up so many voluntaries, as almost doubled his number. But meeting thus with Hannibal, he gave proof of the difference between a stout centurion, and one able to command in chief. He and his fellows were all (in a manner) slain, scarce a thousand of them escaping. Soon after this, Hannibal had word, that Cn. Fulvius, a Roman pretor, with eighteen thousand men, was in Apulia, very careless, and a man insufficient for the charge which he held. Thither he therefore hasted to visit him, hoping to deal the better with the main strength of Rome, which pointed at Capua, when he should have cut off those forces that lay in the provinces about, under men of small ability. Coming upon Fulvius, he found him and his men so jolly, that needs they would have fought the first night: wherefore it was not to be doubted what would happen the day following. So he bestowed Mago, with three thousand of his lightest armed, in places thereabout most fit for ambush: then offering battle to Fulvius, he soon had him in the trap, whence he made him glad to escape alive, leaving all, save two thousand of his followers, dead behind him.

These two great blows, received one presently after the other, much astonished the Romans. Nevertheless all care

was taken to gather up the small relics of the broken armies, and that the consuls should go substantially forwards with the siege of Capua, which was of great consequence, both in matter of reputation, and in many other respects. The two consuls sat down before the town, and C. Claudius Nero, one of the pretors, came with his army from Suessula to their assistance. They made proclamation, that whosoever would issue forth of Capua, before a certain day prefixed, should have his pardon, and be suffered to enjoy all that unto him belonged; which day being passed, there should be no grace expected. This offer was contumeliously rejected, the Capuans relying on their own strength, and the succours attended from Hannibal. Before the city was closed up, they sent messengers to the Carthaginian, which found him at Brundusium. He had made a long journey, in hope of gaining the Tarentine citadel; of which expectation failing, he turned to Brundusium, upon advertisement that he should be let in. There the Capuans met him, told him of their danger with earnest words, and were with words as brave recomforted. He bade them consider, how a few days since he had chased the consuls out of their fields, and told them, that he would presently come thither again, and send the Romans going as fast as before. With this good answer the messengers returned, and hardly could get back into the city, which the Romans had almost entrenched round. As for Hannibal himself, he was of opinion that Capua, being very well manned, and heartily devoted unto his friendship, would hold out a long time, and thereby give him leisure to do what he thought requisite among the Tarentines, and in those eastern parts of Italy, whilst the Roman army spent itself in a tedious siege. Thus he lingered, and thereby gave the consuls time, both to fortify themselves at Capua, and to despatch the election of new magistrates in Rome, whilst he himself pursued hopes that never found success.

Claudius and Fulvius, when their term of office was expired, were appointed to continue the siege at Capua, retaining the same armies, as proconsuls. The townsmen

often sallied out, rather in a bravery, than likelihood to work any matter of effect; the enemy lying close within his trenches, as intending, without other violence, to subdue them by famine. Yet against the Campan horse (for their foot was easily beaten) the Romans used to thrust out some troops, that should hold them skirmish. In these exercises the Campans usually had the better, to the great grief of their proud enemy, who scorned to take foil at the hands of such rebels. It was therefore devised, that some active and courageous young men should learn to ride behind the Roman men at arms, leaping up, and again dismounting lightly, as occasion served. These were furnished like the velites, having each of them three or four small darts; which, alighting in time of conflict, they discharged thick upon the enemy's horse; whom, vanquishing in this kind of service, they much disheartened in the main. The time thus passing, and famine daily increasing within the city, Hannibal came at length, not expected by the Romans, and taking a fort of theirs, called Galatia, fell upon their camp. At the same time the Capuans issued with their whole power, in as terrible manner as they could devise, setting all their multitude of unserviceable people on the walls, which, with a loud noise of pans and basons, troubled those that were occupied in fight. Appius Claudius opposing himself to the Campans, easily defended his trenches against them, and so well repressed them, that he drave them at length back into their city. Nevertheless, in pursuing them to their gates, he received a wound that accompanied him in short space after to his grave. Q. Fulvius was held harder to his task by Hannibal and the Carthaginian army. The Roman camp was even at point to have been lost; and Hannibal's elephants, of which he brought with him three and thirty, were either gotten within the rampart, or else (for the report varies) being some of them slain upon it, fell into the ditch, and filled it up in such sort, that their bodies served as a bridge unto the assailants. It is said, that Hannibal in this tumult caused some fugitives, that could speak Latin well, to proclaim aloud, as it were in the consul's name,

that every one of the soldiers should shift for himself, and fly betimes unto the next hills, forasmuch as the camp was already lost. But all would not serve: the fraud was detected; and the army, having sitten there so long, had at good leisure strongly entrenched itself, so as little hope there was to raise the siege by force.

This did extremely perplex the Carthaginian. The purchase of Capua had (as was thought) withheld him from taking Rome itself; and now his desire of winning the Tarentine citadel had well-near lost Capua; in respect of which, neither the citadel nor city of Tarentum were to have been much regarded. Falling therefore into a desperate anger with himself and his hard fortune, that of so many great victories he had made no greater use, on the sudden he entertained an haughty resolution, even to set upon Rome, and carry to the walls of that proud city the danger of war that threatened Capua. This he thought would be a mean to draw the Roman generals, or one of them at least, unto the defence of their own home. If they rose from the siege with their whole army, then had he his desire; if they divided their forces, then was it likely, that either he or the Campans should well enough deal with them apart. Neither did he despair, that the terror of his coming might so astonish the multitude within Rome, as he might enter some part or other of the city. His only fear was, lest the Campans, being ignorant of his purpose, should think he had forsaken them, and thereupon forthwith yield themselves to the enemy. To prevent this danger, he sent letters to Capua by a subtile Numidian; who, running as a fugitive into the Roman camp, conveyed himself thence over the innermost trenches into the city. The journey to Rome was to be performed with great celerity; no small hope of good success resting in the suddenness of his arrival there. Wherefore he caused his men to have in a readiness ten days victuals, and prepared as many boats as might in one night transport his army over the river of Vulturnus. This could not be done so closely, but that the Roman generals, by some fugitives, had notice of his purpose.

With this danger therefore they acquainted the senate; which was therewith affected, according to the diversity of men's opinions, in a case of such importance. Some gave counsel to let alone Capua, yea and all places else, rather than to put the town of Rome into peril of being taken by the enemy. Others were so far from allowing of this, as they wondered how any man could think that Hannibal, being unable to relieve Capua, should judge himself strong enough to win Rome; and therefore stoutly said, that those legions, which were kept at home for defence of the city, would serve the turn well enough to keep him out, and send him thence, if he were so unwise as to come thither. But it was finally concluded, that letters should be sent to Fulvius and Claudius, acquainting them perfectly with the forces that at the present were in Rome: who, since they knew best what the strength was which Hannibal could bring along with him, were best able to judge what was needful to oppose him. So it was referred unto the discretion of these generals at Capua, to do as they thought behoveful; and, if it might conveniently be, neither to raise their siege, nor yet to put the city of Rome into much adventure. According to this decree of the senate, Q. Fulvius took fifteen thousand foot and a thousand horse, the choice of his whole army, with which he hasted toward Rome; leaving App. Claudius, who could not travel by reason of his wound, to continue the siege at Capua.

Hannibal, having passed over Vulturnus, burnt up all his boats, and left nothing that might serve to transport the enemy, in case he should offer to pursue or coast him. Then hasted he away toward Rome; staying no longer in any one place than he needs must. Yet found he the bridges over Liris broken down by the people of Fregellæ; which as it stopped him a little on his way, so it made him the more grievously to spoil their lands, whiles the bridges were in mending. The nearer that he drew to Rome, the greater waste he made; his Numidians running before him, driving the country, and killing or taking multitudes of all sorts and ages, that fled out of all parts round about. The

messengers of these news came apace, one after another, into the city; some few bringing true advertisements, but the most of them reporting the conceits of their own fear. All the streets and temples in Rome were pestered with women, crying and praying, and rubbing the altars with their hair, because they could do none other good. The senators were all in the great market, or place of assembly; ready to give their advice, if it were asked, or to take directions given by the magistrates. All places of most importance were stuffed with soldiers; it being uncertain upon which part Hannibal would fall. In the midst of this trepidation, there came news that Q. Fulvius, with part of the army from Capua, was hastening to defence of the city. The office of a proconsul did expire at his return home, and entry into the gates of Rome. Wherefore, that Fulvius might lose nothing by coming into the city in time of such need, an act was passed, that he should have equal power with the consuls during his abode there. He and Hannibal arrived at Rome, one soon after another; Fulvius having been long held occupied in passing over Vulturnus, and Hannibal receiving impediment in his journey, as much as the country was able to give. The consuls and Fulvius encamped without the gates of Rome, attending the Carthaginian. Thither they called the senate; and as the danger grew nearer and greater, so took they more careful and especial order against all occurrences. Hannibal came to the river Anio, or Anien, three miles from the town, whence he advanced with two thousand horse, and rode along a great way under the walls; viewing the site thereof, and considering how he might best approach it. But he either went, or (as the Roman story saith) was driven away, without doing or receiving any hurt. Many tumults rose in this while among the people, but were suppressed by care and diligence of the senators. Above the rest, one accident was both troublesome and not without peril. Of Numidians that had shifted side, and fallen (upon some displeasures) from Hannibal to the Romans, there were some twelve hundred then in Rome; which were appointed

by the consuls to pass through the town, from the mount Aventine to the gate Collina, where it was thought that their service might be useful, among broken ways and garden walls lying in the suburbs. The faces of these men, and their furniture, wherein they differed not from the followers of Hannibal, bred such mistaking, as caused a great uproar among the people; all crying out that Aventine was taken, and the enemy gotten within the walls. The noise was such, that men could not be informed of the truth; and the streets were so full of cattle and husbandmen, which were fled thither out of the villages adjoining, that the passage was stopped up; and the poor Numidians pitifully beaten from the housetops, with stones and other weapons that came next to hand, by the desperate multitude, that would have run out at the gates, had it not been certain who lay under the walls. To remedy the like inconveniences, it was ordained, "that all which had been dicta-"tors, consuls, or censors, should have authority as magis-"trates, till the enemy departed." The day following, Hannibal passed over Anien, and presented battle to the Romans, who did not wisely, if they undertook it. It is said, that a terrible shower of rain caused both Romans and Carthaginians to return into their several camps; and that this happened two days together, the weather breaking up, and clearing, as soon as they were departed asunder. Certain it is, that Hannibal, who had brought along with him no more than ten days' provision, could not endure to stay there until his victuals were all spent. In which regard the Romans, if they suffered him to waste his time and provisions, knowing that he could not abide there long, did as became well-advised men; if they offered to fight with him, and either had the better, or were parted (as is said) by some accident of weather, the commendations must be given to their fortune. The terror of Hannibal's coming to the city, how great soever it was at the first, yet after some leisure, and better notice taken of his forces, which appeared less than the first apprehension had formed them, was much and soon abated. Hereunto it helped well, that

at the same time the supply appointed for Spain, after the death of the two Scipios, was sent out of the town, and went forth at one gate, whilst the Carthaginian lay before another. In all panic terrors, as they are called, whereof there is either no cause known, or no cause answerable to the greatness of the sudden consternation, it is a good remedy, to do somewhat quite contrary to that which the danger would require, were it such as men have fashioned it in their amazed conceits. Thus did Alexander cause his soldiers to disarm themselves, when they were all on a sudden in a great fear of they knew not what: and thus did Clearchus pacify a foolish uproar in his army, by proclaiming a reward unto him that could tell who had sent the ass into the camp. But in this present example of the Romans appears withal a great magnanimity; whereby they sustained their reputation, and augmented it no less, than by this bold attempt of Hannibal it might seem to have been diminished. Neither could they more finely have checked the glorious conceits of their enemies, and taken away the disgrace of that fear, which clouded their valour at his first coming, than by making such demonstrations, when once they had recovered spirit, how little they esteemed him. To this purpose, therefore, that very piece of ground, on which the Carthaginian lay encamped, was sold in Rome; and sold it was, nothing under the value, but at as good a rate, as if it had been in time of peace. This indignity, coming to his ear, incensed Hannibal so much, that he made port-sale of the silversmiths' shops, which were near about the market or common place in Rome; as if his own title to the houses within the town were no whit worse than any Roman citizen's could be unto that piece of ground whereon he raised his tent. But this counter practice was nothing worth. The Romans did seek to manifest that assurance which they justly had conceived; Hannibal, to make show of continuing in an hope which was already past. His victuals were almost spent; and of those ends that he had proposed unto himself, this journey had brought forth none other than the fame of his much daring. Wherefore he

brake up his camp; and doing what spoil he could in the Roman territory, without sparing religious places, wherein wealth was to be gotten, he passed like a tempest over the country; and ran toward the eastern sea so fast, that he had almost taken the city of Rhegium before his arrival was feared or suspected. As for Capua, he gave it lost; and is likely to have cursed the whole faction of Hanno, which thus disabled him to relieve that fair city; since he had no other way to vent his grief.

Q. Fulvius returning back to Capua made proclamation anew, that whoso would yield, before a certain day, might safely do it. This, and the very return of Fulvius, without any more appearance of Hannibal, gave the Capuans to understand that they were abandoned, and their case desperate. To trust the Roman pardon proclaimed, every man's conscience of his own evil deserts told him that it was a vanity; and some faint hope was given, by Hanno and Bostar, captains of the Carthaginian garrison within the town, that Hannibal should come again, if means could only be found how to convey such letters unto him as they would write. The carriage of the letters was undertaken by some Numidians; who running, as fugitives, out of the town into the Roman camp, waited fit opportunity to make an escape thence with their packets. But it happened, ere they could convey themselves away, that one of them was detected by an harlot following him out of the town, and the letters of Bostar and Hanno were taken and opened; containing a vehement entreaty unto Hannibal, that he would not thus forsake the Capuans and them. "For," said they, "we came not hither to make war against Rhegium "and Tarentum, but against the Romans; whose legions "wheresoever they lie, there also should the Carthaginian "army be ready to attend them; and by taking of such "course have we gotten those victories at Trebia, Thrasy-"mene, and Cannæ." In fine, they besought him that he would not dishonour himself, and betray them to their enemies, by turning another way; as if it were his only care that the city should not be taken in his full view; promising to

make a desperate sally, if he would once more adventure to set upon the Roman camp. Such were the hopes of Bostar and his fellow. But Hannibal had already done his best; and now began to faint under the burden of that war, wherein (as afterwards he protested) he was vanquished by Hanno and his partisans in the Carthaginian senate, rather than by any force of Rome. [s] It may well be, as a thing incident in like cases, that some of those which were besieged in Capua had been sent over by the Hannonians, to observe the doings of Hannibal, and to check his proceedings. If this were so, justly might they curse their own malice, which had cast them into this remediless necessity. Howsoever it were, the letters directed unto Hannibal fell (as is shewed) into the Roman proconsuls' hands; who, cutting off the hands of all such counterfeit fugitives as carried such messages, whipped them back into the town. This miserable spectacle brake the hearts of the Campans; so that the multitude, crying out upon the senate with menacing terms, caused them to assemble, and consult about the yielding up of Capua unto the Romans. The bravest of the senators, and such as a few years since had been most forward in joining with Hannibal, understood well enough whereunto the matter tended. Wherefore one of them invited the rest home to supper; telling them, that when they had made good cheer, he would drink to them such an health, as should set them free from that cruel revenge which the enemy sought upon their bodies. About seven and twenty of the senators there were, that liking well of this motion, ended their lives together by drinking poison. All the rest, hoping for more mercy than they had deserved, yielded simply to discretion. So one of the town gates was set open; whereat a Roman legion, with some other companies, entering, disarmed the citizens, apprehended the Carthaginian garrison, and commanded all the senators of Capua to go forth into the Roman camp. At their coming thither, the proconsuls laid irons upon them all; and, commanding them to tell what store of gold and silver they had at home,

[s] Liv. l. 30.

sent them into safe custody; some to Cales, others to Theanum. Touching the general multitude, they were reserved unto the discretion of the senate; yet so hardly used by Fulvius in the mean while, that they had little cause of hope or comfort in this adversity. App. Claudius was brought even to the point of death by the wound which he had lately received; yet was he not inexorable to the Campans, as having loved them well in former times, and having given his daughter in marriage to that Pacuvius, of whom we spake before. But this facility of his colleague made Fulvius the more hasty in taking vengeance; for fear, lest upon the like respects, the Roman senate might prove more gentle, than he thought behoveful to the common safety and honour of their state. Wherefore he took the pains to ride by night unto Theanum, and from thence to Cales; where he caused all the Campan prisoners to suffer death, binding them to stakes, and scourging them first a good while with rods; after which he struck off their heads.

This terrible example of vengeance, which the Carthaginians could not hinder, made all towns of Italy the less apt to follow the vain hope of the Campans, and bred a general inclination to return upon good conditions to the Roman side. The Atellans, Calatines, and Sabatines, people of the Campans, that in the former change had followed the fortune of Capua, made also now the like submission, for very fear, and want of ability to resist. They were therefore used with the like rigour by Fulvius; who dealt so extremely with them all, that he brought them into desperation. Wherefore some of their young gentlemen, burning with fire of revenge, got into Rome; where they found means by night-time to set on fire so many houses, that a great part of the city was like to have been consumed. The beginning of the fire in divers places at once, argued that it was no casualty. Wherefore liberty was proclaimed unto any slave, and other sufficient reward unto any freeman, that should discover who those incendiaries were. Thus all came out; and the Campans, being detected by a slave of their own, (to whom, above his liberty promised, was given

about the sum of an hundred marks,) had the punishment answerable to their deserts. Fulvius, hereby being more and more incensed against this wretched people, held them in a manner as prisoners within their walls; and this extreme severity caused them at length to become suppliants unto the Roman senate, that some period might be set unto their miseries. That, whereupon the senators resolved in the end, was worse than all that which they had suffered before. Only two poor women in Capua (of which one had been an harlot) were found not guilty of the late rebellion. The rest were, some of them, with their wives and children, sold for slaves, and their goods confiscated; others laid in prison, and reserved to further deliberation; but the generality of them commanded to depart out of Campania by a certain day, and confined unto several places, as best liked the angry victors. As for the town of Capua, it was suffered to stand, in regard of the beauty and commodious site; but no corporation, or form of polity, was allowed to be therein; only a Roman provost was every year sent to govern over those that should inhabit it, and to do justice. This was the greatest act, and most important, hitherto done by the people of Rome, after many great losses in the present war. After this, the glory of Hannibal began to shine with a more dim light than before, his oil being far spent, and that which should have revived his flame being unfortunately shed; as shall be told in place convenient.

SECT. XV.

How the Carthaginians, making a party in Sardinia and Sicily, held war against the Romans in those islands, and were overcome.

WHILST things passed thus in Italy, the commotions raised in Sardinia and Sicily, by the Carthaginians and their friends, were brought to a quiet and happy end by the industrious valour of the Romans. The Sardinian rebellion was great and sudden; above thirty thousand being up in arms ere the Roman forces could arrive there to suppress it. One Harsicoras, with his son Hiostus, mighty men in that island, were the ringleaders; being incited by Hanno a Car-

thaginian, that promised the assistance of his country. Neither were the Carthaginians in this enterprise so careless, as in the rest of their main undertakings about the same time. Yet it had been better, if their care had been directed unto the prosecution of that main business in Italy, whereon this and all other hopes depended. For it would have sufficed, if they could have hindered the Romans from sending an army into Sardinia. Harsicoras with his followers might well enough have served to drive out Q. Mutius the pretor, who lay sick in the province, and not more weak in his own body than in his train. But whilst they sought revenge of that particular injury, whereof the sense was most grievous, they neglected the opportunity of requiting those that had done them wrong, and of the securing themselves from all injuries in the future. Their fortune also in this enterprise was such, as may seem to have discouraged them from being at the like charge, in cases of more importance. For whereas they sent over Asdrubal, surnamed *the Bald*, with a competent fleet and army; assisted in this expedition by Hanno, the author of the rebellion, and by Mago, a gentleman of the Barchine house, and near kinsman to Hannibal; it so fell out, that the whole fleet, by extremity of foul weather, was cast upon the Baleares; so beaten, and in such evil plight, that the Sardinians had even spent their hearts, and were in a manner quite vanquished, ere these their friends could arrive to succour them.

Titus Manlius was sent from Rome with two and twenty thousand foot and twelve hundred horse, to settle the estate of that island, which he had taken in, and annexed unto the Roman dominion, long before this, in his consulship. It was a laudable custom of the Romans, to preserve and uphold in their several provinces the greatness and reputation of those men, and their families, by whom each province had been first subdued unto their empire. If any injury were done unto the provincials, if any grace were to be obtained from the senate, or whatsoever accident required the assistance of a patron; the first conqueror, and his race after him, were the most ready and best approved means to pro-

cure the benefit of the people subdued. Hereby the Romans held very sure intelligence in every province, and had always in readiness fit men to reclaim their subjects, if they fell into any such disorder as would otherwise have required a greater charge and trouble. The coming of Manlius retained in obedience all that were not already broken too far out. Yet was Harsicoras so strong in field, that Manlius was compelled to arm his mariners; without whom he could not have made up that number of two and twenty thousand, whereof we have spoken before; he landed at Calaris, or Carallis, where mooring his ships he passed up into the country, and sought out the enemy. Hyostus, the son of Harsicoras, had then the command of the Sardinian army left unto him by his father, who was gone abroad into the country, to draw in more friends to their side. This young gentleman would needs adventure to get honour by giving battle to the Romans at his own discretion. So he rashly adventured to fight with an old soldier; by whom he received a terrible overthrow, and lost in one day above thirty thousand of his followers. Hyostus himself, with the rest of his broken troops, got into Cornus, the chief town of the island, whither Manlius pursued them. Very soon after this defeature came Asdrubal with his Carthaginians; too late to win all Sardinia in such haste as he might have done, if the tempest had not hindered his voyage; yet soon enough, and strong enough to save the town of Cornus, and to put a new spirit into the rebels. Manlius hereupon withdrew himself back to Calaris; where he had not stayed long, ere the Sardinians (such of them as adhered to the Roman party) craved his assistance, their country being wasted by the Carthaginians and the rebels, with whom they had refused to join. This drew Manlius forth of Calaris; where, if he had stayed a little longer, Asdrubal would have sought him out with some blemish to his reputation. But the fame of Asdrubal and his company appears to have been greater than was their strength. For after some trial made of them in a few skirmishes, Manlius adventured all to the hazard of a battle, wherein he slew twelve thousand of the enemies,

and took of the Sardinians and Carthaginians three thousand. Four hours the battle lasted; and victory at length fell to the Romans, by the flight of the islanders, whose courages had been broken in their unprosperous fight not many days before. The death of young Hyostus, and of his father Harsicoras, that slew himself for grief, together with the captivity of Asdrubal himself, with Mago and Hanno the Carthaginians, made the victory the more famous. The vanquished army fled into Cornus, whither Manlius followed them, and in short space won the town. All other cities of the isle that had rebelled followed the example of Cornus, and yielded unto the Roman; who imposing upon them such increase of tribute, or other punishment as best sorted with the nature of their several offences, or their ability to pay, returned back to Calaris with a great booty, and from thence to Rome, leaving Sardinia in quiet.

The war in Sicily was of greater length, and every way more burdensome to Rome; as also the victory brought more honour and profit; for that the Romans became thereby not only savers of their own, as in Sardinia, but lords of the whole country, by annexing the city and dominion of Syracuse to that which they enjoyed before. Soon after the battle of Cannæ the old king of Syracuse died, who had continued long a steadfast friend unto the Romans, and greatly relieved them in this present war. He left his kingdom to Hieronymus his grandchild, that was about fifteen years of age; Gelo his son, that should have been his heir, being dead before. To this young king his successor, Hiero appointed fifteen tutors; of which the principal were Andronodorus, Zoilus, and Themistius, who had married his daughters, or the daughters of Gelo. The rest were such, as he judged most likely to preserve the kingdom by the same art whereby himself had gotten, and so long kept it. But within a little while Andronodorus, waxing weary of so many coadjutors, began to commend the sufficiency of the young prince, as extraordinary in one of his years; and said, that he was able to rule the kingdom without help of any protector. Thus, by giving over his

own charge, he caused others to do the like, hoping thereby to get the king wholly into his hands; which came to pass in a sort as he desired. For Hieronymus, laying aside all care of government, gave himself wholly over to his pleasures; or if he had any regard of his royal dignity, it was only in matter of exterior show, as wearing a diadem with ornaments of purple, and being attended by an armed guard. Hereby he offended the eyes of his people, that had never seen the like in Hiero, or in Gelo his son. But much more he offended them, when by his insolent behaviour, suitable to his outward pomp, he gave proof that, in course of life, he would revive the memory of tyrants dead long since, from whom he took the pattern of his habit. He grew proud, lustful, cruel, and dangerous to all that were about him; so that such of his late tutors as could escape him by flight were glad to live in banishment; the rest being most of them put to death by the tyrant; many of them dying by their own hands, to avoid the danger of his displeasure, that seemed worse than death itself. Only Andronodorus, Zoilus, and one Thraso continued in grace with him, and were his counsellors, but not of his cabinet. These, howsoever they agreed in other points, were at some dissension about that main point, of adhering either to the Romans or to the Carthaginians. The two former of them were wholly for the king's pleasures, which was set on change; but Thraso, having more regard of his honour and profit, was very earnest to continue the amity with Rome. Whilst as yet it remained somewhat doubtful which way the king would incline, a conspiracy against his person was detected by a groom of his, to whom one Theodorus had broken the matter. Theodorus hereupon was apprehended, and tormented; thereby to wring out of him the whole practice, and the names of the undertakers. Long it was ere he would speak any thing; but yielding (as it seemed) in the end, unto the extremity of the torture, he confessed that he had been set on by Thraso; whom he appeached of the treason, together with many more, that were near in love or place unto Hieronymus. All these therefore were

put to death, being innocent of the crime wherewith they were charged. But they that were indeed the conspirators walked boldly in the streets, and never shrunk for the matter; assuring themselves, that the resolution of Theodorus would yield to no extremity. Thus they all escaped, and soon after found means to execute their purpose. The king himself, when Thraso was taken out of the way, quickly resolved upon siding with the Carthaginians, whereto he was very inclinable before. Young men, when first they grow masters of themselves, love to seem wiser than their fathers, by taking different courses. And the liberality of Hiero to the Romans, in their great necessity, had of late been such as might have been termed excessive, were it not in regard of his providence; wherein he took order for his own estate, that depended upon theirs. But the young nephew, taking little heed of dangers far off, regarded only the things present; the weakness of Rome; the prevalent fortunes of Carthage; and the much money that his grandfather had laid out in vain, to shoulder up a falling house. Wherefore he dealt with Hannibal, who readily entered into good correspondence with him, that was maintained by Hippocrates and Epicides, Carthaginians born, but grandchildren of a banished Syracusian. These grew into such favour with Hieronymus, that they drew him whither they listed. So that when Appius Claudius, the Roman pretor, hearing what was towards, made a motion of renewing the confederacy between the people of Rome and the king of Syracuse, his messengers were dismissed with an open scoff. For Hieronymus would needs have them tell him the order of the fight at Cannæ, that he might thereby learn how to accommodate himself; saying, that he could hardly believe the Carthaginians, so wonderful was the victory as they reported it. Having thus dismissed the Romans, he sent ambassadors to Carthage, where he concluded a league; with condition, at first, that a great part of the island should be annexed to his dominion; but afterward, that he should reign over all Sicily; and the Carthaginians rest satisfied with what they could get in

Italy. At these doings Appius Claudius did not greatly stir; partly for the indignities that were offered; partly for that it behoved not the Romans to entertain more quarrels than were enforced upon them by necessity; and partly (as may seem) for that the reputation both of himself and of his city had received such blemish, by that which happened unto him in his journey, as much discountenanced him when he came into Sicily, and forbade him to look big. The money that Hiero had bestowed upon the Romans, wherewith to relieve them in their necessity, this Appius was to carry back unto him; it being refused by the Roman senate with greater bravery than their present fortune would allow. But instead of returning the money with thanks, as he had been directed, and as it had been noised abroad that he should do; the war against Philip king of Macedon (whereof we have spoken before) compelled the Romans to lay aside their vainglory, and send word after him, that he should consign that money over to Marcus Valerius; of whose voyage into Greece the city had not otherwise wherewith to bear the charge. This was done accordingly; and hereby Claudius's (which name in the whole continuance of that family, is taxed with pride) errand was changed, from a glorious ostentation of the Roman magnanimity, into such a pitiful tune of thanksgiving, as must needs have bred sorrow and commiseration in so true a friend as Hiero; or, if it were delivered after his death, matter of pastime and scorn in Hieronymus the new king.

But whilst Hieronymus was more desirous of war than well resolved how to begin it, his own death changed the form of things, and bred a great innovation in the state of Syracuse; which thereby might have prospered more than ever, had it been wisely governed. Hippocrates and Epicides, of whom we spake before, were sent about the country with two thousand men, to solicit the towns, and persuade them to shake off their obedience to the Romans. The king himself, with an army of fifteen thousand horse and foot, went to Leontium, a city of his own dominion; hoping that the fame of his preparation would make the

whole island fall to him in all haste, and accept him for sovereign. There the conspirators took him on the sudden, as he was passing through a narrow street; and, rushing between him and his guard, struck him dead. Forthwith liberty was proclaimed; and the sound of that word so joyfully answered by the Leontines, that the guard of Hieronymus had little courage to revenge their master's death. Yet, for fear of the worst, a great largess was promised unto the soldiers, with rewards unto their captains; which wrought so effectually, that when many wicked acts of the murdered king were reckoned up, the army, as in detestation of his bad life, suffered his carcass to lie unburied. These news ran quickly to Syracuse; whither some of the conspirators, taking the king's horses, posted away, to signify all that had passed; to stir up the people to liberty, and to prevent Andronodorus, if he or his fellows would make offer to usurp a tyranny. The Syracusians hereupon presently took arms, and made themselves masters of their own city. Andronodorus on the other side fortified the palace and the island, being yet uncertain what to do; between desire of making himself a sovereign lord, and fear of suffering punishment, as a tyrant, if his enterprise miscarried. His wife Damarata, that was the daughter of Hiero, cherished him in his hopes, putting him in mind of that well known proverb which Dionysius had used, "That a tyrant should "keep his place till he were haled out of it by the heels, "and not ride away from it on horseback." But fear and better counsel prevailed so far, that Andronodorus, having slept upon the matter, dissembled his affections, and deferred his hope unto better opportunity. The next day he came forth, and made a speech unto the people; telling them, that he was glad to see how prudently they behaved themselves in so great a change; that he had stood in fear, lest they would not have contained themselves within bounds of discretion, but rather have sought to murder all, without difference, that any way belonged to the tyrant; and that since he beheld their orderly proceeding, and their care not to ravish their liberty perforce, but to wed it unto

them for ever; he was willingly come to them forth of his strength, and surrendered up the charge committed unto him, by one that had been an evil master both to him and them. Hereupon great joy was made, and pretors chosen (as in former times) to govern the city; of which Andronodorus was one, and the chief. But such was his desire of sovereignty, and so vehement were the instigations of his wife, that shortly he began to practise with Hippocrates, Epicides, and other captains of the mercenaries; hoping to make himself strong by their help that were least pleased with the change. Hippocrates and Epicides had been with the Syracusian pretors, and told them, that, being sent from Hannibal to Hieronymus, they, according to instructions of their captain, had done him, whilst he lived, what service they could; and that now they were desirous to return home. They requested therefore that they might be friendly dismissed; and with a convoy, that might keep them from falling into the hands of the Romans, and set them safe at Locri. This was easily granted; both for that the Syracusian magistrates were well contented to earn thanks of Hannibal with such a little courtesy, and for that they thought it expedient to rid their town quickly of this troublesome couple; which were good soldiers, and gracious with the army, but otherwise lewd men. It was not the desire of these two Sicilians to be gone so hastily as they made show; they were more mindful of the business for which Hannibal had sent them. Wherefore they insinuated themselves into the bosoms of such as were most likely to fill the army with tumult; especially of the Roman fugitives, and those that had cause to mistrust what should become of themselves when the Romans and Syracusians were come to agreement. Such instruments as these Andronodorus had great need of, as also of many other, to help him in his dangerous attempt. He found Themistius, that had married Harmonia the sister of Hieronymus, ready to take his part, as being carried with the like passions of his own and of his wife. But in seeking to increase the number of his adherents, he revealed the matter to one

that revealed all to the rest of the pretors. Hereupon it followed, that he and Themistius, entering into the senate, were slain out of hand; and afterward accused to the people of all the evil which they had done, whilst Hieronymus lived, as by his authority; and now since attempted in seeking to usurp the tyranny themselves. It was also declared, that the daughters of Hiero and Gelo were accessary to this dangerous treason; and that the unquiet spirits of these women would never cease to work, until they had recovered those royal ornaments and sovereign power whereof their family was now dispossessed. These daughters therefore of Hiero and Gelo were also condemned to die; and executioners presently sent by the enraged people to take away their lives. Demarata and Harmonia had perhaps deserved this heavy sentence; but Heraclea, the daughter of Hiero, and wife of Sosippus, being altogether innocent, was murdered, together with her two young daughters, in the hasty execution of this rash judgment. Her husband Sosippus was a lover of the commonwealth, and in that respect so hated by Hieronymus, that being sent ambassador to king Ptolomy, &c. he durst not return home, but stayed in Egypt as a banished man. This consideration, when it was too late, together with some other pitiful accidents accompanying the slaughter, so affected the multitude, that (pardoning themselves) all cried out upon the authors of so foul a butchery. Being thus incensed against the senate, and knowing not otherwise how to satisfy their anger, they called for an election of new pretors in the room of Andronodorus and Themistius, that were lately slain; meaning to substitute such in their places as the senators should have little cause to like. At the election were present a great rout, not only of the poorer citizens, but of soldiers that pressed into the throng. One of these named Epicides pretor; another named Hippocrates; and the less that the old pretors and senators approved this nomination, the more eager was the multitude; and by a general cry forced them to be accepted. These, being made pretors, did what they could to hinder the agreement that was in hand between

the Syracusians and the Romans. But having striven in vain, and seeing that the people stood in fear of Ap. Claudius and of Marcellus, that was lately come into Sicily, they gave way unto the time, and suffered the old league of Hiero to be reconfirmed, which afterward they purposed to dissolve by practice. The Leontines had some need of a garrison; and to them was sent Hippocrates the pretor, attended by such fugitives and mercenary soldiers as were most burdensome to Syracuse. Thither when he came, he began to do many acts of hostility against the Romans; first in secret, afterward more openly and boldly. Marcellus, rightly understanding the purpose of these two brethren, sent word unto the Syracusians, that they had already broken the league; and that the peace would never be kept sincerely, until this turbulent pair of brethren were expelled the island. Epicides, fearing to sustain the blame of his brother's proceedings, and more desirous to set forward the war than to excuse any breach of peace, went himself unto the Leontines, whom he persuaded to rebel against the Syracusians. For, he said, that since they had all of late served one master, there was little reason why the Leontines should not be enfranchised by his death as well as the Syracusians; yea or much rather, all things considered, since in their streets the tyrant was slain, and liberty first proclaimed. Wherefore, since they of Syracuse were not contented to enjoy the freedom purchased among the Leontines, but thought it good reason that they should bear dominion over those that had broken the chain wherewith both the one and the other were bound; his advice was, that such their arrogancy should be checked betimes, ere it could get any colour of right by prescription. Hereunto occasion was given by one article of the league made of late by the Romans and Syracusians. For it was agreed, that all, which had been subject to Hiero and Hieronymus, should henceforth be vassals unto the state of Syracuse. Against this article if the Leontines would take exception, and thereby challenge their own due, Epicides told them, that in this novelty of change they had fit opportunity to recover the

freedom which their fathers had lost not many ages before. Neither was it unreasonable which this crafty Carthaginian propounded, if the Leontines had been subdued by the same hand which took liberty from the Syracusians: but seeing they had long since yielded unto Syracuse, and been subject unto that city, by what form soever it was governed, this claim of liberty was rather seasonable than just. Nevertheless the motion of Epicides was highly approved; insomuch that when messengers came soon after from Syracuse to rebuke the Leontines for that which they had done against the Romans, and to denounce unto Hippocrates and Epicides, that they should get them gone either to Locri, or whither else they listed, so that they stayed not in Sicily; word was returned, that they of Leontium had not requested the Syracusians to make any bargains for them with the Romans, nor thought themselves bound to observe the covenants which others without warrant had made in their names. This peremptory answer was forthwith reported unto Marcellus by the Syracusians, who offered him their assistance in doing justice upon the Leontines their rebels; with condition, that when the town was taken it might be theirs again. Marcellus required no better satisfaction; but forthwith took the business in hand; which he despatched in one day. At the first assault Leontium was taken, all save the castle, whereinto Hippocrates and Epicides fled; and stealing thence away by night, conveyed themselves into the town of Herbesus. The first thing that Marcellus did when he had won the town was the same which other Roman captains used after victory, to seek out the fugitive Roman slaves and renegados, whom he caused all to die; the rest, both of the townsmen and soldiers, he took to mercy; forbearing also to strip or spoil them. But the fame of his doings was bruited after a contrary sort. It was said, that he had slain man, woman, and child, and put the town to sack. These news met the Syracusian army upon the way, as it was going to join with Marcellus, who had ended his business before. About eight thousand mercenaries there were, that had been sent

forth of Syracuse, under Sosis and Dinomenes, two of the pretors, to serve against the Leontines and other rebels. These captains were honest men, and well affected to their country; but the soldiers that followed them had those diseases with which all mercenaries are commonly infected. They took the matter deeply to heart, that their fellow-soldiers (as now they termed those against whom they went) had been so cruelly butchered; and hereupon they fell to mutiny; though what to demand, or with whom to be angry, they could not tell. The pretors therefore thought it best to turn their unquiet thoughts another way, and set them awork in some place else; forasmuch as at Leontium there was no need of their service. So toward Herbesus they marched; where lay Hippocrates and Epicides, the architects of all this mischief, devising what further harm they might do; but now so weakly accompanied, that they seemed unable to escape the punishments belonging to their offences past. Hereof the two brethren were no less well aware; and therefore adventured upon a remedy little less desperate than their present case. They issued forth of Herbesus unarmed, with olive branches in their hands, in manner of suppliants; and so presented themselves to the army. Six hundred men of Crete were in the vanguard, that had been well used by Hieronymus; and some of them greatly bound unto Hannibal, who had taken them prisoners in the Italian war, and lovingly dismissed them. These Cretans therefore welcomed the two brethren, and bade them be of good cheer; saying, that no man should do them harm as long as they could use their weapons. Herewithal the army was at a stand; and the rumour of this accident ran swiftly from man to man with general approbation. The pretors thought to help the matter by severity; which would not serve: for when they commanded these two traitors to be laid in irons, the exclamation was so violent against them, that fain they were to let all alone, and return, uncertain what course to take, unto Megara; where they were lodged the night before. Thither when they came, Hippocrates devised a trick whereby to help himself,

and better the uncertain case wherein he stood. He caused letters of his own penning to be intercepted by some of his most trusty Cretans; directed (as they made show) from the Syracusian pretors, to Marcellus. The contents hereof were, that Marcellus had well done in committing all to the sword among the Leontines; but that it further behoved him, to make the like despatch of all the mercenaries belonging to Syracuse; which were offensive, all of them in general, to the liberty of the city, and the peace with Rome. When this counterfeit epistle was openly rehearsed, the uproar was such, that Sosis and his fellow pretor were glad to forsake the camp, and fly for their lives. All the Syracusians remaining behind, had been cut in pieces by the enraged soldiers, if the two artificers of the sedition had not saved their lives, rather to keep them as pledges, and by them to win their friends within the town, than for any good-will. They persuaded also a mischievous knave that had served among the Leontines, to justify the bruit of Marcellus's cruelty, and to carry home the news to Syracuse, as an eyewitness. This incensed not only the multitude, but some of the senate, and filled the whole town with causeless indignation. In good time (said some) was the avarice and cruelty of the Romans detected; who, had they in like sort gotten into Syracuse, would have dealt much worse, where their greedy appetites might have been tempted with a far greater booty. Whilst they were thus discoursing, and devising how to keep out the wicked Romans, Hippocrates with his army came to the gates, exhorting the citizens to let him in, unless for want of help they would be betrayed to their enemies. The pretors, with the best and wisest of the senate, would fain have kept him out; but the violence of the soldiers to force a gate was no whit greater than the headstrong fury of those within the town, that laboured to break it open. So he entered, and immediately fell upon the pretors, whom (being forsaken by all men) he put to the sword, and made slaughter of them and their followers until night. The next day he went openly to work; and, after the common example of tyrants,

gave liberty to all slaves and prisoners; and, being fortified with adherents of the worst and basest sort, made himself and his brother pretors in title, but in effect lords of Syracuse.

When Marcellus was advertised of this great alteration, he thought it no time for him to sit still, and attend the further issue. He sent ambassadors to Syracuse, that were not admitted into the haven, but chased out as enemies. Then drew he near with his army; and, lodging within a mile and a half of the town, sent before him some to require a parley. These were entertained without the walls by the two new pretors; to whom they declared, that the Romans were come thither, not with purpose to do hurt, but in favour of the Syracusians, which were oppressed by tyrants; and to punish those that had murdered and banished so many of the principal citizens. Wherefore they required that those worthy men, their confederates, which were chased out of the town, might be suffered to return, and enjoy their own; as also that the authors of the great slaughter lately committed, might be delivered up. Hereto Epicides briefly answered, that if their errand had been to him, he could have told what to say to them; but since it was directed unto others, they should do well to return when those to whom they were sent had the government in their hands. As for the war which they threatened, he told them they should find by experience, that to besiege Syracuse was another manner of work than to take Leontium. Thus he sent them gone, and returned back into the city. Immediately began the siege, which endured longer than the Romans had expected. The quick and easy winning of Leontium did put Marcellus in hope, that so long a circuit of walls, as compassed Syracuse, being manned with no better kind of soldiers than those with whom he had lately dealt, would in some part or other be taken at the first assault. Wherefore he omitted no violence or terror in the very beginning, but did his best, both by land and sea. Nevertheless all his labour was disappointed, and his hope of prevailing by open force taken from him by the ill suc-

cess of two or three of the first assaults. Yet was it not the virtue of the defendants, or any strength of the city, that bred such despair of hasty victory. But there lived at that time in Syracuse Archimedes the noble mathematician, who at the request of Hiero the late king, that was his kinsman, had framed such engines of war, as being in this extremity put in use, did more mischief to the Romans than could have been wrought by the cannon, or any instruments of gunpowder, had they in that age been known. This Archimedes, discoursing once with Hiero, maintained, that it were possible to remove the whole earth out of the place wherein it is, if there were some other earth, or place of sure footing whereon a man might stand. For proof of this bold assertion, he performed some strange works, which made the king entreat him to convert his study unto things of use, that might preserve the city from danger of enemies. To such mechanical works Archimedes, and the philosophers of those times, had little affection. They held it an injury done unto the liberal sciences, to submit learned propositions unto the workmanship and gain of base handicraftsmen. And of this opinion Plato was an author, who greatly blamed some geometricians, that seemed unto him to profane their science by making it vulgar. Neither must we rashly task a man so wise as Plato with the imputation of supercilious austerity, or affected singularity in his reprehension. For it hath been the unhappy fate of great inventions to be vilified as idle fancies, or dreams, before they were published; and, being once made known, to be undervalued, as falling within compass of the meanest wit, and things that every one could well have performed. Hereof, (to omit that memorable example of Columbus's discovery, with the much different sorts of neglect which he underwent before and after it,) in a familiar and most homely example, we may see most apparent proof. He that looks upon our English brewers, and their servants that are daily exercised in the trade, will think it ridiculous to hear one say, that the making of malt was an invention proceeding from some of an extraordinary knowledge in natural

philosophy. Yet is not the skill of the inventors any whit the less, for that the labour of workmanship grows to be the trade of ignorant men. The like may be said of many handicrafts; and particularly in the printing of books, which being devised and bettered by great scholars and wise men, grew afterward corrupted by those to whom the practice fell, that is, by such as could slubber things easily over, and feed their workmen at the cheapest rate. In this respect therefore the alchymists, and all others that have or would seem to have any secret skill, whereof the publication might do good unto mankind, are not without excuse of their close concealing. For it is a kind of injustice, that the long travails of an understanding brain, beside the loss of time and other expense, should be cast away upon men of no worth; or yield less benefit unto the author of a great work, than to mere strangers, and perhaps his enemies. And surely, if the passion of envy have in it any thing allowable and natural, as have anger, fear, and other the like affections; it is in some such case as this, and serveth against those which would usurp the knowledge wherewith God hath denied to endue them. Nevertheless, if we have regard unto common charity, and the great affection that every one ought to bear unto the generality of mankind, after the example of him that *suffereth his sun to shine upon the just and unjust*; it will appear more commendable in wise men to enlarge themselves, and to publish unto the world those good things that lie buried in their own bosoms. This ought specially to be done, when a profitable knowledge hath not annexed to it some dangerous cunning, that may be perverted by evil men to a mischievous use. For if the secret of any rare antidote contained in it the skill of giving some deadly and irrecoverable poison, better it were that such a jewel remain close in the hands of a wise and honest man, than, being made common, bind all men to use the remedy, by teaching the worst men how to do mischief. But the works which Archimedes published were such as tended to very commendable ends. They were engines serving unto the defence of Syracuse, not fit

for the Syracusians to carry abroad, to the hurt and oppression of others. Neither did he altogether publish the knowledge how to use them, but reserved so much to his own direction, that after his death more of the same kind were not made, nor those of his own making were employed by the Romans. It sufficed unto this worthy man, that he had approved, even unto the vulgar, the dignity of his science, and done especial benefit unto his country. For to enrich a mechanical trade, or teach the art of murdering men, it was besides his purpose.

Marcellus had caused certain of his *quinquereme* galleys to be fastened together, and towers erected on them, to beat the defendants from the wall. Against these, Archimedes had sundry devices, of which any one sort might have repelled the assailants; but all of them together shewed the multiplicity of his great wit: he shot heavy stones and long pieces of timber, like unto the yards of ships, which brake some of the galleys by their force and weight. These afflicted such as lay far off. They that were come nearer the walls lay open to a continual volley of shot, which they could not endure. Some with an iron grapple were taken by the prow and hoisted up, shaking out all the men, and afterward falling down into the water. Some by strange engines were lifted up into the air, where, turning round a while, they were broken against the walls, or cast upon the rocks; and all of them were so beaten, that they durst never come to any second assault. In like sort was the land army handled. Stones and timber, falling upon it like hail, did not only overwhelm the men, but brake down the Roman engines of battery, and forced Marcellus to give over the assault. For remedy hereof it was conceived, that if the Romans could early before day get near unto the walls, they should be (as it were) under the point-blank, and receive no hurt by these terrible instruments, which were wound up hard to shoot a great compass. But this vain hope cost many of the assailants' lives; for the shot came down right upon them, and, beating them from all parts of the wall, made a great slaughter of them all the way as

they fled, (for they were unable to stay by it,) even till they were gotten very far off. This did so terrify the Romans, that if they perceived any piece of timber, or a rope's end, upon the walls, they ran away, crying out, that Archimedes's engines were ready to discharge. Neither knew Marcellus how to overcome these difficulties, or to take away from his men that fear, against the cause whereof he knew no remedy. If the engines had stood upon the walls, subject to firing, or any such annoyance from without, he might have holpen it, by some device to make them unserviceable; but all, or the most of them, were out of sight, being erected in the streets behind the walls, where Archimedes gave directions how to use them. Wherefore the Roman had none other way left, than to cut off from the town all provision of victuals, both by land and by sea. This was a desperate piece of work: for the enemies having so goodly an haven, the sea in a manner free, and the Carthaginians, that were strong by sea, willing to supply them, were not likely so soon to be consumed with famine, as the besiegers to be wearied out by lying in leaguer before so strong a city, having no probability to carry it. Yet, for want of better counsel to follow, this was thought the best and most honourable course.

In the mean while Himilco, admiral of a Carthaginian fleet, that had waited long about Sicily, being by Hippocrates advertised of these passages, went home to Carthage; and there so dealt with the senate, that five and twenty thousand foot, three thousand horse, and twelve elephants were committed unto his charge, wherewith to make war upon the Romans in Sicily by land. He took many towns, and many, that had anciently belonged unto the Carthaginians, did yield unto him. To remedy this mischief, and to stay the inclination of men, which, following the current of fortune, began to turn unto the Carthaginians, Marcellus, with a great part of his army, rose from Syracuse, and went from place to place about the island. He took Pelorus and Herbesus, which yielded unto him. He took also Megara by force, and sacked it, either to terrify others that were

obstinate, especially the Syracusians; or else because Rome was at this time poor, and his army must have somewhat to keep it in heart. His especial desire was to have saved Agrigentum, whither he came too late; for Himilco had gotten it before. Therefore he returned back toward Syracuse, carefully, and in as good order as he could, for fear of the Carthaginian, that was too strong for him. The circumspection that he used, in regard of Himilco, stood him in good stead against a danger that he had not mistrusted. For Hippocrates, leaving the charge of Syracuse unto his brother, had lately issued out of the city, with ten thousand foot and five hundred horse, intending to join his forces with Himilco. Marcellus fell upon him, ere either was aware of the other; and the Romans, being in good order, got an easy victory against the dispersed and half-unarmed Syracusians. The reputation hereof helped a little to keep the Sicilians from rebellion. Yet it was not long ere Himilco, joining with Hippocrates, ran over all the island at his pleasure, and presented battle to Marcellus, even at his trenches; but the Roman wisely refused it. Bomilcar also, a Carthaginian, entered with a great fleet into the haven of Syracuse, and victualled the city. After this, the disposition of the islanders changed so again, that although another legion was come from Rome, which escaped from Himilco, and safely arrived at Marcellus's camp, yet many places revolted unto the Carthaginians, and slew or betrayed the Roman garrisons.

In the midst of these troubles, winter enforced both parts to take breath a while; and Marcellus, leaving some of his army before Syracuse, that he might not seem to have given over the siege, went unto Leontium, where he lay intentive to all occasions. In the beginning of the spring he stood in doubt, whether it were better to continue the laborious work of besieging Syracuse, or to turn all his forces to Agrigentum against Himilco and Hippocrates. But it would greatly have impaired his reputation, if he had gone from Syracuse, as unable to prevail; and he himself was of an eager disposition, ever unwilling to give ground, or to

quit, as not feasible, an enterprise that he had once taken in hand. He came therefore to Syracuse, where, though he found all the difficulties remaining as before, and no likelihood to take the city by force or famine, yet was he not without hope, that continuance of time would bring forth somewhat which might fulfil his desire. Especially he assayed to prevail by treason, against which no place can hold out. And to this end he dealt with the Syracusian gentlemen that were in his camp, exhorting them to practise with their friends that remained in the city. This was not easy for them to do, because the town would hearken to no parley. At length a slave unto one of these banished men, making show to run away from his master, got into Syracuse, where he talked in private with some few, as he had been instructed. Thus began Marcellus to have intelligence within the city, whence the conspirators used to send him advertisement of their proceedings by a fisher-boat that passed forth in the night; but when they were grown to the number of fourscore, and thought themselves able to effect somewhat of importance, all was discovered, and they, like traitors, put to death. In the mean while, one Damasippus, a Lacedæmonian, that had been sent out of the town as an ambassador to Philip king of Macedon, was fallen into the hands of Marcellus: Epicides was very desirous to ransom him, and many meetings were appointed for that purpose, not far from the walls. There one of the Romans, looking upon the wall, and wanting the more compendious art of geometry, fell to numbering the stones; and, making an estimate of the height, judged it less than it had been formerly deemed. Herewith he acquainted Marcellus, who causing better notice to be taken of the place, and finding that ladders of no extraordinary length would reach it, made all things ready, and waited a convenient time. It was the weakest part of the town, and therefore the most strongly guarded: neither was there hope to prevail by force against Archimedes, if they failed to take it by surprise. But a fugitive out of the town brought word, that a great feast was to be held unto Diana, which was to

last three days; and that, because other good cheer was not so plentiful within the city as in former times, Epicides, to gratify the people, had made the more large distribution of wine. A better opportunity could not be wished. Wherefore Marcellus, in the dead of the festival night, came unto the walls, which he took by scalado. Syracuse was divided into four parts, (or five, if Epipolæ were reckoned as one,) each of which were fortified as distinct cities. When therefore Marcellus had gotten some pieces, he had the commodity of a better and safe lodging, with good store of booty, and better opportunity than before to deal with the rest. For there were now a great many, as well of those in Acradina and the island, inner parts of the town, as of those that were already in the hands of Marcellus, that began to hearken unto composition, as being much terrified by the loss of those parts which the Romans had taken and sacked. As for the weapons of Archimedes, little harm or none they did unto those that were sheltered under strong houses; although it may seem, that the inner walls were not altogether unfurnished of his help, since they held out a good while, and were not taken by force. The Roman fugitives and renegados were more careful than ever to defend the rest of the city, being sure to be rewarded with a cruel death, if Marcellus could prevail. Hippocrates and Himilco were daily expected, and Bomilcar was sent away to Carthage to bring help from thence. It was not long ere Hippocrates and Himilco came, who fell upon the old camp of the Romans, whilst Epicides sallied out of Acradina upon Marcellus. But the Romans made such defence in each part, that the assailants were repelled. Nevertheless, they continued to beset Marcellus, whom they held in a manner as straitly besieged, as he himself did besiege the town. But the pestilence at length consumed, together with the two captains, a great part of the army, and caused the rest to dislodge. The Romans were (though somewhat less) afflicted with the same pestilence, insomuch that Bomilcar did put the city of Carthage in hope that he might be taken where he lay, if any great forces were sent thither.

This Bomilcar wanted no desire to do his country service; but his courage was not answerable to his good-will. He arrived at Pachynus with a strong fleet, where he stayed, being loath to double the cape, for that the winds did better serve the enemy than him. Thither sailed Epicides out of Syracuse, to acquaint him with the necessities of the city, and to draw him on. With much entreaty at length he came forward; but meeting with the Roman fleet, that was ready for him, he stood off into the deep, and sailed away to Tarentum, bidding Sicily farewell. Then durst not Epicides return into Syracuse, but went to Agrigentum, where he expected the issue, with a very faint hope of hearing any good news.

The Sicilian soldiers, that remained alive of Hippocrates's army, lay as near as they could safely unto Marcellus, and some of them in a strong town three miles off. These had done what good they could to Syracuse, by doing what hurt they could unto the Romans. But when they were informed that the state of Sicily was given as desperate by the Carthaginians, they sent ambassadors to treat of peace, and made offer to compound, both for themselves and for the town. Hereunto Marcellus willingly gave ear; for he had stayed there long enough, and had cause to fear, that after a little while the Carthaginians might come thither strong again: he therefore agreed, both with the citizens and with the soldiers that lay abroad, that they should be masters of their own, enjoying their liberty and proper laws; yet suffering the Romans to possess whatsoever had belonged unto the kings. Hereupon they to whom Epicides had left his charge were put to death, new pretors chosen, and the gates even ready to be opened unto Marcellus, when suddenly the Roman fugitives disturbed all. These, perceiving their own condition to be desperate, persuaded the other mercenary soldiers, that the citizens had bargained only for themselves, and betrayed the army to the Romans. Wherefore they presently took arms, and fell upon the new-chosen pretors, whom they slew, and made election of six captains that should command over all. But

shortly it was found out that there was no danger at all to the soldiers, excepting only the fugitives. The treaty therefore was again set on foot, and wanted little of conclusion; which yet was delayed, either by some fear of the citizens, that had seen (as they thought) proof of the Roman avarice in the sack of Epipolæ, Tyche, and Neapolis, the parts already taken; or by some desire of Marcellus to get the town by force, that he might use the liberty of a conqueror, and make it wholly subject unto Rome. Mericus, a Spaniard, was one of the six captains that had been chosen in the late commotion, a man of such faith as usually is found in mercenaries, holding his own particular benefit above all other respects. With this captain Marcellus dealt secretly, having a fit instrument of the same nation, one Belligenes, that went in company with the Roman ambassadors daily passing to and fro. This crafty agent persuaded Mericus, that the Romans had already gotten all Spain; and that if ever he purposed to make his own fortune good, either at home in Spain, or any where else, it was now the only time to do it, by conforming himself to the will of the Roman general. By such hopes the Spanish captain was easily won, and sent forth his own brother among the Syracusian ambassadors to ratify the covenant with Marcellus.

This underhand dealing of Marcellus against the Syracusians cannot well be commended as honest; neither was it afterwards throughly approved at his coming to Rome. For the benefits of Hiero to the Romans had been such, as deserved not to be requited with the ruin of his country; much less, that the miseries of his people, oppressed (though partly through their own folly) by an army of mercenaries, should minister unto the people of Rome advantage against them. The poor citizens could not make good their parts against the hired soldiers, and therefore were fain to yield unto the time, and obey those ministers of Hannibal that ruled the army. But as long as they were free after the death of Hieronymus, and now of late, when they had gathered courage by the flight of Epicides, it had been their

chief care to maintain amity with the people of Rome. They had lately slain many the principal of Epicides's followers; and many of themselves had also been slain, both lately and in former times, because of this their desire unto the peace. What though it were true, that the rascality, and some ill advised persons, joined with the soldiers in hatred of the Romans, by occasion of the slaughter which they heard to be done at Leontium, and afterward beheld in those parts of their own city which was taken? Ought therefore the Roman general, in a treaty of peace held with the Syracusians, to make a bargain underhand against them, with a captain of the mercenaries? These things were objected against Marcellus at his return home: but the senators thought it a great deal better to comfort the Syracusians with gentle words, and promises of good usage in time to come, than to restore the booty, and give over the dominion of a city so great, wealthy, strong, and many ways important. Nevertheless, if we consider the many inconveniences and great mischiefs whereunto Syracuse was obnoxious, both by evil neighbours, and by that very form of polity after which it was governed, we may truly affirm, that it received no small benefit by becoming subject unto Rome. For thereby it was not only assured against all foreign enemies, domestical conspiracies, and such tyrants as of old had reigned therein; but freed from the necessity of banishing, or murdering the most worthy citizens; as also from all factions, intestine seditions, and a thousand the like miseries, that were wont to grow out of the jealousy wherein they held their liberty in vain. Neither enjoyed that city, from her first foundation, any such long time of happiness, as that wherein it flourished when it rested secure under the protection of Rome, and was no more molested by the disease of ambition, whereof by Marcellus's victory it was throughly cured. But such benefit, arising from wrongs done, serves not to make injustice the more excusable, unless we should approve the answer of that thief, who being found to have stolen a silver cup from a sick man, said, "He never leaves drinking."

By the treason of Mericus, the Roman army was let into possession of all Syracuse; wherein the booty that it found was said to have been no less than could have been hoped for, if they had taken Carthage itself, that maintained war by land and sea against them. All the goodly works and imageries, wherewith Syracuse was marvellously adorned, were carried away to Rome; and nothing left untouched, save only the houses of those banished men, that had escaped from Hippocrates and Epicides into the Roman camp. Among other pitiful accidents, the death of Archimedes was greatly lamented, even by Marcellus himself. He was so busy about his geometry, in drawing figures, that he hearkened not to the noise and uproar in the city; no, nor greatly attended the rude soldier that was about to kill him. Marcellus took heavily the death of him, and caused his body to be honourably buried. Upon his tomb (as he had ordained in his lifetime) was placed a cylinder and a sphere, with an inscription of the proportion between them; which he first found out. An invention of so little use, as this may seem, pleased that great artist better than the devising of all those engines that made him so famous. Such difference is between the judgment of learned men and of the vulgar sort. For many an one would think the money lost that had been spent upon a son, whose studies in the university had brought forth such fruit, as the proportion between a sphere and a cylinder.

After the taking of Syracuse, all the towns in Sicily yielded unto the Romans; except Agrigentum, and a few places thereabout. At Agrigentum lay Epicides, with one Hanno a Carthaginian, and Mutines an African, that was lately sent from Hannibal. This Mutines, by many good pieces of service, had added some credit to the beaten Carthaginian side, and withal made his own name great. By his persuasions Hanno and Epicides adventured to meet Marcellus without the town, and not behave themselves as men expecting to be besieged. Neither was he more valiant in counsel than in execution. Once and again he set upon the Romans, where they lay encamped, and drove them

fearfully into their trenches. This bred envy in Epicides and Hanno; especially in Hanno, that having been lately sent from Carthage, with commission and authority from the state, thought himself wronged greatly by Hannibal, in that he had sent unto him this Mutines to be his companion, and to take upon him, like as good a man as himself. The indignity seemed the greater, when Mutines, being to step aside unto Heraclea, for the pacifying of some troubles there among the Numidians, advised (as directing Hanno and Epicides) not to meddle with the enemy until his return. So much therefore the rather would Hanno fight, and offered battle unto Marcellus before he sought it. It is like, that a great part of the Roman army was left behind in Syracuse, as need required; which made the Carthaginians the better able to deal with those that came against them. But whatsoever disproportion was between the two armies, far greater were the odds between the captains. For howsoever the people of Carthage would give authority by favour, yet could they not give worth and ability in matter of war. The Numidians, having before conceived some displeasure against their captains, and being therefore some of them gone away to Heraclea, were much more offended, when they saw that the vainglorious envy of Hanno carried him unto the fight, upon a foolish desire to get victory without the help of Mutines their countryman. Wherefore they sent unto the Roman general, and bade him be confident, for that it was not their purpose to shew themselves his enemies that day; but only look on, and see the proud Carthaginians well beaten, by whom they had been misused. They made good their promise, and had their desire: for Marcellus, finding likelihood of truth in their message, did so lustily set upon the enemies, that he brake them at the first charge; and, with the slaughter of many thousands, drove them back into Agrigentum.

If Hanno could have been contented to follow the directions of one that was a better man of war than himself, and not have hazarded a battle without need, the Romans would shortly have been reduced into terms of great diffi-

culty in their Sicilian war; for Marcellus was shortly after to leave the province, and soon upon his departure there landed in the island a supply of eight thousand foot, and three thousand Numidian horse, that were sent from Carthage. The fame of this new army drew many of the Sicilians into rebellion. The Roman army, consisting (for the most part) of the legions of Cannæ, took it very heinously, that no good service done could bring them into the favour of the senate; but that, as banished men, they were sent far from home, and not suffered to return back to Rome with their general. Mutines had pacified his countrymen the Numidians; and, like an honest man, did the best that he could for those whom he served, without contending against the foolish pride of Hanno, finding that there was a great alteration; and a greater might have been, if the army lately overthrown had been entire. M. Cornelius, the Roman pretor, used all diligence, both to pacify his own men, and to hinder the Carthaginians. He recovered those inland towns that had rebelled; and though he could not hinder Mutines from overrunning all the country, yet he hindered the country from revolting unto Mutines. Above threescore towns, great and small, the Carthaginians held in Sicily; of which Agrigentum was the principal, and far bigger than any of the rest. Thence issued Mutines as often as he pleased, in despite of the Romans; not only to the succour of his own adherents, but to the great waste of those that followed the contrary part. But Hanno, instead of being pleased with all these good services, was filled more and more with envy against the man that performed them. He had, belike, received instructions from old Hanno at Carthage, not to suffer Hannibal, or any Hannibalian, to have share in the honour of these Sicilian wars; which were therefore perhaps the more diligently supplied, whilst Italy was neglected, that should have been regarded more than all the rest. Wherefore to shew his authority, and that it was not in the power of Hannibal to appoint unto him an assistant or director, he took away from Mutines his charge, and gave it to his own son; thinking thereby to

discountenance the man, and make him little esteemed, as one out of office, among his Numidians. But it fell out quite contrary; and this spiteful dealing occasioned the loss of whatsoever the Carthaginians held in Sicily. For the Numidians were so incensed by the indignity offered unto their countryman, being such a brave commander, that they offered him their service to requite the wrong; and were thenceforth absolutely at his own disposition. M. Valerius Lævinus, the Roman consul, was newly come into the province when this fell out, and with him did Mutines enter into intelligence. For he could no longer brook these indignities; but being neither a Carthaginian, nor favoured by those that bore all the sway in Carthage, he thought it the wisest way to play the best of his own game, and forsake that city, which was likely to perish by the evil counsel that governed it. He did not therefore, as his countrymen had lately done, content himself to see his adversaries reap the bitter fruits of their own malicious overweening, and to suffer that harm, in doing whereof he would not bear a part; but conspired against them to deliver up Agrigentum, and to help to expel them utterly out of Sicily. The consul was glad of his friendship, and carefully followed his advertisements. Neither was there much cunning needful, to the performance of that which Mutines had undertaken. For he with his Numidians did forcibly seize upon a gate, whereat they let in some Roman companies, that lay near in a readiness for the purpose. Hanno, when first he heard the noise, thought it had been no worse matter than some such tumult of the Numidians as he had been well acquainted with of late. But when, making haste to pacify the trouble, he saw and heard the Romans intermixed among those discontented followers of Mutines, forthwith he betook himself to flight, and saving himself, with Epicides, in a small bark, set sail for Afric; leaving all his army and adherents in Sicily to the mercy of the Romans, that henceforward continued masters of the whole island.

Lævinus the consul, having taken Agrigentum, did sharp execution of justice upon all the citizens. The principal of

them he scourged with rods, and afterwards beheaded, as was the manner of the Romans; all the rest of them he sold for slaves, and confiscated their goods; sending home to Rome the money that was raised of the booty. This was indeed a time wherein Rome stood in no less necessity of gold than of steel; which may have been the reason why Lævinus dealt so cruelly with the Agrigentines. Nevertheless the fame of such severity bred a terror among all the dependants of the Carthaginians, so that in great haste they sought to make their peace. About forty towns yielded themselves quickly unto the Romans, twenty were delivered up by treason, and six only stayed to be won by force. These things done, Lævinus returned home to Rome, carrying with him about four thousand men from Agatirna, that were a company of outlaws, bankrupts, and banished men, accustomed to live by spoil of others, in these troublesome times. He bestowed them about Rhegium in Italy, where they might exercise their occupation against the Brutians; a thievish kind of people, that were enemies unto those of Rhegium, and to the Romans. As for Mutines, he was well rewarded, and made citizen of Rome; where he lived in good account, accompanying the two Scipios in their journey against Antiochus, and therein doing (as it is said) very especial service. So by this enterprise of Sicily the Carthaginians wasted much of their forces, that with greater profit might have been employed in Italy; leaving yet unto the Romans, in the end of this war, the entire possession of this island, which they wanted when it began.

SECT. XVI.

How the war passed between the Romans and Hannibal in Italy, from the taking of Capua to the great victory at Metaurus.

SHORTLY after the winning of Capua, Marcellus came to Rome; where, for his good services done in the island of Sicily, he had granted unto him the honour of the lesser triumph, which was called *ovation*. The greater triumph was denied him, because he had not finished the war, but was fain to leave his army behind him in the province. He

stayed not long in Rome before he was again chosen consul, together with M. Valerius Lævinus, who succeeded him in the government of Sicily, and was, at the time of his election, making war against king Philip in Greece. Great complaint was made against the consul Marcellus by the Syracusians, for that which he had done unto them; they alleging their great friendship to the people of Rome in the time of their late king Hiero; and affirming, that their city did never willingly break the alliance, excepting when it was oppressed by such tyrants, as were not greater enemies to Rome, than to all good men that lived in Syracuse. The consul, on the other side, reckoned up the labours and dangers whereunto they had put him; willing them to bemoan themselves to the Carthaginians, that had holpen them in their necessity, and not unto the Romans, whom they had kept out. Thus each part having some good matter to allege, the senate made such an end of the controversy as best agreed with the benefit of their own commonwealth; blaming the too much rigour of Marcellus, yet not restoring the booty that he had taken, nor making the Syracusians free from their subjection, but comforting them with gentle words and hopeful promises, as hath been shewed before. The two new consuls, Marcellus and Lævinus, were appointed to make war as their lots should fall out; the one in Italy, the other in Sicily. The isle of Sicily fell unto Marcellus, which province he willingly changed, with his colleague; to the end that the Syracusians (whose cause had not as yet been heard in the senate) might not seem hindered by fear from uttering their grievances freely. Afterwards, when his business with them was despatched, he gently undertook the patronage of them; which remained long in his family, to the great benefit of their country in times following. So Valerius, the other consul, was sent into Sicily, whose doings there have been already rehearsed; but Marcellus was employed against Hannibal.

Before the consuls departed out of Rome, they were much troubled with pressing of soldiers to the war; and most of all with getting mariners for their navy. They

were all of the poorer sort that used to be employed in sea-services, especially in rowing. These could not live without present wages, neither was there money enough in the treasury to give them pay: wherefore it was ordained that they should be set out at the expense of private men; who, in this necessity of the state, were driven to sustain all public charges. Hereat the people murmured, and were ready to fall into sedition, had not the consuls deferred the matter unto further consideration. The senate could ill tell what to determine or do in a case of such extremity. For manifest it was, that the multitude had already endured so much as well it could undergo; and somewhat more, than could with honesty have been imposed upon it. Nevertheless it was impossible to maintain the war against the Carthaginians, or to keep the Macedonian out of Italy without a strong fleet. Wherefore some were of opinion, that since the common treasury was so empty, the people must be forced, by right or wrong, to take the burden upon them. At last the consuls began to say, that no persuasions would be so effectual with the people as good examples; and that if the senators would follow the consuls, like it was that the people also would follow the senate. Wherefore they propounded, and it was immediately concluded, that every one of them should bring forth and put into the treasury all the money that he had, and that no senator should keep any vessel of gold, or plate whatsoever, excepting one saltseller, and a bowl, wherewith to make their offerings unto the gods; as also a ring for himself, with such other tokens of ingenuity for his wife and children, as every one did use, and those of as small value as might be. This advice of the consuls was not more thankfully accepted by the senate, than the ready performance thereof by the senate was highly applauded, and hastily followed by the gentlemen of Rome. Neither did the commonalty refuse to do that which their betters had openly done before them. For since the public necessity could no otherwise be holpen, every one was contented that his private estate should run the same fortune with the commonwealth, which if it suffered wrack, in vain

could any particular man hope to enjoy the benefit of his proper substance. This magnanimity deserved well that greatness of empire whereof it was the foundation.

Convenient order being thus taken for an army and fleet, Marcellus went forth of the city against Hannibal, and Lævinus towards Sicily. The army of Hannibal was greatly diminished, by long and hard service; neither did his Carthaginians seem to remember him, and think upon sending the promised supply, or any such proportion as he needed. His credit also among his Italian friends was much weakened by the loss of Capua, which gave them cause to look unto themselves, as if in his help there were little trust to be reposed when they should stand in need. This he well perceived, yet could not tell how to remedy: either he must thrust garrisons into all towns that he suspected, and thereby so diminish his army that he should not be able to keep the field; or else he must leave them to their own fidelity, which now began to waver. At length his jealousy grew so outrageous, that he sacked and wasted those places that he was unable to defend; thinking that the best way to enrich himself, and make unprofitable to his enemies the purchase from which he could not hinder them. But, by this example, many were quite alienated from him, and some of those whom before he had least cause to doubt. The town of Salapia yielded unto Marcellus, and betrayed unto him a gallant regiment of Numidian horse, the best of all that served under Hannibal; which was a greater loss than the town itself. Blasius, the author of this rebellion, could not bring his desire to effect, without getting the consent of one Dasius, that was his bitter enemy. Wherefore he brake the matter to this Dasius in private, and was by him accused unto Hannibal. But when he was convented, and charged of treason, he so stoutly denied it, and by way of recrimination so vehemently pressed his accuser with the same fault, that Hannibal thought it a matter devised out of mere malice, knowing well what enemies they were, and seeing that neither of them could bring any proof of what he affirmed. This not-

withstanding, Blasius did not cease to press his adversary anew, and urge him from time to time with such lively reasons, that he, who could not be believed by Hannibal, was contented at length to win the favour of Marcellus. Presently after this, the consul took by force Maronea and Meles, towns of the Samnites, wherein he slew about three thousand of Hannibal's men.

Hannibal could not look to all at once, but was fain to catch advantages where he might get them, the Romans now being grown stronger in the field than he. The best was, that his Carthaginians, having wearied themselves with ill speed in many petty enterprises, and laid aside all this while the care of Italy, to follow business of far less importance, had now at length resolved to send presently the great supply, that had been so long promised and expected. This if they had done in better season, Rome itself might have been strucken down, the next year after that great blow received at Cannæ. But since that which is past cannot be amended, Hannibal must force himself to make a good countenance, and tell his followers, that this mighty succour would come time enough. For Masinissa was at Carthage with five thousand Numidians, ready to set sail for Spain; whither when he came, it was appointed, that Asdrubal should forthwith take his journey into Italy, of which there had been so long talk. These news did not more comfort Hannibal and his followers, than terrify the Romans. Wherefore each did their best; the Romans, to prevent the threatening mischief, and win as much as they could upon Hannibal before the coming of his brother; Hannibal, on the contrary, to hold his own, and weaken the Romans as much as he was able. He had intelligence that Cn. Fulvius, a Roman pretor, lay near unto Herdonea, to get the town by practice. It was not long since, near unto the same place, another Cn. Fulvius had lost his army: therefore Hannibal made great marches thitherward, and came to Herdonea, ere Fulvius heard news of his approach. As soon as he came, he offered battle to the Roman pretor, who accepted it with more haste than good speed. The

Roman legions made good resistance a while, till they were compassed round with the Carthaginian horse: then fell they to rout, and great slaughter was made of them: Fulvius himself, with twelve tribunes, or colonels, were lost: of the common soldiers that were slain the number is uncertain, some reporting seven, others thirteen thousand. The town of Herdonea, because it was at point to have yielded unto Fulvius, Hannibal did set on fire; and, putting those to death that had practised with the enemy, carried away the multitude, whom he bestowed among the Thurians and Metapontines. The consul Marcellus hearing of this, wrote unto the senate, and exhorted them to be of a good cheer, for that he would shortly abate the enemy's pride. He followed the Carthaginian apace, and overtaking him at Numistro, in the country of the Lucans, fought with him a battle, which, beginning at nine of the clock in the morning, lasted until night, and ended, by reason of the darkness, with uncertain victory. Afterward Hannibal departed thence into Apulia, whither Marcellus followed him: at Venusia they met, and had many skirmishes, but none of importance. Hannibal removed often, and sought to bring the enemy within danger of some ambush; but Marcellus, though he was very eager of battle, would yet adventure nothing but by open daylight, and upon fair ground.

Thus passed the time away, until Q. Fabius Maximus and Q. Fulvius, he that lately had taken Capua, were chosen consuls. Fabius, considering how much the Roman affairs were bettered by the taking of Capua, purposed that year to besiege Tarentum; which if he could win, like it was, that scarce one good city would afterwards remain true to Hannibal. Wherefore he vehemently exhorted his colleague, and Marcellus, (to whom was continued the command of those legions that served under him the year before,) to press the Carthaginian so hard, as he might have no leisure to help Tarentum. Marcellus was very glad of this charge, for he thought no Roman fitter than himself to deal with Hannibal in open field: he followed him therefore to Cannusium, and thence from place to place, desiring

ever to come to battle, but upon equal terms. The Carthaginian had not mind to hasard much in fight, but thought it enough to entertain his enemy with skirmish, as being desirous to keep his army strong, until the coming of Asdrubal. Yet could he not avoid the importunity of Marcellus, nor brook the indignity of being daily braved. He therefore bade his men to be lusty, and to beat soundly this hot-spirited Roman captain, that would never suffer them to be at quiet, until they once had cooled well his courage by letting him blood. Hereupon followed a battle, wherein Hannibal had the victory, took six ensigns, and slew of the Romans almost three thousand; among which were some of mark. Marcellus was so impatient of this dishonour, that he rated his men as peasants and base cowards; telling them, that they were the first of the Roman legions which had been beaten by Hannibal by plain force and manhood, without being circumvented by any stratagem. With these, and many other the like words, which they were ashamed to hear, he did so vex them, that thinking themselves better able to endure any violence of the enemy, than such displeasure of their general, they besought him to pardon them, and lead them forth once again to fight. He did so; and, placing those companies foremost that had lost their ensigns the day before, bade them be careful to win a victory, whereof the news might be at Rome before the report of their shameful overthrow. Hannibal was angry to see that nothing could make this enemy quiet, and therefore was ready to fight again, since all other motives continued the same, and his men had been heartened by the late victory. But the Romans were stirred up with desire of revenge, and of repairing their honour lost, which affections gave a sharp edge unto their valour; whereas the Carthaginians were grown dull and weary by seeing themselves disappointed of their hope; and the enemy, notwithstanding their late victory, as ready to molest them as before. In this second battle Marcellus got the victory, which he purchased at so dear a rate, that neither he nor Hannibal had great cause to vaunt the second night. For if eight thou-

sand of the Carthaginians were slain, and three thousand of the Roman side, in this next battle, the difference was no greater, than even to recompense the late received overthrow, especially since the number of the Romans that were wounded was so great, as disabled Marcellus from pursuing Hannibal, who dislodged by night. Nevertheless it sufficed, that Fabius the consul hereby got leisure to follow his business at Tarentum without any disturbance. Q. Fulvius the other consul, about the same time, took in many of the Hirpines, Lucans, and Volscentes, that willingly yielded themselves, and betrayed the garrisons of Hannibal that lay in their towns, whom Fulvius entertained in loving sort, gently rebuking them for their errors past, without punishing those that had been authors, or busy doers in the rebellion. That rabble of Sicilian thieves, which Lævinus had lately brought from Agaterna, was then also set on work to besiege Caulonia, a town of the Brutians, and nothing was omitted that might serve to divert Hannibal from the succour of Tarentum.

Q. Fabius the consul, having taken Manduria, a town of the Salentines, sat down before Tarentum, making all preparation that seemed needful to carry it, either by assault or long siege. Of the garrisons in the town a good part were Brutians, placed there by Hannibal, under a captain of their own nation. This captain fell in love with a Tarentine wench, whose brother served under Fabius. Hereof she gave notice by letters to her brother, as thinking belike to draw him from the Roman side, by telling him how rich, and of what great account, her lover was. But her brother made the consul acquainted with these news, and said, that if the Brutian were far in love, he might perhaps be won, by entreaty of his mistress, to do what she would have him. The consul hearing this, and finding likelihood in the matter, willed his soldier to convey himself into the town as a fugitive, and try what good might be done. It fell out according to his desire. The soldier grew acquainted with this Brutian captain, and partly by his own

persuasions, partly by the flattering entreaty of his sister, won him to betray the town to the Romans. When they had agreed upon the business, and resolved how to order it, the same soldier got out of the town by night, and acquainted the consul with his proceedings, telling him in which part that Brutian kept watch, and what might conveniently be done. So in the night-time Fabius gave an alarm to the city, especially about those parts of the wall which were furthest from the place where he meant to enter. The captains in the town prepared to make resistance in those places where the noise did threaten them with greatest likelihood of danger: but Fabius himself, with the choice of his men, came in great silence to the quarter of the Brutians; who, being wrought by their captain, helped the Romans to get up, and break open the next gate, whereat the army was let in. The Tarentines and Carthaginian soldiers made head against Fabius in the market-place, but (as happeneth in like cases, where the main confidence is already taken away) not very obstinately. Nico, Democrates, and Philomenes, with those that before had let in Hannibal, used now the last of their courage in dying against the Romans. Carthalo, who commanded the garrison within the town, offered himself prisoner, hoping to be well used, because of hospitality that had passed between his father and the consul; but he was slain by the way, ere he could come at Fabius. The Romans did put all indifferently to the sword, in such sort, that they spared few of the Brutians. This slaughter of the Brutians was thought to have been made by appointment of the consul, to the end that he might seem to have won the town by force, and not by treason; though he thereby failed of his purpose, and neither had the glory which he expected, nor preserved his reputation of faithful dealing, and keeping his word. The booty found in Tarentum was very great, whereof the Roman treasury, whither it was carried, had great need. As for the imageries, and other curiosities that were in the city, Fabius was contented to let them alone; and being

told of some idols that seemed worthy to be carried away, being very goodly pieces, in such habit and posture as if they were fighting, he said, " Let us leave unto the Taren- " tines their angry gods."

Hannibal being gotten clear from Marcellus, fell upon those that besieged Caulonia. They fled at his coming, but he was so near, that they were fain to betake them to a hill, which served to no other purpose than to bear off the first brunt: there they defended themselves a little while, and then they yielded. When this business was done, he hasted away to relieve Tarentum; but when he came within five miles of the city, he had news that it was lost. This grieved him; yet he said no more than this; " The Romans have " also their Hannibal; we have lost Tarentum in such sort as " we got it." That he might not seem to turn back amazed, or in any fear of the victorious consul, he encamped a few days together so near as he was unto Tarentum; and thence departing to Metapontum, bethought himself how to take Fabius in a trap. He caused the chief of the Metapontines to write unto Fabius, and offer to betray into his hands the Carthaginian garrison, with condition, that he should in that respect forgive them all offences past. These letters were sent by two young men of the same city, who did their errand so well, that the consul wrote back by them unto the Metapontines, and appointed the day when they should expect him. Hereof Hannibal was exceeding glad, and at good leisure made ready his ambushes for the wary Fabius. But whether some secret notice of the plot were given, or whether indeed (as it is related) some tokens in sacrificing terrified the superstitious Roman, the journey to Metapontum was deferred. Hereupon the same two messengers were employed again; but being apprehended, and threatened with torture, they discovered all.

This year was happy to the Romans in all their wars; for they got every where, save only at Caulonia, where they lost a company of such lewd fellows, that it may seem good fortune to have so been rid of them. But their common poverty, and disability to maintain their charge, continued,

and grew greater than it was before. Thirty Roman colonies were then in Italy, of which twelve refused to contribute any longer to the wars. For it was considered, that the legions of Cannæ, and those unhappy companies that had been beaten under the one and the other Cn. Fulvius, were transported into Sicily, where they lived, in a sort, as banished men. This grieved their friends at home, and made them reckon up the more diligently those other miseries which they daily felt. Ten years together they had been exhausted with levies of men, and impositions of money; in every of which years they had received some notable overthrow. In this case, the least that they could fear, or rather the best which they could hope, was, to fall into the hands of the enemy, to be made prisoners. For Hannibal did gently send home their people that was taken by him; whereas the Romans did banish from their homes those that had escaped. It was therefore likely to come to pass within a while, that they should be all consumed, since new soldiers were daily pressed forth of their towns, and the old ones never did return. Such talk was frequent among those of the colonies, especially where they that were transported into Sicily had most compassionate friends. Wherefore it was concluded by the people of Ardea, Sutrium, Alba, and other good towns, to the number of twelve, that they should boldly deny unto the Romans their further help. This was thought the likeliest way to obtain peace, whereof otherwise they saw little hope, as long as Hannibal lived. When the consuls heard the ambassadors of these towns make such declaration, and protest their disability of giving any further help, they were much amazed. They willed the ambassadors to return home, and bring a better answer, forasmuch as this was none other than treason; they bade them to consider, that their people were not Campans or Tarentines, but the offspring of the Romans, and no less partakers of the empire, than they that inhabited the mother city. But all would not serve; the ambassadors continuing to protest, that they had already done what they could, and that they had remaining neither men nor money. It was

well for the Romans, that the other eighteen colonies did not imitate these twelve; but shewed themselves willing to undergo whatsoever should be laid upon them, without shrinking under the burden. This their offer was so highly pleasing to the consuls, that the ambassadors of those faithful colonies were brought unto the senate, and produced into the assembly of the people; where, with commemoration of all their former good services, this their present love unto the state was magnified, and thanks accordingly bestowed upon them, with promise that it should not be forgotten. As for the ambassadors of those twelve colonies that refused to contribute, it was thought best, neither to retain them in the city, nor yet to dimiss them, nor to take any notice of them at all, but leave them to their own consideration of their ill deserving.

It may greatly be doubted what the example of these twelve people would have wrought in those that were so willing to help the state, if Asdrubal had been then coming into Italy: for then must the Romans have betaken themselves wholly to their own defence; whereas now, to the great comfort of their subjects, they employed their forces in the conquest of Italy, with hopeful and fortunate success. Nevertheless they were fain to open their most privy treasury, and thence take out the gold that had been laid up to serve them in cases of greatest extremity. Of the money thus extracted, one quarter was delivered to Fabius the consul, to set him well out against the Tarentines; all the rest was sent into Spain to Scipio, for the maintenance of his army; and to provide that Asdrubal might not pass from thence into Italy. It is likely that Fabius did not spend all his money, finding such easy success at Tarentum, as was shewed before. But to stop the journey of Asdrubal, neither the money sent into Spain, nor any victories won by Scipio, could suffice. Nevertheless it fell out happily for the people of Rome, that this year and the next were spent before his coming, and they better prepared than at less warning they could have been to entertain him. Here it were not amiss to note, that since the Romans, be-

ing in so great necessity of money, were driven to furnish the army in Spain with the greatest part of all their stock that was left; it must needs be, that either the booty taken in New Carthage was far less than fame had reported it, or else that Scipio had not as yet won it: howsoever, Livy rather inclines to those who say that he got it soon after his arrival.

M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quintius Crispinus were chosen consuls after Fabius and Fulvius. In their year it was, that Asdrubal took his journey out of Spain, though he came not into Italy until the year following. After the great battle at Cannæ, Hannibal had lost much time about Cumæ and Naples, in seeking to make himself master of a good haven for the landing of those succours that were promised from Carthage. The hope that he reposed in Philip caused him to turn his principal care to the eastern parts of Italy, where he made ready a fair entrance for the Macedonian, if he had been ready to come. But since this hope was vanished, and the long promised succour of Asdrubal was (though far later than had been expedient) ready to arrive, he began to deal with the people of Hetruria, through whose countries his brother was to pass, that therein he might make a party against the Romans. The loss of Capua, Tarentum, and many other towns, might have terrified all other of the Italian towns from hearkening to any solicitation of the Carthaginians. Yet the poverty of the Romans, and the weariness of their adherents, together with the fame of a greater army coming than that which Hannibal brought into Italy, did embolden many of the Hetrurians, especially the Aretines, to take such counsel as they thought most expedient for themselves, without regard of their fidelity to Rome. The Roman senate hearing the rumour of their conspiracy, sent Marcellus, the new chosen consul, into Hetruria; whose coming did so terrify them, that they rested quiet for a while. All the year following they were devising how to break out; as contrariwise the Roman propretors, partly by terror of severe judgments and inquisitions, and partly by the force of two or three legions, with which they visited all suspected places,

kept them honest against their wills, and took many hostages for better assurance. The two consuls had an earnest desire to make strong war upon Hannibal without more temporising; persuading themselves, that in battle they should be too strong for him. Crispinus had further his particular desire to make his consulship notable by the winning of some good town; as Fulvius and Fabius had gotten honour by Capua and Tarentum. Therefore he went about the siege of Locri, one of the best cities which the Carthaginian then held in Italy; and brought thither all sorts of engines, sending for a fleet out of Sicily to help him. But Hannibal was not slow to relieve the city, the fame of whose approach made Crispinus desist from his enterprise, and retire unto his colleague that lay at Venusia. Thither followed Hannibal, to whom the consuls daily offered battle. This great man of war had no need to stand upon his reputation; which was already so confirmed, that his refusing to fight was not likely to be ascribed unto fear, but rather deemed as part of his wisdom. He entertained the consuls with many light skirmishes, and sought to take them at some advantage; reserving his own numbers as full as he could unto a time of greater employment. In this lingering manner of war Marcellus took no pleasure, but sought to compel the enemy to battle, whether he would or no. The admiral of the Roman fleet about Sicily, L. Cincius, was commanded again to assail the town of Locri; which might well enough be forced, if Hannibal continued, as he began, to trifle away the time at Venusia. To the same purpose, a part of the garrison that lay in Tarentum was appointed to go by land to the assistance of Cincius. But Hannibal had an eye behind him. He laid an ambush in the way, between Tarentum and Locri, whereinto the Romans fell; and having lost about three thousand of their company, were well glad, the rest of them, to quit their enterprise, and save their own lives within Tarentum. As for the consuls, it was the desire of Hannibal to waste their army by little and little; which to do he neglected no advantage. There lay between him and them an hillock, overgrown

with wood, that seemed fit to cover a number of men; who lying there undiscerned, might fall upon such as should straggle from the Roman camp, and cut them off. Therefore he sent thither by night some companies of Numidians, whom he willed to keep themselves close, and attend their best advantage. To this piece of ground the consuls thought it fit to remove their camp, Marcellus thinking that he never lay near enough unto Hannibal. Thither therefore both of them rode to view the place, accompanied with the son of Marcellus, a few colonels, and other principal men; and not many more than two hundred horse, most of them Hetrurians. The Numidian centinel gave warning of their approach to his fellows, who discovered not themselves until they had surrounded the consuls and their train. The consuls, as necessity compelled them, defended themselves, hoping to be quickly relieved from their camp, that was near at hand. But the Hetrurians ran away from them at the first, and left them in that great danger, to the weak assistance of no more than forty horsemen, that were of the colony of Fregellæ. These Fregellans abode by the consuls, and did what they could to have brought them safe off: but when Marcellus was stricken through with a lance, and fell down dead, then began every one to shift for himself, and escape as they might. Crispinus, the other consul, had his death's wound, being stricken with two darts; and young Marcellus was likewise wounded: yet these two recovered their camp. The rest of the colonels and officers, together with the lictors, that carried the bundles of rods and axes before the consuls, were all slain or taken. To the dead body of the consul Marcellus, Hannibal gave honourable funeral, according to the custom of those times; and bestowing his ashes in a silver pot, covered it with a crown of gold, and so sent them to young Marcellus, to be by him interred where he thought good.

Presently after this, Crispinus bethought himself how that the signet ring of Marcellus was fallen into the custody of Hannibal, who might use it to his own purposes, ere that which had happened were well known abroad.

Wherefore he sent word unto all the towns about, that his colleague was slain, and that Hannibal had gotten his ring; wishing them in that regard, to give no credit unto any letters therewithal signed. This providence of Crispinus was not more than requisite: for his messenger was but a little before come to Salapia, when another messenger arrived there sent from Hannibal, bringing letters in the name of Marcellus, and sealed with the captive ring; whereof the contents were, That it was his purpose to come the same night unto Salapia; where he willed, that the soldiers of the garrison should be in a readiness for such employment as he should think needful. The device was plain; and no less plain was the revengeful mind which he bare against that city, because of his brave Numidian companies that had therein been betrayed. The Salapians hereupon bethought themselves how to take their enemy in his own snare. They sent back the messenger, which was a Roman fugitive, without letting him perceive any sign of distrust in them: this done, they prepared all things in a readiness for the entertainment of such a friend. Late in the night he came thither, with a troop of Roman fugitives, armed Roman like, leading the way. These all talking Latin together, called unto the watch, and bade open the gate, for the consul was there. The gate was opened fair and leisurely, and the portcullis drawn up no higher than needs it must be, to let them enter. But when six hundred of them were gotten in, down fell the portcullis again; and they, that thought to have taken others, were taken themselves, being laid at on all hands by the Salapians, that quickly made an end with them.

Hannibal being thus overreached with this stratagem, hasted away to Locri; whereunto Cincius, the admiral of the Roman fleet about Sicily, did lay hard siege. The first appearance of the Numidians, Hannibal's vancouriers, made the Romans, in all confused haste, run to their ships, leaving all their engines, and whatsoever was in their camp, to the enemy's disposition.

The Roman senate, hearing of these accidents, sent unto

Crispinus the surviving consul, and requested him to name a dictator that might take charge of the commonwealth, and despatch the election of new magistrates, with other business, whereunto himself was disabled by his hurts. He did so, and soon after died. Then it was thought needful that new consuls should be chosen out of hand; forasmuch as two Roman armies lay so near unto the enemy, without any general. Especially it was desired, that election should be made of such men as were not only valiant, but well advised; since the best and most fortunate of their great darers, M. Marcellus, by losing himself so strangely, had given them a fair warning not to commit their army unto rash heads. Among those that stood for the consulship, C. Claudius Nero was the most eminent. He was of great nobility, a good soldier, and one whose many services in this present war did forcibly commend unto the place. Yet he seemed a little too violent, and one whose temper needed the allay of a more stayed wit. The fathers therefore endeavoured to join unto him in the consulship M. Livius, one that had borne the same office long before. This M. Livius had been consul with L. Æmilius Paulus, in the year foregoing the beginning of this war. After their consulship, wherein they did good service, they had both of them been called into judgment by the people, and this Livius condemned, Æmilius hardly escaping. Though it hath been once already noted, yet I cannot forbear to remember it again, how it pleased God to upbraid the unthankful Romans with the malicious judgment given by their multitude upon honourable men. For in the battle of Cannæ, it was apparent what lamentable effects the memory of their injustice wrought; when L. Æmilius rather chose to yield to the froward ignorance of his colleague, and afterward to die in the greatest overthrow that ever fell upon the state of Rome, than, by resisting the pernicious courses of Terentius Varro, to cast himself anew upon the danger of the popular fury. As for M. Livius, he is even now ready, and will so continue, to tell the people of their faults in a diverse manner. Eight years together after his condemna-

tion had he been absent out of the city, and lived in his country grange, vexing himself with the indignity of his condemnation. Marcellus and Lævinus, being consuls two or three years ago, had brought him into Rome; where he lived private, in discontented sort, as might appear, both by his carelessness in apparel, and by the wearing of his long hair and beard; which in that age were the badges of men afflicted. Very lately he was compelled by the censors to poll his hair, and come into the senate; where he used to sit silent, and signify his assent or dislike to what was proposed, either in short formal words, or in passing from side to side when the house was divided. At length it happened, that in some business, weightily concerning one that was his kinsman, he stood up and made a set speech; whereby he drew all the fathers to attention; and bade them inquire of him, and take better notice what he was, and what he had been. The senate was much altered since he had left it; many brave men were lost, new ones were chosen; such as rather served to fill up the number, than to answer to the dignity of the place; and they that were left of ancient standing, had even spent their virtues to no great effect. Wherefore all began to say, that it was great pity so worthy and able a man as this Livius, had been all this while forgotten; one, of whom the commonwealth stood in great need, yet had not used, in this dangerous war. Now seeing that the consuls ought one of them to be chosen a patrician, the other of necessity a plebeian; and since neither Fabius nor Valerius Lævinus, being both of them patricians, could be joined with Claudius Nero, every one was of opinion, that there could not be chosen and coupled together two fitter men than C. Claudius and this Marcus Livius. But Livy would not endure to hear of this. He said it was unreasonable that one condemned as a dishonest man should afterwards be chosen ruler of the city: if they had done ill to trust him with one consulship, what meant they then to offer him another? With these and the like phrases he resisted their desires; till by persuasions and examples rehearsed, of such as had patiently digested

injuries done by the people, and repaid good for evil, he was contented to accept the honour.

Here we may behold a true figure of that emblem with which Themistocles checked the ingratitude of the Athenians; resembling himself to a plane-tree, the branches and boughs whereof men break in fair weather, but run under it for shelter in a storm. Such unthankfulness, to well-deserving men, is not rarely found in the outrageous multitude. Neither was the late example hereto much unlike, of Philip the second king of Spain's dealing with the duke of Alva: for although he had committed the duke to prison, upon some small offence conceived, without all regard of his former deserts; yet, when his intended conquest of Portugal required the service of a man more then ordinarily sufficient, he stood no longer upon the scanning of late displeasures, but employed the same duke, whom he had newly disgraced. Thus is wisdom often taught by necessity.

It was a dangerous year toward, when C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius were chosen consuls. Asdrubal was already come into France, and waited only to have the ways of the Alps thawed by warm weather for his passage into Italy. The Romans used at this time the service of three and twenty legions; and wanted not employment for many more, if they had known how to levy and maintain them. Of these which they had, four served in Spain, two in Sicily, and two in Sardinia; the rest were so disposed in several parts of Italy, where need seemed to require, that only two legions were left to each of the consuls. But the consuls were men of execution, and would not be tied to the punctual observance of what the senate thought fit. M. Livius would not stir out of Rome against so mighty a power as followed Asdrubal, until he had first obtained, that he might carry with him as many as could well be spared from other employments; and those, or the most of them, chosen companies: it was true, that two legions, appointed to serve under Lucius Porcius, a pretor of that year, among the Cisalpine Gauls, might be reckoned as an additament

to the forces of Livius, to whom the war against Asdrubal was allotted. So might also two other legions, that were among the Salentines, near unto Tarentum, under another of the pretors, be accounted a part of Claudius's army, that was sent against Hannibal. Nevertheless, the consuls, by the especial instance of Livy, did obtain, that all might be left to their own discretion. For news came that Asdrubal was already passing the Alps; the Ligurians, who dwelt in the country about Genoa, with their neighbour people, were in readiness to join with him; and L. Porcius sent word, that he would adventure no further than he safely might. When all was ordered as themselves thought best, the two consuls went forth of the city, each his several way. The people of Rome were now quite otherwise affected than they had been, when L. Æmilius Paulus and C. Terentius Varro were sent against Hannibal. They did no longer take upon them to direct their generals, or bid them despatch, and win the victory betimes; but rather they stood in fear, lest all diligence, wisdom, and valour should prove too little. For since few years had passed wherein some one of their generals had not been slain, and since it was manifest, that if either of these present consuls were defeated, or put to the worst, the two Carthaginians would forthwith join, and make short work with the other, it seemed a greater happiness than could be expected, that each of them should return home victor, and come off with honour, from such mighty opposition as he was like to find. With extreme difficulty had Rome held up her head ever since the battle of Cannæ; though it were so, that Hannibal alone, with little help from Carthage, had continued the war in Italy. But there was now arrived another son of Amilcar; and one that in his present expedition had seemed a man of more sufficiency than Hannibal himself. For whereas, in that long and dangerous march through barbarous nations, over great rivers and mountains that were thought unpassable, Hannibal had lost a great part of his army; this Asdrubal, in the same places, had multiplied his numbers; and, gathering the people that he found

in the way, descended from the Alps like a rolling snow-ball, far greater than he came over the Pyrenees at his first setting out of Spain. These considerations and the like, of which fear presented many unto them, caused the people of Rome to wait upon their consuls out of the town, like a pensive train of mourners, thinking upon Marcellus and Crispinus, upon whom in the like sort they had given attendance the last year, but saw neither of them return alive, from a less dangerous war. Particularly, old Q. Fabius gave his accustomed advice to M. Livius, that he should abstain from giving or taking battle, until he well understood the enemy's condition. But the consul made him a froward answer, and said, that he would fight the very first day; for that he thought it long, till he should either recover his honour by victory, or, by seeing the overthrow of his own unjust citizens, satisfy himself with the joy of a great, though not an honest revenge. But his meaning was better than his words.

Of the overthrow that Asdrubal received in Spain by Scipio, a little before he took his journey into Italy, such mention hath already been made as agreed with the report of that noble historian Livy. Yet I think it not amiss to add in this place, what may be gathered out of the remaining fragments of [u] Polybius's history concerning that accident. Asdrubal had wrestled with many difficulties in Spain, by reason of those captains that were sent from the city of Carthage to join with him in the administration of that province; they being, as it may seem, of the Hannonian faction, which is to say, thus far forth traitors, that they preferred the advantage of their own side, before the good of their commonwealth. In what particulars they wronged this worthy son of Amilcar, and how they hindered his courses undertaken, it cannot be known; since of those books wherein Polybius hath exactly handled these matters, there are to us remaining only a few broken pieces. But by the spiteful dealing of Hanno in Sicily with Mutines, a better man of war than himself, whom Hannibal had sent

[u] Excerpt. E. Polyb. Hist. l. 10, 11.

into the island, we may conceive, that against the brother of Hannibal it was thought needful, by these mischievous partisans of Hanno, to use the violent opposition of more earnest malice. Nevertheless, Asdrubal was a good patriot, and therefore endured patiently such indignities as Mutines could not long digest. His journey into Italy being resolved upon, he lay with part of the army at Betula, not far from the mines of silver, whence he was to furnish his expedition. Thither came Scipio, and drave him out of his camp, though he were strongly lodged, before the other Carthaginian captains could, or would, come to his assistance. The overthrow seems not to have been so great as it must have been supposed, if no way lay open to those that fled. Rather it appears that Asdrubal dealt like a provident man; and seeing that his camp was likely to be forced, sent away all his money, with his elephants, before him, but stayed behind himself, to sustain the Romans a while, until his carriages might be out of danger. Herein he had his desire. Afterwards he gathered his broken troops together, and retired in such sort, that Scipio thought it not good to pursue him, and so passed over Tagus. Then, taking unto him the forces assigned for his expedition, he marched away toward the Pyrenees, leaving the care of Spain unto his brother Mago, and to Asdrubal the son of Gesco, that thought himself the fittest man for the administration thereof. Fain would Scipio have stopped him on his journey, by sending to defend against him the ordinary way of the mountains. But whether Asdrubal took another way, or whether he forced the guards that Scipio had set to keep the Pyrenees, (as the defence of hard passages commonly sorts to no good effect,) he was not letted in his voyage by any such impediment. Coming into Gaul, and following the steps of his brother Hannibal, he found the nations that lay in his way so well affected, either to him or to his money, that no passages were defended against him, nor any sort of resistance made; but he and his army well entertained, and their numbers much increased by access of such as were desirous to take his pay. Of these he had

the better choice, for that he was driven to winter in their country, whilst that the passages of the Alps were closed up with ice and snow. The mountains likewise, that had so greatly molested Hannibal in his journey over the Alps, were easily won to take part with Asdrubal, when he travelled through their country. For these poor men, at the first coming of Hannibal, were verily persuaded that it was his purpose to rob them of their cattle, and to make spoil of that little wealth which they had painfully scraped together out of the desolate rocks. But now in process of time they were better informed. Therefore, understanding that there were two mighty cities, far disjoined asunder, which made war upon each other by land and sea, and that the Alps did only lie in their way, they gladly condescended to take their part in the fortune of the invaders. The like affection, upon greater cause, was afterward found in the Cisalpine Gauls. The Ligurians also joined with Asdrubal, and so would the Hetrurians have done, if he had arrived in their country. There was no other Roman army near, than L. Porcius with his two legions, of whom there was no great fear. Therefore did Asdrubal set upon Placentia, a Roman colony, in hope to make his coming the more terrible, by the destruction of that town. But there he lost a great deal of time, and finally was driven to quit the enterprise; by undertaking which, he gave the Roman consuls leisure to make ready for him, and caused his brother Hannibal (who upon the first bruit of Asdrubal's so timely and easily passing the Alps, was about to leave his wintering camps, and go forth to meet with him) to sit still a while, as well aware that Placentia would not be taken in haste.

C. Claudius Nero, the Roman consul, made what speed he could to meet with Hannibal, and stop him from joining with his brother. He had about forty thousand foot and five hundred horse, with which he daily offered battle to the Carthaginian, and had of him the better in many skirmishes. Hannibal was once driven to make a tedious march from the borders of the Salentines and Apulians into the country of the Brutians, there to increase his forces,

which were otherwise too weak for the journey intended. Afterward coming to Grumentum, a town of the Lucans, he there fought unprosperously with Nero the consul. Nevertheless he got off, and marched away to Venusia: but Nero followed him, and had there again the better of him. Wherefore he was driven to return to Metapontum, where joining with Hanno, that had made ready a good army, he assayed again to make way by force to his brother. So he passed onward, and came again to Venusia, having Nero still at his heels. Thence went he over the river Aufidus to Canusium, where he sat down not far from the place in which he had obtained his most memorable victory. There also did Nero sit down by him, and both of them rested, without making offer to fight. It seemed perhaps unto Hannibal, who knew the country very well, that his brother might, with little impediment, overcome the way to Canusium; where if he could once again deal with both the consuls, and all the Roman forces together, he had reason to hope for such another victory as once he had gotten in the same open country. If this had so fallen out, Rome would have been undone for ever. But the Carthaginians should not have needed to wish any second victory in the naked champaigns about Cannæ, if such an army as this, which Asdrubal now brings, had come to second Hannibal when he was in his full strength, and the Romans not able to keep the field. Wherefore this worthy general had good reason afterward to say, that Hanno was the man, who, by delaying the supply, did beat him out of Italy; which else no power of the Romans could have done.

Whilst Nero waited upon the Carthaginians, and thought it enough to hinder them from meeting with the army that was coming to their succour, he was advertised of Asdrubal's approach, by letters and messengers intercepted as they were going to Hannibal. These gave notice that Asdrubal had left the siege of Placentia, and drew onwards apace, being already come within two hundred miles of his brother, notwithstanding all opposition that could be made by Livy the consul. Of these news Claudius Nero was nothing

joyful. For if Hannibal could once be joined as head unto that great body of an army which Asdrubal brought with him, it was most apparent, that howsoever the fortune of Rome should avoid for the present any great calamity, yet the very continuance of so strong a war at home would enforce the Latins, and other faithful associates, to faint under the burden, as twelve of the thirty Roman colonies had already done. Wherefore he resolved that it were better to make any desperate adventure, than to suffer the conjunction of two such malevolent planets, whose pestilent influence, if not on the sudden, yet within few years, was like to work most lamentable effect. It seemed apparent, that his colleague was unable to stay the progress of Asdrubal, neither were there any good legions in a readiness, that could do service in such a needful case, excepting those that were already employed under the two consuls. Hereupon he concluded that it was not expedient for him to tie himself to his own charge, which was the war against Hannibal; but rather, that it behoved him to help where more necessity required, and to carry part of his forces unto his colleague. This could not be without much danger: yet since the meeting of the two Carthaginian brethren was far more dangerous to the Roman commonwealth, it seemed the best way to put fortune in trust with that which was of the less importance. Six thousand foot and a thousand horse he therefore took, that were the very choice of his army, and making show, as if he would only step aside to do some small piece of service near at hand, away he posted, as fast as he could, to assist his fellow-consul. His messengers ran before him, to give warning to all towns by which he was to pass, that they should be ready to meet him, with victuals, and all other necessaries for his army. Livius, the other consul, at that time lay encamped near unto Sena Gallica, and Asdrubal within half a mile of him. In six days Nero had finished his journey thither, and, when he drew near, sent messengers before him, to give notice of his coming. Livy thought it fittest that he should stay in some place of covert until dark night, and then enter secretly into the

camp, lest the enemy, perceiving this access of strength, should accordingly frame his counsels. This was done, and a token given that the colonels, captains, and all soldiers, as well horse as foot, that Nero had brought with him, should be lodged and entertained by men of their own sort. Their company was somewhat increased by voluntaries, that joined with them on the way. Nevertheless it was not needful that the quarter which received them should be enlarged, since they had brought with them nothing but their arms. The next day they held a council of war, wherein some were of opinion, that it was best for these new arrived companies to refresh themselves a few days, after their weary journey, before they should be drawn forth to battle. But against this, Nero was very earnest, and besought his colleague to make use of him out of hand, that he might betimes return to his own camp, ere Hannibal should have notice of his absence. The soldiers also of Nero were full of spirit, perceiving that the honour of the victory was like to be theirs, forasmuch as the battle would not have been undertaken without this their coming to help. Finally it was agreed, when the council brake up, that the sign of battle should be hung out, which was commonly a purple coat over the general's pavilion.

Asdrubal was no less willing than the Romans to come to battle, having long desired it, and hitherto not found occasion before. But when he had put his men in order, and was riding before the head of his army, to behold the enemy's countenance, it seemed to him that they were more than they had been, and some of their arms and horses looked as though they had wanted dressing, after a long journey. Hereupon he began to withdraw his army back into the camp, and gave order, that if no prisoners could be taken, by whom he might be certified of the truth, yet should there good observation be made, whether the enemy's camp were enlarged or no, or what other alteration could be noted, that might shew their forces to be increased. The camp, as hath been said, was not extended; but the trumpet, that sounded only once in the quarter of L. Por-

neck, next unto the head, wherewith he killed the beast upon the sudden. This speedy way of preventing such harm as the elephants, being hurt, were wont to do to the squadrons following them, is said to have been the device of Asdrubal himself, who died in this battle.

Great commendations are given to Asdrubal, both by Polybius and by Livy. He is said at all times to have shewed himself worthy of Amilcar his father, and Hannibal his brother; to have striven with great patience against many difficulties, whereinto he fell by the means of those captains that were sent from Carthage into Spain; to have performed in this last battle all duties of a worthy general; and finally, when he saw the loss irreparable, to have ridden manfully into the thickest of his enemies, where fighting bravely he was slain. Of the number that died with him in this battle, the report of Livy and of Polybius do very much disagree. For Livy saith, that the Carthaginians had no less an overthrow, than was that which they gave to the Romans at Cannæ; that fifty-six thousand of them were slain, five thousand and four hundred taken prisoners, and above four thousand Roman citizens, whom they had captives with them, delivered, and set at liberty. He saith also, that of the Romans and their associates there were slain eight thousand; and of the booty, that it was exceeding great, not only in other kinds, but in gold and silver. Concerning the booty, Polybius hath no mention of it: likely it is to have been as rich as Livy reporteth it, for Asdrubal came well stored with money. But Polybius (who had no desire to make this battle of Metaurus a parallel unto that of Cannæ) reports no more than about ten thousand of the Carthaginian side, and two thousand of the Roman, to have been slain. The number of the prisoners he doth not mention, but only saith, that some of the Carthaginian princes were taken alive, and that all the rest died in the battle. Whereby it may seem that they were all Barchines, forasmuch as they preferred the honour of themselves, and of their country, above their lives.

The joy of this victory was no less in Rome, than had

been the fear of the event: for ever since it was known in what sort Nero had left his army, the whole city was troubled, as much as lately at Hannibal's coming thither. Men thought it strange that the consul should make such a great adventure, as thus to put the one half of all the Roman forces unto hazard of the dice. For what if Hannibal should chance to have notice of this his departure, and either pursue him, or set upon the army that stayed behind, much weakened, and without a general? Thus did they talk; yet reserving their censure unto the success, with liberty to approve or condemn, according to the issue. In the mean while, the people filled the market-place; the women ran to the temples, with vows and prayers; and the senators were daily in counsel, waiting still ready at hand upon the magistrates, as if some great matter were likely to fall out, that would require every one's help. In brief, they were all so full of melancholy, that when first news of the victory came, there were not many that would believe it. Afterwards, when messengers arrived from the consuls, with letters containing all that had passed, there was not only great and joyful concourse of all sorts of men unto the temples, but the very face of the city was altered, and men from thenceforth began to follow their private business, making contracts one with another, (which they had long forborne to do,) and attending their own affairs in such wise, as if Hannibal were already driven out of Italy.

Nero, returning to his camp, threw forth openly the head of Asdrubal before the Carthaginians, and producing his African prisoners bound, sent two of them loose, to give Hannibal notice of what had happened. These two prisoners might have served well enough to certify Hannibal of this misadventure, without doing wrong to the dead body of Asdrubal; especially since Hannibal, in honourable and far different manner, had given burial to Gracchus and Marcellus, yea, to all the Roman generals whose carcasses fell into his hands. But it may seem, that howsoever the people of Carthage wanted much of the generous disposition which was found among the Romans, in their love unto the

commonweal, yet in dealing with enemies, they were far more civil, and less prone to the insolency of revenge. The best excuse of this outrage done by Nero, is, that he hoped much more by the sudden terror of such a spectacle, than by the simple relation of that which had passed, to make a deep impression of fear into the Carthaginians. It may also be said, that he forgot himself, being overjoyed with the greatness of his prosperity. For it was the battle of Metaurus that weighed down the balance, and turned the tide of the Roman fortune; which, being then at the lowest ebb, ceased not afterwards to flow, till it could not be contained within any banks. Hannibal, having lost in this unhappy fight (besides that worthy gentleman his brother) all the hope that so long sustained him in Italy, withdrew himself into the country of the Brutians; and thither he caused all the Lucans that were of his party to remove, as likewise all that dwelt in Metapontum. For he wanted men to defend so many places as he held at the present, because they lay too far asunder. Wherefore he drew them all into a lesser compass in the utmost corner of Italy, it being a country of much fastness, and the people exceedingly devoted to his service. In this business Nero gave him no memorable impediment, either because Hannibal was too strong for him, having all his forces united, or because it is likely that this remove of the Lucans and Metapontines was not before the end of summer, when their harvest was gathered in, at what time the senate called him home to Rome. M. Livius, the other consul, tarried among the Cisalpine Gauls until the end of summer, there to set things in such order as he thought requisite; which done, he wrote unto the senate, that there was no more need of him and his army in that province, but that L. Porcius, with the two legions that were there before, might very well discharge the place. For this cause he desired leave to return home, and that he might bring his army with him. The senate well understood his meaning, which was, to have the honour of a triumph, as he well deserved. But forasmuch as it was well known what interest Nero had in the late victory, order was given,

that not only Livy with his army should come home, but likewise Nero, though leaving his army behind him, to confront Hannibal. So the honour of triumph was granted to them both; in the pomp whereof Livy made the greater show, as riding in a chariot, and followed by his soldiers, because in his province, and upon his day of command, the victory was gotten, his army also being present at the triumph. But Nero, that rode on horseback, and without such attendance, was the more extolled both by the people and soldiers, by whom the victory was in a manner wholly ascribed unto his great worth. Neither wanted L. Veturius Philo and Q. Cæcilius Metellus, lieutenants to the generals, the due acknowledgment of their good service: for they were commended unto the people as men worthy to be chosen consuls; and consuls they were chosen for the year following. But nothing was done by them worthy of memory in their consulship. Neither indeed from this year, which was the thirteenth of the present war, until the eighteenth year, wherein it ended, was there any matter of importance wrought in Italy, save only the taking of Locri from the Carthaginians by surprise. For Hannibal wanted strength wherewith to make any great offer, and the Romans had little mind to provoke him, but thought it well that he was quiet. Such opinion had they conceived of him, that though all about him went to ruin, yet in him alone they thought there was force enough to hold himself upright. And surely very notable are the commendations given unto him by Polybius, whom Livy therein follows; that making war upon a people, of all others the most warlike, he obtained so many victories by his own good conduct; and that leading an army compounded of so many sundry nations, Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians, Italians, and Greeks, which were neither in language, laws, conditions, or any other thing, one like to another, he held them all in such good order, that they never fell to sedition among themselves, or against their general. But that which Livy adds hereto is yet perhaps of greater admiration, that he sustained his army without help from other

places, from this time forward, upon the hungry soil of the Brutians; which, when it was best manured in time of peace, could hardly suffice to nourish the inhabitants. It is therefore apparent, that by his proper worth and virtue he kept his army in such order and obedience, rather than by any greatness of reward and booty; since, after the death of Asdrubal, he made no invasion upon the wealthier parts of Italy, but held himself still among the poor Brutians. Where we must leave him until he be drawn into Afric by Scipio, whose doings will henceforth entertain and lead us unto the end of this war.

SECT. XVII.

How P. Cornelius Scipio, the Roman, made entire conquest of Spain.

§. 1.

How the Carthaginians were driven by Scipio from the continent into the isle of Gades.

MAGO, and Asdrubal the son of Gesco, took upon them the charge of Spain, when Asdrubal the son of Amilcar departed thence into Italy. These agreed together, that Mago should make a voyage to the Baleares, there to levy a supply of men; and Asdrubal withdraw himself into Lusitania, (which is now Portugal,) whither the Romans had ill means to follow, being altogether unacquainted in those parts. Mago had soon ended his business, and returned into Spain, where he met with one Hanno, (the same perhaps that had lately been employed in Sicily,) who brought new forces out of Afric, and came to succeed in place of Asdrubal the Barchine. It is not unlikely that Spain was now the better and more readily furnished with men and all things needful from Carthage, when that son of Amilcar, whose authority had been greatest, was thence departed. For hereby might the factious diligence of old Hanno approve itself against that noble race of warriors, when it should appear that things did prosper much the better by being left unto the handling of other men. Whether it were upon desire to make good some such opinion raised of him

at home, or whether upon confidence in the forces that he brought over, Hanno took the field, and led Mago with him, as purposing afresh to set upon the Romans. So he entered into the country of the Celtiberians, not very far from new Carthage; where, by money and other persuasions, he levied above nine thousand men.

P. Scipio in the mean while contained himself in the eastern parts of Spain; attentive, as it may seem, to the proceedings of Asdrubal the son of Amilcar; against whom he is reported by some writers to have sent part of his forces into Italy, to the assistance of C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius the consuls. But hearing of the levy made by Hanno and Mago among the Celtiberians, he sent M. Syllanus, the propretor, with ten thousand foot and five hundred horse. Syllanus got intelligence by some fugitive Celtiberians, who became his guides, that their countrymen encamped apart from the Carthaginians in great disorder; as men fearing no danger, because they were at home. Wherefore, as closely as he was able, he drew near to these Celtiberians; and falling upon them on the sudden, gave them such an overthrow, that Hanno and Mago coming to their succour, instead of heartening and reinforcing them, became partakers of the loss. Mago saved himself, with all the horse, and old companies of foot, which were about two thousand; and in ten days' journey brought them safe to Asdrubal. The rest of the Africans were either slain or taken; among whom Hanno had the ill luck to be taken prisoner, though he kept himself out of the fight until all was lost. As for the Celtiberians, they knew better how to make shift, and saved most of themselves by running into the woods.

It could no otherwise be, but that Scipio was much troubled with the danger wherein Italy stood, by the coming thither of Asdrubal. Ten thousand foot and eighteen hundred horse he did therefore send out of Spain (as it is reported by some authors) to the defence of his own country; or was perhaps about to send them, and thereupon remained at New Carthage, intentive to the necessity and success of

his countrymen at home. But when he had word of the great victory at Metaurus, which fell out long before the end of this summer, then might he well adventure to take in hand the entire conquest of Spain, which must needs be much alienated from the Carthaginians by the report of such an overthrow. The Spanish soldiers that served under Hannibal, and those that had been sent over into Afric, were as pledges heretofore by whom their country was held obnoxious to the Carthaginians. But when it was noised abroad, that all which had followed Asdrubal into Italy were fallen into the hands of the Romans, and that Hannibal with his army was closed up in a strait whence he could not get out, then did it greatly behove the Spaniards to conform themselves unto the will of the victors. That it was the success of things in Italy which gave such confidence unto Scipio, it is the more probable, because he took not this great enterprise in hand until the summer was almost spent. Asdrubal therefore used the benefit of the season; and by disposing his army into many garrisons, hindered the enemy from doing any great exploit before winter. So the very length of way, and the time of the year, caused Scipio to return back, without any other matter performed, than that his brother L. Scipio took by assault the town of Oringis.

Against the next year's danger Asdrubal prepared a great army, and spared nor cost nor travail in strengthening himself for the trial of his last fortune in Spain. With seventy thousand foot, four thousand horse, and two and thirty elephants, he took the field; which number I believe that he could hardly have raised without boldly denying the truth of those reports that came from Italy. Scipio thought his Roman legions too weak to encounter with such a multitude. Wherefore he judged it needful to use the help of his Spanish friends. But the death of his father and uncle, that were cast away by the treason of such false auxiliaries, made him on the other side very doubtful of relying upon those that might perhaps betray him in his greatest need. Yet since one Colchas, that was lord of

eight and twenty towns, had promised him the last winter to raise three thousand foot and five hundred horse for his service, he resolved to make use of those, and some few others, that might help to make a show, and yet not be able to do great harm, if they would revolt. So with five and forty thousand foot and three thousand horse he sought the enemy, near to whom he encamped. At his first coming, Mago and Masinissa fell upon him, with hope to take him unprepared, whilst he was making his lodgings. But he laid certain troops of horse in covert, which, breaking upon them unexpected, caused them to fall off. They made at first an orderly retreat, but, being more hardly pressed, they shortly betook themselves to plain flight. After this encounter, which added some courage to the Romans, and abated the presumption of the Carthaginians, there were daily skirmishes between the horse and light armature on both sides, wherein was nothing done of importance. Asdrubal drew forth his army, and arranged it before his trenches; the like did Scipio; each of them to shew that he durst fight, yet not proceeding any further. Thus they continued many days; Asdrubal being still the first that issued forth in the morning, and the first that in the evening withdrew himself into his trenches. The Spanish auxiliaries were placed on both sides in the wings; the Carthaginians were in the midst, with their elephants before them; and opposite to these, on the other side, were the Roman legions. When they had in this order confronted one another, though at far distance, many days together, it grew to be the common opinion, that they should shortly meet in the same form, and be matched on each part with the enemies, long before designed. But Scipio, when he purposed indeed to fight, altered the form of his army, and withal came forth earlier than he had been wont. He caused his men and horses to be well fed betimes in the morning before day, and then sent forth his horse and light armature, to train out the Carthaginians with their bellies empty; using herein the same trick, whereby he might remember that Hannibal had beaten his father in the battle of Tre-

bia. His Roman legions he bestowed in the wings; his Spaniards in the battle. Asdrubal sent forth his horse in all haste to entertain the Romans; whilst he himself arranged his men, in their wonted order, at the hill-foot upon which he encamped. In the skirmishes of the horse, it could not be discerned which part had the better; since being overpressed on either side, they had a safe retreat unto their foot, and one troop seconding another by course, returned to charge. This fight was protracted by Scipio to a great length; because his men, having well fed themselves, were like to hold out better than the enemy. But about noon he caused his wings to advance a good pace; leaving their battle of Spaniards far behind them, that came on leisurely, according to direction. The Spanish mercenaries, that stood in Asdrubal's wings, were no way comparable, save only in number, to the Latin and Roman soldiers that came against them; for they were fresh soldiers, levied in haste, and fighting only in respect of their pay. Being therefore charged in front by the legions, and in flank, at the same time, by the Roman velites, and by some cohorts, that were appointed to wheel about for the same purpose, they were sorely pressed, and with much difficulty made resistance. The Carthaginians would fain have succoured them; but that they durst not stir out of their places, because of the Spanish battle which was coming against them, though it were as yet far off. Thus the best part of Asdrubal's army stood idle, until the wings were broken. For had he adventured to meet with the Spaniards, he must have cast himself into the open space that lay before him between the Roman wings, to the depth whereof when he had arrived, he should have found himself enclosed in such sort as was the consul Paulus at the battle of Cannæ. Wherefore he did only employ his elephants; which did, according to their manner, no greater harm to his enemies than to his friends. When they were chafed with wounds, they could no longer be ruled by their guides; but ran, as chance led them, and troubled both parts; or those perhaps the more, that were the more unwilling to kill them. In process of the fight,

the Romans, who had well refreshed their bodies in the morning, endured lusty, when the others began to faint with travail and heat of the day. Wherefore perceiving their advantage, they followed it the more hotly; and gave not over till they had forced the enemy to change his pace, and run from him. Asdrubal did his best to have made an orderly retreat; and afterward again, to have caused his men to turn head at the hill-foot. But the Romans would not suffer the victory to be so extorted from them; neither was it easy to put fresh courage into the vanquished, led by the obstinate passion of fear, which hearkens to no persuasion. The camp of Asdrubal had that day been taken, if a storm of rain, which fell violently on the sudden, and bred some superstition in the Romans, had not caused them to give over.

The same night Asdrubal gave no rest to his men; but caused them, hungry and overlaboured as they were, to take pains in fortifying the camp, wherein he feared to be assaulted. But little assurance could he have in the strength of his trenches, when he had lost the hearts of his Spanish soldiers. One Attanes, that was lord of the Turdetani, fled from him to the Romans, with a great band of his subjects: many followed this example; and, soon after, two strong towns were yielded up to Scipio, and the garrisons betrayed. It seems that the perverse fortune of this late battle, whereupon Asdrubal had set his rest, bred in the Spaniards a disposition to believe the more easily those reports which they heard from Italy: for henceforward they never did good office to the Carthaginians. Asdrubal perceiving this, withdrew himself, and marched away faster than an ordinary pace toward the ocean sea. Scipio followed the next morning, and overtaking the Carthaginians with his horse, caused them so often to make stand, that they were at length attacked by the Roman legions. Here began a cruel slaughter; for there was no resistance made, but all fell to rout, save only seven thousand, that with Asdrubal himself recovered a very strong piece of ground, which they fortified in haste. This place he made shift a while to defend; but

wanting there necessaries to sustain himself long, he was forsaken by some of those few that continued hitherto partakers of his fortune. Wherefore he resolved to make shift for one, and stealing from his company by night away to the sea-side, that was not far thence, he took shipping, and set sail for Gades. When Scipio understood that Asdrubal was thus gone, he left Syllanus with ten thousand foot and a thousand horse to besiege their camp, (which was not taken in haste, for Mago and Masinissa stayed in it,) whilst he with the rest of the army did what was needful in the country abroad. It was not long, ere Mago and Masinissa followed Asdrubal to Gades, and their army dispersed itself; some flying over to the Romans, other taking what way they liked. So upon all the continent of Spain there were only three towns left, Illiturgi, Castulo, and Astapa, that made countenance of war against the Romans; of which only Castulo had in it a Carthaginian garrison, consisting of such as had saved themselves by flight in the late overthrows. Hereby it seems that the report of those historians was ill grounded, who said, that Castulo yielded long since unto the Romans, though Hannibal took a wife in that city. For this was one of the last three towns that held out on the Carthaginian side. Illiturgi had sometimes been inclinable to the Romans, if not altogether at their devotion. Yet after the death of the two elder Scipios, following too earnestly the Carthaginian fortune, it not only rebelled, but with great cruelty betrayed and slew the poor men that escaped thither from the overthrows. Astapa was a town that had still adhered to the Carthaginians; and, which was worse, had thriven by spoil of the Romans and their confederates. Wherefore (though not until the next year) Scipio went against these, and took himself Illiturgi and Castulo; Illiturgi by assault, and with a general slaughter of the inhabitants; Castulo, by treason of one Cerdubellus. Astapa was taken by Lucius Marcius, or rather detroyed by the inhabitants. For a great pile of wood was raised in the market-place, whereinto was thrown all the gold and silver, with whatsoever else was precious; the

women and children standing by it under a sure guard, that should kill and burn them, if the Romans got into the town. This provision being made, all the inhabitants that could bear arms rushed forth desperately, and fell upon the Roman camp, where, striving beyond their power, they were every one slain. Then was the town forthwith set on fire, by those that had taken charge to do it, and many of the Romans consumed with the flame, whilst they rushed overhastily to catch the gold and silver which they saw lying on the pile ready to melt.

Asdrubal, being beaten into the island of Gades, found no cause of long stay there, but returned home to Carthage, with seven galleys, leaving Mago behind him, to wait upon occasion, if any should be offered. He visited in his way home Syphax, king of the Massæsyllii, a people of the Numidians, hoping to win him to the friendship of the Carthaginians. But he met with Scipio, as it were with his evil angel, in the king's port, who, landing at the same time, carried Syphax quite another way. For Scipio, having driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, did forthwith bethink himself how to finish the war, by putting them to the like distress in Afric. Hereunto it seemed that the help of Syphax would be much available, a king that had many times fallen out with the Carthaginians, and sustained much hurt by their procurement, of which in all likelihood he might easily be moved to seek revenge. He had also been beholding to P. and Cn. Scipio, that sent him over a captain into Afric, who instructed him so well in marshalling his forces, as he thereby often became victorious. Upon these reasons the Numidian king sent ambassadors to Rome, and made league with the city, in a time of great extremity. So that hereby P. Scipio conceived hope of laying a good foundation to the war, which he intended in Afric, upon the friendship of this ill neighbour to the Carthaginians. For which cause he sent over C. Lælius, his ambassador, to deal with Syphax, who declaring that the Carthaginians did very ill in Italy, and had nothing now at all to do in Spain, easily persuaded the king to take part with those that had the

better, and were without question his better friends. Only Syphax requested, that the Roman general should visit him in person, to conclude the league, by which he was to enter into conditions of more importance than in any former treaty. Hereto Scipio condescended, thinking the friendship of so great a king, that was neighbour to Carthage, and not far distant from Spain, well worthy of the adventure. So with two *quinquereme* galleys he took sea, and arrived in the king's port at the same time with Asdrubal. This would have been very dangerous to him, had he been descried by his enemies further at sea; but in the haven they forbare to make offer one upon the other. Syphax might well be proud, seeing at one time two such captains, of two most powerful cities, come to desire his friendship. He would have brought them to treat of peace; but the Roman excused himself, by want of such commission from the senate. He feasted them together, and shortly dismissed Scipio, with whom he readily entered into covenant, which, in time of performance, he as readily brake.

§. 2.

Funeral games held by Scipio. A duel between two Spanish princes. A digression, concerning duels.

SCIPIO returning into Spain, and resting that winter, took vengeance the next year upon those of Illiturgi, Castulo, and Astapa, as hath been said before. The conquest of the country being then in a manner at an end, he performed at New Carthage, with great solemnity, some vows that he had made, and honoured the memory of his father and uncle with funeral games, especially of those that fought at sharp, according to the manner of the times. Neither was it needful that he should trouble himself with preparing slaves for that spectacle, to hazard their lives, as was used in the city of Rome; for there were enough, that either offered themselves as voluntaries, or were sent from their princes, to give proof in single combat of the valour that was in their several countries. Some also there were, that being in contention, which they could not or would not otherwise end, agreed to refer the decision of their con-

troversies to trial of the sword in single fight. Among these, the most eminent were Corbis and Orsua, cousin-germans, that contended for the principality of a town called Ibes. Corbis was the elder, and the elder brother's son; wherefore he claimed the lordship, as eldest of the house; after the manner of our Irish tanistry. But the father of Orsua stood lately seized of the principality, which, though himself received by the death of his elder brother, yet this his son would not let it go back, but claimed to hold it as heir unto his father, and old enough to rule. Fain would Scipio have compounded the matter: but they answered peremptorily, That all their friends and kindred had already laboured in vain to take up that quarrel, and that neither God nor man, but only Mars, their god of battle, should be umpire between them. So they had their wills; and the elder, who was also the stronger, and more skilful at his weapon, easily vanquished the foolhardiness of the younger.

Such combats have been very ancient, and perhaps more ancient than any other kind of fight. We read of many performed before the war of Troy, by Theseus, Hercules, Pollux, and others; as also of two at the war of Troy, the one between Paris and Menelaus, the other between Hector and Ajax. Neither want there examples of them among the Hebrews; whereof that between David and Goliath, and others performed by some of David's worthies, against those that challenged them, are greatly celebrated. Unto the same kind appertains the fight between twelve of the tribe of Judah, and as many of the Benjamites. The Romans had many of them; whereof that was principal in which they ventured their dominion upon the heads of three brethren, the Horatii, against the three brethren Curiatii, that were Albans. The combat of Manlius Torquatus, and shortly after of Valerius Corvinus, with two champions of the Gauls, which challenged any Roman, were of less importance, as having only reference to bravery. In England there was a great combat fought between Edmund Ironside and Canutus the Dane, for no less than the kingdom. The use of

them was very frequent in the Saxon times, almost upon every occasion, great or small. In the reign of Edward the Third, who sustained the party of Mountfort against the earl of Blois, contending for the duchy of Bretagne, there was a fight, for honour of the nations, between thirty of the Bretanes and thirty English; two of which English were, Calverly, a brave captain, and that sir Robert Knolles, who afterwards became a renowned commander in the French wars, and did highly honour his blood, whereof the lord Knolles is descended. It were infinite to reckon the examples of the like found in English, French, and Italian histories. Most of them have been combats of bravery, and of *gaieté de cœur*, as the French term it; for honour of several nations, for love of mistresses, or whatsoever else gave occasion unto men desirous to set out themselves. But, besides those of this sort, there are two other natures of combats; which are, either upon accusation for life, or upon trial of title and inheritance, as in writ of right. And of this latter kind was that, of which we spake even now, between Corbis and Orsua. Unto these, methinks, may be added, as of different condition from the rest, the combat upon wager; such as were that between David and Goliath, or that between the Horatii and Curiatii; in which, without regard of title, the dominion of nations one over the other is adventured upon the head of champions. [x] Upon an accusation for life, there was a combat appointed between the lord Henry of Bolingbroke, duke of Hereford, and Mowbray, duke of Norfolk. [y] There was a combat performed by sir John Ansley and one Cattrington, whom Ansley charged with treason, and proved it upon him by being victorious. [z] The like was fought between Robert of Mountfort and Henry of Essex. The like also between a Navarrois and one Welch of Grimsby, whom the Navarrois accused of treason; but, being beaten in fight, confessed that he had belied him, and was therefore drawn and hanged. Whether our trial by battle do determine that the false accuser, if he be vanquished, shall suffer the

[x] Anno 21 Ric. II. [y] Anno 3 Ric. II. [z] Anno 9 Hen. II.

punishment which had been due to the offender, if the accusation had been proved, I cannot affirm. But we every where find, that if he which is accused of treason, or, according to the customs of Normandy, of murder, rape, or burning of places, (offences punished by death,) be overcome, he shall suffer the pains appointed for those crimes. In combats for trial of right, it is not so; neither is the appellant or defendant bound to fight in person, but he may try it by his champion, as did Paramor and Lowe, or offered to do, in the reign of queen Elizabeth: and in this case, he that is beaten, or yieldeth, loseth only his cause, not his life. Neither are the combats upon accusation, or trial of right, fought in open field, as are those of bravery; but in camp close, that is, within rails. Now this trial by combat was so ordinary in France, before the time of St. Lewis and Philip the Fair his grandchild, as every lord of fee, ecclesiastical or temporal, had power to grant it within his own jurisdiction. And it seemeth that the French kings, and other lords, made their profit hereby: for in the [a] Memorials of the Chamber of Accompts is found an article to this effect: That if a combat were once accepted, and after, by consent of the lord, were taken up, each of the parties should pay two shillings and sixpence; but if it were performed, then should the party vanquished forfeit an hundred and twelve shillings. And upon this custom grew the French proverb, which they use when any man hath had an hard or unjust judgment, saying, that "he was "tried by the law of Loray, or Bern," *où le battu paye l'amende*, where he that is beaten gives the recompense. Of these frequent trials by battle, that great learned man Yvo, bishop of Chartres, did often complain, and specially against the French churchmen, as appears by [b] his letters to the bishop of Orleans, to the archdeacon of Paris, to Rembert archbishop of Sens, and to others; wherein he rebukes the

[a] Si homines de Loraico vadia duelli temere dederint, &c.

[b] Clerici vestri nuper ad nos revertentes, qui causæ comitis Theobaldi Aurelianis interfuerunt, retulerunt nobis, quod quidam miles domini Rodulphi quendam militem comitis ad monomachiam provocaverit, et hanc provocationem ecclesiæ vestræ judicio confirmaverit, &c.

judgment of their churches, that had ratified such challenges of combat. But this liberty and kind of trial was retrenched by St. Lewis and Philip the Fair, so that no man should decree or grant it, save the king himself. It hath since been granted, though more sparingly, by the French kings; as to the lord of Carouges against Jaques le Gris, and to Julian Romero, the Spaniard, against Moro his countryman, wherein sir Henry Knevet, father of the lord Knevet, now living, was patron to Romero, that had the victory; and lastly, to the lord of Chast. Now in those challenges, upon accusation of treason, murder, or other offence deserving death, (and in those only,) the rule held, that *le défendeur estoit tenu de proposer ses deffenses per un démentir*, "the defendant was bound to plead not "guilty, by giving the accuser the lie;" otherwise it was concluded, that the defendant did *taisiblement confesser le crime*, "silently confess the crime." But after such time as Francis the French king, upon some dispute about breach of faith, had sent the lie unto the emperor Charles the Fifth, thereby to draw him to a personal combat, every petty companion in France, in imitation of their master, made the giving of the lie mortality itself, holding it a matter of no small glory to have it said, That the meanest gentleman in France would not put up what the great emperor Charles the Fifth had patiently endured.

From this beginning is derived a challenge of combat, grounded upon none of those occasions that were known to the ancient. For the honour of nations, the trial of right, the wager upon champions, or the objection and refutation of capital offences, are none of them, nor all of them together, the argument of half so many duels as are founded upon mere private anger; yea, or upon matter seeming worthy of anger in the opinion of the duellists. So that in these days, wherein every man takes unto himself a kingly liberty to offer, accept, and appoint personal combats, the giving of the lie, which ought to be the negation only in accusations for life, is become the most fruitful root of deadly quarrels. This is held a word so terrible, and a wrong so

unpardonable, as will admit no other recompense, than the blood of him that gives it. Thus the fashion, taken up in haste by the French gentlemen, after the pattern of their king, is grown to be a custom, whence we have derived a kind of art and philosophy of quarrel, with certain grounds and rules, from whence the points of honour, and the dependencies thereof, are deduced. Yea there are (among many other no less ridiculous) some so mystical curiosities herein, as that it is held a far greater dishonour to receive from an enemy a slight touch with a cane, than a sound blow with a sword; the one having relation to a slave, the other to a soldier. I confess that the difference is pretty; though, for mine own part, if I had had any such Italionated enemy in former times, I should willingly have made with him such an exchange, and have given him the point of honour to boot.

But let us examine indifferently the offence of this terrible word the *lie*, with their conditions, who are commonly of all other the most tender in receiving it. I say, that the most of these, who present death on the points of their swords to all that give it them, use nothing so much in their conversation and course of life, as to speak and swear falsely. Yea it is thereby that they shift and shuffle in the world, and abuse it: for how few are there among them, which, having assumed and sworn to pay the monies and other things they borrow, do not break their word and promise as often as they engage it? Nay, how few are there among them that are not liars by record, by being sued in some court or other of justice, upon breach of word or bond? For he which hath promised that he will pay money by a day, or promised any thing else wherein he faileth, hath directly lied to him to whom the promise hath been made. Nay, what is the profession of love that men make nowadays? what is the vowing of their service, and of all they have, used in their ordinary compliments, and, in effect, to every man whom they bid but good-morrow, or salute, other than a courteous and courtlike kind of lying? It is, saith a wise Frenchman, (deriding therein the apish custom

of his country,) *un marché et complot fait ensemble se mocquer, mentir, et piper les uns les autres*, "a kind of mer-"chandise and complot made among them, to mock, belie, "and deride each other;" and so far nowadays in fashion and in use, as he that useth it not is accounted either dull or cynical. True it is notwithstanding, (omitting the old distinctions,) that there is great difference between these mannerly and complimental lies, with those which are sometimes persuaded by necessity upon breach of promise, and those which men use out of cowardice and fear; the latter confessing themselves to be in greater awe of men than of God, a vice of all other styled the most villainous. But now for the lie itself, as it is made the subject of all our deadly quarrels in effect; to it I say, that whoso gives another man the lie, when it is manifest that he hath lied, doth him no wrong at all, neither ought it to be more heinously taken, than to tell him, that he hath broken any promise which he hath otherwise made: for he that promiseth any thing, tells him to whom he hath promised, that he will perform it; and, in not performing it, he hath made himself a liar. On the other side, he that gives any man the lie, when himself knows that he to whom it is given hath not lied, doth therein give the lie directly to himself. And what cause have I, if I say that the sun shines when it doth shine, and that another fellow tells me I lie, for it is midnight, to prosecute such an one to death, for making himself a foolish ruffian, and a liar in his own knowledge? For he that gives the lie in any other dispute, than in defence of his loyalty or life, gives it impertinently, and ruffian-like. I will not deny but it is an extreme rudeness to tax any man in public with an untruth, (if it be not pernicious, and to his prejudice against whom the untruth is uttered;) but all that is rude ought not to be civilized with death. That were more to admire and imitate a French custom, and a wicked one, than to admire and to follow the counsel of God. But you will say that these discourses savour of cowardice. It is true, if you call it cowardice to fear God or hell; whereas he that is truly wise and truly valiant, knows that there is

nothing else to be feared. For against an enemy's sword we shall find ten thousand sevenpenny-men, (waged at that price in the wars,) that fear it as little, and perchance less, than any professed swordman in the world: *Diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo;* "Fortitude is a diligent preserver of "itself." "It is," saith Aristotle, "a mediocrity between "doubting and daring." *Sicut non martyrem pœna; sic nec fortem pugna, sed causa;* "As it is not the punish-"ment that makes the martyr, so it is not fighting that de-"clares a valiant man; but fighting in a good cause." In which whosoever shall resolvedly end his life, resolvedly in respect of the cause, to wit, in defence of his prince, religion, or country, as he may justly be numbered among the martyrs of God, so may those that die with malicious hearts, in private combats, be called the martyrs of the Devil. Neither do we indeed take our own revenge, or punish the injuries offered us, by the death of the injurious. For the true conquest of revenge is, to give him, of whom we would be revenged, cause to repent him, and not to lay the repentance of another man's death on our own consciences, *animasque in vulnere ponere*, "and to drown our souls in the "wounds and blood of our enemies." Hereupon you will again ask me, if I condemn in generous and noble spirits the defence of their honours, being pressed with injuries? I say that I do not, if the injuries be violent: for the law of nature, which is a branch of the eternal law, and the laws of all Christian kings and states, do favour him that is assailed in the slaughter of the assailant. You will secondly ask me, whether a nobleman, or a gentleman, being challenged by cartel by one of like quality, be not bound in point of honour to satisfy the challenger in private combat? I answer, that he is not; because (omitting the greatest, which is the point of religion) the point of the law is directly contrary and opposite to that which they call the point of honour; the law which hath dominion over it, which can judge it, which can destroy it; except you will style those acts honourable, where the hangman gives the garland; for, seeing the laws of this land have appointed

the blow, did kneel before him on both his knees, holding in his right hand a sword with the point towards himself, and in his left hand the like cudgel, or bastinado, wherewith he had stricken M. de Plessis; both which weapons he delivered into Plessis's hands, submitting himself to such revenge as it should please him to take with either of those weapons, the constable and marshals having formerly left it to the will of Plessis to use his own discretion in the revenge of his own wrongs. Now whether the baron had reason to please himself, as one beforehand in point of honour, who struck M. de Plessis like a ruffian, coming behind him, and (having advantage of company, and his horses ready) shifted himself away on the sudden, but, being afterward taken, was taught to repent himself in this shameful manner; or whether M. de Plessis (of whose valour no man doubted) had not far juster cause to rest satisfied, since he might at his pleasure have beaten or wounded his enemy, but forgave him, let any wise man judge. To this if it be said, that the baron was constrained to make his submission, that his repentance was enforced, and not voluntary, and therefore no disgrace unto him; I answer, that one may say as well, that it is no disgrace to a thief, when he is brought to the gallows, to repent him of the robberies by him committed, because his repentance also is constrained. And it is true, that enforced repentance is no disgrace in respect of the force, but in respect of the fact, which (but for our sins to God) makes all repentance shameful; because all forced repentance is inflicted upon us for somewhat unworthy of a gentleman and of an honest man. Nay voluntary repentance itself, as it hath relation to men, ariseth either out of the fear of the ill that may befall us, or out of the acknowledgment of our own weakness. Certainly, as wise men and valiant men do rather deride pettȳ injuries or sudden injuries, that are not offered from malice forethought, than revenge them; so men, apt to quarrel, do commonly suspect their own valour, and rather desire that thereby the world should believe them to be of great daring, than know any such resolution in themselves. For he that

knows himself indeed to be a valiant man, scorns to hunt after the opinion.

Now the same power, which the constable and marshals of France have, hath also a marshal of England, or his deputies; by whose judgment, in all disputes of honour, every man's reputation may be preserved: we may therefore as well submit ourselves to the judge of honour in all disputes of honour, as we do submit ourselves, in all controversies of livelihood and life, to the judges of the law. And, out of doubt, the institution of this court of chivalry in England, in France, and elsewhere, was no less charitable than politic. For the blood of man, violently spilt, doth not bring forth honey-bees, as that of bulls doth, which sting but the fingers or the face; but it produceth that monstrous beast, *revenge*, which hath stung to death, and eaten up of several nations, so many noble personages, as there is nothing more lamentable, nor more threatening the wrath of God upon supreme governors, than the permission.

His majesty therefore (which Henry the Fourth of France also endeavoured) hath done a most kingly and Christian-like deed in Scotland, which the most renowned of all his predecessors could never do, in beating down and extinguishing that hereditary prosecution of malice, called the *deadly feud*; a conquest which shall give him the honour of prudence and kingly power for evermore. And we have cause to hope, that his royal care shall be no less happy in preventing the like mischief which threatens England, by the audacious, common, and brave, yet outrageous vanity of duellists.

Unto this that I have spoken of lying, and of manslaughter, it must be added, that each of these are of great latitude, and worthy of reproof and vengeance proportionably, more or less in their several degrees. There is much difference between lies of necessity upon breach of promise, or complimental lies, and such pernicious lies as proceed from fear and cowardice, or are uttered by false witnesses; the former sort being excusable by weakness or levity, the latter being altogether detestable. No less, if not more, dif-

ference there is, between killing of a man in open field, with even weapons, and that killing which the scriptures call "killing by guile," *dolo* or *per insidias;* though our laws do not much distinguish them in punishment. For in the latter, God, forsaking his own privilege, commandeth, that the *guileful* murderer be drawn by force from the protection of his altar. [d] Neither is every guileful murder performed by the sword, nor by overt violence; but there is a guileful murder also by poisoning, and by the pen, or by practice. For such distinction is found between coming *presumptuously* upon a man [e] *to slay him with guile*, and *lying in wait for blood privily, for the innocent, without a cause*, upon hope of spoil, after such manner as [f] *the net is spread before the eyes of the birds*. Francis the First, queen Mary of England, and the king's majesty now reigning, have given notable testimony of their justice upon three noblemen, who committed guileful murder. Of the first kind, king Francis upon the lord of Talard, who being, saith the French historian, *de haute et ancienne lignée, et supporté de plusieurs grandes alliances;* "who being of high and "ancient lineage, and supported by divers great alliances," of which the cardinal of Bellay (in especial favour with the king) was one, was notwithstanding delivered over into the hands of the hangman. Queen Mary, upon a nobleman of her own religion, and, in many other respects, very dear unto her. His majesty, upon a baron of Scotland, whose house was no less ancient and faithful than himself valiant, and greatly friended both at home and abroad. Of killing guilefully by poison, and of punishment following such wicked artisans, every age hath had too many examples. Of guileful killing by the pen, (that I may not speak of any English judge,) the author of the French Recherches gives us two notable instances; the one of des Eshars, who, [g] saith Pasquier, *fit mourir Montaigu, grand maistre de France, pour contenter l'opinion de celuy dont il estoit lors idolastre; et Dieu permit que depuis il fut pendu et estranglé;* "who

[d] Exod. xxi.
[e] Exod. xxi. 14.
[f] Prov. i. 11.
[g] Lib. 5. cap. 12. & cap. 11.

" caused Montaigu, great master of France, to die, to con-
" tent his mind," (to wit, the duke of Burgoyne,) " whom at
" that time Eshars worshipped as his idol; but God per-
" mitted that he himself was soon after hanged and stran-
" gled." The other was of the great Francis the First upon his chancellor Poyet; who, to satisfy the king's passion, practised the destruction of the admiral Chabot, a man most nobly descended, and of great service. For as in other men, so in kings, the passion of love grows old, and wears out by time. So the king's affection being changed towards the admiral, he charged him with some offences which he had formerly committed. The admiral, presuming upon the great good service which he had done the king in Piedmont, and in the defence of Marseilles against the emperor, gave the king other language than became him, and desired nothing so much as a public trial. Hereupon the king (it being easy to provoke an ill disposition) gave commission to the chancellor, as president, and other judges, upon an information of the king's advocate, to question the admiral's life. The chancellor, an ambitious man, and of a large conscience, (which is rare in men towards the law,) hoping highly to content the king, wrought with some of the judges with so great cunning, with others with so sharp threats, and with the rest with so fair promises, as, albeit nothing could be proved against the admiral worthy of the king's displeasure, yet the chancellor subscribed, and got others to subscribe, to the forfeiture of his estate, offices, and liberty, though not able to prevail against his life. But what was the chancellor's reward (the king hating falsehood in so great a magistrate) other than his own degradation, arraignment, and condemnation? *Belle leçon certes* (saith Pasquier) *à tout juge pour demeurer tousiours en soy, et ne laisser fluctuer sa conscience dedans les vagues d'une imaginaire faveur, qui pour fin de jeu le submerge;* " A fair lesson to all
" judges to dwell always in themselves, and not to suffer their
" consciences to float upon the waves of imaginary favour,
" which, in the end, overwhelms them." And as for the admiral, though it might have been answered unto his friends,

if any bewailed his calamity as undeserved, that he was tried, according to his own desire, by the laws of his country, and by the judges of parliament; yet the king's justice, surmounting all other his passions, gave back unto him his honour, his offices, his liberty, and his estate.

§. 3.

The last acts of Scipio in Spain. His return to Rome, where he is chosen consul.

THE last business that troubled Scipio in Spain grew by the rebellion of the people, and mutiny of his soldiers. He fell dangerously sick, in such sort, that the rumour of his death ran current throughout Spain. This encouraged Mandonius and Indibilis, petty kings that had forsaken the Carthaginians, and followed Scipio a while before to take arms against the Romans. They were vainly persuaded, that, after the Carthaginians were driven out, they themselves should become the mightiest in all Spain: but seeing now, that things were no way answerable to the greatness of their hopes, they thought it best to take the present advantage, and hammer out their own fortunes. So they rashly fell upon the Suessetani and Sedetani, confederates of the Romans, and wasted their country. Part of the Roman army lying at Sucro, instead of making head against these rebels, grew to be affected with the like distemper. They had not reaped such profit of their Roman conquests as might satisfy their desires, or as they thought easy to be gotten, if they might be their own carvers. Wherefore, when the death of Scipio was reported, they thought that the time served very well to enrich themselves with spoil of the country. Many outrages they committed, and, which was greatest of all, driving away their colonels, that should have bridled their fury, they chose out of their own number two base fellows, Albius Calenus and Atrius Umber, to be their commanders. These took upon them all the ensigns of proconsuls, or propretors, as if this their election had been like to that wherein Lucius Martius was chosen by the soldiers, after the death of the two Scipios. But whilst they were devising what exploits they might do for the en-

riching of themselves, in a time of such combustion as was expected, there arrived more certain news that Scipio was both alive and in good health. There came also new colonels, sent unto them from their general, who, mildly rebuking their want of consideration, and seeming to be glad that they had no further overshot themselves, led them to Carthagena, there to receive their pay. Before their coming, Scipio had resolved to do exemplary justice on the principal offenders, and to put the whole multitude of them in fear of what they had deserved. Therefore he caused Syllanus to make ready the companies, which lay before in the town, as it were to make an expedition against Mandonius and Indibilis; he caused Albius and Atrius, with some thirty other of their complices, to be secretly apprehended in their lodgings; he called the mutineers to assembly, and having them unarmed, as they were encircled round by Syllanus and his companies, prepared for the purpose, he bitterly inveighed against them all as traitors: this done, Albius and Atrius, with the other prisoners, were haled to the stake, where they were whipped and beheaded, as was the Roman custom toward such offenders. The rest of the soldiers, to the number of eight thousand, were caused to take their oath of obedience anew, and received every man his pay when he was sworn.

Mandonius and Indibilis continued in arms, notwithstanding that they had certain word of Scipio's life and health. Well they could have been contented to be quiet; but, by the severity used to the Roman soldiers, they stood in fear, as being Spaniards and greater offenders, of harder measure. Scipio went against them, and found them in a valley, that was scarce large enough to hold all their army. In the entrance thereof he fought with them, and sending Lælius with all his horse to fetch a compass about the hills, and charge them in rear, he overthrew them. Indibilis and Mandonius had after this no hope remaining to preserve themselves, and their estates, otherwise than by making submission. Mandonius therefore came to Scipio, and humbly craving pardon, both for himself and for his brother Indi-

bilis, obtained his request; yet so, that they were taught to acknowledge themselves less free princes than they formerly had been.

Afterward Scipio went toward Gades, and was met on the way by Masinissa, who secretly promised to do him all service, if the people of Rome would send him to make war in Afric. Unto Mago, that lay in Gades, came directions from Carthage, that, letting all care of Spain alone, he should thence depart with his fleet into Italy, and there wage an army of Gauls and Ligurians to join with Hannibal. For this purpose was money sent unto him from Carthage, and he himself laid hold upon all that he could find in the town of Gades, without sparing either private men, the common treasury, or the temples. In his voyage thence he landed at Carthagena, hoping to have taken it by surprise. But he failed in the attempt, and was so beaten to his ships, that he returned back to repose himself a while at Gades. The Gaditanes, offended with the robberies and spoil that he had made at his taking leave of them, would not suffer him again to enter into their city. By this he foresaw that it would not be long ere they became Roman: wherefore, sending messengers into the town, to complain of this uncourteous dealing, he allured their magistrates forth unto him, whom, notwithstanding all the excuse that they could make, he whipped and crucified: this done, he followed his former intended voyage, bidding Spain farewell for ever.

The isle and city of Gades was yielded to the Romans presently after the departure of Mago. Then did Scipio deliver up the province to those that were sent from Rome to succeed him therein, and himself with ten ships returned home. At his coming to Rome he made suit for the honour of a triumph; but it was denied him, for that it had as yet been granted unto no proconsul, excepting to such as received that dignity after a consulship, as it were by prorogation. But to make amends for this repulse, the election of new consuls being then in hand, by general voice of the city P. Cornelius Scipio was chosen consul, and P. Licinius Crassus

joined with him. This Crassus, being high priest, or bishop of the Romans, might not, by the custom of those times, go far from the city, as being to intend the matters of their superstition; though Cæsar and others, who in ages following held the same office, were stayed by no such religious impediment from being far and long absent. Hereby it came to pass that Scipio, desiring to have the war transferred into Afric, was in no danger to lose that honourable charge by any mischance of lot in the division of provinces; for that his colleague was not capable of employment so far off.

SECT. XVIII.

Scipio obtains leave to make war in Afric. His preparations. Of Masinissa, who joined with Scipio. The victories against Asdrubal and Syphax.

Pub. Cornelius Scipio and P. Licinius Crassus, entering into their consulship, held a meeting of the senate in the Capitol; wherein it was decreed, that Scipio should be allowed to bestow part of the money which he had brought out of Spain into the treasury, upon the setting forth of solemn plays, that he had vowed to make, whilst he was busied in his Spanish wars. This helped well to revive the memory of his victories already gotten; and to give hope unto the people of greater victories in the war which he intended to make in Afric. To the same purpose did the Spanish embassages avail much in the senate, especially that of the Saguntines, who magnified his actions highly and deservedly; saying, that they were the most happy of all their countrymen, since they, being present, had seen him chosen consul, and should carry home such joyful news. The Saguntine ambassadors were lovingly entertained by the senate; as their faith to Rome, though costly it were both to them and to the Romans, had well deserved. Nevertheless, when Scipio proposed that Afric might be decreed unto him for his province, there wanted not many, even of the principal men, that vehemently gainsaid him. Of these was Q. Fabius Maximus the chief, who seems to

have been troubled with that disease, which too often causeth men, renowned for long approved virtue, to look asquint upon the actions of those that follow them in the same kind. He alleged many reasons against the purpose of the consul; whereof the chief were, that the treasury was unable to sustain the charges of a war in Afric; and that it was extremely perilous to hazard so great forces, where they could not at pleasure be recalled unto the defence of Rome itself, if need required. Hereunto he added many words concerning the danger wherein Italy stood, not only of Hannibal, but of Mago his brother, that was arming the Ligurians; as also concerning the honour of the consul; which would (he said) be greater in setting Italy free from enemies, than it could be in doing any harm to Afric. Neither did he forget both to elevate the Spanish wars, as of less moment than the intended voyage against Carthage, nor withal to lay great blame upon Scipio, for having suffered Asdrubal to pass into Italy; shewing, that it was greatly to be feared, lest the like might happen again; and that a new army, notwithstanding the good success of Scipio, (if it happened to be good,) might be sent from Carthage, to the utter endangering of Rome, whilst the Roman forces were employed abroad. But the main point which he urged, was, that neither the senate had ordained, nor the people commanded, Afric to be that year a province; which the consul nevertheless propounded in such wise, as if it were a matter already concluded, and no longer to be argued. Scipio, on the other side, insisted upon this one point, that it was better to make an offensive than a defensive war; especially against such as the Carthaginians; who, being ill provided of able men at home, did furnish themselves, by help of money, with levies made abroad. As for the care of Italy, he doubted not but P. Licinius, his colleague, would be as well able to discharge it now, as others had done in times of greater danger. So promising to draw Hannibal into Afric for defence of his own home, and taxing as civilly as he could the envy of Fabius, which withstood such a gallant enterprise, he proposed the

matter again unto the senate. Much altercation there was about the manner of his proceeding; forasmuch as it was noised abroad, that, if he could not bring the senate to his mind, he would carry it by the people. This offended many of the ancients, who resented in this honourable man a little spice of that arrogancy, which, in following ages, grew to be much hotter in those that had commanded long abroad. But, in conclusion, Scipio referred himself wholly unto the senate's good-will and pleasure; whereby he obtained thus much, that the isle of Sicily might be appointed unto him for his province, with leave to pass over into Afric, if he found it expedient.

Want of money, and no great liking to his voyage, made the Roman senate have little care to furnish out Scipio to the war by him intended upon Afric. Herewithal it fell out, that Mago, coming on the sudden from the Baleares to Genoa, and winning the town, bred a fear of no less terrible invasion upon Italy than that which Asdrubal had lately made. He could not indeed raise any great army of the Ligurians, for that he found them distracted with civil wars. Therefore he was driven to make choice of his party, and to help those whom he thought fittest for his turn against the others. This troublesome business, though it occupied more of his time than he could willingly have spared, yet it got him reputation by his victories, and made the unsteady Gauls ready to enter into his pay. Hereupon the dispersed legions of the Romans, that under proconsuls and pretors lay ready to be employed where need should require, were directed unto the borders of Lombardy and Liguria, there to make head against Mago. But all his menaces passed away in vapour. For a fleet either coming to his aid from Carthage, or by him sent thither (the report is uncertain) loaden with the booty that he had taken, fell into the hands of the Roman pretor that governed in Sardinia. This did much disable him; and though, after a while, there came letters from Carthage, together with store of money, heartening him in his proceedings; yet some im-

pediments which he found, and that fatal voyage of Scipio into Afric, disturbed all, and made him be recalled home.

Against Hannibal was nothing done this year. Neither was any thing done by him of which the Roman historians have been pleased to take notice. Only it is said, that he spent the summer by the temple of Juno Lacinia, where he raised an altar, with a huge title of all that he had performed, graven in Punic and Greek letters. Such account of winnings past is commonly, in gamesters that are at the height of their fortune, a cause of remission and carelessness; in those that are upon the losing hand, a cause both of the same for the present, and shortly after of dejection, when they find a notable change. A great pestilence, infesting both the Carthaginian and the Roman camp, is said to have been the occasion of this year's idleness; which fell not out much amiss for the city of Rome, that was marvellously impoverished by this war; and had already tried the utmost way to defray the charges, which grew insupportable. To relieve the present necessity, it was well thought upon, that a great part of Campania (not many years since confiscated) should be sold or let out; in which bargain, that the city might receive no loss, the tenth part of the fine was ordained as a reward unto the detectors of lands concealed.

Of this, or other money, none was given to Scipio. Neither was he allowed to make press of soldiers for his African voyage; neither did he overmuch labour to obtain it. That which the senate refused, the people did for him; or rather they did it for themselves, that were therein wiser than the senate. It is usually found in councils of state, that the busy or obstinate heads of a few do carry all the rest. And many times, men make a surrender of their own judgments to the wisdom that hath gotten itself a name, by giving happy direction in troubles forepast. Therefore he, that reposeth himself upon the advice of many, shall often find himself deceived; the counsel of those many being wholly directed by the temper of a few that oversway the rest. Q. Fabius was accounted the oracle of his time; for

his wary nature sorted well with the business that fell out in the chief of his employment. Unto him therefore Q. Fulvius adhered, with other of the senators, that were grown old in following one course, from which they could not shift as the change of times required. But the people (who though they could not well advise and deliberate, yet could well apprehend) embraced the needful resolution of Scipio in such sort, that, besides his Roman forces, he had from divers parts of Italy about seven thousand voluntaries. He had also provision from the several towns; corn, iron, canvass for sails, axes, beedhooks, handmills, and the like implements; fir for building of ships; many thousands of targets, helmets, and spears of all kinds; every place furnishing him with that commodity which it best could afford. Unto this willingness of the people, the diligence of Scipio was correspondent. In the compass of five and forty days, he had both felled his timber, built and launched twenty *triremе* and ten *quinquereme* galleys, wherewith he transported his army into Sicily. In Sicily he found, besides other forces, two legions that had served at Cannæ; which were old soldiers, and (as he himself well knew) not guilty of the overthrow for which they had long undergone a heavy censure. They had served under Marcellus and Lævinus at the taking of many cities and strong places; in which regard they were like to be of good use to him in Afric, where would be store of such employment. For increasing the number of his horse, he pressed three hundred Sicilians, all wealthy young men, and such as loved well their ease. These he afterward discharged from the war, highly to their contentment; but with condition, that they should deliver their horse and arms to as many Roman gentlemen, which he brought over with him for the purpose. Whilst he was providing to have things in a readiness for Afric, the banished Locrians, that followed the Roman side, made him acquainted with an intelligence, whereby they hoped to recover their city. Some handicraftsmen that wrought for the Carthaginians in one of the citadels of Locri, (for there were two in the town,) being taken prison-

ers by the Romans, promised to betray the place, if they might be ransomed and rewarded. Scipio, being advertised of this, gave order to have the attempt made by night; which happily succeeded, and that citadel was surprised. The other citadel was strongly defended by the Carthaginian garrison, which sent to Hannibal for aid. The Romans in like sort, fearing lest their own paucity should make them too weak for Hannibal, craved help of the consul Scipio. The townsmen were doubtfully affected; but the best and most of them inclining to the Romans, kept Hannibal out; whom the coming of Scipio caused thence to depart; and caused likewise the Carthaginian garrison to abandon the other citadel. Many outrages were committed by the Roman soldiers, that were left by Scipio in custody of the town. Wherefore a vehement complaint was made by the Locrians unto the Roman senate; not only against those of the garrison, but much more against Pleminius the captain, who gave bad example, and was worse than all the rest. Besides many murders, robberies, rapes, and other villainies, the temple of Proserpina, that had a great fame of sanctity, was spoiled by these barbarous thieves. The Locrians therefore advised the senate to make present amends to the goddess for this sacrilege; saying, that the like had never been committed without notorious vengeance by her taken upon the authors. The senate gave good ear to this complaint; comforted the Locrians, and redressed the injuries done unto them; sent for Pleminius, with other the principal offenders, whom they cast into prison, and used according to their deserts; as also they restored unto Proserpina her money twice told. But old Q. Fabius was not herewithal contented: he laid much of the blame upon Scipio, that had placed such a man in Locri, and had not carefully hearkened to the complaints made against him, but suffered him to run on in these his wicked courses. By the sharp invective that Fabius made, others took courage to speak what they pleased; as well against the demeanour of Scipio, as against the dissoluteness of his army; which lay, as they said, idle in Sicily, neither mind-

ful of any service toward, nor fit for it, if need should require. Finally, things were so far urged, that ten legates were sent over into Sicily, together with the pretor appointed for that island; two of the tribunes, and one of the ædiles, who should examine these matters; and either cause the general to return into Italy, or continue him in his charge, as they thought fit. The end of all was, they found him so well prepared against Carthage, as that they hastened him on his journey, and gave him high commendations at their return.

Scipio had already employed Lælius in Afric, rather to make discovery than to work any other great effect of war. He took a great booty, and struck no little terror into the Carthaginians, who saw their affairs to be upon terms of change. But the greatest fruit of his journey was, that, speaking with Masinissa, he well informed himself of the state of Afric; and knew what was to be expected of those two kings that had promised to join with the Romans at their landing.

Concerning Masinissa's revolt from the Carthaginians, and his compact made underhand with the Romans, [h] Livy doth profess, that there was no such evident cause thereof at the present; but that the long continuance of his faith and constancy, in following times, must help to prove, that this his change was not without some good cause. But Appianus (an historian far inferior to Livy both in worth and time) gives one reason so probable of this, and many accidents thereto belonging, as that it carries with it a great appearance of necessary truth. Only the doubt is, how it could any way come to pass that the knowledge of such a matter should have escaped the diligence of Livy, if it had been true, unless we should believe that he wilfully forbare to rehearse a tragedy, the sorrow whereof would cause men to think amiss of Scipio. Howsoever it was, thus [i] Appian tells it; and many circumstances of things done confirm it: Asdrubal, the son of Gisco, had a fair daughter, whom both king Syphax and Masinissa loved. Masinissa, being

[h] Livy, l. 28. [i] Appian. Alexan. de Bell. Punic.

brought up at Carthage, and being withal a goodly gentleman of person, and excellent in qualities, was chosen by Asdrubal to be his son-in-law. When the virgin was betrothed unto him, he went into Spain, and there did great service. But afterwards the Carthaginian senate thought the marriage of Asdrubal's daughter to be a matter of state, and bestowed her upon Syphax, without standing to acquaint her father or Masinissa therewithal. This they did, for that Syphax was the more mighty prince; and for that the indignity of the repulse had made him become their enemy. Hereof Masinissa was advertised; and forthwith entered into intelligence with Scipio, secretly, as he thought; yet not so secretly, but that some notice was taken of it; which would have cost him his life, had he not with great circumspection conveyed himself home into his father's kingdom. Thus far forth we may believe Appianus; all the narration well cohering with things past and following. Only it seems, that howsoever Sophonisba, the daughter of Asdrubal, was promised by the Carthaginians unto Syphax, yet, since this their courtesy proceeded from fear, he thought it wisdom to continue and increase the same their fear, by making fair promises to the Romans, until Asdrubal had sent for his daughter from Carthage, and the marriage was consummated [k]. In other matters concerning the war itself, wherein Appian differs much from Livy and from Polybius, whom (as appears by the broken pieces of his works remaining) Livy did follow, it will be no offence to take little heed unto his reports.

Masinissa was the son of Gala, a king of the Numidians, whose father dying, the crown descended, by order of the country, unto Desalces the brother, not unto Masinissa the son. But this uncle of Masinissa shortly died; and his elder son, who took possession of the kingdom, was vanquished, and slain in battle by a rebel, that made himself protector over the younger, which was a child. The traitor fortified himself against Masinissa, whose return he feared, by alliances with the Carthaginians and Syphax. But all would

[k] Livy, l. 29.

not serve; he and his pupil were dispossessed of their estates by Masinissa, that was a skilful warrior, and well beloved for the memory of his father Gala. The Carthaginians in reason should have been glad, that Masinissa, who had done them notable service, was thus confirmed in his estate, had they not been guilty of the injury by them done unto him, whilst his uncle or cousin reigned, and he seemed unlikely to stand them in any stead. But Syphax, by their procurement, and perhaps by his own malice towards his corrival, warred upon him; and, overcharging him with numbers, drove him out of his kingdom. Nevertheless, Masinissa still retained the hearts of his people; and thereby remained strong enough to infest both Syphax and the Carthaginians, though he was often put in distress by great forces that were sent against him. He therefore, keeping much about the lesser Syrtis, between the borders of the Carthaginians and the nation of the Garamants, expected the coming of the Romans; yet so, as he made long roads over all the country, even as far as to Hippo; and, when Lælius arrived thereabouts, exhorted and encouraged him to hasten on Scipio to the invasion of Afric.

But Syphax, in whose great aid and succour was reposed more hope of good success than could be expected from the good-will of poor Masinissa, sent an embassage into Sicily about the same time, which was little pleasing unto Scipio. He excused himself of his promise lately made, and signified his alliance with the Carthaginians; adding, that he could not choose but fight for the defence of Afric, wherein he was born and reigned; and for defence of his beloved wife's country, if it were invaded. Nevertheless, he promised to remain a neuter, so long as the Romans and Carthaginians held war abroad, far enough from Afric, as hitherto they had done. This message hastened Scipio in his expedition much more than any persuasion could have done. For the promised assistance of Syphax had not a little advanced his enterprise, in procuring both the assent of the senate and the forwardness of many adventurers. Lest therefore

the failing of this hope should work too great a change in common opinion, he thought it the best way to prevent all discourse, and set the war undertaken immediately on foot. The ambassadors he dismissed in all haste, with letters to their king; wherein he willed him to consider, that what he had promised he had also sworn; and therefore should do well to make it good. Having sent them away, he called his soldiers together, and bade them make ready for the voyage, which he intended no longer to defer. For, said he, Masinissa hath been with Lælius, and Syphax hath newly sent to me; greatly wondering upon what I should thus stay; and saying, that they will provide for themselves, if I fail their expectation by tarrying any longer. This fine tale prevented all further inquisition, that might else have been made concerning the message of these ambassadors, whose followers had been seen walking up and down Syracuse. And lest any thing should afterwards break out, that might hinder the business, Scipio immediately sent about his fleet unto Lilybæum; and requesting by letters M. Pomponius, that was pretor in Sicily, to meet him there, hasted thither with his army. At Lilybæum he agreed with the pretor about the division of the legions between them, which to leave behind for defence of the island, and which to carry with him into Afric. What numbers he transported, it is not certain; some historians reckoning only ten thousand foot and two and twenty hundred horse; others increasing them to five and thirty thousand, horse and foot. Concerning his directions for embarking, and other matters belonging to their course, I hold it needless to set them down; since they were points of ordinary care, and which it is like that neither he, when he took his voyage into Spain, nor others, upon like occasions, have omitted; they being also word for word set down by an historian who borrowed them from Livy, and fitted them to a prince of later age.

This Roman army landed in Afric, near unto a foreland then called the Fair Promontory; which how far it was from

Carthage, or toward what point of the compass, I cannot precisely affirm; because it is uncertain, whether it were that cape or headland which bore the name of Mercury, and lay to the north-east of Carthage; or whether that of Apollo, which lay northerly from Carthage, and by west. The coming of Masinissa unto Scipio, at his first arrival, helps to confirm the opinion of Xylander, who thinks the Fair Promontory to have been the same that was also called Mercury's Cape, since with little difficulty Masinissa might come thither from the Lesser Syrtis, whereabout was his common abiding. But forasmuch as without any memorable impediment, soon after his arrival, Scipio encamped before Utica, that stood westward from Carthage beyond the river Bagradas, it may rather seem that he landed within the promontory of Apollo; whence the way to Utica was not long. This is also strongly proved; for that out of Carthage were sent, the next day, five hundred horse, to trouble him in his disembarking. Neither was it so hard for Masinissa, that roved about the country with a troop of horse, to find out the Romans, though they landed far from the place to the which he usually resorted, like as before he had met with Lælius at Hippo, that was further off; as it would have been for Scipio, with his army and carriages, to overcome the trouble of a long journey, and fetch a great compass to Utica by land, when he might have disembarked nearer unto it. Nevertheless it may pass as a conjecture, that Scipio came first of all to Emporia, a plentiful region about the Lesser Syrtis; since he gave charge to the masters of his ships, at the setting forth from Lilybæum, to shape their course for that coast. The country thereabout was very rich, and fit for sustenance of an army; neither were the inhabitants warlike, or well provided to make resistance. Thus much perhaps Masinissa had signified unto Lælius, when he spake with him at Hippo; thinking that the Romans, howsoever they made brave promises, would not come strong enough to fight at head. But when he saw their fleet and army to be such, as not only served to invade the

lands of Carthage, but threatened a conquest of the city and whole estate; then might he better advise them to set sail for Utica, and make war upon the enemies at their own doors.

The Carthaginians had at that time neither any captain of great worth at home, nor better army than of raw soldiers, that were levied, or to be levied, in haste. Asdrubal the son of Gisco, the same that had lately been chased out of Spain by Scipio, was their best man of war. And good enough perhaps he was thought by Hanno and his fellows, of whose faction he was; or if ought were wanting in him, yet his riches and nobility, together with the affinity of king Syphax, made him passable. He was at that present with the king his son-in-law, working him (no doubt) against the Romans, when letters were brought from Carthage, both to Syphax and to him, informing them of the invasion; entreating the one of them to give assistance, and commanding the other to make his repair unto the city, where he was chosen general. But ere these could be ready, Scipio had beaten the troop of Carthaginian horse, that were sent out of the city to disturb his landing, and slain Hanno, a young gentleman that was their leader. He had also taken and sacked a town of the Carthaginians; wherein, besides other booty, he took eight thousand prisoners; all which he conveyed aboard his hulks, or ships of burden, and sent them back loaden into Sicily. He took likewise a town called Salera, which he held and fortified. In Salera lay another Hanno, with four thousand Numidian horse; whose service being fitter for the field than for defence of walled places, made Scipio to perceive the unskilfulness of their leader, that had thus housed them. Wherefore he sent Masinissa before him; who rode up to the gates; and, by making a bravado, trained out the improvident Hanno so far, that he drew him unto a place where the Romans lay in wait for him. The victory was easily gotten, and Hanno either taken or slain. With those that fled, the Romans entered pell-mell into the town, which presently they made

their own. Thence went Scipio to Utica, a city of great importance, [1] of which mention hath been formerly made, and sat down before it. Forty days he spent about it; assailing it both by land and sea, and using all his engines of battery whereof he had plenty; yet was in no likelihood of prevailing. And now the summer was quite spent; so that it was time for him to choose a place, and fortify his winter camp, which must be well stored against the year following. Whilst thus necessity urged him to leave Utica, and shame of taking the repulse in his first great enterprise, rather than any hope of better success, caused him to stay there; Asdrubal and Syphax gave him the honour of a fair pretence to leave the siege. Asdrubal had made a levy of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; yet adventured not with this ill-trained army to draw near unto the Romans before the coming of Syphax. Syphax brought with him unto Carthage fifty thousand foot and ten thousand horse; which joining unto the forces of Asdrubal, they marched bravely toward Scipio, who thereby took occasion to dislodge. He chose for his winter-camp the banks of an inlet, that had good harbour for his navy. His footmen he lodged on a promontory, joining to the continent by an arm of land; his horsemen he bestowed upon lower ground, on the other shore: in the bottom of the creek he moored his ships, and there he quartered the mariners, with all that belonged unto the fleet. The whole camp he strongly fortified; and so attended the season of the year, when it should serve him again to fight. Of cattle and other booty, Masinissa had brought in great store, by driving the country, before the coming of Asdrubal and Syphax. Corn also he had gotten some; and great store was sent him from Sicily and Sardinia. Likewise apparel for his soldiers was sent from home, or from Sardinia, though scarce enough to serve turn; for that it was a matter of more cost. The ships that brought these things he freighted homewards with such part of his booty as he could best spare; especially with captives, to be sold for slaves. Asdrubal and Syphax

[1] Lib. 5. cap. 2. §. 3.

encamped near unto Scipio; not so strongly fortifying themselves, as did the Romans; either for that they wanted the severe institution which the Romans used in discipline of war; or for that they presumed upon their multitude, against which they found in Scipio no disposition to issue forth of his strength, and fight: so the winter passed without action.

When spring drew near, Scipio thought it good to assay his old friend the Numidian king, if perhaps he might be won by persuasions to forsake the Carthaginians. It was considered, that those Barbarians were naturally unconstant; and, particularly, that Syphax had given proof before this of his much levity. It might therefore be hoped, that, having wearied himself, by lodging a whole winter in the camp, and being peradventure no less weary with satiety of his wife, who had caused him to enter into this war, he might be moved, with a little entreaty, to withdraw himself home into his kingdom, and rest a neuter. But it is not unlikely that such a friend as this king had been highly entertained and honoured in the city of Carthage, which was near at hand, as often as during this winter it had pleased him, or as he had been invited, to make a step thither, and repose himself a while; his wife queen Sophonisba lying also there at the same time, to cherish him in his resolution. Howsoever it were, Syphax did only make an overture of peace, propounding it as reasonable, that Hannibal should be recalled out of Italy by the Carthaginians; and that the Romans in like sort should quietly depart out of Afric; and so make an end of the war, wherewith now both Afric and Europe were disquieted. Unto this would not Scipio at the first give ear; yet being pressed earnestly by many messages from Syphax, and desiring to continue the intercourse of ambassadors, he began to make show, as if he would consider of the motion. He was given to understand, by those whom he had sent unto the king, that the enemies had their camps without any great defence of earth, full of wooden cabins, and covered with boughs; and that the Numidians, such of them as came first with Syphax,

used coverings of mats and reeds; others, that came later, had thatched their lodgings with dry boughs and leaves; under which they lay carelessly without their trenches. Upon this advertisement he bethought himself, that it would not be hard for him to set their camps on fire, and thereby give them a notable overthrow. Without help of some such stratagem, he foresaw that it would be a work of great difficulty for him to proceed in his wars when time should serve. It was a plain open country wherein he lay; and the enemies had great advantage of him in number, especially in horse; which, upon such ground, could not be resisted by the Roman legions. The longer therefore that he thought upon the matter, the more needful he found it for himself to make some sudden attempt upon their camp. To this end, he sent many ambassadors, under pretence of treating about the peace; but indeed of purpose to discover all that might concern the intended surprise. With these ambassadors he sent, as attendants, many old soldiers disguised like slaves; that, wandering (as it were) idly up and down the camp, might observe the ways and entrances, with whatsoever else was needful. When he had learned as much as he desired, upon the sudden he sent word to Syphax, that it was vain to hold any longer treaty, forasmuch as he could not get the consent of his council of war, without whose approbation all that himself could do was no more than the good-will of one man. This he did to the end that, without any breach of faith, he might put his design in execution. The truce being thus cut off, Asdrubal and Syphax were very pensive, as having lately persuaded themselves that their trouble was almost at an end. But since it could be no better, they began to devise by what art they might draw Scipio out of his camp, and provoke him to battle in those plains. This if they could do, they hoped to make his council of war repent as greatly the refusal of peace, as did M. Attilius after the like presumption. But if he should refuse to come forth of his trenches, what else remained than to besiege him? which they themselves were well able to do by land, and the Carthaginian fleet

should do by sea, that was making ready for the purpose. By such discourses these two comforted themselves, recompensing in conceit the loss of their hopes past with that of victory to come. But herein they were extremely and worthily disappointed, for that, consulting about the future, they provided not against present danger, but continued in the same negligence, which was grown upon them by the long discourse of peace. As for Scipio, he was not idle, but made preparation out of hand, as it were to do somewhat against Utica. Two thousand soldiers he had made ready, and appointed to take the same piece of ground whereon he lay against Utica before. This he did, partly to keep secret that which he had in hand, lest, being suspected by his own soldiers, the enemy might happen to have notice of it; partly to hinder those of Utica from setting upon the few that he purposed to leave behind him in his camp. He caused his men that night to sup well, and betimes, that they might be ready for the journey. After supper, he appointed such companies as he thought fit unto the defence of his camp; all the rest of his army he led forth about nine of the clock at night. The Carthaginians lay from him seven miles and an half, whom he purposed to undertake himself with the one half of his army; the other half he committed unto Lælius and Masinissa, whom he sent before him, to set upon the camp of Syphax, that was further off. It was his meaning, that the camp of Syphax should be on a light fire, ere he would meddle with the Carthaginians: for the fire, might seem to have taken hold by casualty upon the Numidians, that lay further off; whereas if it first appeared in the camp of Asdrubal, it would be suspected as the doing of enemies, and give Syphax warning to look unto himself. To this end therefore Scipio marched fair and softly, that Lælius and Masinissa, who had a longer journey, and were to fetch a compass about, for fear of being discovered, might have time to get before him, and do their feat. It was about two or three of the clock in the morning, when the camp of Syphax began to blaze; which not only the Numidians, but their king himself, imputed unto casualty,

as thinking themselves safe enough from enemies, for that the Carthaginians lay interposed between them and the danger. Wherefore, as if there were no more to do, some, starting half asleep, and others that had sitten up late at drinking, ran out of their cabins to quench the fire. But such was the tumult, that they neither could rightly understand in what case they were, nor give remedy to the mischance, as it was supposed. Many were smothered and burnt in the flame, which grew greater and greater; many, leaping into the trenches for fear of the sudden mischief, were trampled to death by the multitude that followed them. They that escaped the fire, fell upon the enemies' sword, which was ready to receive them. Especially Masinissa, that best knew the country, did great execution upon them, having laid all the ways by which he foresaw that they would seek to escape. The Carthaginians perceiving this fire, thought none other than that it was a pitiful mischance; so that some ran out to help the poor Numidians, carrying only what would serve to quench the fire. Others ran up to the rampart; where, fearless of any danger towards themselves, they stood beholding the greatness of the flame, and lamenting the misfortune. This fell out right as Scipio would have it. He therefore lost no time; but setting upon those that were running towards the Numidians, he killed some, and pursued the rest back into their camp; which in a little while he made to burn as bright as did that of Syphax. Asdrubal seeing this, and knowing that the Romans were there, did not stand to make resistance, but shifted only for himself, and escaped with a few of his horse about him. If Hannibal, or any of the Barchine faction, had been taken in such a manner, it is more than probable that old Hanno would have judged him worthy to be crucified. It would then have been said, that with less than one half of thirty thousand men, he might at least have given some bad recompense to them that were taking pains in kindling these fires, had he not been only careful how to save his own fearful head. Nevertheless, [m] Polybius

[m] Excerpt. e Pol. lib. 14.

acknowledgeth, and it is most likely to have been true, that if Asdrubal, or any of those about him, would have striven to shew valour when the camp was once on fire, he should not thereby have done any manner of good, because of the tumult and consternation. I shall not need to tell what a fearful thing it was to hear the cries of so many thousands that perished by fire and sword, or to behold the cruel flame that consumed them, which (as Polybius affirms) none *that hath being* is able to describe. It is enough to say, that of those many thousands very few did escape, which accompanied Asdrubal and Syphax in their several ways of flight. Besides these also there were some scatterers, especially of the Numidians, that saved themselves in the dark; but they were not many, as after shall appear. Surely it must needs have been very hard to tell how many were burnt or otherwise made away, and what numbers escaped in the dark of night. Wherefore Livy, who in the rest of this relation, as often elsewhere, doth follow Polybius, may seem to have followed some less worthy author, and him no good arithmetician, in casting up the sum. For he reckons only two thousand foot and five hundred horse to have escaped, forty thousand to have perished by sword or fire, and above six thousand to have been taken prisoners; the whole number of all which together is far short of fourscore and thirteen thousand, which were in these two camps.

Asdrubal putting himself into the next town, that was very strongly fortified, thought there to find the Romans work, until the Carthaginians at good leisure might repair their army. He had with him no more than two thousand foot and five hundred horse, which he thought sufficient to defend the town, if the townsmen would not be wanting to themselves. But he found the inhabitants of the place very earnest in contention, whether it were better to fight or to yield. Unto this disputation he well foresaw that the arrival of Scipio would soon give an end. Wherefore, lest they should lay hold upon him, and seek the victor's favour by delivering him up, he shrunk away betimes, and made all haste to Carthage. As for the town, which he left, it

opened the gates to Scipio, at his first coming, and thereby preserved itself from all manner of loss. The two next towns adjoining would needs be valiant, and make countenance of war; but their strength not being answerable, they were soon taken by Scipio, who abandoned them to the pleasure of his soldiers. This done, he returned to the siege of Utica.

The Carthaginians were sore troubled, as they had good reason, when, instead of either peace or victory, which they lately hoped for, they heard news of such a lamentable overthrow. Necessity enforced them to make hasty provision for the future; but how to do it few of them saw any means. Some gave advice to crave peace of Scipio; others, to send for Hannibal out of Italy; but the most, and they which finally prevailed, were of opinion, that notwithstanding the loss of this army, they might well defend themselves against the Romans, by raising new forces, especially if Syphax would not leave them. It was therefore concluded, that they should bend all their care this way, levying in all haste another army, and sending ambassadors to deal with Syphax, who lay then at a town called Abba, not passing eight miles from Carthage. Immediately the same, their unfortunate commander, Asdrubal the son of Gisco, was employed to make new levies of men; and queen Sophonisba went forth with ambassadors to her husband Syphax, who, having gathered together as many as he could of his subjects, that had escaped from the late slaughter, was thinking to return into his own kingdom. Sophonisba laboured so with her husband, that at length she won him to her own desire. And it fell out at the same time, that four thousand Spaniards, waged by the Carthaginians, were brought over to serve in Afric. Of these were made such brave reports, as if their courage, and the arms which they used, were not to be resisted. Even the multitude within Carthage believed these tales, and were more glad than they had cause to be, which is great wonder, since in one age the whole country of Spain had been twice conquered, first by the Carthaginians them-

selves, and after by the Romans. But with Syphax these tales prevailed much; which the Carthaginian ambassadors helped with a lie, saying, that there were come ten thousand of these terrible Spaniards. Upon this confidence the people of Carthage and their friends gathered such spirit, that in thirty days they made up an army consisting well near of thirty thousand men, reckoning the Spaniards and Syphax with his Numidians in the number. So they encamped in a region called the Great Fields, about five days journey from Utica. Scipio hearing of this, came from Utica thither, to visit them, leaving behind him his impediments, with some part of his army, to make a show of continuing the siege. Two or three days, after the meeting of both armies, passed away in skirmish, without any great thing done. It had now been time for Asdrubal to follow the example of the Roman Fabius, and seek to weary out the enemy by delays: but either (which is likely) he was a far worse commander, or else it was not in his power to give such directions as best pleased himself. The fourth day the armies met in battle, wherein the Romans were marshalled by Scipio after their wonted manner, having their Italian horse in the right wing, and Masinissa with his Numidians in the left. On the contrary side, Asdrubal and his Carthaginians had the right wing, Syphax the left, and the Spaniards the battle. The victory was gotten without many blows; for the untrained followers of Syphax and Asdrubal could not sustain the first charge of the Italians, or of Masinissa. Only the Spaniards fought a long time, even till they were all in a manner slain, rather as men desperate, and not hoping for mercy, since they were thus come over to fight against Scipio, who had otherwise deserved of them, than upon any likelihood or conceit of victory. This their obstinacy was beneficial unto those that fled, for that it hindered the Romans from making any great pursuit. Hereby Asdrubal and Syphax escaped; Asdrubal to Carthage, and Syphax home to his own kingdom; whither his wife was either gone before, or immediately followed him.

Scipio having thus gotten the mastery of the field, took

counsel about the prosecution of the war. It was resolved upon as the best course, that he himself, with part of the army, should attempt the cities round about him, and that Masinissa with his Numidians, and Lælius with some of the Roman legions, should follow after Syphax, not permitting him to take rest within his own kingdom, where easily else he might repair his forces, and put them to new trouble. This advice it seems that Masinissa gave, who knew best the quality of the Numidians, and what good might be done among them, by the reputation of a victory. The least that could be expected was his restitution into his own kingdom, usurped by Syphax; which to accomplish, it no less concerned the Romans at the present, than it did himself. According to this order concluded, Lælius was sent away with Masinissa, and Scipio stayed behind, carrying the war from town to town. Many places yielded for fear, many were taken by force; and all the subjects of Carthage wavered in their fidelity, as if the time were now come, wherein they might take notice of those unreasonable burdens, which their proud masters had laid upon them, for maintenance of the war in Spain and Italy. What to do in this case the Carthaginians could hardly resolve: fortune was their enemy; they had lost their armies, and many of their towns; neither durst they make bold to trouble their own subjects with any violent exaction of men or money, who nevertheless of their own freewill were likely to give little help. Very much it grieved them to send for Hannibal out of Italy; yet since there was no other hope remaining, than in him and his good army, it was decreed, that ambassadors should be forthwith sent to call him home. Some there were that gave advice to set out a fleet against that of Scipio, that rode before Utica, weakly manned, and easy to be taken, whilst Scipio himself was busied in the inland countries. Some were of opinion, that it should be their principal care to fortify by all means the city of Carthage, upon the safety whereof they said that all depended, adding, that whilst they were true, and at unity among themselves, they might well enough subsist, and expect

those opportunities with which fortune, doubtless, would present them. These counsels were not rejected; but order was forthwith taken, both for all things concerning defence of the city, and for the attempt upon the Roman fleet at Utica. Nevertheless it was considered, that hereby they should only protract the war, without any way advancing their own affairs towards likelihood of victory, no, though it should fall out, that all the ships at Utica might be taken or destroyed. Wherefore the determination held concerning Hannibal, that he should immediately come over into Afric, as the last refuge of Carthage. The council was no sooner broken up, than all the senators betook themselves to the execution of that which was decreed; some to fortification of the town, some to make ready the fleet, and some, appointed thereunto, forthwith to embark themselves for Italy. In this their trepidation, Scipio comes to Tunis, a city in those days very strong, and standing in prospect almost of every part of Carthage. This place, or rather some defensible piece adjoining, he easily took, the garrison forsaking it, and running away, as soon as he drew near. But whilst he was about there to encamp, and fortify himself against the city, he might perceive the Carthaginian fleet setting forth, and making towards Utica: what this meant he readily conceived, and stood in great fear lest his own ships, that were very ill prepared for sea-fight, (as being heavily laden with engines of battery, and wholly disposed in such order as was most convenient for assaulting the town,) should make bad resistance against a fleet appointed for that special service. Wherefore he hasted away towards Utica, to assist with his presence in this needful case. It fell out well that he had sent his carriages, and all the great booty which he drew along with him, thither before, at his going to Tunis. For, had not he now made great expedition, he should have come too late. Neither could he indeed have been there in due time, if the Carthaginians had used such diligence as was convenient: but they rested one night in harbour by the way, and at their coming to Utica they tarried a while, to make a bravado, presenting themselves in

order of battle, as if the Romans would have put forth to sea against them. But Scipio had no such intent; he thought it would be sufficient if he could preserve his galleys. As for the pleasure of their bravery at sea, it should little avail the Carthaginians, if they got nothing by it, and lost their whole estate by land. Wherefore he took his ships of burden, and fastening them together with cables, in four ranks, one behind another, made a fourfold bridge over the channel of the haven, whereon he placed a thousand of his choice men, with store of darts and other casting weapons, to make defence. Some open spaces he left, whereat his frigates and other small vessels might run out and back again upon any advantage or need; but these he covered with planks, using the masts and yards of his ships instead of rafters, to join all together, that his men might help one another, and the bridge itself not be torn asunder. Scarce was this work finished, when the Carthaginians, seeing none issue forth against them, came into the haven. The fight between them and the Romans, that were in the hulks, was rather like to the assaulting of a wall than to any sea-fight. For they that stood upon the bridge had sure footing, and threw their weapons downwards with their whole strength and violence, which the Carthaginians out of their galleys, that were lower and unsteady, could not do. But the Roman frigates and long boats, adventuring forth from behind the bridge, were greatly overborne by the force of the galleys, and were one occasion of that small loss which followed. They that stood upon the bridge were neither able to relieve them, nor yet could freely bestow their weapons among the Carthaginians as before, for fear of hurting these their friends, that were entangled and mixed among the enemies. The Carthaginians had brought with them grappling hooks, hanging at iron chains. These they threw upon the masts and yards, which served as arches to join the bridge together; then rowing backwards, they tore all asunder, in such sort that one ship followed another, and all the first rank was broken or defaced. The defendants had no other way than to save themselves, as

hastily as they could, by shifting into the next rank of ships, that lay behind them untouched. Neither did the Carthaginians trouble themselves any further in this laborious work, but having haled away six ships of burden, and towed them out of the haven, returned home to Carthage. Their welcome was greater than their victory, because, among so many grievous losses, only this exploit had succeeded well, though it were of small importance.

Whilst things thus passed about Carthage, Lælius and Masinissa, in their journey against Syphax, found as good success as could be desired. The fame of the victories already gotten restored Masinissa to his kingdom, without further contention; the Massæsylii, his subjects, joyfully receiving him, and forsaking the usurper. But here they stayed not, neither indeed would Syphax permit them to be quiet. He had such abundance of men and horses, that he felt not greatly the losses past, and therefore, being solicited by Asdrubal and Sophonisba, he prepared again for war. But, beside the instigation of his beloved wife, the loss of the Massæsylii would let him take no rest; neither was it the purpose of Lælius and Masinissa to give him any breathing time. It is common in men to depart no less unwillingly from that which they have gotten by extortion, than from their proper inheritance, but to think all alike their own, whereof they are in possession, be the title unto some part never so unjust. Hereunto alludes the fable of the young kite, which thought that she had vomited up her own guts, when it was only the garbage of some other fowl that she had hastily swallowed, and was not able to digest. But, whether or no, Syphax, like the young kite, believed the kingdom of the Massæsylii to be part of his entrails; Lælius and Masinissa will shortly give him somewhat that shall make him cast his gorge: for to this purpose chiefly are they come so far. It concerned the Romans to dispossess (if it might be) that king, whose false and hollow friendship towards them had been converted into strong enmity, as also to set in his place another, who might do them such good offices as Syphax had lately done unto the

Carthaginians. How easily this might be effected Masinissa knew best, as being well acquainted with the nature of those countries, wherein even to this day, though there be many strong towns, yet the fortune of a battle is enough to translate the kingdom from one competitor to another. So they met with Syphax, who came against them with no less an army than his former, and marshalled in the Roman order, according to the skill which he had learned of the Roman centurion, long ago sent unto him out of Spain from Cn. Scipio. But though he could teach his men how to march in order, yet could he not teach them to fight courageously. They were a rabble of all sorts, gathered up in haste, and few of them had seen the war before. Encamping near unto the Romans, it fell out as commonly, that some small troops of horse, on both sides, encountered one another in the midway, and they that had the worst were seconded by other of their fellows. By continuance of the skirmish, more and more were drawn out from either camp, so that at length Syphax, unwilling to dishearten his men by taking any foil at their first meeting with the enemy, came up with all his horse, which were the best part of his forces, and therewith overcharged Masinissa, whose numbers were far less. But whilst he was prosecuting his hope of victory, some Roman squadrons of foot came against him through their own troops of horse, which fell to the sides, and made a lane for them; so, their battle standing now more firm than a little before, Syphax was unable, though he laboured much in vain, to make them give ground. Masinissa likewise, and his troops, grew confident upon this assistance, and charging afresh the enemy, that could not make way forward, caused him to give back. Herewithal the legions came in sight, which so terrified the Numidian horse, that they began presently to disband. Fain would Syphax have stayed them from flight, and to that end made head in person against the Romans, with hope that his men would be ashamed to leave him. But it fell out unhappily, that he was cast from his horse, which received a wound, and so taken prisoner. Of others that were slain or taken, the

multitude was not great. It sufficed, that they forsook the place and fled, and that their king, upon whom all depended, was in the Roman's hand. Masinissa told Lælius, that this victory should make an end of the Numidian war, if presently they hasted away to Cirta, the chief city of the kingdom, whither he himself desired to be sent before with the horse, carrying Syphax along with him. Hereunto Lælius agreed. Masinissa coming to Cirta before any news of the king's mischance was there arrived, called out the chief of the city to parley, wherein by many fair promises and threats, but especially by shewing unto them Syphax bound, he prevailed so far, that the gates were forthwith opened unto him, and every one strove to get his favour that was like to be their king hereafter. Among the rest, queen Sophonisba yielded herself into his hands, and vehemently besought him that she might not be delivered up unto the Romans. Her youth and excellent beauty so commended her suit, that Masinissa forthwith granted it; and, to make good his promise, married her himself that very day, thereby to prevent Lælius and Scipio from determining otherwise of her, since she was his wife. But Lælius, when he came thither, took the matter heinously; so that at first he would have haled her away, together with Syphax and other prisoners, and have sent her unto Scipio. But, being over entreated by Masinissa, he suffered the matter to rest a while as he found it, and referred all to Scipio's discretion; to whom he sent away Syphax and other captives immediately, following shortly after himself with Masinissa, when they had done what was needful in the kingdom.

At the coming of Syphax there was great joy in the Roman camp; the mighty armies which he had lately brought into the field, and his entertainment of Scipio and Asdrubal, both at one time, when Rome and Carthage together sought his friendship, with such other commemoration of his past and present fortune, ministering to every one a large argument of discourse. Scipio demanded of him, what had moved him, not only to forsake the Roman friendship, but

to make war upon them unprovoked. He briefly answered, that his wife had moved him so to do, calling her a fury, and a pestilent creature; and saying, that Masinissa was no wiser than himself, since he had now taken the same woman to his wife, who would shortly draw him to the same courses. Hereat Scipio was greatly troubled, and stood in great doubt, lest this perilous woman should deprive him of Masinissa, as she had done of Syphax. It was not long ere Masinissa and Lælius came unto him, both of whom together he lovingly welcomed, and highly commended in public, for their notable service in this expedition. Then taking Masinissa apart, he brake with him as touching Sophonisba, letting him understand, that the Romans had title to her head, and that she was a mischievous enemy of theirs. Wherefore he entreated him to moderate his affections, and not to deface the memory of his great services already done, (for which he should be highly rewarded, to his own contentment,) by committing a great offence upon little reason. Masinissa blushed and wept, and finally promised to be governed by Scipio, whom he nevertheless entreated to think upon his faith given to Sophonisba, that she should not be delivered into the Romans' power. So he departed to his own tent, where, after some time spent in agony, he called unto him a servant of his, that had the custody of his poison, (which princes then used to have in readiness against all mischances that might make them unwilling to live,) and, tempering a potion for Sophonisba, sent it unto her with this message; That gladly he would have had her to live with him as his wife, but since they, who had power to hinder him of his desire, would not yield thereto, he sent her a cup that should preserve her from falling alive into the hands of the Romans; willing her to remember her birth and estate, and accordingly to take order for herself.

At the receipt of this message and present, she only said, That if her husband had no better token to send unto his new wife, she must accept of this; adding, that she might have died more honourably, if she had not wedded so lately

before her funeral. And herewithal she boldly drank off the poison. Thus Livy reports it. But Appian varies from this, and sets it down agreeably to that which hath been spoken before, concerning the precontract between Masinissa and Sophonisba. He saith, that, after the taking of Syphax, ambassadors from Cirta met with Lælius and Masinissa upon their way thither, yielding up their city and the king's palace; and that Sophonisba, for her own private, sent messengers to excuse her marriage with Syphax, as made against her will, by compulsion of those in whose power she was. Masinissa readily admitted this excuse, and accepted her to wife. But when Scipio had received information from Syphax, how cunning in persuasion Sophonisba was, and that all her thoughts laboured for the good of Carthage, he fell out about her with Masinissa at his return, and challenged her as a part of the booty belonging to the Romans. Masinissa said, she was his own wife, and unto him betrothed many years before. But Scipio would not hear of this; or if it were true, yet he said it was no reason that Masinissa should keep her in possession, as long as it was disputable unto whom she might appertain. Wherefore he willed him first of all to produce her, and then afterwards to make his claim unto her, wherein he should have no wrong. Herewithal he sent to fetch her away, and Masinissa accompanied the messengers, as it were to deliver her; but, making her acquainted with the necessity, gave unto her a cup of poison, wherewith she ended her life, before they came that should have apprehended her. So he shewed unto the Romans her dead body, which he royally interred. The sudden violence of Masinissa's love, and the ready consent of Sophonisba to marry with him, add not so much credit unto this relation of Appian, as doth the want of all other evident cause (which [n] Livy notes) of the sudden falling out between him and the Carthaginians, under whom he had been trained up, and done them great service. Howsoever it were, Scipio, hearing of this tragical accident, sent for Masinissa, and com-

[n] Liv. l. 28.

forted him as well as he could, lest his melancholy should lead him to some inconvenience. Having therefore gently rebuked him for his rashness, he brought him forth in presence of the army, where, extolling his noble acts, and shewing how highly he had deserved of the city of Rome, he proclaimed him king, and gave unto him a crown of gold, with other royal ornaments. This was indeed the ready way to divert his thoughts from the sad remembrance of that which was past, unto the more cheerful contemplation of good fortune, that began to smile upon him.

This was the first time that the Romans took upon them to create or proclaim a king. Which honour, though Masinissa well deserved, yet would not the title have redounded unto his great benefit, neither should he have been much beholding to them for it, if he had not by their means recovered possession of his country, together with the greatest part of Syphax's dominions. It seems not unlikely, that had he remained a neuter in these wars, and sustained himself with his troop of horse, in such sort as he did before the coming of the Romans, he might nevertheless have recovered his proper inheritance, by the love of his own subjects, without other help, when Syphax had once or twice been vanquished. As for the enlargement of his kingdom, it was not more than he deserved; neither were the Romans then in case to make a conquest of Numidia for themselves; neither could they have wished a fitter opportunity, than of such a man upon whom to bestow it, that was their assured friend, and passable withal among the Numidians, as being (for the Massæsylii were a Numidian tribe) a great prince of the same nation. Yet this liberality of the Romans was noised abroad as very glorious, and the Romans themselves, in a politic sort of gravity, took highly upon them, as if even their saluting him by the name of king had been a matter of great consequence. He thrived indeed well after it, and by their maintenance waxed mighty in times following, encroaching upon his neighbours on all sides, but most of all upon the state of Carthage, whereat they were little displeased. Hence it grew that Vermina

the son of Syphax, (of whom we shall shortly speak more,) which held some piece of his father's kingdom, desiring friendship of the Romans, and promising by all means to deserve their love, requested therewithal that they would call him king. But though it were so, that never any before him had made this a matter of suit, yet the Roman senate was *punctilious* herein, and answered very gravely, [o] that it was not their custom to give the honour of that appellation, save only unto such kings as had greatly deserved of their city. Thus they made it a matter of state, and in process of time grew so proud of this their imaginary prerogative, that they imputed as a singular benefit unto kings, that no way depended upon them, the salutation by [p] that name, though it were not accompanied with any other favour or profit thence redounding.

SECT. XIX.

The Carthaginians desire truce, and break it.

THE Carthaginians were extremely dismayed, when they heard of the great calamity that was befallen their good friend Syphax, and understood that Masinissa, their mortal enemy, had got possession of his kingdom. To increase their fear, Scipio returned again to Tunis, in view of their city; where he made an end of that fortification which he had begun at his last being there. The Carthaginians had neither forces nor courage to withstand him, but their hearts so failed them, that they sent forth unto him thirty ambassadors, princes of the city, which were their privy counsel, to make suit for peace. These, being admitted into the presence of Scipio, did not only prostrate themselves on the ground, but kissed the [q] feet of him, and of those that sat in council with him.

Answerable to this base adoration was their speech that followed. They confessed themselves to have unjustly broken the peace between them and Rome, and to have deserved whatsoever punishment it should please the Ro-

[o] Liv. l. 31. [p] Cæsar's Com. l. 1. [q] Excerpt. e Polyb. l. 15. Liv. l. 30.

mans to inflict upon them. Yet they humbly besought Scipio and the rest, that, in common regard of those misfortunes, whereto all men are subject, they would shew mercy unto the city of Carthage, and let it remain as a monument of their clemency, which, by the folly of her citizens, had now twice deserved to be overthrown. Herewithal they did not forget to lay the blame upon Hannibal, who without their appointment had begun the war, and was maintained in his doings by a faction, without the good liking of the whole city. By this it appears, that these ambassadors were no Barchines, but rather, that they were Hanno, and the choice of his company, who had now their long desired work in hand, of suing unto the Romans for peace. Whatsoever they were, it must needs be that they were most insolent men over those that were subject unto their power; for they would not have made such adoration unto the Romans, in their own necessity, unless they themselves had expected the like, where they had the advantage.

It was not unknown to Scipio, or to his assistants, in what poor case the city of Rome then was, and how unable to defray the charges of continuing the war. Neither were the Carthaginians, notwithstanding the loss of so many armies, in such ill case as the Romans themselves had very lately been: for they had money enough wherewith to wage more men, they had a city far stronger than Rome, and they had the sea free. But they wanted the Roman resolution, and therefore distrusted the walls of Carthage; though Utica, a weaker city, had all this while held out against Scipio, and could not yet be forced by him and his army, though so often victorious in the field. Scipio therefore accepted their submission, and told them, that though he came into Afric to make a conquest, and not a peace, yet having the conquest as it were in his hand, he would not deny to grant them the peace which they desired; for thereby should all nations understand, that the people of Rome did follow the rule of justice, both in making war and in concluding it. The conditions which he imposed upon

them were these: That they should render up unto him all prisoners that they had taken, together with all renegadoes and fugitive slaves; that they should withdraw their armies out of Italy and Gaul; that they should not meddle in Spain, nor yet in any island between Italy and Afric; that they should deliver up all their ships of war, save twenty; and that they should pay a great sum of money, with certain hundred thousand bushels of wheat and barley. To consider of these articles, he gave them three days; and, when they had approved them, he granted a truce, that they might send ambassadors unto the Roman senate.

This done, Masinissa was dismissed, and went home into his kingdom, as if the war had been already at an end. Syphax was a little before sent with Lælius unto Rome, where the fame of these victories filled men with joy, and gave hope, that the long endured miseries would be shortly at an end. Wherefore all the temples were set open, and an holyday appointed for thanksgiving and supplication to their gods. Lælius was accompanied with ambassadors from king Masinissa, who, gratulating the happy success of the Romans in their African war, and giving thanks unto the senate for the benefits done by Scipio unto their master, made request for the Numidians, such as were now his subjects and prisoners in Rome, that they might be bestowed upon him, who, by rendering them to liberty, should do an act very plausible, that would make him gracious among his people in the beginning of his reign. The Roman senate were not behind with Masinissa in compliment; but shewing themselves to be highly pleased with all that Scipio had done and should do for him, they called him king again, released his Numidians that were captives, and sent him two purple cassocks, that had each of them one gold button; with such other presents, as in time of their poverty might serve to testify their good-will. Scarcely were these and Lælius gone from Rome, when the news came, that ambassadors from Carthage were arrived to desire peace. These ambassadors were not admitted into the city, but were lodged without; until Lælius, being sent for,

came back from Ostia, to be present when their demands were to be heard. Then was audience given them in the temple of Bellona, that stood in the suburbs. The errand of these ambassadors was peace; but the meaning of them and of their city was only to win time, and get respite from war, until Hannibal and Mago should come out of Italy, either to chase the Romans out of Afric, or to obtain peace for Carthage, by terror of their great names and armies, upon more easy conditions. Wherefore they made an idle discourse of the league that was concluded between them and Luctatius Catulus at the end of the former war: this league, they said, all things well considered, did still remain in force; neither had there since been any war at all between the people of Rome and the Carthaginians. For it was only Hannibal, that, without any leave from Carthage, had of his own head besieged and razed the town of Saguntum; and after that adventured in like sort, without commission, to pass the Alps, and trouble (as he had done) the quiet of Italy. This being so; their message was none other, than to desire that the league before spoken of, made in the time of Catulus, might hereafter stand in force, as indeed it hitherto did, and ought to do. The senators had cause to wonder at this tale, hearing these ambassadors make (as it were) a jest of a war that had been so terrible. Wherefore they asked them a great many questions concerning that peace made by Luctatius, and other passages following between the two cities. But they excused themselves by their age, (for they were all young men,) and said, that those things were beyond their knowledge and remembrance. Forthwith it appeared that all was but collusion, and that they sought no other than to gain time, until they might repair the war. Wherefore they were sent home in company of Lælius, without any conclusion at all of peace, and, in effect, without answer. This notwithstanding, we find in [r] Polybius, that the senate, receiving advertisement from Scipio of that which had passed between him and the Carthaginians in this treaty of peace, approved the condi-

[r] Excerpt. e Polyb. l. 15.

tions by him propounded, and gave him license thereupon to proceed unto conclusion. This may with good reason be believed; since it was not unknown, that if the war continued, all these goodly hopes must rest upon the most uncertain issue of one battle between Hannibal and Scipio; wherein if fortune should be averse to them, their forces in Afric were no better than quite lost.

Matters thus hanging in suspense, before the Carthaginian ambassadors came back from Rome, a fleet out of Sicily, wherein were two hundred ships of burden and thirty galleys, being bound for Afric, to victual the Roman camp, was overtaken by foul weather at sea; and hardly escaping wreck, was dispersed, and driven aground in divers parts of the bay of Carthage, even in view and under command of the city. There was at that time, as we find in Appian[s], and may gather out of Polybius, a great dearth of victuals in Carthage; which caused the people to cry out upon their magistrates, that they should not let such a booty escape them; saying, that the danger of famine was greater and worse than of breaking truce. Whether it were so that hunger urged them, or that they yielded to their own greedy desires, the multitude in Carthage understood (as it seems) that all this discourse of peace in hand was no better than mere mockery; and therefore cared not for observation of particular points, when they meant deceit in the whole. [t] It was the manner in Carthage, as likewise in Alexandria, for all the rascality, together with women and boys, to be meddling in uproars; the clamours of the boys being in such tumults no less violent than of the men. Wherefore it is no marvel, if little regard were had of reason or of honour in any such commotion. A fleet was sent out under Asdrubal, to gather up the dispersed Roman ships of burden, (for the galleys, by force of oars, recovered the station whereto their camp adjoined,) and bring them into Carthage; which was done. Scipio was hereat much offended; not only for the loss, and for that the town was thereby relieved; but for that, by this breach of truce, he

[s] Appian. de Bello Punico. [t] Excerpt. e Polyb. l. 15.

foresaw the intention of the Carthaginians to renew the war, and put him to more trouble. Wherefore he sent ambassadors unto them; both to require satisfaction for the injury done, and to deter them from entertaining any other hope than in the peace which they had so much desired. These gave the Carthaginians to understand, that letters were come from Rome unto Scipio, with allowance to conclude the peace, upon those conditions which he had propounded. But, said they, "we hold it strange, that ye, who so "lately have cast yourselves to the ground before us, and "kissed our feet, after an unusual manner of humility, "confessing yourselves to have perfidiously broken the "league that was between us, and thereby to have de- "served such punishment as is due unto rebels, should so "soon forget what ye then uttered, and run headlong again "into the same crimes, for which ye acknowledged your- "selves worthy to be destroyed, having only recourse unto "our mercy. We are not ignorant, that it is the confidence "which ye repose in Hannibal that thus emboldens you. "Yet were it not amiss that ye should consider how long "he hath been pent up in a corner of Italy among the Bru- "tians, where he is in a manner besieged, and unable to "stir; so that ye are like to find his help wanting in "your greatest need. Or let it be supposed, that he were "now in Afric, and ready to give us battle; yet should it "well agree with your wisdom, to doubt what might befall, "remembering that he is a man, and not invincible. Now "if it should happen that he were overcome, what refuge "have ye left unto yourselves against hereafter? What "gods will ye either swear by, to be believed, or call upon "in your misery? What words and lamentable gesture "will ye henceforth use, to move compassion? Surely ye "have already wasted all your forces of persuasion, and "shall not again deceive us, if ye refuse the grace whereof "at the present ye are capable." It is no marvel though the Carthaginians were angry, when they heard themselves upbraided with the base demeanour of their ambassadors. For it was not the general opinion of the city, that the

truce was broken by themselves, though it had pleased Hanno, or such as were of his faction, to gratify the Romans with all manner of submission; and to renounce, not only their hope of the future, but all justification of matters past. And indeed it seems, that the Roman ambassadors were very much delighted in the rehearsal of that point which was yielded unto them; as knowing that thereon depended the justice of the quarrel. But the Carthaginians took this in so ill part, that hardly they could refrain from doing violence unto the men who had used unto them such insolent speeches. Yet the fury of the multitude was in some sort appeased, either by Hanno, whom Appian (I know not why) calls Hanno the Great, or by the very reverence due unto the place of those that had uttered such liberal words. So they were dismissed in friendly sort, though it were without answer to their proposition. There were also two galleys appointed for their safe convoy home, though with little intent of good unto their persons. Asdrubal was then in the midway, as men sailed from Carthage towards Utica. He, whether only desirous to please the multitude, of whose disposition he was informed, or whether directed by public order to cut off these ambassadors in their way homeward, lay waiting for them behind a cape, that was a little beyond the mouth of the river Bagradas. Their convoy having brought them on the way, as far as to the mouth of Bagradas, wished them a good voyage; and so took leave of them, as if they had been then in safety, since the Roman camp was even in sight. The ambassadors took this in ill part; not as fearing any danger toward, but thinking themselves too much neglected, forasmuch as their attendants did so abruptly leave them. But no sooner had they doubled the cape, than Asdrubal fell upon them in such manner, as they might well discern his purpose, which was, to have stemmed them. They rowed hard therefore; and being in a *quinquereme*, that had more banks of oars than had any galley of Asdrubal, they slipt away, and made him overshoot himself. Yet he gave them chase; and had well near surprised them:

but they discovered some Roman companies on the shore over against them, and therefore adventured to run their vessel aground, whereby they saved their own lives; though a great part of their company were slain or hurt. This practice of the Carthaginians was inexcusable; and for the same cause perhaps were the citizens heartened in such a dishonourable attempt by those that were desirous to continue the war, that thereby they might be driven to study nothing else than how to get the victory, as having none other hope remaining. Yet likely it is, that the same fear, which had caused them to make such earnest suit for peace, would also have caused them to be better advised, than thus to abandon all hope of treaty, had they not been given to understand, that Hannibal was already landed in Afric, in whom they reposed no small confidence; but verily persuaded themselves, that he would change their fortune, and teach the Romans to hold themselves contented with more easy conditions than were those that Scipio, in the pride of his fortune, had of late propounded.

SECT. XX.

In what sort Hannibal spent the time after the battle of Metaurus. The doings of Mago in Italy. Hannibal and Mago called out of Italy. How the Romans were diversely affected by Hannibal's departure.

EVER since the loss of that battle at Metaurus, Hannibal remained in the country of the Brutians, waiting for another supply from Carthage. The Roman consuls that succeeded unto Claudius and Livius, by whom Asdrubal was overcome and slain, were contented to be quiet all their year. Neither did Licinius, the colleague of Scipio, ought worthy of remembrance against Hannibal, being hindered by the pestilence that was in his army. Sempronius, the consul, who followed Licinius, and Cn. Servilius Cæpio, who followed Sempronius, were earnestly bent to have done somewhat; but their diligence was in a manner fruitless. In some skirmishes with Hannibal, they had the better; in some the worse; and a few poor towns they got from him,

as it were, by stealth; his care being more to preserve his army, than to keep those places that were weak.

The Romans had at this time so many great pieces of work in hand, that their chief enemy was become not the chief part of their care. Their thoughts were mainly bent upon Afric, wherein they were at no small charges to maintain the army, which (as was hoped) should bring the war to a short and happy conclusion. They stood nevertheless in much fear of Mago, the brother of Hannibal, who took exceeding pains among the Ligurians and Gauls to raise an army, wherewith to kindle anew the war in Italy, that began to wax cold. Mago solicited also the Hetrurians; and found them so ready to stir in his behalf, that if he could have entered their country strong, it might have proved no less needful for Scipio to return home out of Afric, than shortly it was for Hannibal to make speed unto the defence of Carthage. These dangers caused the Romans to employ one of their consuls, or proconsuls, with an army, among the Hetrurians, another among the Gauls, and a third among the Ligurians; forasmuch as it was uncertain upon which side Mago would break out. Being thus busied, it is no wonder though they forbore to overcharge Hannibal with any great power.

As for Mago, when things were in some readiness for his setting forwards, he met in the country of the Insubrians, which is about Milan, with M. Cornelius the Roman proconsul, and P. Quintilius Varus, one of the pretors. With these he fought a battle, wherein though his virtue shewed itself worthy of his father and brethren, yet his fortune was Carthaginian. The fight continued a long while doubtful, in such sort that the Roman commanders began to distrust the issue. Wherefore Quintilius the pretor, taking unto him all the Roman horse, thought to have shaken the enemies to pieces. The legions at the same time gave a loud shout, and strained themselves hard, as if at that brunt the victory should have been carried before them. But Mago opposed his elephants to the horse; the service of those beasts being fitter for such use than against the squadrons

of foot. The figure, scent, and braying of these elephants, did so affright the horse, that they started aside, and were scattered over the field, their riders being unable to manage them. Hereby the Numidians got advantage upon them; whose manner of fight was more available against those that were loose, than against the troops that were close and thick. Then fell the elephants upon the legions, which entertained them after the accustomed manner, with a shower of darts, and killed four of them, causing all the rest to give back. This notwithstanding, the same legions were so vehemently pressed by the enemy, that more for shame of running away, than by any great force to make resistance, they held their ground. The proconsul therefore brought up those forces, which he had kept unto the last, to succour where need should most require. Against these Mago employed some of his Gauls, whom he had in readiness for the like occasion. But these Gauls discharged their parts very ill. They were soon beaten off, and recoiled so hastily, that they brought fear upon all the rest. When Mago saw that his men began to shrink, he put himself in the head of his army, and held them so well to it, that, keeping their order, they made a fair retreat, with their faces toward the enemy. But at length he received a grievous wound in his thigh, whereof shortly after he died. He was taken up, and carried out of danger by some of his own men; the rest of them, after little further resistance, provided every one for himself: so the Romans obtained victory, not without great cost, as purchasing the death of about five thousand enemies, with the loss of two thousand and three hundred of the pretor's army, besides those that died of the proconsul's legions; also besides divers colonels, captains, and gentlemen of mark, that fell in this hot piece of service. Neither were there any prisoners taken; whereby it may seem that the enemies did not fall to rout before they had recovered some ground that might assure them from pursuit. However it were, this victory would have much imported for the assurance of Italy, if the state of Carthage could longer have permitted these valiant sons of Amilcar to abide

therein. But Mago withdrawing himself (by easy journeys, because of his wound) into Liguria, found there ambassadors from Carthage attending him, who gave him to understand the pleasure of their city; which was, that both he and Hannibal should presently repair home with all their forces, not staying any longer to think upon the conquest of Italy, since Carthage itself was ready to be lost. He obeyed this commandment, and embarked shortly his army, but died of his wound about Sardinia in the way homewards.

About the same time Hannibal received the like command from Carthage to return into Afric. He heard it with great impatience, gnashing his teeth, and groaning, and hardly keeping in the tears that were ready to burst out, whilst the ambassadors were delivering their errand. When their message was done, he told them, that "this "was yet plain dealing: for," said he, "they that now di- "rectly bid me come home, have long ago done their best "to hale me out of Italy, though more closely and crook- "edly they went to work, by stopping the supply that "should have enabled me to manage the war here. Scipio "therefore shall not need to brag that he hath drawn me "home by the heels; it is Hanno, that hath wrought this "noble feat, and overwhelmed the house of the Barchines, "for lack of other means to do it, with the ruin of Car- "thage." He had before prepared a fleet in readiness, doubting that which after came to pass; wherein he embarked, besides his own men, as many of the Italians as were content to be partakers of his fortune. Many there were that shrunk back from him, and refused to do service in this expedition; of whom such as he could take, he slew; not sparing those that fled into the temple of Juno Lacinia, which had been held an inviolable sanctuary unto that day. He was indeed then wholly transported with rage; and departed out of Italy no less passionate than men are wont to be when they leave their own countries to go into exile. He looked back unto the shore, accusing both gods and men, and cursing his own dulness, in that he had not led his

army from Cannæ, hot and bloodied as it was, directly unto the walls of Rome. With such vexation of spirit he quitted the possession of Italy, wherein he had lived almost half his time.

If it could have been foretold unto the Romans, in the first beginning of this war, with what exceeding joy in times following they should entertain the news of Hannibal's departure out of Italy, they would (I think) less earnestly have pressed the Carthaginians to send him over thither. When sure advertisement was brought unto the city, that Hannibal was gone with all his army, an holyday was appointed for thanksgiving unto their gods, and extraordinary great sacrifices publicly made, for joy of such happy tidings. Yet old Q. Fabius was of opinion that the danger did still remain the same, though the place were changed; for that Hannibal, at his coming into Afric, would find P. Scipio other manner of work than he had been troubled with at any time before, and would do greater matters in his own country, than ever he was able to perform abroad in a land of strangers. The remove of the war from their own doors, and the conceit of that victory for which they hoped, was enough to make them presume further than at other times they would have done. When therefore the Saguntine ambassadors brought unto them a great mass of gold and silver, together with some agents of the Carthaginians taken by them in Spain, only the Carthaginian prisoners were accepted, the treasure was rendered back unto the Saguntines that had surprised it. Upon like confidence of the future, a little before this, order was taken for the repayment of those monies that had been borrowed in time of more necessity from private men. Hence also proceeded the severe chastisement laid upon those twelve colonies, that for want either of means or of good-will had refused to give aid to the Romans. They were commanded and enforced to give double the number of foot to that which they had been wont to set out for the wars, with a proportion of horse answerable to the very most of their ability. So confident were the Romans grown (though their wealth were

not as yet suitable to the greatness of their spirit) upon the good success of the battle at Metaurus, and the hopes which they reposed in Scipio. All this notwithstanding, when they considered more nearly of that which might happen, and were informed that the terrible army, whereof Italy had been few days since discharged, was landed safe in Afric, they began to revolve a thousand fearful matters in their heads, and to stand in doubt, lest Q. Fabius (who died about the same time) would be found a true prophet. For bethinking themselves of that which might comfort them in their hopes, they found in the victories against Syphax and Asdrubal no specialty of such great worth, as might promise the like success against another manner of general, followed by other manner of men, than were either of those two. The Numidian king had been wont to bring into the field a rascal multitude of half-scullions, that were good for nothing, being himself a fit captain for such soldiers. Likewise Asdrubal the son of Gisco was a commander well thought of by the Carthaginian senate; but otherwise one that in the field was only good at saving himself by a swift retreat. But now there came an army of men hardened from their childhood with incredible patience, fleshed many hundred times in Roman blood, and wearing the spoils, not only of good soldiers, but of brave captains, by them slain. Such talk used the people of Rome, saying, that Scipio was like to meet in battle with many that had slain Roman pretors, yea and consuls, with their own hands; with many that had been first in getting over the trenches of several Roman camps, or in winning the tops of walls at the siege of towns; briefly, that he should now be opposed by an army as good as had ever served in war, and following the dreadful name of Hannibal.

SECT. XXI.

Hannibal in Afric prepares to fight with Scipio; treats with him about peace in vain; loseth a battle at Nargara, and persuades the Carthaginians to sue for peace. Of the peace granted from Rome to Carthage.

HANNIBAL disembarked his army at Leptis, almost an hundred miles from Carthage, eastward from the headland of Mercury, and somewhat more than one degree to the south. He was ill provided of horse, which it was not easy for him to transport out of Italy. Therefore it behoved him to land, as he did, somewhat far from the enemy, that he might furnish himself with this and the like needful helps against the day of battle. From Leptis he passed on to Adrumetum, and so along through the inland country, gathering friends unto him by the way. Tychæus, a Numidian prince, and familiar friend of Syphax, was said to have in those days the best horses of service that were to be found in Afric. Him therefore did Hannibal allure unto his party, making him understand, that if the Romans got the victory, it should be easy for Masinissa, by their countenance and help, to oppress both him and as many other of the neighbour princes as hindered his prospect. This argument, and the fame of him that used it, prevailed with Tychæus, who shortly after brought unto the Carthaginian two thousand horse. Appian further adds, that Mezetullus (the same who had made himself protector over Masinissa's cousins, and was head of a family, and adverse to the Numidian kings of that race) brought unto Hannibal another thousand horse; as likewise that Vermina, the son of Syphax, holding a great part of his father's kingdom, began at the same time to assail the places that yielded obedience to Masinissa. This Vermina, as we find in Livy, came with more than sixteen thousand men (for he lost more than so many) to succour Hannibal when it was too late.

The Carthaginians were at this time in such hard estate, or (at least) so impatient of the state wherein they were, that they could not attend the leisure of those preparations which would have made the victory assured. When they

considered the worth of Hannibal, and the greatness of his acts, it offended them to think that they had been so base as to make humble suit unto the Romans for peace, whilst they had such a brave champion alive, to maintain their cause by war. But when they bethought themselves of their own sufferings, which, for want of Roman magnanimity to endure them, appeared greater than indeed they were, then cried they out earnestly, that it was no time to linger, but presently to fight, that so they might see an end of these troubles, either good or bad. And to this purpose they sent their mandates to Hannibal, requiring him, without any further protraction, to do what he could do out of hand. Hannibal made answer, that they were his good lords, and had power to dispose of him and his army; but since he was general of their forces, he thought it reasonable that they should suffer him to do as a general ought to do, and to choose his own times. Nevertheless, to give them satisfaction, he made great marches to Zama, and there encamped.

The breach of truce made by the Carthaginians, the violence done to his ambassadors, and the news of Hannibal's being landed in Afric, made Scipio to understand the resolution of the Carthaginians; which was, not to yield unto any conditions unprofitable for themselves, as long as they were able to make resistance. Wherefore he sent unto Masinissa, and informed him of all that was fallen out, praying him to come away with speed, and lay all other business apart. Ten Roman companies, of horse and foot together, Masinissa had with him, that were lent unto him by Scipio, to do him service in the establishing and enlarging of his kingdom. But he well understood, that those and many more, besides all his own forces, would little avail him, if Hannibal should drive the Romans out of Afric: wherefore, taking such order as he could upon the sudden for the safety of his own kingdom, with four thousand horse and six thousand foot, he made all haste unto Scipio.

Soon after the beginning of these new troubles, the Carthaginian ambassadors that had been at Rome returned

back under the conduct of Lælius and Fulvius, who brought them safe into the Roman camp. There when they arrived, and understood what had lately passed, especially how their citizens had behaved themselves towards the Roman ambassadors, they made little doubt how their own heads should answer for such notorious outrage. To confirm them in this opinion, M. Bæbius, one of the late ambassadors that had been in Carthage, being left by Scipio to take charge of the camp, laid hands upon them, and detained them, sending word unto his general, who was gone abroad to make war in the country, that he had them in his power, and that now the Carthaginians might be repaid in their own coin for the injury by them lately done. Scipio was very glad to hear of this, and commanded Bæbius to use them with all possible courtesy, and send them safe home. By thus doing, he brake the hearts of his enemies, and caused them to acknowledge themselves (which was a great victory) far less honourable than the Romans. This notwithstanding, he made more cruel war upon them than before, taking their towns by force, and putting them to sack, without hearkening to any composition. It was the manner of the Romans, as often as they took a town by assault, to put all that came in their way to the sword, whatsoever they were, without regard. This they did to make themselves terrible, and the better to work such impression in the minds of those with whom they had to do, they used oftentimes to kill the very dogs and other beasts that ran athwart them in the streets, hewing their bodies asunder, as men delighted in shedding of blood [u]. This being their practice at other times, it is likely that now they omitted no piece of cruelty, when they meant to give proof of their vehement indignation and revengeful minds for the injuries received. Hence it partly grew, that the Carthaginians were so earnest in pressing Hannibal to fight.

Hannibal, being encamped at Zama, sent forth his scouts and spies to discover where the Romans lay, what they were doing, and as much as might be of their demeanour. Some of

[u] Excerpt. e Polyb. l. 10.

these were taken, and brought unto Scipio; who, instead of trussing them up, gave them free leave to view his camp at pleasure, appointing one to conduct them up and down, and shew them whatsoever they desired. This done, he gave them liberty to depart, and sent them away safe unto their general. Hannibal understanding this, admired the bravery and courage of his enemy, with whom on the sudden he grew desirous to have an interview and personal conference, and signified so much unto him by a messenger sent of purpose. Of this motion the Roman liked well; and returned answer, that he would meet him shortly in place convenient. The next day Masinissa came with his army, whom Scipio taking with him removed unto a town called Nargara, near unto which he sat down, in a place otherwise commodious, and close by a water that might opportunely serve his camp. Thence he sent word unto the Carthaginian, that the time and place did fitly serve, if he had ought to say to him. Hannibal thereupon removed from Zama, and came within four miles of the enemy, where he encamped well to his own good liking in all things else, excepting that his men were driven to take much pains in fetching their water somewhat far off. Then was order taken for their meeting; and the two generals, each of them with a troop of horse, rode forth of their camps, till they came unto a piece of ground, which was before well searched, for fear of ambush. There they will their followers to stand off; and themselves, with each of them one interpreter, encountered each other in the midway between their companies. They remained a while silent, viewing one the other with mutual admiration. Then began the Carthaginian, saluting the Roman, to deliver his mind to this effect: That it had been better both for Carthage and for Rome, if they could have limited and contained their ambition within the shores of Afric and of Italy; for that the countries of Sicily and of Spain, about which their fathers and themselves had striven, were no sufficient recompense for so many fleets as had been lost, and of so much blood as had been shed in making those costly purchases. But since things past could

not be recalled, he said, that it was meet for them to consider unto what extreme dangers their own cities had been exposed by the greedy desire of extending their empires abroad, and that it was even time for them now at length to make an end of their obstinate contention, and pray the gods to endue them with greater wisdom hereafter. And to such peaceable disposition he affirmed that his own years and long trial of fortune, both good and evil, had made him inclinable. But much he feared, that Scipio, by want of the like experience, might rather fix his mind upon uncertain hopes, than upon the contemplation of that mutability, whereto all human affairs are subject. "Yet," said he, "mine own example may peradventure suffice to teach thee "moderation: for I am that same Hannibal, who, after my "victory at Cannæ, won the greatest part of Italy, and de-"vised with myself what I should do with your city of Rome, "which I hoped verily to have taken. Once I brought mine "army to your walls, as thou hast since brought thine to "ours of Carthage; but now, see the change! I stand here "entreating thee to grant us peace. This may serve as a "document of fortune's instability. I fought with thy fa-"ther Scipio; he was the first of the Roman generals that "ever met me in the field. I did then little think that the "time would come, that I should have such business, as "now at the present, with his son. But this is even one of "fortune's pageants, whereof she hath many. And thou "mayest have experience of the like in thyself, who knows "how soon? Think upon M. Attilius: if he would have heark-"ened unto such persuasions, as I now use to thee, he "might have returned home to Rome an happy man. And "so mayest thou do now, if any reasonable offer will give "thee satisfaction. How sayest thou? Canst thou be con-"tented, that all Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and whatsoever "islands else are situate between Italy and Afric, be aban-"doned by the Carthaginians for ever, and left unto the "Romans to bear dominion therein? Thou shalt have glory "enough by effecting thus much; and the Romans may "well be glad of such a bargain. As for us, our own quiet

" shall henceforth give us contentment. And the same " contentment of ours shall make us faithfully observe the " peace with you. But if thou thinkest all too little, I must " desire thee to ponder well how great an hazard thou " must undergo for the obtaining of a very little more than " that which thou mayest have without contention. It is " now in thine own power to lay hold upon good fortune, " if it please thee; stay but till to-morrow night, and thou " must take such fortune as it shall please the gods. The " issue of battle is uncertain, and many times beguileth ex- " pectation. Men and steel we shall each of us bring into " the field; but of the victory neither of us hath assurance. " Let us therefore without more ado make peace. And do " not tell me, that some false-hearted citizens of ours dealt " fraudulently of late in the like treaty; it is I, Hannibal, " that now desire peace with thee, which I would never do, " if I thought it not expedient for my country. And think- " ing it expedient, I will always maintain it, like as I " have maintained unto my power, as long as the gods did " not envy me, the war by me begun." Hereunto Scipio made answer, that it was no ambitious desire of ruling in Sicily and in Spain which had moved the Romans to enter into this or the former war; but that the defence of the Mamertines, and afterwards of the Saguntines, their confederates, had caused them to put on those arms, which the gods by the final issue of the wars had approved, and would approve to be most just. As for the mutability of fortune, he said, that he was not thereof ignorant; and that without any note of insolence or overweening he might well refuse the conditions offered. For was it not plain, that all these countries, with which the Carthaginians now so willingly departed, were already won from them by the Romans? " If," said he, " these conditions had been propounded whilst as yet ye " detained some part of Italy, they might peradventure not " have been rejected. But as the case now stands, I see no " reason why I should remit unto you any one piece of " those my former demands, to which the Carthaginians " have yielded already, and thought me to deal graciously

" in being so moderate. Rather, I say, that the injuries, " which they have done me since, have made them un- " worthy of obtaining peace upon so friendly terms. But I " cannot blame thee, Hannibal, though thou wouldest be " glad to make thy citizens understand from how much of " their burden they are by thy means eased. Only thou " must think, that in like sort it concerns me in honour, not " to let them be gainers or savers by the wrongs which they " have done of late. Thou knowest well, that, besides those " offers which thou here hast made, they were well con- " tented to restore unto us ransom-free all prisoners that " they have of ours; to pay us five thousand talents, to " deliver up their galleys, and to deliver hostages for assur- " ance of fair dealing. And must they now be discharged " of all this, by their breach of truce, their spoiling of our " fleet, and their violating our ambassadors? Not so. But " if they can be contented, besides all this, to make such " amends as I shall require for these injuries newly done, " then will I take advice with my council what answer to " give you; otherwise you may even prepare for war, and " blame your own selves for that I have denied you peace."

Hereupon they brake off, and returned each to his own camp, with no other news than war, bidding their soldiers prepare for a battle, wherein should be decided the quarrel between Rome and Carthage. The next morning at break of day they issued into the field; a notable match, and such as hath very seldom been found, whether we regard the generals, their armies, the two cities that contended, or the great importance of the battle at hand. Scipio ordered his men after the Roman manner; placing first the Hastati, divided into their maniples, or small battalions, with a reasonable distance between them; not far behind these followed the Principes, likewise divided; and so after them the Triarii. But herein Scipio altered a little the ordinary custom of the Romans; he placed not the maniples of his Principes opposite unto the void spaces between the Hastati, that so the Hastati, as was usual, might fall back between the Principes; but he placed them directly one behind an-

other, as it were in file. This he did, because of the elephants, whereof Hannibal had many. For of those beasts the danger was less whilst there was open way to let them through. Therefore he took such order, that when they had passed through the spaces between the first battalions, they should not come upon the Principes in front. Unto his velites, or those of the light armature, that were to begin the fight, he gave direction, that when they found themselves overcharged either by the enemies or (which was most to be feared) by the elephants, they should run back through those lanes that were between the maniples; and that those which were swiftest, or otherwise best able, should continue on their flight until they were got behind all their own army, thereby leaving room enough unto those that were wounded, or cast behind, to save themselves on the void ground that was betwixt the first and second, or the second and third battles, without cloying up the way between the maniples, which he desired to keep open. His Italian horse he placed in the left wing under C. Lælius. In the right wing was Masinissa with his Numidians. He himself, riding up and down, exhorted his men to do valiantly; using words not many, but very forcible. He bade them remember what they had achieved since their coming into Afric. He told them, that, if this day were theirs, the war was at an end; and that their victory in this war should make them lords of all the world; for that afterwards none would be found able to resist them. On the contrary, if they were beaten, he asked them whither they would fly. They were far from home, yea and far from their own standing camp; neither was there any place in Afric that would give them shelter; if they fell into the Carthaginians' hands, they knew what to expect: and therefore there was none other way, but death or victory, unless they would live like wretched slaves under most merciless enemies. In such necessity, he said that they which consider themselves to be, and take resolution answerable thereunto, have never been known to fail of getting victory.

Hannibal, on the other side, placed his elephants, that were more than fourscore, in front of his battle. Next behind these he made his vanguard, all of mercenaries, Ligurians, Gauls, Baleares, and Moors. Then followed his battle; which was of Carthaginians and Africans, more interested in the quarrel than were those mercenaries, though not so good soldiers; but to help (if it might be) their want of courage, they had with them four thousand Macedonians, lately sent from king Philip. More than the space of a furlong behind these came his rearward, consisting of those brave soldiers which had served him in his Italian wars, and were the only men in whom he reposed any confidence. Opposite to Lælius, in his own right wing, he bestowed the Carthaginian horse. Tychæus and the Numidians he placed in his left wing against Masinissa. He was indeed far too weak for the enemy in horse, both in number and in goodness. For Tychæus and Mezetullus had no more than three thousand; and those not so well exercised as were the four thousand of Masinissa. The Carthaginians also were no more, nor none other, than such as could be levied in the haste of a few days; and the remainder of those that had of late been often vanquished, and accustomed to fly. But it was no time for Hannibal, neither had he perhaps authority, to make these his companions alight and serve on foot, setting better men in their saddles. All that he could have done, was to stay a little longer, and expect more help. Had Vermina the son of Syphax come thither, as he did in few days after, with sixteen thousand and upwards, the most of them horse, the advantage of number might have served well to supply all other defect. Yet since the lords of Carthage would brook no delay, Hannibal must be fain to comfort himself with the hope that he reposed in his old Italian soldiers, whose virtue had wrought greater wonders when it was more strongly opposed. He encouraged therefore his men with words agreeable to their several conditions, promising unto the mercenaries bountiful rewards; threatening the Carthaginians with inevitable servitude, if they lost that day; but espe-

cially animating his old fellow-soldiers by the many victories which they had obtained against far greater numbers. He bade them to look upon the enemies, and make an estimate, whether they were any thing like so many as that huge army which they had slaughtered at Cannæ. He willed them to remember, that it was one P. Scipio, even the father of this man, whom they had first of all compelled to run away. He told them, that these legions, which they yonder beheld, were, for the most part of them, the very worst of the Roman soldiers; even such, as for their dastardly flight out of sundry battles, could no longer be trusted to bear arms in their own country. As for the rest, they were young men, the sons of cowards, and bred up in the continual fear of those weapons by which their fathers were daily slain or chased. Wherefore he entreated these his old companions, upon whose virtue he meant wholly to repose himself, that they would this day strive to make good their honour, and to purchase the fame of men invincible.

Such exhortations used the two generals before the fight. When they drew near together, the Numidian horsemen on both sides began to skirmish: the trumpets and other instruments of war sounded to battle; and Hannibal commanded his elephants to break upon the Romans. Of these elephants, (as they were always an uncertain kind of help,) those that stood near unto the point of the left wing turned back for fear, and ran upon their own Numidian horse, which they affrighted and disordered. Masinissa, espying this, gave charge upon the same Numidians; and, not suffering them to rally themselves, drave them quite out of the field. The rest of those beasts made a great spoil of the Roman velites, whom they followed into the spaces between the maniples; but without any harm to the battalions themselves; which gave them open way, accordingly as Scipio had well provided. Divers of them receiving many wounds, and growing therewith furious, could no longer be governed; but ran back upon the right point of their own battle, and beyond that into the open field. Herewithal

they disordered the Carthaginian horse which were in that wing; against whom they gave to Lælius the same advantage that Masinissa had against the Numidians, which he used in like sort. In the mean while, the battles of foot advanced, and drew near together with a slow and stately pace, till they were almost within a weapon's cast; at what time they gave a shout, and ran one at the other. The mercenaries for a time seemed both in audacity and in quickness to have the better of the Romans, wounding many, and doing more harm than they took. But the Roman discipline after a while prevailed against the boisterous violence of these untrained barbarians. Whereunto it helped not a little, that the battle of the Principes, following somewhat near after the Hastati, encouraged their fellows, and shewed themselves ready, if need were, to relieve them: contrariwise, the mercenaries received no manner of help or comfort from those that should have seconded them. For the new levied Carthaginians and Africans, when they saw their hired soldiers give back, did also themselves retire. This caused the Ligurians, Gauls, and the rest to think themselves betrayed; whereupon they inclined unto flight. The Carthaginian battle was herewith more terrified than before; so as it refused to give way unto the mercenaries for their safe retreat, and yet withal forbore to make head against the enemies that pursued them. It was no time to ask them what they meant by this; fear and indignation caused those that were at once chased by the Romans, and betrayed as they thought by their own fellows, to turn their arms with an heedless fury against both the one and the other. Thus were many of the Carthaginians beaten down and slain, through their own indiscretion, by their own mercenaries. The Roman Hastati in like sort, fighting with desperate men in a throng, had their hands so full of work, that the Principes were fain to come up unto them, and help to overbear this great medley of enemies, that were together by the ears among themselves. In this place was made a great slaughter both of the mercenaries and of the

Carthaginians; which, hindering one another, could neither fight nor easily fly. Such of them as escaped ran towards Hannibal, who kept his ground, and would not stir one foot to help or save these runaways. He caused his men to bend their pikes at those of his own side that would have rushed upon him, whom he thereby compelled to turn aside beyond his battle, and save themselves in the open field. The ground, over which the Romans were now to march, ere they could meet with Hannibal, was covered with such thick heaps of dead bodies and weapons, and so slippery with blood, that Scipio began to stand in great doubt, lest the orders of his battalions should be dissolved in passing that way. In such case, if he should fight with that warlike army which he saw before him, remaining yet entire, and without fear expecting him, he might be well assured to receive a notable overthrow. He caused therefore the Hastati to make a stand there where they were, opposite unto the main battle of the Hannibalians. Then drawing up his Principes and Triarii, he placed them, when they had overcome the bad way, all in one front with the Hastati, and made of them his two cornets. This done, he advanced towards Hannibal, who entertained him after another manner than ever he had been received in his life before. All the day's work till now seemed to have been only a matter of pastime, in regard of the sharp conflict that was maintained between these notable soldiers. The Romans were encouraged by their having prevailed all the day before; they were also far the more in number. But these old soldiers of Hannibal were fresh, and (perhaps) the better men. They fought with such obstinate resolution, that no man gave back one foot, but rather chose to die upon the ground whereon he stood. So that, after a long time it was uncertain which part had the worse, unless it may seem that the Romans were beginning to shrink; forasmuch as the return of [x] Masinissa and Lælius from pursuit of the enemies' horse is said to have been most happy,

[x] Excerpt e Polyb. l. 15.

and in a needful time. These upon the sudden charged the Hannibalians in rear, and, overbearing them by mere violence, compelled them to fall to rout.

In this battle there died of the Romans fifteen hundred and upwards; on the Carthaginian side about twenty thousand, besides as many that were taken; of whom Sopater, captain of the Macedonians, was one. The singular skill that Hannibal shewed in this his last fight is highly commended by Polybius; and was acknowleged, as Livy reports, by Scipio himself. But the enemies were too strong for him in horse; and being enjoined, as he was by the state of Carthage, to take battle with such disadvantage, he could work no marvels. He saved himself with a few horse, and stayed not in his journey till he came to Adrumetum. Thence was he sent for to Carthage; from which he had been absent six and thirty years. At his coming into the senate, he said plainly, that there was none other way left than to take such peace as could be gotten. Wherefore the Carthaginians, not knowing what other course to take, resolve to send ambassadors again, and try the favour of Scipio, whose arms they could not now resist.

Scipio, having spoiled the enemies' camp, returned back to Utica; where he found P. Lentulus newly arrived, with fifty galleys and an hundred ships of burden. With this fleet, and that which he had before, he thought it best to make towards Carthage, rather of purpose to terrify the city, than with any hope to take it. His legions he committed unto Cn. Octavius, whom he willed to meet him there by land. Then sending Lælius away to Rome with news of the victory, he set sail from Utica towards Carthage. He was encountered on the way by ten ambassadors from the city, who, bearing up with the admiral galley, began to use the pitiful gesture of suppliants. But they received none other answer, than that they should meet him at Tunis, where he would give them audience. So rowing along before the city, and viewing it more in bravery than with meaning to attempt it, he returned back to Utica, and called back Octavius thither, with whom in person he set forwards

to Tunis. As they were in their journey thither, they heard the news that Vermina, the son of Syphax, was coming with an army of more horse than foot to the succour of those that were already vanquished. This Vermina seems to have been both careless of getting intelligence how things passed, and very defective in all other duties requisite in the commander of an army. Part of the Roman foot, with all their power of horse, was sent against him; which did not only beat him, but so compass him in, that he hardly escaped himself with a few; leaving fifteen thousand of his followers dead behind him, and twelve hundred taken prisoners. If this good company had been with Hannibal at Nargara, they should have been far better conducted, and might well have changed the fortune of the day; which the Carthaginians lost by default of horse: but God had otherwise determined. It is not to be doubted that this victory, though it were no great access unto the former, yet served well to daunt the Carthaginians, and imprint in them the greater fear of Scipio. When he came to Tunis, there met him thirty ambassadors from Carthage; whose behaviour, though it was more pitiful than it had been before, yet procured it less commiseration, by reason of their late false dealing after they had in like sort humbled themselves. Nevertheless, it was considered what a long and laborious work it would prove to besiege the mighty city of Carthage: and particularly Scipio stood in great doubt, lest the honour of this war, if it were protracted, should be taken out of his hands, and given to one of the consuls. Cn. Servilius Cæpio, that consul who had charge of the war against Hannibal at such time as he departed out of Italy, was bold to pass over into the isle of Sicily, (as it were in chase of Hannibal, by him terrified and driven away,) with a purpose thence to have proceeded into Afric, and taken from Scipio the command of the army there. But a dictator was chosen of purpose to restrain the ambition of this consul Servilius. After him followed Tiberius Claudius, who made suit for the same province of Afric; and was therein so earnest, that though neither the senate nor

people would grant him his desire, yet he needs would be going, procuring only leave of the senate, that he, being consul, might join with Scipio, were it with no more than equal authority. But ere he could have his fleet and all things in a readiness for the journey, wherein no man cared to further him, winter came on, and he was only tossed at sea with foul weather, first upon the coast of Hetruria, and afterwards by Sardinia; where his consulship expired, and so he returned home a private man. Then came the joyful news to Rome of the victory obtained against Hannibal, and that the war was now even at an end. Yet was Lentulus the new consul so passionate, in desiring Afric for his province, that he said he would suffer nothing to pass in the senate until he had first his will. Much ado there was about this; and after many contentions, both in the senate and before the people, at last it was ordered, that if peace were granted, it should be granted by Scipio; if the war continued, Scipio should have command therein by land, and the consul at sea. The ambition of these men caused Scipio to give the more favourable answer unto the Carthaginian ambassadors. He willed them to consider what they had deserved; and in regard thereof to think themselves well dealt withal, in that he was contented to leave unto them their liberty and their own laws, without appointing any governor over them, or garrison to hold them in subjection; leaving also unto them their possessions in Afric, such as they were at the beginning of this war. As touching the rest he was at a point, that, before he either granted them peace or truce they should make satisfaction for wrongs which they had done whilst the late treaty was in dependance. Hereunto if they would yield, then required he "that immediately they should deliver up unto the Romans all prisoners, fugitives, and renegadoes that they had of theirs; "likewise all their galleys, excepting ten; and all their elephants; that they should make no war at all thenceforth "out of Afric, neither yet within Afric, without license of "the Romans; that the countries, towns, goods whatsoever, belonging any wise unto Masinissa, or to any of his

" ancestors, which were in their possession, should be all " by them restored unto him; that they should find corn for " the Roman army, and wages for their auxiliaries, during " the time of truce, until the peace were fully concluded; " that they should pay ten thousand talents of silver in the " term of fifty years, by two hundred talents a year; and " that for observance of conditions, they should give an " hundred hostages, such as Scipio would choose, being " none of them under fourteen years of age, nor above " thirty."

With these conditions the ambassadors returned home, and reported them unto the city. They were very unpleasing, and therefore one Gisco stood up to speak against them, and exhorted the people, who gave good attention, that they should not condescend unto such intolerable demands. But Hannibal perceiving this, and noting withal what favourable audience was given to this vain orator, by the unquiet yet unwarlike multitude, was bold to pull him down from his standing by plain force. Hereat all the people murmured, as if their common liberty were too much wronged by such insolence of this presumptuous captain. Which Hannibal perceiving, rose up and spake unto them, saying, that they ought to pardon him, if he had done otherwise than the customs of the city would allow, forasmuch as he had been thence absent ever since he was a boy of nine years old, until he was now a man of five and forty. Having thus excused himself of the disorder, he discoursed unto them concerning the peace, and persuaded them to accept it, as wanting ability to defend themselves, had the demands of the enemy been yet more rigorous. Finally, upon good advice they resolved to yield unto the conditions propounded by Scipio, to whom they payed out of hand five and twenty thousand pound weight of silver, in recompense of damages and injuries by them done to his fleet and ambassadors. Scipio granted them truce for three months, in which time they might negotiate with the state of Rome about confirmation of the league. But herewithal he gave injunction, that they should neither in the mean while send

ambassadors any whither else, nor yet dismiss any ambassadors to them sent, without first making him acquainted what they were, and what their errand was.

At this time Hanno, and they of his faction, were become wise and honourable men, by the miseries whereinto Carthage was fallen through their malicious counsels. Asdrubal, surnamed the Kid, a venerable man, and a great friend of Hanno, was chief of the embassages which they sent to Rome for obtaining peace. They went thither in company of Scipio's ambassadors, who related unto the senate and people these joyful news. About the same time arrived at Rome ambassadors from Philip, king of Macedon; who, together with the Carthaginians, were fain to wait a while for audience, till the election of new consuls, then in hand, was finished, and order taken for the provinces of them and the new pretors. Then were the Macedonian ambassadors called into the senate, who first answering unto some points, wherein the Romans had lately signified unto their king that they found themselves grieved, returned the blame upon those Greeks themselves that had made their complaint at Rome. Then accused they M. Aurelius, who being one of the three ambassadors that had lately been sent from Rome unto king Philip, tarried in Greece behind his fellows, and there levying men, made war upon the king, without any regard at all of the league that was between him and the Romans. Further they desired of the senate, that one Sopater, a Macedonian gentleman, with other of their countrymen, that had lately served Hannibal for pay, and being taken prisoners in Afric were kept in bonds by Scipio, might be released, and delivered unto them. Unto all this, M. Furius, whom Aurelius had sent to Rome for that purpose, made a sharp answer. He said, that the Greeks which were confederate with Rome, endured so many injuries at the hands of Philip, that M. Aurelius was fain to stay behind, to help them as he might, which else were like to be brought under the king's subjection. As for Sopater, he affirmed him to be one of the king's counsel, and very inward with him; one that served not for money, but carried money

with him, and four thousand men, sent from the king to the aid of Hannibal. About these points, when the Macedonian ambassadors could make unto the senate no good answer, they were willed to return, and tell their master, that war he sought, and war he should find, if he proceeded as he had begun: for in two main points he had broken the league that was between him and the Romans; first, in that he had wronged their confederates; and secondly, in that he had aided their enemies against them with men and money.

These quarrels with Philip, that promised to open a way into Greece and the eastern countries, helped well the Carthaginian ambassadors in their solicitation of peace. They appeared a very reverend company when they entered into the senate; and Asdrubal above the rest was much respected, as one whose good offices had kept the Romans from necessity of sending ambassadors to Carthage upon the like errand. He liberally granted, that the justice of the quarrel had been wholly on the Roman's side, saying, that it was the fault of some violent men through which the peace was broken. Yet could he not altogether excuse the city, that had been too vehement in the prosecution of bad counsel. But if Hanno and himself might have had their wills, the Carthaginians, even at the best of their fortune, should have granted the peace which they now desired. Herewithal he commended the moderation of the Romans as no small argument of their valour, by which always they had been victorious. To the same effect spake the rest of the ambassadors, all of them entreating to have the peace ratified, though some with more lamentable words than others, according to the diversity of their style. They had patience enough to endure such reproof of perjury, as they themselves might have laid upon the Romans, if their diligence and fortune had been such as the Romans' was. Among the rest, when one of the senators demanded by what gods they would swear to keep the peace hereafter, Asdrubal made answer, "Even by the same gods that are "so severe unto those that violate their leagues."

Lentulus the consul, interposing the authority of his office, would have hindered the senate from proceeding unto conclusion of peace, for that hereby he was like to lose the honour which he purposed to get by making war in Afric. But the matter was propounded unto the people, in whom rested the sovereign command of Rome, and by them referred wholly unto pleasure of the senate. So it was decreed, that Scipio, with ten delegates sent unto him from Rome of purpose, should make a league with the Carthaginians, upon such conditions as seemed best, which were none other than the same which he had already propounded. For this favour the Carthaginian ambassadors humbly thanked the senate, and craved license that they might visit their countrymen, which were prisoners in Rome; afterwards, that they might ransom and carry home with them some that were their especial friends, of whom they gave in writing almost two hundred names. Whereupon the senate ordained, that two hundred of those prisoners, which the ambassadors would choose, should be sent over into Afric, and be freely restored to liberty by Scipio, when the peace was fully concluded. So they took leave, and returned home in company of the ten delegates that were appointed by the senate to join with Scipio in commission.

At their coming into Afric, the peace was given and accepted, without any controversy or disputation. The prisoners, fugitives, and renegadoes, were delivered up to Scipio, likewise the galleys and the elephants. Scipio took more vengeance upon the renegadoes than upon the fugitives; and upon those of the Romans, than upon the Latins, or other Italians. The Latins he beheaded, the Romans he crucified. About the first payment of their money, the Carthaginians were somewhat troubled; for though perhaps their common treasury could have spared two hundred talents for the present; yet since the pension was annual, and to continue fifty years, it was thought meet to lay the burden upon the citizens. At the collecting of the sum there was piteous lamentation, as if now the Roman yoke had begun to pinch them, so as many, even of the senators,

could not forbear weeping. Contrariwise, Hannibal could not refrain from laughter. For which, when he was checked by Asdrubal Hædus, and told, that it worst of all beseemed him to laugh, since he had been the cause why all others did weep; he answered, "That laughter did not always "proceed from joy, but sometimes from extremity of in- "dignation. Yet," said he, "my laughter is more season- "able, and less absurd than your tears. For ye should have "wept when ye gave up your ships and elephants, and "when ye bound your own hands from the use of arms, "without the good leave of the Romans first obtained. "This miserable condition keeps us under, and holds us in "assured servitude. But of these matters ye had no feel- "ing. Now, when a little money is wrung out of your pri- "vate purses, ye have thereof some sense. God grant that "the time come not hereafter, wherein ye shall acknow- "ledge, that it was the very least part of your misery for "which ye have shed these tears." Thus discoursed Hannibal unto those, who, tasting the bitter fruits of their own malicious counsel, repented when it was too late; and instead of cursing their own disorders, which had bred this grievous disease, accused that physician whose noble endeavours had been employed in procuring the remedy.

Scipio, being to take leave of Afric, produced Masinissa, and magnified him, in presence of the army, with high commendations, not undeservedly. To him also he consigned over those towns of king Syphax, which the Romans at that present held, wherein, to say truth, he gave him but his due, and that which otherwise he knew not well how to bestow. But the love of the Romans, and friendship of Scipio, was fully answerable, now and hereafter, to all the deservings of this Numidian king. About Carthage there rested no more to be done. Wherefore the Romans embarked themselves for Sicily; where, when they arrived at Lilybæum, Scipio, with some part of his army, took his way home to Rome by land, and sent the rest before him thither by sea. His journey through Italy was no less glorious than any triumph, all the people thronging out of the

towns and villages to do him honour as he passed along. He entered the city in triumph; neither was there ever before or after any triumph celebrated with so great joy of the people as was this of Scipio; though, in bravery of the pomp, there were others in time shortly following that exceeded this. Whether Syphax were carried through the city in this triumph, and died soon after in prison; or whether he were dead a while before, it cannot be affirmed. Thus much may be avowed, that it was a barbarous custom of the Romans to insult over the calamities of mighty princes, by leading them contumeliously in triumph, yea, though they were such as had always made fair and courteous war. But hereof we shall have better example, ere the same age pass. It was neither the person of Syphax, nor any other glory of the spectacle, that so much beautified the triumph of Scipio, as did the contemplation of that grievous war past, whereof the Romans had been in a manner without hope that ever they should set Italy free[y]. This made them look cheerfully upon the author of so great a conversion, and filled them with more joy than they well could moderate. Wherefore they gave to Scipio the title of *the African*, styling him by the name of that province which he had subdued. This honourable kind of surname, taken from a conquered province, grew afterwards more common, and was usurped by men of less desert; especially by many of the Cæsars, who sometimes arrogated unto themselves the title of countries wherein they had performed little or nothing, as if such glorious attributes could have made them like in virtue unto Scipio the African.

[y] Excerpt. è Polyb. l. 16.



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